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GAUTAMA'S

NYĀYASŪTRAS

[With Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya]

Translated into English with his own Revised Notes

BY

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PREFACE

Not being learned in the 'Science' or 'Art' of 'Chronology, I secured in 1920 a contribution on that subject from my colleague, Pandit Gopinatha Kaviraj, which is reproduced here as the 'Introduction'; and I am thankful to him for having thus removed a serious defect from my work. It remains for me only to indicate in brief the materials that I made use of in preparing this translation. For the Bhāṣya I relied mainly upon my own Edition published in the 'Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series' along with a commentary of my own. In the case of the former I was helped by the following manuscripts:—

I. Palm-leaf, styled in the notes as 'Puri Ms. B' which contains the Bhāṣya from 1-2-4 to the end.

II. Palm-leaf, styled as 'Puri Ms. A', containing the Bhāsya from the beginning to 3-2-42.

III. A palm-leaf Ms. of the Sūtra only.

These three were kindly lent to me by the revered Śankarācārya of Govardhanamaṭha, Puri.

IV. A palm-leaf Ms. of the Bhāsya, Adhyāya V only—styled 'C'.

V. A palm-leaf Ms. of the Bhāsya, Adhyāya V only—styled 'D'.

VI. Paper Ms. of the Sūtra only belonging to Jagadiśa Mishra.

VII. Paper Ms. of Sūtra only belonging to Babu Govindadāsa.

Every one of these manuscripts was found to be quite correct, specially the first two, which proved of incalculable help in fixing the text of the Bhāṣya in several places.

For the *Tātparya* I have used the edition in the 'Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series'.

For the *Parishuddhi*, I have had to rely upon a manuscript secured for me several years ago from Madras, by my friend Babu Govindadāsa.

Of the *Bhāṣyacandra*, I had a single manuscript, obtained from Babu Govindadāsa's valuable collection.

In addition to these I have also used, for my notes, (*a*) the *Bodhasiddhi*, also called *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*, of Udayana, and the *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha* of Vardhamāna;—manuscripts of both of them having been secured for me by Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Vindhyeshwari Prasad Dube of the Sanskrit College Library.

When the translation was first published in *Indian Thought* it was accompanied by a complete translation of the *Nyāya vārtika* also. The publishers of this revised Edition however have decided to omit the *Vārtika*, in order to make the work handier and more within the means of the Sanskrit Scholar whose circumstances are seldom affluent.

With this brief preface I lay this Edition also at the feet of those to whom I owe all I am and all I have—

पित्रोस्तीर्थलता—तीर्थनाथयोरिदमर्पितम् ।
भ्रातुः श्रीविन्ध्यनाथस्य प्रभोर्लक्ष्मीश्वरस्य च ॥

ALLAHABAD

February, 11, 1939. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ.

INTRODUCTION

I.—PRELIMINARY

The Works, of which an English translation has been offered for the first time in the following pages, consist of (*a*) Nyāya-sūtras by Gotama, (*b*) Nyāya-bhāsya by Vātsyāyana and (*c*) Nyāya-Vārtika by Uddyotakara. Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyatīkā, Udayana's Tātparyapariśuddhi and Raghūttama's Bhāṣyacandra, have been utilised only in so far as they have been deemed useful for illuminating the more obscure points in the Sūtras or in their Commentaries.

The history of Nyāya remains still to be written, and it is not known with certainty how and when this system came to be associated with Vaiśeṣika. In the Nyāyabhāṣya, and naturally in all subsequent works based upon it, we find the two systems generally mixed up. The Vaiśesika categories are everywhere tacitly assumed in Nyāya, and, though on certain points, metaphysical (*e. g.* 'pīlupāka' *versus* 'piṭharapāka') and epistemological (*e. g.* recognition of the number of pramāṇas, *viz.* four in Nyāya and two in Vaiśeṣika), the two schools diverge from each other, their general harmony is still very remarkable and would seem to be fundamental.* In the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to discriminate the two systems with any degree of accuracy, except by characterising one as mainly logical and methodological and the other as metaphysical. And besides this there are other factors to be counted. There have been theological influences at work in the elaboration of the ideas of each school. The allied Jain and Buddhist thought of the age must also have had some effect on the system as a whole. The age in which the early Nyāya literature was written was an age of polemics, and until the history of contemporary thought, especially what is revealed in the oldest Buddhist and Jain literature, comes to be written, all speculations regarding the fundamental character of this literature are bound to be more or less unsuccessful. Then again, there is the almost

* Cf. in this connection Dr. D. Faddegon's "The Vaiceṣika System," p. 48-49.

insurmountable difficulty of determining, in the case of the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya, whether the whole work proceeded from one author or consists of parts ascribable to different authors belonging to different times. The subject is complicated, and a study of the Bhāṣya and of the Vārtika is calculated to be very helpful in this direction.

II.—THE NYĀYA SŪTRAS AND VĀTSYĀYANA BHĀṢHYA.

(1) Opinions of Scholars.

(i) *On Nyāya Sūtras.*

The Nyāya system of philosophy, like every other Indian system, is based upon a body of aphoristic sayings, called 'Sūtras' which are ascribed by tradition to one Akṣapāda (called in Chinese *soc-mock*, lit. 'foot-eye'), more popularly known as Gotama or Gautama. Who this Gotama was and in what time and country he flourished are questions to which no satisfactory answer can be given. Scholars have, of course, attempted to offer an answer, but all in different ways.

(*a*) Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda Śāstrī (J. A. S. B., 1905, pp. 177-180) tries to show, on Chinese evidence, that Akṣapāda, the 'founder' of Nyāya, was a pre-Buddhistic teacher, but he adds that the Sūtras as we have them are comparatively modern, being probably post-Mahāyānic in age. He places them in the 2nd Century A. D.

(*b*) Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satis Candra Vidyābhuṣaṇa (Introduction to "The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama", S. B. H, pp. v-viii; Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 161-162) believes that the author of the Nyāya Sūtras, who was identical with the author of Gautama Dharma Sūtras and of the Pitrimedha Sūtras and was an inhabitant of Mithila, lived in the 6th Century B. C. and was a contemporary of Buddha. He was the author of the *first* chapter of the work, the later chapters being subsequent additions.

(*c*) Professor Jacobi (J. A. O. S, XXXI, 1911, pp. 2, 13) says that the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya are later than the origin of Śūnya Vāda (*i. e.*, end of 2nd Century A. D.) and earlier than that of

Vijñānavāda (*i. e.*, end of 5th Century A. D.), and that the interval between the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya need not be supposed to have been more than a generation. He assumes, it seems, that the whole Bhāṣya is one uniform work (*Cf.* Ibid, p. 6).

(*d*) Professor Stcherbatskoi ('Epistemology and Logic as taught by the later Buddhists,' as summed up in J. A. O. S., 1911 pp. 4-5), on the contrary, sees in the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya marks of acquaintance with Buddhist Idealism, whence he declares them both to be posterior to 500 A. D. This view has been refuted by Jacobi.

(*e*) Bodas (Introduction to Tarkasaṅgraha, B. S. S, pp. XXX–XXXII) says that the work of Kaṇāda, as we possess it, cannot be anterior to 400 B. C. and posterior to 500 A. D., which is the date of Vātsyāyana. Vātsyāyana under Ny. Sūt. 2-2-36, refers to Vaiś. Sūt. 3-1-16. The Sūtras of Gotama are older than those of Kaṇāda. He says definitely that Gotama's text belongs to 400 B. C. on the ground that Śabar Svāmi (Bib. Ed., p 10) quotes from Upavarsa a passage showing that Upavarṣa was familiar with Gotama's system If this Upavarṣa be identical with the minister of Nanda there is no inconsistency in placing Gotama in the 4th Century B. C. or a little earlier.

(*f*) Professor Suali (Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia Indiana, p. 14) accepts in the main Jacobi's conclusion but remarks that though the time of Vātsyāyana may be accepted as right, that of Gotama is doubtful. One generation is too short an interval to be placed between the Bhāṣya and the Sūtras. He would suggest an interval of 100 years, if not more, thus referring the Sūtras to about 300 or 350 A.D.

(*g*) Professor Garbe (Die Sānkhya Philosopie, p. 33) considers Nyāya to be the latest of the six orthodox systems and says that no trace of it is to be found before the Christian Era. He states no grounds for his conclusion, but he notes that the Nyāyadarśana as such was known to Pañchaśikha whom he believes to have been a contemporary of Śabara, living sometime between 100 and 300 A. D.

(*ii*) *On Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.*

Regarding the Bhāṣya too there is a wide diversity of views.

(*a*) First of all we may refer to the theory of Dr. Windisch who, in his excellent pamphlet 'Uber Das Nyāya Bhāṣya,' pp. 14-15, has sought to prove that the Nyāyabhāṣya must be ascribed to the same period in which the Mahābhāṣya was written, *i. e.*, about 200 B. C. He shows by means of illustrations that both the works are more or less similar in structure and style and that both contain a number of pregnant sentences which are of the same type. In the case of Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn has established this satisfactorily (*Cf.* his booklet 'Kātyāyana and Patañjali'). These sūtra-like short sentences never end in इति and must be the work of a predecessor. It is interesting to find that the explanations of these generally end in इति। These explanations, in the case of the Nyāyabhāsya, usually end in वचनीयम् or वाच्यम्, resembling the वक्तव्यम् of the Mahābhāshya which Kielhorn showed as belonging to the explanation-part and not to the Vārtika itself. The sūtra-like sentences would in course of time (as their origin was forgotten) come to be regarded doubtfully as Sūtra or Bhāṣya. This has been, we know, really the case.

(*b*) Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (Introduction, p. X) places Vātsyāyana, whom he makes a native of Southern India, about the middle of the 5th Century A. D. or (Bhandarkar Volume, p. 163 : Ind. Ant., 1915) about 400 A. D. The whole work is evidently by one author. The Nyāya Sūtras 4-1-39, 4-1-48, 2-1-1-19, 4-2-32 2-1-37 and 4-2-26, 3-2-11 are interpolations from Mādhyamika Sūtra and Lankāvatāra Sūtra, which somehow crept into the text before or during the age of Vātsyāyana.

(*c*) Mm. H. P. Śāstri (J. A. S. B , 1905, p. 178) makes Vātsyāyana post-Mahāyānic, *i. e.*, a successor of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

(*d*) Stcherbatskoi's view (*loc. cit.*) is that Vātsyāyana lived long after 500 A.D. Both the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya are supposed to contain references to Vijñāna-Vāda and must be posterior to the date of its origin in the 5th Century.

5 (*e*) Jacobi (*loc. cit.*) places Vātsyāyana about the beginning of the 6th Century or earlier. He accepts Windisch's Vārtika

theory and allows an interval of about a generation between the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya.

(*f*) Suali (*loc. cit.*) accepts Jacobi's date for Vātsyāyana, as already noted.

(*g*) Bodas (Introduction, p. XLI) assigns Vātsyāyana to the end of 500 A.D. on the ground that "he preceded the well-known Buddhist teacher, Diṅnāga, who is said to have lived in the early part of the 6th Century."

(2) Review and Remarks.

We have attempted to give above the views of some of the best authorities on the chronology of the Nyāya Sūtras and Vātsyāyana's Commentary upon them. The time of the Sūtras is found to range from the pre-Buddhistic or Buddhistic age to about 600 A. D. So about Vātsyāyana the dates assigned vary from 200 B. C. to about 700 A. D. This wild confusion is a sure indication of the fact that we are travelling on insecure ground. And as a matter of fact it is not possible to be quite precise when the premises are so shaky. The Sūtras and the Bhāṣya do not seem to have yet been studied with that minuteness and thoroughness which their nature demands. A critical edition of the Sūtrapāṭha of Nyāya, based upon a collation of all available Mss. of different recensions and of the Sūtras as accepted by the various glosses and commentaries still existing, is the greatest desideratum of the day, and until this is done it is vain to endeavour to determine the *sūtratva* of a particular aphorism. In the translation efforts have been made to determine this, as far as possible. From the very nature of the present work, the translator has had to rely upon the verdict, direct or implied, of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika*, and the *Tātparya*, and also upon Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* ; but help was also derived from two old manuscripts, obtained from two different sources.

The question of Bhāṣya is even more complicated, as Mss. of this work are comparatively very rare. In these circumstances therefore all such theories as have a bearing more or less direct on the character of the text have to be accepted as only tentative. Then again there is the inevitable danger of a tendency to read modern thought into old words. If there be a passage illustrat-

ing an old theory which has died out but which survives in its developed form in a recent but better known *Vāda* it is very likely that we shall understand it as representing the latter. The early history of Indian thought being not known in detail it becomes really very hard at times to identify a particular doctrine.

Professor Stcherbatskoi's theory does not seem to call for any new comments. Jacobi has already treated it at some length and tried to shew that neither the Sūtras nor the Bhāṣya can be proved to contain allusions to Buddhist Idealism, so that they must be earlier than the age of Asanga and Vasubandhu (500 A D.). Vācaspati's interpretation of Sūtras 4, 2, 26, 35 as directed against Vijñānavāda is erroneous. So far it is all right But Jacobi, Vidyābhūsana, H. P. Śāstrī and Suali all find in the Sūtras and Bhāsya traces of Śūnyavāda. This seems to me problematic. That there is a doctrine much allied to the later Buddhist Śūnyavāda need not be gainsaid. But it does not seem to have yet been established that this doctrine is really the same as the so-called Śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna's school. And even if it is there is no necessity to assume *a priori* that the whole work proceeded from one pen and belongs to one, *viz.*, the post-Nāgārjuna period.

(3) *The Age of the Sūtras and the Bhāṣhya*

Assuming that all the Nyāya-sūtras, as we have them to day, are not genuine and that some of them may possibly represent later interpolations,* there is no reason to deny that the general framework of the system is of a much earlier date. There is nothing to contradict Dr. Vidyābhūsaṇa's view that the Sūtras belong to 600 B. C. Mm. Sāstrī's opinion that Akshapāda was pre-Buddhist and was the founder of the school is also acceptable but where is the proof to show that *all* the Sūtras came after the development of the Mahāyānic School and that even some of them were not composed by Aksapāda himself? The suggestion of the Sūtras having passed through several redactions may be accepted in the main, but this does not militate against the antiquity and genuineness of some parts of the work at any rate

* Cf. Faddegon, "The Vaicesika System," pp. 46-47.

The introduction of Yoga in a work on Nyāya is not altogether inexplicable, if we remember that both Yoga and Nyāya (including Vaiśeṣika), as systems of theological philosophy, belonged to the Śaiva School. The very word Iśvara, (as distinguished from 'Puruśottama' of Sāṅkhya which, as Haribhadra points out, was affiliated to Vaiṣṇavism) signifies *Śiva*. Even in later times the Śaiva Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña (800 A. D.) introduced Yoga in his Nyāya tract, *viz*., Nyāya-Sāra. The section on Yoga in Gotama's work (Sūtras 4, 2, 38-48) does not bear on it any special mark of later development. The "peculiar character" referred to by the Śāstrīji is not apparent to me.

It is interesting to observe that the several doctrines which have been introduced in the 1st Lecture of Chapter IV as पूर्वपक्षाः does not refer explicitly either to Śūnya Vāda or to Vijñāna-Vāda. They may well stand for theories so widely current in Buddhistic and post-Buddhistic (but generally pre-Christian) times, and a detailed examination of these in connection with the history of contemporary thought is sure to be highly profitable and enlightening. The Sūtras and the Bhāṣya must be subjected to such an examination before any final opinion regarding their age can be fitly pronounced.

This is not the right place to enter into a discussion of this ind, but we may just note a word or two here briefly in order o suggest that this line of pursuit is likely to yield valuable esults.

(1) First of all, we may refer to the doctrine as stated in ūtra 3-1-52, which states that त्वक् 'touch' is the only sense-organ, he other so-called sense organs being only modifications of it. 'his is a queer, but a very old view, and we find it as early as '00 B. C. in Greece, where Democritus (and later on Aristotle oo) advocated a similar theory. And even in modern Nyāya, hough the unity of sense-organs has been rejected as such, the nportance of त्वक् and its distinctive character have been strong- emphasised. The doctrine of त्वङ्मनोयोग, *i. e.* the view hat relative consciousness is possible only when there is conict between *manas* and *tvak*, is based upon the recognition of

the fact that the function of त्वक् in our mental life is unique.* But the doctrine as mentioned in the Sūtra asserting that त्वक् is the only sense-organ stands by itself. It is unknown to any of the existing systems of philosophy. But we know that it is the old Sāṅkhya theory. Both Ratnaprabhā and Bhāmatī under Ved. Sūt. 2-2-10, attribute it to Sāṅkhya. It does not exist in the Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa and appears to be much older than this author. The date of Iśvarakṛṣṇa is uncertain. Dr. Keith (Sānkhya System, p. 69) places him about 450 A. D. and Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's opinion is very much the same (Med. Logic, p. 83). For reasons into which I cannot enter here I feel inclined to assign a much earlier date to the work. Probably the publication or Māṭhara Vṛtti undertaken by Dr. Belvalkar will help to clear up much confusion on the matter. At any rate it seems probable that the view on त्वक् was very old and Gotama's allusion to it is a probable sign of the antiquity of the Sūtras.

(2) Then we may pass in review the various Vādas discussed in the 4th Chapter, Lecture 1. We should remember that these were all extremist theories एकांताः in connection with the origin and nature of the world.

(i) The first Vāda (4. 1. 14–18) which affirms the origin of things from pre-existing अभाव, is as old as the Upanisads and is found in the Pali literature. It amounts to a denial of what is technically called उपादाननियम।

(ii) The next Vāda known as Īśvaravāda (4. 1. 19-21) declares that the Ultimate *Nimitta* of production is God and not पुरुषकर्म or पुरुषकार† । This ultra-theistic position disavow the efficiency of human will altogether and assigns ever

* It is for this reason that in Suśupti or dreamless sleep, when th *manas* happens to be within the 'puritat' beyond the sphere of त्वक् it enjoy rest and there is abeyance of conscious life altogether. For details see m forthcoming work 'Nyāya Vaiseshika System of Thought' (Part III, Sectic on Psycho-physics, etc.)

† Probably this was a reaction against the extreme Mīmānsā theory (Karma. The theory is as old as Buddha's day. And it is not impossibl though not likely, that the word कारणं in the phrase 'ईश्वरः कारणं' etc. in plies material (उपादान) as well. In that case it would be an allusion to th early Brahmavada. In this connection the reader is referred to the not given in the present translation *in loco*.

product to the direct intervention of a Divine Resolve. The human will is said to be efficient in subordination to actuation from Above. The Ancient Pāli and Prākrit literature is replete with accounts of similar theories. The statement अज्ञो जंतुरनीशोऽयमात्मन: सुखदु:खयो: । ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ॥ (M. Bht. वनपर्व, 33. 28) says plainly that pleasure and pain, *i. e.* the fruits (फल), come directly from God and not from human effort, for the simple reason that man as such is ignorant (अज्ञ) and impotent (अनीश) in regard to his pleasure and pain. The प्रेरक is God Such ईश्वरवाद exists in the Upanisads,* and we may detect it in some shape in the Pāśupata Darśana of Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśanasangraha. This is, of course, slightly distinguished from the Iśvaravāda of which the Śveta† Up† (1. 2) speaks.

(iii) The next Vāda (4 1. 22–24) leads us to a denial of all kinds of *nimittas*. This is evidently an aspect of स्वभाववाद *Cf* Aśvaghosha's Buddhacarita, 9. 52. Here too the freedom of will is repudiated. This doctrine is really the same as अधिच्चसमुप्पत्तिवाद described in the Brahmajālasutta of Dīgha Nikāya. In the Sumangala Vilāsinī (1. 118) Buddhaghośa explains the term as 'springing up without a cause', and in the Udāna (6. 5) it is said to signify negation of origin from a cause, whether intrinsic (स्वत उत्पत्ति:) or extrinsic (परत उत्पत्ति:). This is स्वभाववाद pure and simple, and was an old doctrine, associated, in one of its phases, with the name of Makkhaliputta Gosāla who denied not only freedom of will (पुरिसकारे) but also all forms of causality हेतु or प्रत्यय*. This doctrine is also called अहेतुकवाद and was one of the three views which the Com. on Dhammasangani characterises as incorrigible and hopeless.

(iv) Now the rejection of स्वभाव, own nature or individuality of a thing ends in अभाववाद—a doctrine which is discussed in Sūtras 4. 1. 37-40, This अभाववाद is the preliminary to the historical Śūnyavāda.

(v) This is closely related to the other doctrine, *i. e.* सर्वानित्यतावाद, *viz*, that everything is impermanent. This is the

* Cf. Kaush. Up., 3. 9.

† Samanyaphala Sutta in D. Nik., 2. 20; Uvasagadasa 57.166 (Hoernles 1., p. 97).

logical antecedent of *technical* क्षणिकवाद of subsequent centuries and was an old view. This view is a truism of Buddhist Literature and need not be stated in detail.

(vi) The opposite doctrine, *viz.*, सर्वनित्यतावाद (Sūtras 4. 1. 29–33), was also current very widely in early times. The name शाश्वतवाद used sometimes to be given to an aspect of this doctrine though of course with a slightly different shade of meaning. The सर्वास्तिवाद, *i. e.*, the belief that 'Everything Is', of which the Satkāryavāda of Sāṅkhya was a later modification, was the earliest and most general form of this doctrine. Professor Garbe, in his 'Sānkhya Philosophie', notes that the Sāśvata Vāda as discussed in the Brahmajālasūtta is the Sānkhya view. That Garbe is right would appear from the following declaration in Vyāsabhāṣya (under Yoga Sūt. 11. 15): उभयप्रत्याख्याने (*i. e.*, on denial of उच्छेदवाद and हेतुवाद both) च शाश्वतवादः, इत्येतत् सम्यक्दर्शनम्। And on the other hand we observe that the सर्वनित्यवाद discussion turns on a view which from the very language of its expression we recognise at once to be of the Yogins. *Cf.* Nyāya Bhāsya : अवस्थितस्योपादानस्य धर्ममात्रं निवर्तते धर्ममात्रमुपजायते, स खलु उत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्विषयः। यच्चोपजायते तत् प्रागप्युपजननादस्ति। यच्च निवर्तते तन्निवृत्तमप्यस्तीति (under Nyāya Sūtra 4–1–32).

(vii) सर्वपृथक्त्ववाद (Suts. 4–1–34–36) was also known to the earlier Buddhist literature. This view is intimately connected with पुञ्जवाद and therefore with अवयवावयविवाद in general. The notion that the whole is a mere aggregate of parts and not a distinct entity from them, *i. e.*, that द्रव्य is only a name given to a definite collocation of guṇas, was very old indeed. Away from the Buddhist philosophers it was also partly recognised by Patañjali in his Mahābhāsya (*Cf.* गुणसमवायो द्रव्यम्).

(viii) The संख्यैकान्तवाद is very mysterious. Vātsyāyaṇa's interpretation is not clear. It was a doctrine of number, propounded to account for the origin or nature of things. The word एकान्त implies that it was an extreme view. Could it have any connection with the Vedic notion of छन्दः or with some form of the Pythagorean Theory of Number?

All this is guess-work, but very probable. At all events it is plain that the thesis regarding the late origin of some of the Sūtras, especially those referring to the several doctrines, is not

conclusively demonstrated, though it may be admitted that interpolations *do* exist in the Sūtra and in the Bhāṣya. The similarity of ideas, and even in some cases of stray words, does not necessarily prove, as Pandit Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa rightly remarks in his introduction (P.34) to his excellent Bengali translation of Nyāya Sūtra and Bhāṣya, reference to any particular theory of later years, unless it is clearly stated. We know from a study of Indian philosophy and Literature that certain stereotyped sayings have come down from ancient times, and though these may be found in different works they need not be ascribed to any of them. By way of illustration it may be said that Nyāya Sūtra 4-2-32 reminds one of a similarly-worded saying in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (under Pan. 4-1-1): असत्तु मृगतृष्णावत् गन्धर्वनगरं यथा। आदित्यगतिवत् सच्च वस्त्रान्तर्हितवच्च तत्। Even this verse which is split up into 4 parts and commented on by Patañjali is apparently older than his own time.

What is said of the Sūtras applies to a certain extent to the Bhāsya also. The interval between the two is not known, but it is certain, as Windisch has already established, that the Bhāṣya was not the immediate successor to the Sūtras. There had been a Vārtika of which some fragments exist, not only on the 1st but even on subsequent chapters. *Cf*. the Vārtika : गुणविशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः, तस्यात्मकल्पात् कल्पान्तरानुपपत्तिः under Sūtra 4–1–21. This piece has been explained by Vātsyāyana which practically exhausts the whole Bhāṣya on the Sūtra. Considering this fact a space of 300 or 400 years would not be an unreasonable interval to suppose between the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya. In other words Vātsyāyana may be assigned to the 2nd or 3rd Century B. C.*

This date would not be incompatible with the general style and structure of his language. The peculiar use of certain particles, *viz*., इति, अथ, खलु and more particularly of वै would seem to be an indication of the antiquity of the work. The use of वै in prose, which reminds one of the Brahmans and Pāli texts, is remarkable and almost decides the question.

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* It must be confessed that this view too, like the others contested, is no better than a tentative assumption, but it works better on the whole. Any definite conclusion regarding the date of these works must be put off till the results of researches into the history of Pre-Christian thought of India are available to us.

As to the further question of his identity with Kauṭilya and with the author of Kāmasūtra a negative answer has to be given. There does not seem to be any historical evidence in support of this identity. Kautilya's attitude towards आन्वीक्षिकी and his style of composition are in direct antithesis to the Nyāya Bhāṣya; and as for the Kāmasūtra it is decidedly a later composition. The testimony of lexicographers where these names are put together as synonymous does not go far enough.

III.—NYĀYA-VĀRTIKA.

The date of Uddyotakara, the author of Nyāya Vārtika, is capable of more exact determination. It is beyond doubt that his Nyāya-Vārtika was intended to be a defence of the Bhāṣya against the attacks of the Buddhist philosopher Diṅnāga, whose time is now generally believed to have been the end of the 5th Century A. D. Thus the age of Dinnāga establishes the *terminus a quo* for the date of Uddyotakara, and the *terminus ad quem* is furnished by a reference to his name in Subandhu's Vāsavadattā: न्यायस्थितिमिवोद्योतकरस्वरूपाम् (Hall's Edition, p. 235). Subandhu was unquestionably prior to Bāṇa (705 A. D.) who eulogises on his Vāsavadattā in the Harśacarita (*e. g.* कवीनामगलद्दर्पो नूनं वासवदत्तया), and probably, as Dr. Gray says (Introduction to the Eng. translation of Vāsavadattā, pp. 8-12), he may have lived in the latter part of the 6th Century or beginning of the 7th Century. From these evidences it would follow that Uddyotakarā's literary activities belonged to a period in 600 A. D.

The statement of Vācaspati with reference to the Vārtika (उद्योतकरगवीनामतिजरतीनां समुद्धरणात्) is not however quite intelligible. From what he says it seems that even as late as Vācaspati's day the Vārtika had been an old and antiquated work and apparently fallen into discredit. The expressions समुद्धरणात् and दुस्तरकुनिबन्धपङ्कमग्नानाम् read together imply that the work had been already overloaded with wrong interpretations. All this involves a long interval of time between Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, though the date for Vācaspati as given in his Nyāyasūcīnibandha be understood to refer to Śaka Era (898=976 A. D.), instead of Saṁvat which to me seems the most agreeable assumption. Till Subandhu's day Uddyotkar's work had been in the height of its glory, after which some powerful Buddhist Logicians

directed their polemic attacks against it in defence of Diṅnāga, and overthrew its repuation. Who these Buddhist Logicians were we do not know: Dharmakīrti might have been one of them and there might have been others from the Buddhist Universities *viz.*, Nālandā and Vikramasilā. The Buddhist Logic was in its fullest vigour in those days. But it is certain that in this pretty long interval there arose no eminent scholar* who could come forward and champion the cause of Orthodox Logic—a task which was left for Vācaspati in the 10th Century (or more probably in the 9th Century) to accomplish. The word अतिजरतीनां would therefore imply great antiquity (which though not *very* great would appear as such on account of the neglect of the text) of the Vārtika as well as the unsettled condition to which it was reduced. Udayana informs us that in the work of restoration of Uddyotakara's text Vācaspati was indebted to (his teacher or विद्यागुरु as Vardhamāna says) Trilocana.

Dr. Vidyābhūshaṇa's identification of Vādavidhi and Vādavidhānaṭīkā with Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya and Vinīta Deva's Vādanyāya-Vyākhyā is not more than an assumption. Dharmakīrti was a later writer who did much, it seems, to throw Uddyotakara's work into disgrace. If Dharmakīrti's date be accepted as 635 A. D. (Med. Logic, p. 105)—a date which synchronises with the time of Śrī-Harśa, the patron of Bāṇa, who refers to Subandhu in whose romance, as we have seen, the name of Uddyotakara occurs as the author of a Nyāya treatise—Uddyotakara must be pushed back much earlier. The hypothesis that all these famous writers were contemporaries does not rest on any positive basis.† The two works mentioned in Nyāya-Vārtika cannot yet be determined. Pandit Phaṇi Bhūṣaṇa's suggestion that Vādavidhānaṭīkā might have been a commentary on a work by Subandhu—the Buddhist Naiyāyika who had been one of the main objects of Uddyotakara's assaults—is indeed a happy suggestion‡ but no *definite* conclusion can be arrived at from these uncertain data.

* Udayana refers to this fact उद्योतकरसम्प्रदायो हंसूषां (गवीनां) यौवनं, तत्र कालवशाद् गलितमित्र । *Tat. Pari., P. 9.*

† For Dr. Vidyābhuṣana's arguments see J. R. A. S., July, 1914; Bhandarkar Com. Volume, pp. 163-164.

§ See his Introduction, p. 39.

Uddyotakara was very deeply and widely read in Buddhist philosophy (post-Mahāyānic), and we find everywhere in his work the unmistakable stamp of a learned and eloquent personality. There are several quotations and hidden allusions to Buddhist literature in the Vārtika which are yet untraced, and it will be some time perhaps before any light can be expected to be thrown upon these obscure passages. What for instance was the Sarvābhisamaya Sūtra to which the Vārtika refers (Ben. Ed. p. 339) and from which it has taken an extract? It seems from the language to have been one of the earlier Buddhist Sūtras and was devoted to the exposition of *Pudgalavāda* against *Nairatmyavāda*. May it be identical with the well-known 'Bhārahāra Sūtra' mentioned in Prajñākara Mati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (P. 474) and other Buddhist works? *Cf.* Pouosin's note in J. R. A. S., P. 308.

IV.—TĀTPARYAṬĪKĀ, TĀTPARYA-PARIŚUDDHI AND BHĀṢYA-CANDRA

(a) Tātparyaṭīkā.

Vācaspati's age is too well-known to call for any special notice. But the identification of the era mentioned in his Nyāyasūcīnibandha, *viz.*, 898 (वस्वङ्कवसु) is an open question still; some hold that it stands for Vikrama Saṁvat, while others protest against this view and accept the Śakābda. In the former alternative the year corresponds to 841 A. D. and in the latter to 976 A. D. On grounds which I have stated elsewhere at length I should prefer the former equation and assign Vācaspati to the middle of the 9th Century. He was a voluminous author and extremely learned in all the systems of philosophy (orthodox and heterodox), on each of which he is said to have written commentaries.*

(b) Tātparya-pariśuddhi

Udayana belonged to the latter half of the 10th Century. He himself mentions 906 Śakābda or 984 A. D. (तर्काम्बराङ्क) as the year of the composition of Lakṣaṇāvali. His Tātparyapariśuddhi

* There is no evidence, as far as I know, to support this tradition. Apart from the Buddhist systems even the Vaiśeṣika has been left untouched. Nor does any indication exist in his other commentaries to show that he wrote on Vaiśeṣika or on the Buddhist philosophy. That he was a master of all the systems सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र stands of course uncontested.

is a valuable Commentary on Vācaspati's work. But he was more than anything else, an intense and original thinker, and it is in such works as the Nyāya-Kusumāñjali and Ātmatattvaviveka that we can find his genius at its best. Besides the Pariśuddhi, in which he had to confine himself to the traditional way of interpretation, Udayana wrote also an independent commentary, named बोधसिद्धि or न्यायपरिशिष्ट on the Sūtras of Gotama, which work also has been utilised in the notes on Chapter V. of the present work.

(c) Bhāṣya-candra.

Not very long ago, Babu Govindadāsa of Benares discovered among a heap of manuscripts said to have belonged to the great Vedānta teacher Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a manuscript of an entirely unknown commentary on the Nyāyabhāṣya, by one Raghūttama. This unique find he made over to the translator of the Bhāṣya, who has utilised it in his 'notes'. The manuscript however extends to only the middle of Adhāya III, and as the copy appears to be in the author's own handwriting, there is no hope of securing a complete copy. Such as it is, it has been published for the Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, and Dr. Gaṅgānath Jhā has supplemented the *Candra* by his own gloss, which bears the humble title of '*Khadyota*' and has been published in the same series.

V.—CONCLUSION

The Nyāyabhāṣya and the Nyāya-Vārtika are extremely difficult works, not only for obscurity of style and relative frequency of elliptical expressions (specially in the former) but also for the comparative obsoleteness of many of the doctrines which have been therein introduced. The neglect into which the books were allowed to fall during the last millennium, more particularly on the advent of Navya-Nyāya in the 13th or 14th Century, helped only in adding to this obscurity. It is a matter of no small congratulation therefore that we have at last an English translation of these abstruse scholia from the mature pen of a veteran and distinguished scholar, and it may be fairly hoped *that the publication of these works, now in their English garb,* will bring on a revival of interest in the study of ancient Nyāya Śāstra of India.

Government Sanskrit Library,
Benares.

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

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WITH

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DISCOURSE I

DAILY LESSON I

Lecture 1

Enunciation of Subjects, Purpose and Connection of the Treatise

Sūtra 1

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Instruments (or Means) of Right Cognition* must be regarded as rightly effective, because it is only when a thing is known by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition that there is a possibility of its giving rise to fruitful and effective exertion. As a matter of fact, nothing can be known except through an Instrument of Cognition; nor can fruitful exertion be aroused, except when things have become known.

As it is only when the agent has cognised a thing by means of an Instrument of Cognition that he desires either to acquire or to get rid of it; and the effort of the agent stimulated by this desire to acquire or get rid of the thing known is what is called 'exertion'; and this exertion is called 'fruitful' when it becomes related to a result.

* This word '*pramāṇa*' is used both in the sense of 'instrument of right cognition' (in which case the right cognition is the direct *fruit*, and ultimate exertion only the indirect fruit), and in that of 'right cognition,' in which case the exertion is the direct *fruit*. In the present context we take the word to mean 'instrument of right cognition' because of what follows in lines 22–25 of p. 2, where the '*pramāṇa*' is distinguished from *pramiti* or Right Cognition.

That is to say, when the person putting forth exertion, on desiring either to acquire or get rid of the thing, comes, by that exertion, actually to acquire or to discard it, his exertion becomes 'fruitful'.

The 'object' or 'thing' (cognised by means of the Instrument of Cognition) is of four kinds: *viz* (1) pleasure, (2) source of pleasure, (3) pain, and (4) source of pain. These objects of the Instruments of Cognition are innumerable owing to the fact of the number of living creatures being infinite. It is only when the Instrument of Right Cognition duly operates with regard to an object, that due success can belong to the 'cogniser', (who then only can have any idea of the object),—to the 'cognised object' (which then only can have its true character known),—and to the 'right cognition' (which then only can lead to the due apprehension of the object); because there is no possibility of the object being accomplished, so long as the most effective cause is not present [and it is the *Instrument* of Cognition which is the most effective cause].*

'Cogniser' (*Pramātr*) means that person who is stimulated to exertion by the desire to acquire or discard the object; that by means of which the person obtains the right cognition of the thing is called the 'Instrument of Right Cognition' (*Pramāna*); that thing which is rightly known is called the 'cognised object' (*Prameya*); and the apprehending or knowledge of the thing is called 'right cognition' (*Pramiti*). It is on all these four factors that the real nature of things is dependent (for its being accepted, or rejected, or treated with indifference).

"Now what is this 'real nature' (of things)?"

It is nothing else but 'being' or 'eixstence' in the case of that which *is* (or exists); and '*non*-being' or 'non-existence' in the case of that which *is not* (does not exist). That is to say, when something that 'is' (or exists) is apprehended as *being* or *existent*—so that it is apprehended as what it really is, and not as something of a contrary nature (*i. e.* as 'non-being')—then that which is thus apprehended constitutes the 'true nature' of the thing. And analogously, when a non-entity is apprehended as such—*i. e.* as what it really is, not as something of a contrary nature,—then

* '*Anyatamārthaḥ sādhakatamārtho draṣṭavyaḥ*'—*Vārtika.*

that which is thus apprehended, constitutes the 'true nature' of the thing (of the non-entity).

"But how is it possible for the latter,—*i. e.*, the non-entity, that which does not exist—to be cognised by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition ? "

This is possible, we reply ; because as a matter of fact, at the time that the existent thing is cognised (by means of the Instrument of Cognition), the non-existent thing is not cognised. That is to say, there is non-cognition of the non-existent, and this shows that it is only by means of the Instrument of Cognition, whereby the *existent* is cognised, that we cognise also the non-existence of the *non-existent.** We illustrate this by reference to a lamp · when the lamp illumines, and renders visible, something that is visible, —that which is not seen in the same manner as that visible thing, is regarded to be *non-existent*; the mental process being as follows : 'if the thing existed it would be seen,—as it is not seen, it must be concluded not to exist' In the same manner, at the time that the existent thing is cognised by means of an Instrument of Cognition, if, at the same time, something else is not equally cognised, the conclusion is that this latter does not exist ; the mental process being as follows : 'if the thing existed, it would be cognised,—as it is not cognised, it must be concluded not to exist.' Thus we find that the same Instrument of Cognition which manifests—makes known—the existent thing, also manifests or makes known, the non-existent thing. The 'Entity', that which exists, is going to be described by means of a comprehensive group of sixteen.

From among (endless) entities (*e.g.*, *Pramāna* etc. and many such other things as the grains of sand etc).

Sūtra 1

It is the knowledge of the real essence (or true character) of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of the Highest Good—(1) The means of Right Cognition : (2) The objects of Right Cognition ; (3) Doubt ; (4) Motive; (5) Example ; (6) Theory ; (7) Factors of Inference ;

* The only difference thus between the *existent* and the *non-existent* is that, while the former forms the object of the Instrument of Cognition *directly*, the latter does so only *indirectly*,—*i. e.* through something that exists.

(8) Cogitation ; (9) Demonstrated Truth ; (10) Discussion ; (11) Disputation; (12) Wrangling; (13) Fallacious Reason; (14) Casuistry; (15) Futile Rejoiner; and (16) Clinchers.

BHĀṢYA

* When expounding the compound in which the above categories are mentioned, each of them should be stated by means of words having the singular, dual or plural form in accordance with the actual number of the category concerned, as described later on The compound is the *Dvandva* of the *copulative* class. The Genitive ending at the end of the compound word '*Pramāṇapramēya.........tattva*' has the force of the '*śeṣa*'† (that is, signified relationship in general); the Genitive ending involved in the compound '*tattvajñāna*' (which is equivalent to '*tattvasya jñānam*'), —as also that involved in the compound '*niśśreyasādhigamah*' (*niśśreyasasya adhigamah*),—has the sense of the *accusative*.

Those enumerated in the Sūtra are the entities or categories for the true knowledge of which the present treatise has been propounded Thus the present *Sūtra* should be taken as stating in brief the purport of the whole treatise ;—this purport being that the Highest Good is attained by the knowledge of the essence of such things as the Soul and the rest ; this same idea is further elaborated in the next Sūtra,—the sense of which is that the Highest Good is attained when one has rightly understood the real nature of—(*a*) that which is fit to be discarded (*e.g. pain*) along with its causes, (*i.e., ignorance and desire, merit and demerit*, as leading to pain), (*b*) that which is absolutely destructive (of pain, *i.e., true knowledge*), (*c*) the means of its destruction (*i.e.*, the scientific treatises), and (*d*) the goal to be attained (*i.e.*, Highest Good), these being the four kinds of objects dealt with (by all philosophical treatises)

An objection is raised :—"The mention of *Doubt* and the rest apart by themselves is superfluous ; because all these, being in-

* The Vārtika makes the sentence '*cārthē dvandvasamāsah*' precede '*nirdeśe yathāvacanam vigrahah*' This also appears to be the natural order, the explanation of the particular form that the *vigraha* is to take can come only after the particular compound has been noted.

† '*Śeṣa*' is a grammatical technical name given to that which does not fall within any of the case-relations denotative of active agency towards an action In the case of the Genitive, when no case-relation is found possible, it has to be taken as expressing mere relationship in general.

cluded either among 'the Means of Cognition' or among 'the Objects of Cognition', cannot be regarded as different from these."

This is true; but for the good of living beings have been provided the four sciences [Vedic, Agricultural, Political and Logico-Metaphysical], of which Logic-Metaphysics form the fourth, also called 'Nyāya', the Science of Reasoning;—each of these sciences deals with a distinct set of subjects, and each has its own distinct method of treatment; and as a matter of fact, Doubt and the rest form the subjects dealt with by the science of Logic-Metaphysics*; consequently, if all these were not distinctly enunciated, it would appear that this science dealt with the Soul only, like the Upaniṣads. It is for this reason (*i.e.*, for the purpose of guarding against this idea) that Doubt and the other categories have been enunciated with a view to indicate clearly the distinctive subjects dealt with by this Science (which thus becomes distinguished from the other Sciences).

[The Author proceeds to show in what manner Doubt and the other categories form integral factors of the Science of Reasoning].

[A] (As regards *Doubt*, the third among the enunciated categories) '*Nyāya*' or 'Reasoning' functions neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to those known definitely for certain; it functions only with regard to things that are *doubtful*; as is declared in the *Sūtra* 1-1-41—'On any matter held in suspense, when the reality of things is ascertained by means of considering the two sides of the question, we have what is called *Demonstrated Truth*';—in this *Sūtra*, 'suspense' stands for *Doubt*; the 'considering of the two sides' consitutes the process of reasoning; and 'the ascertinment of the reality of things,' which is 'Demonstrated Truth', forms 'the knowledge of the real nature of things.' The form in which *Doubt* appears is 'or'—'is the thing this *or* that?:'—it is an uncertain idea that we have of things; and thus (*i. e.*, being an *idea*), though it is an *object of cognition*, and thus already included in the second category (Prameya), it is mentioned separately for reasons indicated

* Thus even though Doubt, etc. may be included under the 'Means' and the 'Objects' of Cognition, it is necessary to enunciate them separately, in order to indicate the several 'subjects' dealt with by the Science.

above [*i.e.*, because it forms a necessary factor, the very basis, of the process of *Reasoning*].

[B] As regards '*Motive*' (the fourth category);—*Motive* is that, on being urged, by which man has recourse to activity, that is to say, it is that, desiring either to obtain or reject which, man has recourse to an action; and as such, this bears upon (or affects) all living beings, all actions and all sciences. and this forms the basis of all reasoning or investigation (Nyāya) [without some motive, or end in view, no reasoning had recourse to]. "What do you mean by this *nyāya* or *reasoning*?" It means the examination of things by means of proofs,* that is to say, Inference based upon Perception and Verbal Cognition is called 'Nyāya' or 'Reasoning'; it is also called '*Anvīkṣā*' ('Investigation') because it consists in the *reviewing* (*anu - īkṣana*) of a thing previously *apprehended* (*īkṣita*) through Perception and Verbal Cognition; the science that proceeds by this 'investigation is '*Ānvīkṣikī*', '*Nyāyavidyā*', '*Nyāyaśāstra*', the 'Science of Reasoning' (Logic) That Inference which is contrary to Perception and Verbal Cognition† is not *true* Reasoning; it is *false Reasoning*

[It has been asserted that '*Motive* bears upon all living beings, all actions and all sciences'; the author now proceeds to show what *motive* there is in the three kinds of *Discussion*, mentioned among the categories] That in regard to this (above-mentioned 'false reasoning') Discussion and Disputation serve distinct purposes is well known [Discussion being carried on for the purpose of getting at the truth, and Disputation for that of vanquishing an opponent]; as regards Wrangling, we proceed to examine whether or not it has or serves any purpose One who has recourse to *wrangling* is called a *wrangler* and when pressed to state what his motive is, if he states his motive, declaring that such is his standpoint and such his theory (for establishing which he has recourse to the wrangling),—then he abandons his character of *wrangler* (a wrangler being one who does not take up any definite position for himself); if, on the other hand, he does not state his motive,

* The *Tātparya* explains that by 'proofs' here are meant the five factors or members of the syllogism.

† The *Tātparya* adds 'Analogy'.

then he becomes open to the charge of being neither an ordinary man of business, nor a serious enquirer;—lastly, if (in order to escape from these contingencies) he declares his motive to consist in the showing of the impossibility or untenability of the position of his opponent (without the establishing of any position of his own),—then too he becomes open to the same contingencies; for instance, when *showing the untenability of the opponent's position*, he has to accept the following four factors—(1) the person *showing* the untenability (*i.e.*, the wrangler himself), (2) the person to whom the untenability is shown, (3) that (reasoning) by means of which he shows the untenability, and (4) that (untenability) which is shown; and in accepting these, he renounces his *wranglership* ([The true *wrangler* being one who does not admit anything].) If, on the other hand, he does not admit these four factors, then his assertion—that his purpose lies in the showing of the untenability of his opponent's position—becomes meaningless. Then again, *Sūtra* 1-2-3 defines Wrangling as *a collection of sentences 'wherein there is no maintaining' (of any definite standpoint)*; now if the wrangler admits what is declared by means of those sentences, then that becomes his *position*, which he has to maintain; if, on the other hand, he does not admit what is meant by the sentences, then, those sentences become absolutely meaningless (for him), and his putting them forward becomes a mere random incoherent babbling, and ceases to be Wrangling.*

[Having proved the presence of some motive in all actions, the author takes up the original subject, and proceeds to show how *Example*, the fifth category, and the rest of the categories enunciated, form integral factors in the Science of Reasoning, and what purposes each of them serves.]

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* The Bhā. only puts forward the arguments *against* there being any motive in Wrangling, it does not show how a motive is present in this form of discussion. This answer has been supplied by the Vārtika, wherein it is shown that the definition of Wrangling does not mean that the wrangler can have no position of his own; all that it means is that in wrangling his *motive* lies, not in the maintaining of any position that he might hold, but simply in showing the untenability of the opponent's position. Hence even though he admits the four factors enumerated above, he does *not* renounce his *wranglership*.

[C] As regards *Example*, the *fifth* category,—it is something that is directly perceived—*i. e.*, which cannot fail to be percieved (or known) by all enquirers—ordinary men and learned (and which needs no proof, which is self-evident); this (*Example*) is, from its very nature, an '*object of cognition*' (and thus included in the *second* category) ; but it has been mentioned separately, because Inference and Verbal Cognition are both dependent upon it; it is only when there is an *Example* (to corroborate the premiss, for instance)—and not otherwise—that there can be a Valid Inference, or Verbal Cognition. It is thus on the basis of an *Example* that all Reasoning proceeds; as in demolishing the Opponent's position, it is necessary to show that it is opposed to (not compatible with) an *Example* (admitted by both parties); and in establishing one's own position also, it becomes necessary to show that it is corroborated by an *Example.* [There is yet another reason why importance has been attached to *Example*; it is through this that the position of the atheistic Bauddha becomes doubly untenable]. If the Atheist admits a corroborative example, he renounces his atheistic (Nihilistic) position [as by Nihilism, all things have merely momentary existence ; and hence it is not possible for the *Example*, which must be in the form of something that existed in the past, to be present at the time that it is put forward]; if, on the other hand, he does not admit an *Example*, on the basis of what could he attack the position of his Opponent ? Further, the enunciation of *Example* among the categories is necessary, because it is only when the *Example* has been described that we can have the definition of the 'Instance corroborative of the inferential premiss' as propounded in *Sūtras* 1. 1. 36 and 37, —'the *Corroborative Instance* is that *example* which possessing the properties of the Probandum, is similar to it' (Sūtra 36), and also it is 'that *Example* which, not possessing the properties of the Probandum, is dissimilar to it' (sūtra 37). [Thus the description of *Example* is found to be a necessary factor in the art of reasoning].

[D] A proposition or statement of fact asserted in the form 'this is so' is called 'Theory' (or Doctrine). This is an 'object of cognition' (hence included under the second category); and

yet it has been enunciated separately by itself, because, it is only when there are a number of different *theories*, and never otherwise, that the three forms of discussion—Discussion, Disputation and Wrangling—become possible.

[E] When a certain conclusion has to be proved, a number of words (sentences) have to be used; and the five sentences that are necessary for the proving of the conclusion are called '*Pratijñā*' (Statement of the Conclusion, Proposition) and the rest; and these five taken collectively are what have been called '*Factors*' (the *seventh* category); all the 'Means of Cognition' (or forms of valid cognition) are found to be present among these 'Factors'; for instance, the 'Statement of the Conclusion' is *verbal*; 'the Statement of the *Probans*' is *inferential*; the 'Statement of the Instance' is *perceptional*; the Statement of the Minor Premiss' is *analogical*; and the 'Reassertion of the Conclusion' consists in the indicating of the capability of all the aforesaid Statements to bear upon the same object or purpose. It is this five-fold declaration that constitutes the highest form of reasoning; [as it is only when thus stated that the Reasoning succeeds in convincing the unbeliever]. It is on the basis of this form of Reasoning again that the three forms of Discussion proceed; they cannot do so without it; and the ascertainment of truth also is dependent on this form of Reasoning. It is for these reasons that though the aforesaid 'Factors of reasoning,' being in the form of words, are included in the second category, 'Object of Cognition', yet they have been mentioned separately.

[F] *Cogitation* is neither included among the four aforesaid 'Means of Cognition'; nor is it a distinct (fifth) 'Means of Cognition'; it however helps the 'Means of Cognition' in that it leads to the ascertainment of their validity or invalidity, and thereby helps in the attaining of true knowledge. As an example of *Cogitation*, we have the following:—There arises a doubt as to whether the birth of man is brought about by a cause that is itself caused,—or by a cause that is uncaused —or it is merely accidental, without any definite cause; and this uncertainty affords an occasion for the functioning of *Cogitation*, based upon the consideration of the possible causes (and their effects); and it proceeds in the following manner:—

'If birth is brought about by a cause that is itself caused, then it is only right that on the disappearance of the cause (which being *caused* is liable to disappearance), there should be cessation of birth;—if birth is brought about by an uncaused cause, then, the disappearance of the *uncaused* entity being impossible, there would be no possibility of any cessation of birth:—if, lastly, it were without a cause, then, as coming into existence without a cause (and as such being *uncaused*, eternal), it could never cease to be; and hence there could be no cause for its cessation; which means that there would be no cessation of birth. The 'Means of Cognition' bearing upon the subject-matter of the above tend to indicate that *birth is due to Karma*; and in this they are helped (have their validity established) by the above *Cogitation*; and thus, inasmuch as *Cogitation* serves the purpose of analysing the objects of true knowledge, it is regarded as helping in the attaining of true knowledge. *Cogitation*, even though included in the second category, 'Object of Cognition.' is yet enunciated separately, because, along with the 'Means of Cognition' it is of use in Discussion, both in establishing (one's own position) and in demolishing (the position of the opponent).

[G] *Demonstrated Truth* constitutes that true knowledge which is the result of the 'Means of Cognition';* it forms the final aim of all Discussion; and Discussion is aided by Disputation and Wrangling. It is the last two categories of *Cogitation* and *Demonstrated Truth* that carry on all the business of the world; and it is for this reason that, though included in the 'object of cognition', *Demontrated Truth* has been enunciated separately.

[H] *Discussion* consists in a number of sentences (or declarations) put forward by various speakers purporting to be reasons in support of several theories, leading ultimately to the acceptance of one of these theories as the 'demonstrated truth'; and it has

* The *Tātparya*. points out that it is the Factors of reasoning that are meant here by 'Means of Cognition'; as it is only in them that we have all the Means of Cognition along with Cogitation. But it adds that in reality Demonstrated Truth is that true knowledge which is led up to by *Cogitation*; and therefore Demonstrated Truth should be regarded as the result of Perception and all the other Means of Cognition, as aided by Cogitation.

been enunciated separately for the purpose of indicating its distinctive features; as it is only when it is carried on in accordance with its distinctive characteristics that it leads to the ascertainment of truth.

[I and J] *Disputation* and *Wrangling* are different forms of Discussion; they are different from Discussion *proper* [inasmuch as Disputation admits of the use of Casuistry etc., which are not allowed in Discussion; and Wrangling does not tend to the *establishing* of any position, which forms the main purpose of Discussion]; and they have been enunciated separately, because they help in the guarding of the *knowledge of truth* once attained (by means of Discussion). [see *Sū*. 4 2. 50]

[K] *Fallacious Reasons* are in reality included among the *Clinchers* (the sixteenth category); but they have been enunciated separately, because from among the 'Clinchers', it is these that can be put forward or indicated in Discussions,—the other 'clinchers' being indicatable only in Disputations and Wranglings

[L, M and N] *Casuistry*, *Futile Rejoinder* and *Clinchers* have been enunciated separately, for the purpose of showing what they are; as it is only when the real character of these has been shown that these can be avoided by one in his own assertions, and urged with force against the assertions of others; and also when an opponent has recourse to Casuistry, it can be easily refuted and also easily made use of [indicated and explained to the Umpire only when its real character is known]*

[Recapitulation of the Introductory Sūtra—Importance of the S'āstra.]

The aforesaid *Science of Reasoning*, dealing as it does with the *Means of Right Cognition* and the other Categories,—

'is the lamp of all Sciences; the Means (of the Knowledge of all things: it is the basis of all activities and as such it has been expounded at the very outset (of all scientific investigation)

As regards the 'knowledge of truth' and 'attainment of highe good' (spoken of in the Sūtra), it must be borne in mind that there is such 'knowledge' and such 'attainment' dealt with in (ar

* Thus then it has been shown that *Doubt* and the other categories, even though included in the first two categories, have been separately enunciated with a view to indicate the *subjects* dealt with in the Science of Reasoning.

pertaining specifically to) each of the four Sciences (or branches of knowledge), in its own peculiar manner. In the Science we are dealing with here the Science of the Soul (Logic-Metaphysics), which forms the 'knowledge of truth', is the knowledge of the Soul and the other objects of cognition; and the 'attainment of highest good' is the obtaining of Release.

Sūtra 2

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—"Does the Highest Good appear immediately after true knowledge'?"

Answer—No; after 'true knowledge.'—

Sūtra 2

There is cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion;—the cessation of that which follows bringing about the annihilation of that which precedes it; and this ultimately leads to the Highest Good.—

BHĀSYA

(A) Of 'Wrong Notion' (mentioned in the *Sūtra* as the first to cease after the attainment of true knowledge), there are various kinds, pertaining as it does to the several objects of cognition, beginning with 'Soul' and ending with 'Highest Good.' (*a*) With reference to the *Soul*, the 'Wrong Notion' is in the form 'there is no such thing as Soul';—(*b*) with regard to the *Not-Soul*, people have 'Wrong Notion' when it is regarded as the 'Soul';—(*c*) when *pain* is regarded as pleasure, we have the 'Wrong Notion' of *pain*; and so on; (*d*) when the *non-eternal* is regarded as eternal, there is 'wrong notion' of *eternal*; (*e*) when *non-safety* is regarded as *safety*, there is 'wrong notion' of *non-safety*; (*f*) when the *fearful* is regarded as *free from fear* there is 'wrong notion' of *fearful*;—(*g*) when the *disgusting* is regarded as *agreeable* there is 'wrong notion' of *Disgusting*;—(*h*) when that which deserves to be *rejected* is regarded as 'worthy of *not being rejected* there is 'wrong notion' of what *should be rejected*; (*i*) when with regard to *activity*, we have such notions as 'there is no such thing as *Karma*, nor any result of *Karma* there is wrong notion' of *activity*'; (*j*) when with regard to *Defects* we have the notion that metempsychosis is not due to 'defects' there

is 'wrong notion' of *defects*;—(*k*) with regard to *Re-Birth* (*i.e.*, Transmigration) we have such *wrong notions* as—'there is no such thing as an animal or a living being, or a being or soul, who could die, or, having died, could be born again,' 'the birth of living beings is without cause,' 'the cessation of birth is without cause.' 'Transmigration has beginning, but no end,' 'even though caused, Transmigration cannot be due to *Karma* it consists only in the disruption (at death) and restoration (at rebirth) of the chain of such things as the body, the sense-organs, the Consciousness and sensation';—(*l*) with regard to *Highest Good* we have such *wrong notions* as 'it is something terrible, involving as it does the cessation of all activity,' 'in the *Highest Good* which consists in dissociation from all things, we lose much that is desirable,' 'how can any sane person have any longing for such *Good*, in which there is neither pleasure nor pain, nor any consciousness at all?'

(B) From the above-described *Wrong Notion* proceeds attachment to the agreeable and aversion for the disagreeable: and under the influence of this attachment and aversion, there appear the *Defects*,—such as envy, jealousy, deceit, avarice and the like

(C) Urged by these *Defects*, when the man acts, he commits such misdeeds as—(*a*) killing, stealing, illicit intercourse, and such other acts pertaining to the body; (*b*) lying, rude talking and incoherent babbling,—these pertaining to speech; (*c*) malice, desire for things belonging to others, and materialism,—these pertaining to the mind. Such misdeeds constitute the Wrong or Sinful Activity which tends to *Adharma* (Vice, Demerit). The right sort of *Activity* consists in the following actions—(*a*) with the body,—charity, protecting and service; (*b*) with speech,-telling the truth, saying what is wholesome and agreeable, studying the Veda; (*c*) with the mind,—compassion, entertaining no desire for the belongings of other people, and faith, this right Activity tends to *Dharma* (Virtue, Merit).

What are meant by 'activity' ('*pravṛtti*') in this connection (in the Sūtra) are the *results* of activity, in the form of Merit and Demerit; just as life being the result of food, we speak of the life or living beings as 'food.'

(D) The 'Activity' described above (in the form of Merit and Demerit) becomes the cause of mean and respectable *birth* (respectively); and *Birth* consists in the collective appearance (in one congregated group) of the Body, the Sense-organs and the Consciousness.

(E) When there is *birth*, there is *Pain*; it is that which is felt as disagreeable, and is also known by such names as '*bādhanā*' (harrassment), *pīḍā* (suffering) and '*tāpa* (affliction.)

The above five categories, beginning with *Wrong Notion* and ending with *Pain*,* when functioning contiguously (without break) constitute Metempsychosis, Transmigration.

When 'true knowledge' is attained, 'wrong notions' disappear; on the disappearance of 'wrong notions' the 'defects' disappear, the disappearance of 'defects' is followed by the disappearance of 'activity' (merit and demerit); when there is no activity there is no 'birth'; on the cessation of birth there is cessation of pain; cessation of pain is followed by Final Release, which is the 'highest good'.'

What is 'true knowledge' is explained by the contrary of the 'wrong notions' indicated above For instance, (*a*) the 'true knowledge', with regard to the *Soul* is in the form 'there is such a thing as Soul;'—(*b*) that with regard to the '*not Soul*,' is in the form 'the not-soul is not the Soul;'—similarly with regard to (*c*) *pain*, (*d*) the *eternal*, (*e*) *safety*, (*f*) the *fearful*, (*g*) the *disgusting*, and (*h*) the *rejectable*, we have 'true knowledge' when each is known in its real character,—(*i*) with regard to *activity* it is in the form 'there is such a thing as *karma*, and it is effective in bringing about results'; (*j*) with regard to *defects*, it is in the form 'Transmigration is due to defects;'—(*k*) with regard to *Rebirth* it is in the form 'there is such a thing as an animal, a living being, a being, a soul, which, having died, is reborn,—birth has a definite cause,—the cessation of birth has a definite cause,—Death-Rebirth is without beginning, but ends in Final Release,—Death-Rebirth, having a cause, is caused by activity (merit and demerit),—Death-birth is connected with the soul and operates through disruption and restoration of the continuous connection of such things as the body, the sense-organs, the consciousness

* The order of these as given in the *Sūtra* has been altered here. See *Vārtika*).

and sensation;'—(*l*) with regard to Final Release, it is in the form 'Final Release' involving dessociation from all things and cessation from all activity, is extremely peaceful,—much that is painful, frightful and sinful disappears on Final Release,—and how can any sane person fail to have a longing for it, being, as it is, free from all pain and, entirely devoid of all consciousness of pain? Final Release must be free not only from *pain*, but from *pleasure* also; because all pleasure is invariably connected with some pain, and as such should be avoided, in the same manner as food mixed with honey and poison is avoided.

Lecture 2

Definition of Pramānas

*The Science of Reasoning proceeds by three processes,—*enunciation*, *definition* and *examination*. *Enunciation* is the mere mention by name of the categories; *Definition* consists in that character or property which serves to differentiate that which has been enunciated; and *Investigation* is the examination, by means of argumentation, of the question as to whether or not the definition is applicable to the thing defined

†In some cases, the *definition* is stated after the thing has

* We have explained in what manner the true knowledge of Pramāna, etc., is related to the Highest Good. After this the following thought might occur to the enquirer :—'Everyone understands what *Pramāna* and the rest mean, and this knowledge would be enough to dispel ignorance and bring Final Release; what then is the necessity of proceeding with this treatise any further ?' It is in anticipation of this feeling that the Bhāsya adds this Introduction; the sense of which is that the mere mention of the categories cannot suffice for true knowledge; for which correct definition and thorough investigation are necessary.

† It having been declared that Sūtra 3 contains the classification of Pramānas, it might be asked why we have this classification before we have been told what Pramāna is; *i.e.*, before Pramāna has been defined. In anticipation of this the Bhāsya proceeds to explain that it is by no means necessary that in every case a regular definition must precede the classification; in some cases we have the definition of a thing after it has been classified; while in others definition precedes classification. As regards this particular Sūtra, it may be noted that while really propounding the classification of Pramāṇas, it also implies the definition of Pramāṇa; inasmuch as the word '*pramānāni*' in the Sūtra serves the purpose of indicating the characteristic features of Pramānas; and *definition* is nothing more than the indication of such features.

been enunciated and classified,—*e.g.*, in the case of '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Prameya*'; while in other cases, the *classification* is mentioned after the thing has been enunciated and defined; *e.g.*, in the case of Perverse Reasoning, we find the classification in *Sūtra* 1–2–11, while the enunciation and definition are given in Sūtra 1–2–10.

In the following *Sūtra* we have the classification (or enumeration) of *Pramānas*, which have been enunciated in Sūtra 1*

Preliminary Survey of the Pramāṇas.

Sūtra 3

Perception, Inference, Analogy and Words are the Pramāṇas

BHĀṢYA

(*A*) *Perception* consists in the operation† of each sense-organ upon a particular object; this 'operation' being in the form either of *contact* or of *cognition*; when it is in the form of *contact* then the 'result' is in the form of *cognition* or *right knowledge*; and when the 'operation' is in the form of *cognition* the 'result' is in the form of the idea of the thing being discarded or elected or treated with indifference (disregarded).‡

(*B*) *Inference* consists in the consequential-cognition, of the object, the *probandum*—possessed of the 'indicative feature,'—obtained through the agency of this indicative feature duly recognised.‡

* This enumeration being a form of 'Enunciation,' the *three-foldness* of the Scientific process is not violated.

† In every cause that property of it which is the immediate precursor of the effect, is called its 'operation'; *e.g.*, when the yarns bring into existence the cloth, the 'operation' consists in the final conjunction of the yarns. In the case in question, when the sense-organs bring about Right Cognition, their 'operation' would be in the form of their contact with the object cognised, and when the result brought about by the sense-organs consists in the idea leading ultimately to the object being rejected etc., then their 'operation' would be in the form of the *cognition* itself, which is the immediate precursor of the said idea.

‡ By the epithet 'duly recognised', all fallacious reasons are excluded. The word 'artha' here stands, not for object in general, but that *object* which forms the *probandum* of the inference, that which forms the predicate of the conclusion, the *Tātparya* explains '*artha*' as '*arthyate sādhyate yat*—that which is intended to be proved by means of the inference'

(*C*) *Analogy** consists in the cognition of approximation; by approximation' here is meant *the presence of common properties, i. e., similarity*; *e. g.*, 'as the cow so is this animal, *gavaya*.'

(*D*) *Word* is that by which the objects are signified, or denoted, or made known.

That the Pramāṇas are *means of cognising things* is indicated by the literal signification of the constituent factors of the name '*pramāna*'; that is to say, the word '*pramāṇa*', consisting as it does of the root '*mā*' with the preposition '*pra*' and the instrumental verbal affix '*lyut*', its literal signification comes to be '*pramīyate anena*', (that by the instrumentality of which things are rightly cognised'; and the names of the particular *pramānas* also are similarly explained.†

Question:—"Have the *Pramānas* their objectives in common? or is the scope of the *Pramānas* restricted within mutually exclusive limits?"

Answer:—As a matter of fact, we find both ways of functioning among *Pramāṇas*. For instance, in the case of Soul we find that—(*a*) it is by means of *Word* that we come to know that the Soul exists;—(*b*) we find *Inference* operating upon it, when it is asserted that 'the indicative marks of the Soul are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and consciousness' (*Sūtra* 1. 1. 10) [which means that it is from the presence of these latter that the existence of the Soul is to be *inferred*];—and (*c*) the Soul is also *perceived* by a peculiar contact of the Soul with the mind, this *Perception* being the result of mystic trance, and as such possible only for the Mystic. [Thus Soul is an object which is operated upon by all the *Pramāṇas*.]—Similarly in the case of fire, we find that—(*a*) when a trustworthy person says 'there is fire at such and such a place', we have the cognition of fire by means of *Word*;—(*b*) drawing nearer to the place, if we happen to see smoke-issuing, we *infer* from this, the existence of fire;—(*c*) actually getting at the place, we directly *see* the fire. On the other hand, in the case of certain things we find that one thing is amenable to only one particular *Pramāṇa*; as for example, that 'the *Agnihotra* should be

* This definition pertains to the *Means* of analogical cognition, and not to analogical *cognition* itself.

† '*Anumāna*'-*anumīyate anena*; '*Upamāna*'—*upamīyate anena*; '*Śabda*'—*śabdyate anena*.

performed by one desiring heaven', we can know only by the *Words* of the Veda; the ordinary man of the world does not know of any indicative features of Heaven (by means of which he could have an *inferential* cognition); nor is he able to *perceive* it directly;—similarly when we hear the sound of thunder, from this, we *infer* the source of the sound; and in regard to this we can have no Perception, nor any Verbal Cognition;—lastly of our own hand we, have a direct *Perception*, and no *Inference* or *Word* is operative in this case.

Among the four kinds of Cognition, *Perception* is the most important; because when a man seeks the knowledge of a certain thing, if he is told of it by a trustworthy person, and thereby he has the *verbal* cognition of the thing, there is still a desire in his mind to ratify his information by means of Inference through particular indicative features; and even after he has been able to get at the inferential knowledge of the thing, he is still desirous of actually *seeing* the thing with his eyes; but when he has once *perceived* the thing directly, his desires are at rest, and he does not seek for any other kind of knowledge*; the examples already cited above (the cases of Soul and Fire) serve to make this point clear; for instance, when the man has to know fire, if several *pramānas* come to bear npon it (as shown above) there is a commingling of the *Pramāṇas* (in which case all longing for knowledge does not cease until the appearance of direct Perception), whereas if there is a single *Pramāna* bearing upon the thing there is no commingling, but separate functioning [and in this case also it is found that it is only Perception that fully satisfies the inquisitive mind.]

[HERE ENDS THE TRISŪTRĪ-BHĀSYA].

Of the Instruments of Right Cognition enumerated above, the author proceeds to supply definitions—

SENSE-PERCEPTION

Sūtra 4

Sense-perception is that cognition—(a) which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ—(b) which

* This shows that while the other Pramāṇas are not sufficient to allay all desire for knowledge, it is Perception alone which is self-sufficient; hence its predominance.

is not expressible (by words)—(c) which is not erroneous,—and (d) which is well-defined.

BHĀṢYA

(*a*) That cognition which is produced by the contact of the Sense-organ with the object cognised is *Sense-perception*.

An objection is raised against this:—"If such is the definition of Sense-perception, then it is not right to hold (as the Logician does) that (in all Perceptions) the Soul is in contact with the Mind, the Mind with the Sense-organ, and the Sense-organ with the cognised Object; [because the *Sūtra* lays down only the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object as the necessary condition of Perception]."

Our answer is that the declaration in this Sūtra is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all the factors that enter into the cause of Sense-preception; it does not mean that what is here mentioned is the only cause of Sense-perception; all that it does is to indicate that factor which pertains to Sense-perception exclusively, and which distinguishes it from all other forms of cognition; and it omits to mention the other factors (*e. g.* the contact of the Soul with the Mind, and so on), not because these agencies are not present in Sense-perception, but because they are common to Inference and other forms of cognition also.

"Even so, it should be necessary to mention the contact of the Mind with the Sense-organ [which is a factor that is present in Sense-perception only, and in no other form of cognition]."

*The *contact of the mind with the sense-organ* is not mentioned

* The *Vārtika* supplies two explanations of this sentence.—(1) The Mind-organ contact is as good a distinctive feature of Perception as the organ-object contact—this is what is meant by '*samānatvāt*'; but the Sūtra does not make it its business to point out all its distinctive features; one is quite enough to differentiate it from all other forms of cognition. The meaning of the sentence would, in this case, be as presented in the translation.

(2) The second explanation is that the Sūtra mentions only the organ-object contact because this forms the distinctive feature of every individual perception; *when one perception differs from another, the difference does not consist in mind-organ contact*; *i. e.* individual perceptions are never spoken of in terms of mind-organ contact. In this latter case it is difficult to explain the word '*samānatvāt*', the explanation given by the *Vārtika* being forced. The *Vārtika* does not pronounce itself in favour of any one of the two interpretations; in the concluding statement it mentions both.

It is remarkable that the *Tātparya* notices the latter interpretation only.

in the *Sūtra* because when Perceptional Cognition is distinguished from other forms of cognition, that contact is as good a distinctive feature of it as the *contact of the sense-organ with the cognised object* [consequently when one has been mentioned, there is no need for the mention of other conditions, as the Sūtra is not meant to contain an exhaustive enumeration of all the distinctive features of Perception].

(*b*) * [Some people have held the view that there is no such perception as is entirely free from verbal representation; this view may be briefly put as follows]:—" As many things there are, *so many also are the names or words* expressive of them; and through these names, the things come to be cognised as identical with, inseparable from, the words; and it is on such cognition that all usage is based; that is to say, every cognition of objects

* "Every object has a name, there is nothing that is devoid of name; this establishes the inseparability of the thing from its name; whenever a thing is cognised it is cognised as bearing its name, the name is not the means by which the object is known; as when the object—cow—is perceived as 'this is cow', there is a distinct co-ordination between the *this* and the *cow*, both of which are in the same case, thus things being inseparable from their names, the perception of things must involve the perception of the name also; hence there can be no perception devoid of verbal expression'

—*Tātparya*.

The translation has followed the interpretation of the *Tātparya*. This interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* however appears to be a little forced, the *Tātparya* found it necessary to have recourse to it, and explain the word '*Śabda*' not as 'verbal' (its ordinary signification), but as 'associated with the word or name', as it could not accept the view that cognition of the thing as bearing a name—*i. e.* the *Savikalpaka* cognition—is not included under 'Sense-perception'. The reader is referred to its remarks in connection with the word '*vyavasāyātmakam*', below.

It appears simpler to take the *Bhāṣya* as meaning that whenever the cognition of a thing 'involves its name, it cannot be regarded as *Sensuous*, being as it is *verbal*;' and it is with a view to exclude such verbal cognition (which includes *Savikalpaka* cognition also) that the Sūtra has added the epithet—'which is not expressible by words'. It has to be admitted however that this explanation would militate against the Logician's accepted view that Sense-perception is of two kinds, *Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka*. It is for this reason that we have adopted in the translation the interpretation of the *Tātparya*, which also appears to have the support of the *Vārtika*, which latter however is not quite explicit on the point.

that is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object is in the form of 'colour,' or 'taste,' and so forth; and all these words—'colour' 'taste' and the rest—are names of objects;—by which names the cognition is expressed in such words as—'such and such a person cognises the thing as colour', 'such and such cognises it as taste', and so on; and that which is thus expressed by means of names, must be inseparable from, always associated with, words; [whence it follows that there is no Sense-cognition that is free from verbal representation.]"

It is in view of the above position that the author has added the qualification that the cognition should be '*not expressible by words.*' In a case where the relation of the object with a word is not known [*i. e.* when we do not know the name of the object that we perceive], the apprehension of the object that there is is certainly never spoken of by means of any name: and when the said relation is known, it is known in the form that 'such is the name of the thing I perceive' (where the two are entirely distinct, and not identical). Even when the fact that 'such is its name' is known, the cognition of the thing itself does not differ from that cognition of it which we have had before when its name was not known; it remains like that.' So long as there is no name or appellation or verbal expression for the cognition of the object, it cannot be comprehended by others, and thereby put to any practical use, because what is not comprehended cannot serve any practical purpose (such, for instance, as being communicated to others, and otherwise made use of). It is for these reasons [i.e. because the thing cognised is something different from its name] that whenever the cognition of things is spoken of by means of names, these names are always accompanied by the word 'as' ('*iti*'),—the form in which the cognition is expressed being 'the thing is cognised *as* colour', 'it is cognised *as* taste', and so forth. For these reasons we conclude that the name is not (necessarily present and) operative at the time that the apprehension of the thing takes place; it becomes operative (and useful) only at the time of its being spoken of, or communicated to other persons. The upshot of all this is that the apprehension of things, produced by the contact of the sense-organ with them, is *not verbal*—*i. e.* it is entirely free from all verbal representation.

* (c) During the summer it often happens that the sun's rays become mixed up with the heat-rays radiated from the earth's surface; and the two together, flickering at a distance, come into contact with the eye of the observer, who apprehends them as water; now if the definition of *Sense-perception* consisted of only two terms—'that which is produced by the sense-object contact' and 'that which is not representable by words',—then the apprehension of water under the above circumstances would have to be regarded as 'Sense-perception'. With a view to guard against this contingency, the author has added the further qualification that the cognition should be *not erroneous*. That cognition is erroneous in which the thing is apprehended as what it is not; while when a thing is perceived as what it is, the Perception is *not erroneous*.

(*d*) When the man observes from a distance, and sees (something rising from the earth), the cognition that he has is in the (doubtful) form—'this is smoke, or this is dust'; inasmuch as this doubtful cognition is also *produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object*, it would have to be regarded as *Sense-perception*, if this were defined simply as 'that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.' With a view to guard against this, the author has added the further qualification that the cognition should be *well-defined*.† It will not be right to

* The qualification '*avyabhicāri*' is necessary in the case of Perception only; as in the case of other forms of knowledge, the *erroneousness* lies in the Perception upon which every one of them is, in one way or the other, based;—says the *Tātparya*.

† The *Tātparya*, anxious to include the *Savikalpapa* Perception under the definition contained in the Sūtra, remarks that doubtful cognition is already excluded by the qualification 'not erroneous', as that cognition also is erroneous; consequently we must take the qualification 'well-defined' as meant to include the *Savikalpaka* cognition; so that the phrase 'not expressible by words' applies to the *Nirvikalpaka* or non-determinate or abstract cognition; and the word 'well-defined' applies to the *Savikalpaka*, determinate or concrete cognition. The *Tātparya* justifies its interpretation by the remark that the *Bhāsya* and *Vārtika* have omitted to make mention of this Determinate Perception because it is too plain to need any explanation; and that it has put forward its interpretation, according to the view taken by Trilocana-Guru. According to the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* the Determinate Cognition would not be Perception, the entire definition being applicable

urge that—"all *doubtful cognition* is produced by the contact of the Soul with the Mind [and *not* by the contact of the sense-organ with the object]; so that the doubtful cognition would be precluded by the first word of the definition; and for the exclusion of such cognition it would not be necessary to have a further qualification";—because as a matter of fact, it is when one sees the object with his eyes [when there is contact of the object with the eye] that he has a doubtful cognition with regard to it [in the form—'this object that *I see* is this smoke or dust];* then again, just as in all cases of Perception, when a man apprehends the object with his sense-organ, he perceives it also with his mind, so also when he has the doubtful cognition of a thing through his sense-organ, he has the same cognition through his mind also [which shows that in such cases the doubtful cognition, though brought about by the mind, is dependent upon a sense-operation]; and it is this latter kind of cognition which is brought about by the mind through the agency of the organ,—and which has this additional qualification [over the doubtful cognition, produced by the mind alone by its contact with the Soul]—which is meant to be referred to here by the name 'doubtful'; and not the former kind of doubtful cognition [mentioned by the opponent, as that which is brought about by the contact of the Soul with the mind independently of the operation of the senses].† Thus then in reality, in all cases of Sense-perception, the Sense-organ of the perceiver is invariably operative; and the operation of the Mind comes in only subsequently, for purposes of the representative cognition (which recalls the third cognition previously got at through the senses); that this is so is proved by the fact that there is no representative cognition for those whose

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to Non-determinate Perception only. It would seem that the Bauddha definition of Perception as *Kalpanāpodham—abhrāntam*—were a true, rendering of Vātsyāyana's view. The Vārtika also, when refuting the Bauddha definition, directs its attack only to the presence of the word '*Kalpanā*'.

* Which shows that *all* doubtful cognitions are not independent of sense-operation; even though there are some that are due to the operation of the Mind alone.

† Thus there being many doubtful cognitions brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object, a further qualification was necessary for the exclusion of these.

Sense-organs have perished. [And just as in the case of representative cognitions which are directly due to the Mind-operation, Sense-operation is necessary, so in the case of doubtful cognitions also, which are due directly to Mind-operations, the operation of the Sense-organ is necessary].

The Opponent raises another objection against the definition :—" It is necessary ", he urges, " to supply a definition of Perception that should be applicable to the* (cognition of) the Soul and (that of) pleasure, &c.; because the cognition of these is not *produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object* ; [and hence the definition given in the *Sūtra* cannot apply to it]".

Our reply is that the *Mind* [by whose contact the cognition of the Soul, Pleasure, &c., is produced] is as good a 'sense-organ' as the Eye, &c., and the reason why the *Mind* is mentioned in the Sūtra, apart from the 'Sense-organs' enumerated (in Sū. 1. 1. 12,) lies in the fact that there are certain marked differences in the character of the *Mind* and the other Sense-organs [and not because the Mind is *not* a Sense-organ ; these differences are the following : all the other 'sense-organs'] (*a*) are composed of material or elemental substances,—(*b*) are effective upon only a few specific objects ; and (*c*) †are capable of acting as *organs* only as endowed with certain specific qualities (which they apprehend);—whereas the Mind is (*a*) immaterial,—(*b*) effective on all objects,—and (*c*) capable of acting as an organ, without being endowed with any quality.§ And further, we shall show, under Sū. 1. 1. 16, that even when the contact of more than one sense-organ with their respective objects is present, there is no simultaneous perception of all these objects,—which is due to the fact that while there is proximity or contact of the *Mind* (with one

* '*Ātman*' and *sukhādi*' must be taken as equivalent to '*ātmajñāna*' and '*sukhādijñāna*' according to what the *Vārtika* says. Pleasure may be produced by sense-object contact ; but it cannot be called 'Perception' ; it is only the cognition of the pleasure that can be called 'Perception'.

† The Eye is an organ of perception, because it is endowed with the quality of Colour which it apprehends ; and so on with the Nose, the Ear, the Hand, and the Tongue.

§ The *Vārtika* accepts only one of these three points of difference—*viz*., that the other Sense-organs operate only upon certain specific objects, whereas the Mind operates on all objects

object), there is no such contact of it (with the other objects); which shows that the operation of the Mind is necessary in every act of perception ;—and all this goes to prove that the Mind is a 'sense-organ'; and this obviates the necessity of providing another definition (of Perception, for including the perception of the Soul, &c.). Then again [even though the *Sūtra* does not mention the *Mind* among the 'sense-organs'], the fact that the *Mind* is a 'sense-organ' can be learnt from another philosophical system (the *Vaiśeṣika*,); and it is a rule with all systems that those doctrines of other systems which are not directly negatived are meant to be accepted as true.*

Thus has Sense-perception been defined.

INFERENCE

Sūtra 5.

† After Perception comes Inferential Cognition, § which is led up to by Perception; it is of three kinds—(1) the Pūrvavat, (2) the S'eṣavat and (3) the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.††**

BHĀSYA

The expression 'led up to by Perception' refers to the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*, as also to the perception of the *probans* itself; and the *perception of the relation between the probans* and the *probandum* also implies the remembrance of the *probans*, and thus it is by means of remembrance and perception of the *probans* that the non-perceptible thing is *inferred*.§§

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* Dinnāga, the Buddhist Logician, has objected to this declaration, in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, remarking 'if silence was the proof of assent, why did the Nyāya-Sūtra not remain silent regarding the other five Sense-organs also ?' (See S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa. *Indian Logic*—pp. 86–81, *footnote*).

† This is how the *Tātparya* explains the word *atha*.

§ The *Vārtika* expands this into—'that which is preceded by other forms of valid cognition and by two perceptions.'

** These are technical names, of which the *Bhāṣya* supplies two different meanings. Hence the names are left untranslated.

†† Another interpretation of the Sūtra has been proposed by the *Vārtika*.

§§ We *see* the fire and smoke together—this is one perception, that of the relation between fire and smoke ;—after some time we see the *smoke*—this is the second perception ;—on seeing the smoke we remember the relation that we had perceived ; and this leads us to the inference of fire—the unperceived member of the relat on.

I. [The first explanation of the three kinds of Inference] —(A) the *Pūrvavat* Inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause;* e. g. when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain. (B) The *S'eṣavat* Inference is that in which the cause is inferred from the effect;† e. g., when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, and that the stream is fuller and the current swifter, we infer that there has been rain. (C) The *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* Inference [is that in which the inference is based upon a general observation]; e. g., we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place dfferent from where we saw it before only when it has moved; and from this fact of general observation we infer that the sun must be moving, even though we cannot perceive it (because we see the sun in the evening in a place different from where we saw it in the morning).

II. [Another explanation of the three kinds of Inference]. Or, we may explain the three names in the following manner:— (A) The *Pūrvavat* Inference is that in which out of two things as *perceived on some former occasion*, the one that is not perceived (at the time of inference) is inferred from the preception of the other ; e. g , when fire is inferred from smoke.§

(B) The word '*S'esavat*' means *remainder*; with regard to an object, there are certain possibilities-and some of these possibilities are eliminated; and there being no other possibilities—when the remaining possibility is cognised in relation to the said object, this cognition is *S'eṣavat*;‖ e. g., in regard to Sound, we find that it is an entity and is transient ; and as these two properties (*being an entity* and *being transient*) are found to be common to Substances, Qualities and Actions only, their presence in Sound distinguishes it from the remaining categories of Community, Individuality and Inherence (all of which three are *entities*, but *eternal*);—, then there arising a doubt as to Sound being either a Substance, or a Quality, or an Action, we reason (by a process of

* The cause is 'pūrva' or *prior* to the effect ; hence that in which the inference is based upon the cognition of the cause, has been called *Pūrvavat* or *a priori*.

† The effect being '*Śeṣa* or *posterior*,' to the Cause.

§ The *Pūrvavat* inference would thus be *Inference per Prior Perception*.

‖ The *Śeṣavat* inference would thus be *Inference per Elimination*.

elimination) in the following manner:—(a) Sound cannot be a Substance, because it inheres in a single substance (*Ākāśa*) [while there is no Substance which inheres in only one substance, all substances being either not inherent in any substance.—*e. g.*, the atoms,—or inherent in more than one substance,—*e. g.*, the jar, which inheres in more than one atom];—(*b*) Sound is not an Action, because it is the originator of another sound [it thus gives rise to something that is of its own kind; and this is never the case with any Action, which always brings about effects that are entirely unlike itself;—*e. g.*, *Action*, in most cases, produces some kind of conjunction or disjunction];—and by this eliminative reasoning we come to the conclusion that Sound must be a *Quality* (this being the only member of the three that is not eliminated).*

(C) The *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* Inference is that in which, the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum* being imperceptible, the imperceptible *probandum* is inferred from the similarity of the *probans* to something else; *e.g.* when the *Soul* is inferred from *Desire*;—Desire is a Quality, and Qualities always inhere in Substances; and (from this similarity of Desire to other qualities we come to the conclusion that Desire must inhere in a Substance) and this leads to the inference that that Substance in which Desire inheres is the Soul.

It is true that the fact of there being three kinds of Inference is sufficiently indicated by the enunciation of the three kinds, and hence the additional word '*trividham*,' 'it is of three kinds,' in the *Sūtra* could well have been left out;—but this additional curtailment of the *Sūtra* was not considered desirable by the author of the *Sūtra*, as he thought that he had secured sufficient conciseness in expressing by means of the short *Sūtra* the entire extent of the vast subject of Inference. This method of explanation—of being satisfied with one form of conciseness and not minding other possible forms—is often employed by the author of the *Sūtra*; as we find in the case of his descriptions of the various kinds of '*Siddhānta*', '*Chala*', '*S'abda*' and so forth.

* This example of *Śeṣavat* Inference is not accepted by the *Tātparya*—*Pariśeṣa* is only another name for the purely *negative* inference; while the example cited by the *Bhāṣya* is one of the affirmative-negative kind. The example suggested is the inference of the fact of 'Desire' etc., being dependent upon the Soul.

[The difference between Perception and Inference is that] Perception pertains to things present, while Inference pertains to things present as well as not present (*i. e.* past and future). "How so?" As a matter of fact, Inference is applicable to all the three points of time: by means of Inference, we apprehend things past, present and future: for instance, we infer (a) that 'such and such a thing *will happen*',—(b) that 'such and such a thing is present',—and also (c) that 'such and such a thing existed in the past.' The past and the future are 'not present" [hence we speak of Inference as pertaining to the *present* as well as to the *not-present*].

ANALOGY

Analogy is next considered—

Sūtra 6

*** Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity to a known object.**

BHĀSYA

† That is, Analogy is that which makes known what is to be made known, through similarity to an object that is already well

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* The confused use of the word 'pramāna' continues. We have seen that *Pratyaksa* has been defined as the *cognition* that is brought about by sense-contact etc.; and here we find *Upamāna* being defined as that which accomplishes the purpose of making known,—*i. e.* a *means* of cognition.

† There is some difference between the *Bhāṣya* on the one hand and he *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* on the other. As regards the object of analogical cognition and the exact *form* of that cognition, there is no difference; is according to both the object is the connection of the name with the object; he form of the cognition being 'this object is what is named *gavaya*.' There is however a marked difference of opinion as to the *means* of the ognition; that it is the similarity between the two objects that is the neans, on this also all are agreed; but according to the *Bhāṣya*, it is this imilarity as expressed in the assertion 'the *gavaya* is like the cow',—which ssertion is *remembered* at the time that the man sees the animal resembling the cow; while according to the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* it is the imilarity that is actually *seen* when the animal is seen to resemble the ow,—this perceived similarity being aided by the remembrance of the imilarity expressed in the assertion 'the *gavaya* is like the cow.' Says the '*arisuddhi*. सादृश्यस्यैव प्रज्ञायमानस्य करणत्वमभिप्रैति ।

The *Tātparya* interprets the *Bhāṣya* passage '*yathā gauh tathā gavayah*' I. 1.2) to mean that the similarity should be one that is already known

known ; *e. g.* the assertion 'as the cow so the *gavaya*' [*i. e.* the animal called '*gavaya*' is like the cow].

"What is it that is accomplished by this *analogy* ?"

When a person finds similarity to the cow, he actually perceives the object that had been referred to in the *analogy* ; and thence he comes to cognise the connection of that object with the name mentioned in that Analogy; so that it is this latter cognition that is the purpose accomplished by Analogy. For instance, when the Analogy, in the form 'the animal called *gavaya* is like the cow', has been put forward,—and the man who has heard this happens, subsequently, to perceive through the contact of his sense-organs, an object similar to the cow,—he realises that 'the word *gavaya* is the name of this object', and comes to cognise the connection of that particular name with that particular object. Similarly in the case of such analogies as 'the *mudgaparnī* is similar to the *mudga*', 'the *māsaparnī* is similar to the *māsa*'—being put forward, the observer, by means of these analogies, comes to know the connection of the particular names with the particular objects, and thereby obtains the particular herb (*mudgaparnī* or *māṣaparnī*) that he requires In the same manner we can explain other objects of Analogy met with in common experience.

WORD

We now proceed to describe the *Word* [as an Instrument of Right Cognition]—

Sūtra 7

The assertion* of a reliable person is 'word'.

by means of such assertions But we find (in 1. 4) the *Bhāṣya* calling this assertion itself '*Upamāna*.'

There is no doubt that the view of the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* is more logical. The latter rightly remarks that for the cognition that 'this animal is what is called *gavaya*' it is necessary that the observer should know of the assertion 'the *gavaya* is similar to the cow', and also that he should perceive the similarity to the cow in the animal concerned. If the analogical cognition had for its means only this *remembered* similarity, then its validity would be as doubtful as that of the Remembrance itself.

* 'The word Upadeśa, standing for words uttered for the benefit of others, here applies to the Sentence as well as to what is expressed by the sentence. When the sentence is regarded as the 'means' of the cognition, the result brought about by it is the knowledge of what is expressed by it; and when this latter is the 'means' the 'result' consists in the idea of acquiring or discarding the thing spoken of.—*Tātparya*.

BHĀṢYA

That person is called '*āpta*', 'reliable', who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things, who is moved by a desire to make known (to others) the thing as he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it. The word '*āpta*' is explained as denoting one who acts or proceeds, through '*āpti*', *i. e.* through the direct right knowledge of things. This definition applies to sages, *as well as to *Āryas* and *Mlecchas* ;† the activities of all these people are carried on through such 'Words.'

Thus we find that it is by means of the aforesaid four Instruments of Cognition,—and not by any other means—that the activities of Deities, Men and Animals are carried on.

Sūtra 8

The said Word is of two kinds—the Dṛṣṭārtha, that of which the thing spoken of is perceived, and the Adṛṣṭārtha, that of which the thing spoken of is not perceived.

BHĀSYA

That 'Word' of which the thing spoken of is perceived in this world is called '*Dṛstārtha*'; while that of which the thing

* 'One who has direct intuitive knowledge of things is a Sage. The name Ārya stands for the people of the Central Land (bounded by the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, the Vindhya and the Himālaya). And the residents of the rest of the world are called Mlecchas'

† 'There are cases where the word of the worst man is true and reliable. For instance, after a robber has taken away all that a traveller possessed, if he is asked to point out the way to a certain place, what he indicates does turn out to be the right path. The word of such people is reliable only when they have no motive for giving incorrect information. Hence for being an '*apta*', for the purposes of the validity of his assertions, it is not necessary that he should be completely free from all defects, as has been asserted by some philosophers'.—*Tātparya*.

On this the *Pariśuddhi* observes as follows .—There are two kinds of persons—omniscient and not-omniscient ; of these, the unreliabity of the former is set aside by the very proof that establishes his existence ; as the person who is proved to be ommiscient is also proved to be free from all defects of ignorance, love, hatred and the like. As for the not-omniscient person, his assertions can bear testimony to his being reliable, by reason of his being possessed of—(a) due knowledge of the thing spoken of, (b) desire to convey true information, (c) efficient faculty of right articulation etc.; and one can be sure of this only after having repeatedly found the man to be possessed of these qualities.

spoken of is only believed to exist in the other world is '*Adṛṣṭārtha*'.* These are the two divisions under which are included all the assertions of sages and ordinary men.

"For what purpose does the Sūtra mention these two divisions?"

This mention is made so that the other party may not think that what is a *valid instrument of cognition* is only that *assertion of the reliable person* which speaks of things that are directly perceived, as it is only such things that can be duly ascertained. This idea had to be guarded against, as such assertions also as speak of things not seen are *valid Instruments of cognition*; as such things also can be duly ascertained by means of Inference.†

Here ends the section of the Bhāṣya dealing with the Instruments of Cognition.

Lecture 3.

The Prameyas.

[The Objects of Cognition.]

The *Sūtra* now proceeds to explain what is to be known by means of the above-described Instruments of Cognition.

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* (1) That which speaks of things directly perceived by the Speaker, and (2) That which speaks of things only known to him indirectly, by means of Inference for instance.

† If only Words speaking of visible things were reliable, then the Veda would become excluded. Hence it is added that words speaking of invisible things also are reliable. Such invisible things as Heaven and the like can be known by means of Words whose validity can be ascertained only by means of an Inference based upon the fact of their being the Word of 'a reliable person',—i. e God. And it is for this reason that these things are said to be inferred. This precludes the validity of mere Hearsay, or of the word of persons whose veracity cannot be correctly inferred; *e. g.* that of Buddha and others. And it does not mean that the things spoken of in this case are those that cannot be cognised by means of Perception. As Heaven etc., are actually perceived by the sages. When the ordinary man speaks of Heaven etc., his words are '*adṛṣṭārtha*' in a double sense—the thing is one cognisable only by means of words whose validity can be only inferred, and the man speaks of things that he has not seen, but knows by means of words whose reliability he knows from Inference. It is on the basis of this double sense of '*adṛṣṭārtha*' that we find the *Vārtika* offering a second interpretation of the words '*dṛṣṭārtha*' and '*adṛṣṭārtha*'—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 9

Soul, Body, Sense-organs, Things, Apprehension, Mind, Activity, Defect, Re-birth, Fruition, Pain, and Ultimate Good really* constitute the Objects of Cognition.

Of these—(1) the Soul is the perceiver (of all that brings about pain and pleasure),—the experiencer (of all pains and pleasures)—the knower of all (pains, pleasures and their causes)—who attains all things.† (2) The Body is the receptacle of the Soul's experiences. (3) The sense-organs are the instruments of the experiences, (4) The Things are the objects to be enjoyed and experienced. (5) Apprehension consists of the experience itself (6) §The Mind is that internal organ which is capable of bringing about the apprehension of all things,—which the Sense-organs (being limited in their scope) cannot do. (7) Activity is the cause of the propagation of the body, the sense-organs, the thing and the sensing of pleasure and pain. (8) So also are the Defects. (9) Rebirth;—the body that belongs to the Soul in one life is not the first that the Soul has had; nor is it the last; in fact there can be no 'first' in the previous bodies that the soul has had [as we cannot trace the beginning of the worldly process]; and as for its subsequent bodies there can be an end to these only when Ultimate Good is attained,—and it is this that constitutes *Rebirth*. (10) Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain along with the causes leading to these. (11) *Pain*—by the special mention of 'pain' (and the omission of 'pleasure') it is not meant that there is no pleasure at all,—which is what is actually felt as agreeable [just as much as Pain is felt as disagreeable], what is

* According to the *Pariśuddhi* there are two readings in the *Sūtra*—one with '*tu*', and the other without it. We shall see later on how this particle is essential.

† If the Soul did not attain all things, it could not know 'all things'.

'The point in which the *Soul* differs from the other objects is that it is only as the experiencer of pleasures and pains that the Soul is something to be got rid of (*heya*); in its own positive form, it is never *heya*, it is always *upādeya*, to be acquired and treasured; while all the rest—except Ultimate Good are always only fit to be got rid of; and Ultimate Good is always to be acquired and treasured.'

§ There is much uncertainty on the exact nature of *manas*. The later Logicians regard it as an '*indriya*'; while the *Bhāṣya* is not clear on this point. We shall deal with this subject later on, under '*Manas*'.

meant is to lay stress upon the teaching that it is desirable that one should practise the thoughtful contemplation of the fact that Pleasure also is only a form of Pain,—being as it is, along with its causes, found to always end in pain, to be never also entirely free from pain, and to be inseparable from various difficulties; as when one is thoughtful and contemplates upon the said fact, he becomes disgusted;—this disgust makes him free from all attachment, and brings Dispassion;—and having become dispassionate, he attains the Ultimate Good, Emancipation (12) Ultimate Good or Emancipation consists in the cessation of the series of births and deaths, and the consequent disappearance of all pain.

Though apart from these enumerated, there are many other 'objects of cognition' also—such as Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Individuality and Inherence,—yet it would be impossible to enumerate all such objects severally; so what the Sūtra has done is to make specific mention of only those 'objects' whose right knowledge brings Emancipation and wrong knowledge leads to Birth and Rebirth [and it does not mean that these are the only objects that can be cognised.]

Soul—The First Prameya.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

* As a matter of fact, it is found that the Soul is not apprehended by Perception; the question then arises as to whether it is known only by means of 'reliable assertion'. The answer is that it is not so; as Soul is cognised by means of Inference also.—"How so?"

* 'That there is such a thing as Soul is known, in a general way, from Reliable Assertion (of the Veda, for instance), and this knowledge is ratified by Inference'—*Tātparya*. 'By being *ratified* is meant that the vague general cognition is specified'—says the *Pariśuddhi*. That is, the existence of particular souls in particular bodies becomes recognised.

In connection with the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya*, the objection is raised as to why the perception of the Soul is denied, when as a matter of fact, the Soul is always an object of *mental perception*, being always perceived as 'I', a conception that appears along with every cognition. The answer to this is that it is true that we have the notion of 'I'; but this might be (and actually is) taken as referring to the body; and as such it could not afford a sufficient proof for the existence of the Soul apart from the body, so long as it is not strengthened and ratified by other means of

Sūtra 10

Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the indicatives of the Soul.

[A] The Soul having experienced pleasure by coming into contact with a certain kind of things, whenever, in the future, he happens to see a thing of that same kind, he wishes to acquire that thing; and this wish to acquire is possible only in one who, while remaining one and the same, perceives several things; as it arises from his remembrance of a previous perception, it is thus that Desire becomes an indicative (a sign or proof) of the Soul.* No such desire would be possible [if there were not one and the same agent to cognise and to recognise the thing, and] if there *were only a series of distinct cognitions, each pertaining* to its own distinct object, for the recognition of one cognition by another cognition would be as possible as the recognition by one body of the experiences of another body.†

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cognition, Inference &c. This is the answer from the stand-point of one who does not regard the Soul as purely perceptible; the answer from the stand-point of one who regards Soul as perceptible is that the passage refers to the Soul of others, one's own Soul being always *perceptible*,—[as held by some Logicians, called by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *'svayūthyāh'*]—*Pariśuddhi.*

* Having found a certain kind of thing to give pleasure, the man formulates the judgment 'this kind of thing gives pleasure',—this is the major premiss; when he sees that kind of thing again, he has the idea 'this is that kind of thing'; this forms the minor premiss, from these two premisses he comes to the conclusion 'this will give pleasure'; and then *desires* to acquire that thing. Thus this *Desire* proves that the agent who has this desire must be the same who has the three cognitions represented by the two premisses and the resultant conclusion,—there being a common agent for all the four; if the agent were not the same there could be no such recollection or fusion of the several cognitions involved, and it is this common agent—who is the seer of the thing, the experiencer of pleasure, the rememberer of the thing being the source of pleasure, and the desirer of the thing,—who is the *'Soul'*—*Tātparya.*

† This anticipates the following argument.—'Even in the absence of a *Soul*, the recollection and fusion of cognitions would be possible under the hypothesis of every cognition setting up, and forming a factor in, a series of cognitions.' If this were so, then every cogntion would recall and fuse into every other cognition of the same series. *Tātparya.*

The phrase *'dehāntaravat'* is explained by the *Bhāṣya* itself later on.

[B] Similarly it is only when one and the same agent perceives several things, that, on recollecting a previous perception, he comes to have *Aversion* to the thing that has been the cause of pain to him.

[C] When a certain kind of thing has been found to be the cause of pleasure, on subsequently seeing a thing of that kind, the man makes an attempt to obtain that thing; and this *Effort* would not be possible if there were not *one* agent perceiving a number of things and recollecting his past perceptions; specially no such Effort would be possible if there were only a series of distinct cognitions, each pertaining to its own distinct object; for the Effort of one cognition on the basis of the experience of another cognition would be as impossible as the Effort of one body on the basis of the experiences of another body. This explanation also applies to the *Effort* that is put forth for the getting rid of what has been found to be a cause of pain.

[D and E] It is only by reason of his remembrance of his previous experience of pleasure and pain that when the man gets by the thing that had caused him pleasure he is pleased, and when he gets by what had caused him pain he feels unhappy, and thus it is that he experiences *Pleasure* and *Pain*. And in this also the reason is the same as before [that is to say, the said pleasure and pain are possible only when the person getting by the thing and remembering the previous experiences is the same who had had those experiences; and this proves the Soul as the experiencer of Pleasure and Pain in the past, their rememberer and their experiencer in the present].

[F] When a man is desirous of knowing or understanding (the real character of a certain thing), at first he ponders over it in the form—'what may this be?'; and pondering thus he comes to know it in the form—'this is so and so'. This *Knowing* of the thing is by the same agent as the previous *desire to know* and the consequent *pondering*;—so that this *Knowledge*, *Cognition*, becomes an indicative of the presence of the common agent in the shape of the 'Soul'. And here also the reason is the same as before.

Now we proceed to explain the phrase *dehāntaravat*, 'as in the case of another body', [that we have used twice before] :—The philosopher who does not admit the Soul readily admits that

the diverse Cognitions, each pertaining to a distinct object, when appearing in different bodies, are never recognised [and never fuse together, the cognitions of one body not being recognised by another body]; and for the same reason the diverse cognitions, appearing in the same body also, could not be recollected; the two cases being for the said philosopher exactly alike, [so far as the absence of the common agent is concerned; there being no such agent in either case]. Thus then, with regard to a single agent we find that he recognises only what he has perceived, and not what he has not perceived or what has been perceived by another; similarly with regard to diverse agents also, we find that one agent does not recognise what has been perceived by another; neither of these two well-known facts can be adequately explained by the philosopher who does not admit a *Soul*.

Thus it is proved that there is such a thing as *Soul*

Body—The Second Prameya.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

* The receptacle of the Soul's experiences is—

Sūtra 11

The Body, which is the vehicle of actions, of sense-organs and of objects. †

BHĀṢYA

[A] "How is the Body the *vehicle of actions?*"

With regard to things that the Soul desires to obtain or to discard, there arises in the Soul the desire to obtain, or to discard it respectively; urged by this desire, the Soul puts forth exertion embodying the operation of the means for obtaining or discarding it; and that wherein this exertion appears is the *Body*.

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* As the Body is the receptacle of the Soul's experiences of pleasure and pain, it lies at the root of the series of births and rebirths; hence its treatment comes next after the Soul.'—*Tātparya*.

† According to the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika*, this Sūtra contains three definitions of the Body—(1) It is the vehicle of the Soul's actions, (2) it is the vehicle of the Soul's sense-organs,—(3) it is the vehicle of the Soul's objects. Some philosophers have taken the Sūtra as providing a single definition—"It is the vehicle of actions etc. etc." This is rejected by the *Vārtika*.

[B] "How is the Body the *vehicle of sense-organs*?"

That thing alone can be regarded as the *vehicle of the sense-organs* by whose benefit the sense-organs are benefited, and by whose injury they are injured,—and it is according to this benefit or injury, that they act upon their objects good and bad;—and such a thing is the *Body*.

"How is the Body the *vehicle of objects*?"

That is to be regarded as the *vehicle of objects* in which receptacle there appear the feelings of pleasure and pain caused by the contact of the sense-organs with those objects;—and such a receptacle is the *Body*.

The Sense-organs—The Third Prameya.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

* The instruments that bring about the experience (of pleasure and pain) are—

Sutra 12

The Olfactory, the Gestatory, the Visual, the Cutaneous and the Auditory Organs, proceeding from material substances

BHĀSYA

That by whose instrumentality one smells things is the Olfactory Organ; so called because it apprehends odour That by whose instrumentality one tastes things is the Gestatory Organ; so called because it apprehends taste That by whose instrumentality one sees things is the Visual Organ; so called

* The sense-organs being the *presenters* [as they serve to bring before the Soul through the body, definite objects, which become the source of pleasure and pain—*Pariśuddhi*], they differ, in this respect, from the objects that are *presented*; and as such they have to be defined before the Objects. As the Sūtra only provides the definitions of the particular organs,—and as these particular definitions are not intelligible until we have the definition of 'Sense-organ' in general, the Bhāsya in this introductory clause, supplies this general definition. The general definition should have been stated in the form that the sense-organs are the instruments by which direct cognitions are brought about, but it is with a view to excite disgust against the organs (along with every thing else), that the *Bhāṣya* speaks of them as the 'instruments of the experience of pleasure and pain.'—*Tātparya.*

because it apprehends colour. That which is located in the skin is the Cutaneous Organ; so called indirectly because of its location.* That by whose instrumentality one hears things is the Auditory Organ; so called because it apprehends sound. Thus from the force of the literal signification of the names, we learn that the sense-organs are to be defined as the apprehenders of their respective objects.

† *Proceeding from material substances*—adds the Sūtra. The meaning of this is that it is because the organs proceed from diverse sources (in the shape of the material substances) that they are restricted to particular objects, this would not be possible if they all proceeded from a single source [in the shape of the 'self-consciousness' of the Sānkhyas]; and it is only when each of them is restricted to a particular object that it can be defined as the apprehender of its object.

The Material Substances.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

"What are the causes from which the Sense-organs proceed?"

Sutra 13

§ **The Material Substances are Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ākās'a**

* The other organs are named after what is apprehended by them, the Cutaneous Organ apprehends the *touch* of things, hence the name 'Cutaneous Organ' applies to it, not directly, in the sense in which the names of the other organs apply, but only indirectly, in the sense that the skin is the locus of that organ.

† As a matter of fact, odour, which is the specific quality of Earth, is apprehended by the Olfactory Organ only; taste, the specific quality of Water, is apprehended only by the Gestatory Organ; and so forth. This is so because the Olfactory Organ proceeds from—is built of—Earth, and the Gestatory Organ of Water. If both proceeded from a single source, as held by the Sānkhya, then we could not account for the aforesaid facts.

§ The *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* do not take any note of this Sūtra; but the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* has this as an independent Sūtra. The *Bhāṣya* also speaks of this as containing the *upadeśa* of the *bhūtas*; and this word could have been used only with reference to the words of the *Sūtrakāra*.

BHĀṢYA

Here we find the Material Substances mentioned by their respective names with the view that when they are thus clearly mentioned, it will be easy to point out which Sense-organ is the product of which substance.

Artha—Things or Objects. The Fourth Prameya.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Of the endless objects, the following are those 'objects' [which, when pondered upon as things apprehended by the sense-organs, lead to that dispassion which helps the attainment of Release; and which, when not rightly discerned, become the cause of endless births and rebirths]—

Sūtra 14

*** Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound, which are the qualities of Earth [Water, Fire, Air, and Ākās'a], are the objects of the aforesaid [sense-organs].**

* The translation here follows the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. The *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* however do not agree with the view that Odour and the other four qualities alone are 'perceptible'. Hence they interpret the *Sūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* differently. The first difference lies in the following explanation suggested by the *Tātparya*—'*Tadarthāḥ*', the last word in the *Sūtra*, means that which is sought after—*i. e.* acted upon,—by the sense-organs; so that this word embodies the definition of the fourth 'object of cognition', '*artha*', and the rest of the *Sūtra* is not a definition; it only supplies certain details of information; though not in a precise manner, as it is meant for a friendly listener, and not for a critical opponent.

The reason why the *Tātparya* had recourse to this explanation of the definition of *artha* lay in the fact that according to the view of the *Vārtika*, the *Sūtra* could not be taken as supplying an accurate enumeration of the 'objects' of perception; so the precise definition had to be found somewhere in the *Sūtra*; and this was found in the word '*tadarthāh*'.

The word '*pṛthivyādigunāh*' is taken by the *Vārtika* to mean *pṛthivyādayah*—i e. '*pṛthivī*', '*jala*' and '*agni*'—and *gunāh*, *gandha*, etc. being included in '*gunāh*'; their separate mention is regarded as another information supplied in a friendly spirit, with a view to indicate what is precisely apprehended by each sense-organ.

The great weakness in this explanation of the Sūtra is that *Pṛthivyādi* has to be taken as standing for only three out of five *bhūtas*; while the *gunas* of the other two are as perceptible as those of the other three. It is not

BHĀṢYA

The qualities mentioned, belonging to Earth and the other elementary substances, are the 'objects' of the sense-organs respectively; in accordance with the actual functioning or operating of the sense-organs.

Buddhi—Apprehension. The Fifth Prameya

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

* Some people (the Sānkhyas) have held the view that *Jñāna*, 'Cognition,' is the function of *Buddhi*, 'Cosmic Intellect,' which latter is a non-intelligent or unconscious instrument; while *Upalabdhi*, 'Apprehension,' is the function of the intelligent (Soul), which latter is not-active. And our Author makes the following declaration, with a view, it would seem,† to set aside this view.

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easy to see why the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* fought shy of the *Bhāṣya's* explanation, the only reason appears to be that this explanation precludes the 'perceptibility' of the other qualities of '*Pṛthivyādi*'—viz number, separateness etc.

* The Sānkhya theory is thus explained in the *Tātparya*:—Buddhi is a product of the three *guṇas*, which are unconscious entities. Hence Buddhi also is unconscious Through the medium of the Sense-organs, the Buddhi becomes modified into the form of the object The faculty of consciousness on the other hand is unmodifiable, and is ever conscious. When Buddhi comes into close proximity to this conscious entity, it reflects within itself this consciousness, and thereby appears as itself conscious, and becoming modified into the form of the object, it cognises it; hence the modification of the Buddhi into the form of the thing cognised completes the 'cognition' of that thing While the connection of the conscious entity, through reflection, with the Buddhi in the shape of the object cognised, constitutes a function of the conscious Soul, and is called the 'apprehension' of the object by the Soul. Just as the moon though without light of its own, reflects the light of the Sun, and with this reflected light illumines objects, in the same manner Buddhi, though itself unconscious, reflects the consciousness of the Soul and thereby cognises objects and makes them apprehended.

† "*It would seem*"—This qualifying clause is added with a view to indicate that this refutation is not the main purpose of the Sūtra. The Sūtra is for the purpose of providing a definition of Buddhi, and the way in which the definition is put forward serves also the purpose of setting aside the Sānkhya view.

Sūtra 15

'Intellection,' 'Apprehension,' and 'Cognition' are synonymous terms*

BHĀṢYA

It is not possible for Cognition to belong to the unconscious instrument Buddhi; as if it were, then Buddhi could be a conscious entity; while there is a single conscious entity, apart from the aggregate of the body, and the sense-organs.† Though the sentence composing the Sūtra is for the purpose of providing the definition of one of the *objects of cognition*, yet it is taken as implying the other fact (the refutation of the Sānkhya theory) by the force of the argument (implied in the mention of the synonyms) §

Manas—Mind. The Sixth Prameya.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Remembrance, Inference, Verbal Cognition, Doubt, Intuition, Dream, Imagination, as also the Perception of Pleasure etc and Desire and the rest—all these are indicative of the existence of the Mind; and in addition to all these, we have the following also—

Sūtra 16

The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions is indicative of the existence of Mind.

BHĀṢYA

Inasmuch as Remembrance and the rest (enumerated above) are not brought about by the instrumentality of the (external) ‡ sense-organs, they must be due to some other organ. As a matter of fact, we find that even though at one and the same time several perceptible objects, odour and the rest, are in close proximity to the respectively perceptive sense-organs, the Olfactory organ and

* Thus the definition of Buddhi comes to be this—'That thing which is denoted by these synonymous words is Buddhi.'

† This refutation is thus explained by the *Tātparya*,—Buddhi cannot reflect the conscious Soul, in the way that the moon reflects the light of the Sun. As consciousness being non-modifiable, there can be no reflection of t Hence it would be necessary to attribute consciousness to the Buddhi itself. So that every cognition will have two conscious agents.

§ Thus explained by the *Pariśuddhi*.

‡ This qualification is added by the *Tātparya*.

the rest, yet there is no simultaneous cognition of them; and from this we infer that there is some other cause, by whose proximity cognition appears, and on account of whose non-proximity cognition does not appear,—this other organ being in contact with the several sense-organs, and helping them, and being non-pervasive (limited) in its dimension. If the proximity of sense-organs to their objects, by themselves, independently of the contact of the Mind, were the sole cause of cognitions, then it would be quite possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously.

Pravṛtti, Activity—The Seventh Prameya.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

After Mind comes the turn* of Activity; and

Sūtra 17

Activity consists in the operating of Speech, of Mind and of Body.

BHĀSYA

By the word '*buddhi*' in the Sūtra the Mind is meant,—the word being taken in the sense of *that by means of which things are cognised (buddhyate anayā)*†.

§ The various 'operatings' by the Body, by Speech and by the Mind are righteous and unrighteous; and are of ten kinds. This we have already explained above under Sūtra 2

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* As Activity belongs to the Mind (see Sūtra), Activity has to be defined after Mind has been described.

† The word '*buddhi*', when explaind as '*buddhyate iti*', that which is apprehended, denotes cognition, and when explained as '*buddhyate anayā*', it denotes the instrument of cognition, Mind.

§ Says the *Tātparya* —Operations are of two kinds—some give rise to cognition, others give rise to action. For instance, the operation of Speech becomes the cause of virtue or sin according to the nature of the cognition that it produces (in the mind of the person spoken to) So that 'Speech' must be taken here to stand for *all* those operations that bring about cognitions, and thus the operations of the Eye and other organs, which consist in the perceiving of agreeable or disagreeable things, become included Operations leading to Action are of two kinds—*that having the Body for its cause, and that caused by the Mind.*

These two expressions are explained by the *Pariśuddhi* to mean—'that of which the body is the *object*' and 'that of which the Mind is the *object*'. For instance, the operation or effort involved in the actions of giving, steal-

Doṣa—Defect—The Eighth Prameya.

Sūtra 18

Defects have urging or inciting for their distinguishing feature.

BHĀṢYA

* 'Inciting' means *causing activity*. Attachment and the rest incite, or cause the activity of, man towards virtuous or sinful deeds; and whenever there is ignorance, there are attachment and aversion.†

Objection—"Everyone knows what these *Defects* are; why are they described by means of a definition?"

As a matter of fact, persons affected by attachment, aversion and ignorance (which are the inciters to activity) are distinguished (or characterised) by their action: the man who has attachments does that action whereby he experiences pleasure or pain; similarly the man who has aversion, or one who has ignorance. [And it was necessary to bring out this fact of Attachment etc. being the cause of activity, in order to produce disgust against them; which fact could not have been brought

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ing and the like, have all got the Body for their object, as it is the Body that is active, similarly, sympathy, jealousy and the like are operations having the Mind for their object, as it is the Mind that is active This explanation of the two expressions—'*Kāyanimittā*' and '*Manonimittā*'—are necessitated by the fact that otherwise all operations could be called both *Kāyanimittā* and *Manonimittā*, as there is not a single action of man in which *both* Mind and Body are not the cause.

* The action of the *inciter* can be understood only after that of the *incited* has been understood, hence after the definition of Activity comes the turn of its excitant, Defects—*Tātparya*.

† Both Attachment and Aversion arise from ignorance, and urge the man to activity, so that 'inciting' is a peculiarity of Attachment and Aversion; and this peculiarity subsists in the same substrate as the ignorance.—*Tātparya*.

In explaining this, the *Pariśuddhi* draws a distinction between *pravartaka* (that which incites) and *pravartanā*, (the action of inciting). What incites men to activity are ignorance and the consequent Attachment and Aversion towards the object on which the activity turns; and the *inciting* is towards this activity, which is the means leading to that object, and with regard to which also there are ignorance and consequent Attachment and Aversion.

out by the mere mention of Attachment and the other *Defects* : for] when the words ' attachment,' ' aversion ' and ' ignorance ' are used by themselves, not much is expressed by them.*

Pretyabhāva, Rebirth—The Ninth Prameya.

Sūtra 19

† **Rebirth consists in being born again.**

BHĀSYA

Having died, when [the Soul] is born again in an animate body, this *being born again* constitutes the *Rebirth* of that [Soul], which is born,—*i e.*, becomes connected with the body, the sense-organs, the mind, apprehension, and experience ; and *being born again* consists in repeated connection with the body etc ;—the word ' repeated ' denotes *recurrence.*§ The literal meaning of the word ' *Pretyabhāva* ' may be thus explained .—When the Soul, subsisting in a particular animate body, abandons the body etc, previously occupied, then it *dies* (*praiti*); and when it takes possession of another body and sense-organs etc., it is *born* (*bhavati*) ; so that ' *pretyabhāva* ' is *birth* (*bhāva*) after *death* (*pretya*). The recurrence of this process of birth and death should be regarded as without beginning, and ending only with Final Release.

Fruition, Phala—The Tenth Prameya

Sūtra 20

‡ **Fruition is a thing produced by activity and defect.**

* The *Tātparya* explains—All that the words express are the mere forms of the defects , and they give no idea of their being excitants of activity , and until this fact is brought out, there would be no disgust against the Defects , as there is nothing wrong in Attachment or Aversion *per se* , it is only when they give rise to activity bringing pleasure and pain, that they come to be recognised as something to be shunned.

† The *Tātparya* omits to mention the ground for the treatment of Rebirth after Defect The *Pariśuddhi* says—Rebirth is the acquisition of the Body etc., down to Defects, after the abandonment of the same ; so that it is only natural that Rebirth should be dealt with after these

§ 'Recurrence' of connections with body etc , implies also the abandoning of these.—*Pariśuddhi*.

‡ Fruition is the direct result of man's *activity* alone ; but the Sūtra adds *Defects* also with a view to show—(1) that defects are the cause of Activity and (2) that Pleasure and Pain (which constitute Fruition) are the

BHĀṢYA

Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain, as every action leads to pleasure and pain. And as pleasure and pain appear only when the Body, the Sense-organs, the Objects and Apprehension are present, what are meant to be included under the name 'Fruition' are pleasure and pain along with Body etc, which constitute the Fruition, which is *a thing produced by Activity and Defect* Each time this Fruition is received by man, it is relinquished by him; and each time it is relinquished, it is again received: and there is no end* or absolute cessation of these receivings and relinquishings; and it is by this unceasing current of receivings and relinquishings that the entire worldly process is carried on.

Pain, Duhkha—The Eleventh Prameya.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

This same (Fruition)—

Sūtra 21

When connected with Annoyance is Pain.

BHĀṢYA

By 'Annoyance †' here is meant *suffering, injury.* Every thing, (*i. e* Body etc. and also Pleasure and Pain), being intermingled with *i e.* invariably accompanied by, never existing apart from—pain, is inseparable from Pain, and as such is regarded as *Pain* itself. Finding everything to be intermingled with Pain,

result of Defects also. It is only when the soil of the Soul is irrigated with the water of Defect that the seeds of Merit and Demerit produce the fruits of Pleasure and Pain.'—*Tātparya.*

The *Pariśuddhi* adds that the author of the Sūtra will himself describe in Adh. IV how Defects help Activity in the bringing about of Fruition.

On the word *'Arthah'*, 'thing', in the Sūtra, the *Tātparya* remarks:—'The word is put in for including all kinds of Fruition, primary as well as secondary. The primary fruition consisting in Pleasure and Pain, and the secondary in the Body, the Sense-organs and the rest—says the *Pariśuddhi*.

* *'Niṣṭhā'* is mere end; and as there is some sort of an *end* to Pleasure and Pain etc. at each Dissolution, the *Bhāṣya* corrects itself and adds the word '*Paryavasānam*' *absolute* (*pari*) *cessation* (*avasāna*).—*Tātparya.*

† 'Annoyance' here stands for the *feeling* of annoyance; so that it refers primarily to Pain; but secondarily to the Body and the rest also,—all of which are necessary factors in the feeling of pain.—*Tātparya.*

when one wishes to get rid of pain, he finds that birth (or life) itself is nothing but pain; and thus becomes disgusted (with life); and being disgusted, he loses all attachment; and being free from attachment, he becomes released.

Apavarga—Final Release—The Twelfth Prameya.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

When there is an and, an absolute cessation [of the series of receivings and relinquishings of Fruition], this is what constitutes Final Release, (which becomes thus defined) :—

Sūtra 22

Absolute freedom from the aforesaid (Pain etc.) is Final Release.

BHĀSYA

Release is absolute freedom from that—from the aforesaid Pain, *i. e*, from birth *

"How is this?"

When there is a relinquishing of the birth that has been taken and the non-resumption of another,—this condition, which is without end (or limit) is known as 'Final Release', by those who know what Final Release is. This condition of immortality, free from fear,† imperishable (unchanging), consisting in the attainment of bliss, is called 'Brahman'

Some people hold the view that—"in Final Release what is manifested is the eternal pleasure of the Soul, just like its vast-

* The word '*tat*' in the Sūtra stands, not only for Pain proper, but also for all such products as the Body, the Sense-organs etc., to everyone of which the name 'Pain' is applied in its secondary sense —*Tātparya*.

† The 'fear' meant here is the fear of being born into the world; the epithet 'unchanging' is added with a view to deny the view that Brahman evolves itself into diverse names and forms, the phrase 'condition of immortality' is meant to exclude the Bauddha theory that Release consists in the absolute cessation of the mind, resembling the extinguishing of the lamp.—*Tātparya*. The *Pariśuddhi* adds—Evolution is of two kinds—(1) the material object itself ceases and another object takes its place, which idea of evolution is favoured by the *Bauddha*; and (2) the object remaining intact, there is a change in its qualities; this form of Evolution being held by the *Sāṅkhya*. Neither of [illegible] is possible in the case of Brahman; as in either case it would be transient.

ness; and when that happiness is manifested, the Soul is absolutely free and becomes happy."*

This position is untenable; as there is no proof for what is here asserted; that is to say, there is neither Perception, nor Inference, nor Word of Scripture to prove that 'like its vastness, the eternal pleasure of the Soul is manifested in Final Release.'

Then again, the above view of the *Vedāntin* meaning that (in Final Release) there is manifestation—*i. e.*, feeling or experience—of the eternal (pleasure),—it behoves him to point out the cause of this 'manifestation.' In other words, when it is asserted that there is experienced a feeling or knowledge of eternal (pleasure), it is necessary to explain what is the cause of this manifestation—*i. e.*, the cause whereby it is produced.

(*a*) If it be held that the manifestation, or experiencing or feeling, of pleasure is eternal, like the pleasure itself [so that there can be no production of it by any cause, which, therefore, need not be pointed out],—then there would be no difference between the Soul released and the Soul still in the meshes of birth and rebirth. That is to say, just as the released Soul is endowed with the eternal pleasure and its eternal experience, so also would be the Soul that is still involevd in birth and rebirth; as both these Souls are eternal [and would therefore be equally endowed with the pleasure, which also is eternal; and as such cannot be absent at any time, even before Final Release]. And if this be admitted, then people would be cognisant of the concomitance and simultaneity (of Final Release) with the result of Merit and Demerit. In other words, we would be cognisant of the concomitance and simultaneity of the eternal feeling of eternal pleasure with that pleasure and pain which, brought about by Merit and Demerit in the substrates (viz., the souls) wherein they are produced, are actually experienced by turns! And there would never be any substrate (soul) where either pleasure or its experience would be absent; both of these being *ex-hypothesi*, eternal!

* We have the text '*vijñānam ānandam brahma*' where all the three appear as synonymous; so that Brahman is of the nature of happiness; and as Brahman is eternal, the happiness also must be eternal. Hence in the phrase 'happiness of the Soul', the preposition 'of' has the sense of apposition.—*Tātparya*.

(*b*) If, on the other hand, it be held that the feeling of pleasure is not eternal, then it becomes necessary to point out its cause, *i e.*, if it be held that the manifestation in Final Release of the eternal pleasure, is not eternal,—then it becomes necessary to point out the cause from which that manifestation proceeds.

As regards the Mind-Soul contact, it can be such a cause only when aided by other causes; *i e.*, if it be held that the Mind-Soul contact is the cause of the said manifestation of pleasure, then it would be necessary to point out some other cause which aids the said contact (in bringing about that manifestation of pleasure) *

If Merit be held to be that auxiliary cause, then the cause of this has to be pointed out; *i e.*, if Merit be held to be that other accessory cause, then it becomes necessary to point out the cause from which that Merit proceeds [which, through the Mind-Soul contact, brings about the manifestation of eternal pleasure] The merit that is produced by Yogic contemplation, being a product, must have an end; so that if the product of this ephemeral Merit (in the shape of the said manifestation) were held to be eternal, this would involve an incongruity (the continuance of the product in the absence of the cause); consequently it is necessary to regard the said manifestation also as coming to an end on the cessation of the Merit. That is to say, if the Merit brought about by Yogic contemplation be the cause of the Merit that brings about the manifestation of pleasure, then, inasmuch as the continuance of the product after the cessation of the cause would involve an incongruity, it would be necessary to admit that, when the Merit ceases,—as it must cease, being itself a product,—there must follow the entire cessation of the feeling of pleasure. And when the *feeling* of pleasure is absent, the *pleasure* itself is as good as non-existent. In other words, if there is a cessation of the feeling of pleasure, on account of the disappearance of Merit, then it cannot be true that *eternal* pleasure is felt; as there is nothing to determine whether the feeling is absent, because the pleasure itself is absent, or that the feeling is absent even though the pleasure is present.

* Alone by itself, the Mind-Soul contact can bring about nothing

[Nor will it be right, with a view to escape from these difficulties, to hold that the Merit is eternal, as] there is nothing to prove that the Merit is imperishable ; for the simple reason that it is something that is produced. That is to say, there can be no arguments to prove that the Merit produced by Yogic contemplation does not perish; on the other hand, there is a clear argument to the contrary—viz, 'a thing that is produced is non-eternal [and Merit being *produced*, must be ephemeral]' In case there were a person whose feeling of pleasure never ceased, he alone would be justified in arguing that the cause of that feeling (Merit) is eternal. But if Merit were eternal, there would be no difference between the man that has been *released* and one who is still in the meshes of birth and rebirth,—as we have already pointed out above. What we mean is that, just as in the case of the released man, the pleasure as well as the cause of the feeling of that pleasure are both eternal,—and there is no cessation of the feeling itself, for the simple reason that the Merit, which causes the feeling, is eternal,—so in the case of the worldly man also [as his Merit also would be eternal, its effects, in the shape of the feeling of pleasure, would also be eternal]. And this would mean that Final Release is co-existent with the feelings of pleasure and pain brought about by Merit and Demerit *. It might be argued that (in the case of the worldly man) the presence of the Body, and the Sense-organs is the cause of obstruction (of pleasure-experience). But this cannot be right; as the Body etc., are for the very purpose of experience; and there is no reason to prove the contrary. In other words, our Opponent might put forward the explanation that in the case of the man who is still in the meshes of worldliness, the presence of the Body etc., obstructs the operation of the cause that leads to the feeling of eternal pleasure; so that there is a clear difference between the worldly man and the released man (in whose case, the Body etc., having fallen off, there is no obstruction) This however is not right; as the only purpose for which the Body, the Sense-organs and the rest exist is to bring about experience; so that it is not possible that they should

* As it is such feelings that abound in worldly existence; and both worldly Existence and Release have been shown to be co-eternal.

obstruct or hinder the experiencing (of eternal Pleasure), specially as there is nothing to prove that there is any sort of experience for the Soul deprived of the Body and the rest.

The Author has said above that there is no proof in support of the view that final Release consists in pleasure. In order to meet this, the Vedāntin puts forward proofs in support of his view.] 'The activity of man is always for the purpose of obtaining what is desired.'—If this be urged as a proof in support of the Vedānta view, then we deny this; as activity is (also) for the purpose of removing what is undesirable. That is to say, the Vedāntin might put forward the following argument.—*"The instructions in regard to Final Release, as also the activity of men desiring Final Release are both for the purpose of obtaining what is desirable; and neither of the two can be absolutely useless" But this reasoning will not be right; as the instruction relating to Final Release as well as the activity of men desiring Final Release, may both be also for the sake of avoiding or removing what is undesirable That the said activity is for the purpose of removing something undesirable (and not always for obtaining what is desirable) is also proved by the fact that there is nothing that is absolutely desirable, and not mixed up with an undesirable element, so that what is *desirable* also becomes *undesirable*; and thus when one is active towards the removing of something undesirable, he comes to remove or renounce also what is desirable; as removing by discrimination is not possible, *i. e.*, it is not possible to remove the one without also removing the other

As regards the renouncing of what is desirable, this applies with equal force to the case of the Body etc. That is to say, the Vedāntin might put forth the following argument—"We see, as a matter of fact, that people renounce the ordinary transitory pleasure and seek for the more lasting pleasure (which proves the presence of a pleasure that is ever-lasting; and this is Final Release)." But on the analogy of this argument, you might also

* The real sense of this argument is thus explained by the *Tātparya*—"The scriptures urge men to activity towards the obtaining of Final Release; and in ordinary experience we find that it is only when a man desires something that he acts towards its accomplishment; and as pleasure is the only thing desirable, it follows that Final Release must consist in pleasure."

argue that, because in ordinary life people are found to renounce their ephemeral Body , Sense-organs and the rest, this indicates the presence of an eternal set of Body etc., for the released man ; and in this manner you will have really established the singularity or aloofness and self-sufficiency of the released man ! † If it be urged that this would be against all Proof, that would apply with equal force to both parties In other words, it might be urged that the eternality of Body etc., being contrary to all evidence, it would not be right to assume such body etc., for the released man. But this could be said with equal force with regard to Pleasure also: that is, the eternality of Pleasure being contrary to all evidence it is not right to assume such pleasure for the released Soul.

Inasmuch as the absolute cessation of metempsychic pain could be spoken of as 'Pleasure,' there would be no incongruity (in the view that Pleasure consists in the cessation of Pain), even though there be scriptural texts describing Release as 'Pleasure'. That is to say, even though there be certain scripture-texts to the effect that 'absolute pleasure belongs to the released man,'—yet, such texts could very well be taken as using the word 'pleasure' in the sense of 'absolute cessation of Pain'; in fact in common parlance, we often find the word 'pleasure' used to denote the cessation or absence of pain. [So that the view that Final Release consists in the cessation of pain is quite in keeping with the said texts.]

Further,* until there is a renunciation of the desire for eternal pleasure, there can be no attaining of Final Release ; for the simple reason that all desire or attachment has been held to be a *bondage*. That is to say, if it be held that in Final Release eternal pleasure is manifested, then, in accordance with this view, whenever a man would put forth activity for the attaining of Final Release, he would do so only under the influence of a desire for the eternal pleasure; and being so influenced, he could never attain the Final Release ; nor would he deserve the attainment of

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† In seeking to prove that the man becomes free, isolated, you come to prove that it is eternally beset with the entire set, Body, sense-organs and all the rest of it.

* The reading '*sya prchāne*' gives no sense ; the 'Pandit' edition, as also all the manuscripts consulted, read '*syāprchāne*'.

Final Release; as desire of all kinds has been held to be a bondage; and it is not possible that a man should be *released* while he is under *bondage* !

* On the other hand, when a man is free from desire for pleasure, there is no longer any feeling of aversion or undesirability (with regard to any thing). In other words, when the man's desire for eternal pleasure has disappeared, the desire for eternal pleasure being not there to obstruct (his path towards Final Release), [and the activity towards Release thus emanating from one who has renounced desire],—whether the man does, or does not, really obtain eternal pleasure, in either case, there is no doubt as to his attaining Final Release †

LECTURE 4

The Preliminaries of Reasoning

DOUBT

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

§ *Doubt* having been the next in order to appear in the Mention of Categories (in Sū 1), it is now—after the definition of its predecessor, 'Objects of Cognition'—time to put forward its definition. This definition is now put forward—

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* This is added in anticipation of the following objection "If Final Release consists of the removal of pain, then man's activity towards it could be due only to aversion to pain, and aversion is as much a bondage as desire". The sense of the reply is that there is real aversion only so long as there is no desire for something,—the aversion being against that which obstructs the fulfilment of the desire

† Being free from all desire, when the man betakes himself to activity towards the attaining of Release, he does not care whether the eternal pleasure comes to him or not. As in any case, the activity being of a man who is purified of all desire, there can be no uncertainty as to his attaining Final Release.—*Tātparya.*

§ The *Pariśuddhi* attempts a rational explanation of the order of sequence All knowledge depending on Pramāṇas, and Prameyas being the objects sought to be known, these two have been first mentioned. Reasoning in all its details is what is to be explained next; and among all these details Doubt comes first, as until there is Doubt there is no occasion for any reasoning.

Sūtra 23

Doubt is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises either—(A) from the cognition of the characters common to the objects concerned, or (B) from the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects, or (C) from the presence of contradictory opinions;—and the appearing of such wavering judgments is due to the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions.*

BHĀṢYA

(A) † *Doubt is the wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises from the cognition of characters common to the objects concerned* For example, when a man perceives the qualities of length and breadth, which are common to man and post, and is desirous of detecting the previously perceived characters that would distinguish the one from the other, there arises in his mind the idea of 'whether it is this or that', and he cannot ascertain whether it is the one or the other, it is this uncertain cognition that constitutes *Doubt*,—and what raises the Doubt is the 'want',‡ appearing in the form 'I can perceive only such characters as are common to the two things, and do not perceive the distinctive features of either'; it is for this reason that Doubt is called '*that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting*'.

§ (B) *Doubt arises from the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects* This is to be thus

* The interpretation of the Sū. by the *Bhāṣya* is different from that by the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*. According to the former the Sūtra puts forward five kinds of Doubt; according to the latter it lays down only three The translation follows the latter interpretation.

† According to the *Bhāṣya*, there are five kinds of Doubt described in the Sūtra The first kind of Doubt arises from the cognition of common characters.

‡ The *Tātparya* remarks that the mere presence of this 'want' is not enough, what is meant by the word 'want' '*Apekṣā*' is the remembrance of the distinctive characters of the things, along with the non-perception of those characters. This is supported by the last sentence of the *Bhāṣya* on Sū 23.

§ This is the second kind of Doubt.

explained : The word '*aneka*', 'diverse', denotes all those things that are homogeneous and heterogeneous to the thing in question : and Doubt arises from the cognition of characters that distinguish the thing from, or exclude,* those 'diverse' objects ; as a matter of fact, the specific character of a thing is found to serve both purposes ;—things are distinguished by them from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things ; *e g.* the presence of Odour distinguishes the Earth from Water and the rest (which being *substances* are homogeneous to Earth), as also from Qualities and Actions (which being not *substances* are heterogeneous to Earth). [As an example of Doubt arising from the cognition of the specific character of a thing; we have the following]—Sound is found to be endowed with a specific property, in the form of *being produced by disjunction* ; and the cognition of this character gives rise to the Doubt as to whether Sound is a Substance, a Quality or an Action. Inasmuch as the specific characters of things are found to serve both purposes (of distinguishing from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things), there naturally arises a Doubt as to whether—(a) being an entity, Sound is a *substance* distinguished by the said specific character from Qualities and Actions, or (b) being an entity, it is a Quality distinguished by that character, or (c) being an entity, it is an Action distinguished by that character †And in this case ' the *want* of cognition of the specific property' is in the form of the idea, 'I do not perceive any such character as

* The phrase '*tasya anekasya dharmah*' is explained by the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* in two ways —(1) *anekaṃ, tasmāt viśeṣako dharmah ;* the words *tasmāt viśeṣaka'i* being supplied , (2) *tasya anekasya dharmaḥ vyāvartakatayā*. Both interpretations have been combined in the translation

† This explanation has been added with a view to the objection that it is only the remembrance of common properties that gives rise to Doubt, and not that of specific or exclusive properties. The sense of the explanation is that, (1) in the case of the Earth, we know that it is an entity, and on perceiving that it has Odour, we naturally are uncertain as to its being either a Substance or a Quality or an Action , all of which are *entities*, like the Earth; and the presence of Odour distinguishes it equally from all the three. (2) Similarly in the case of Sound ; it is an *entity*, like Substance, Quality and Action ; so when we find that the presence of the character of being produced by disjunction distinguishes it equally from all entities—just as much from other Qualities, as from Substances and Actions—there arises the Doubt as to its being a Substance, a Quality or an Action.

would definitely indicate any one of the three (Substance, Quality and Action).'

*(C) Doubt arises *from the presence of contradictory opinions.* Contradictory notions entertained with regard to one and the same thing constitute 'contradictory opinions'; 'contradiction' consisting in the mutual enmity, *i. e.* incompatibility. For instance, one system of philosophy asserts that 'the Soul exists', while an other declares that 'there is no such thing as Soul'; and when no proof one way or the other is available, there is an uncertainty as to the truth ; and this constitutes *Doubt.*

†(D) Doubt also arises from *uncertainty attaching to perceptions.* As a matter of fact, there is perception of really-existing water, as in the tank and such other reservoirs; there is perception also of non-existent water, in the rays of the Sun (appearing in the mirage); so that when in any particular case there is perception of water, and yet there is no proof available which would determine the real character of what is perceived, there arises a Doubt as to whether the water perceived is really existent or non-existent.

§(E) Doubt also arises from *uncertainty attaching to non-perceptions.* As a matter of fact we find that even really existing things are not perceived; *e. g.* we do not perceive the water within the roots and branches of trees; and there is non-perception also of what is non-existent; *e.g.* of what is not produced at all, or what has been destroyed; so that whenever there is non-perception of a

This is the *Bhāṣya's* answer. The answer of the *Vārtika* is thus explained by the *Tātparya.*—It is true that the character of being produced by disjunction has never been found in Substances, &c., but the absence of that character is found equally in all—in Substances, in Qualities, in Actions , so that when Sound is found to possess this character, as also the character of being an entity,—the latter being common to Substances, Qualities, and Actions—there arises the Doubt—'Being distinguished from Substances and Actions by the character of being produced by disjunction, is Sound a Quality ? Or being distinguished from Qualities and Actions, is it a Substance ? Or being distinguished from Qualities and Substances, is it an Action?' Thus in this case the specific character brings to the mind the other things only by negation, *i. e.*, by reason of its *absence* being common to all.

* This is the third kind of Doubt.

† This is the fourthk ind of Doubt, according to the *Bhāṣya.*

§ This is the fifth kind of Doubt, according to the *Bhāṣya.*

thing there arises the Doubt as to whether what is not perceived really exists, or it does not exist at all In this case also 'the want of cognition of the specific character' is as before.

*In the first two kinds of Doubt, the 'common properties' and the 'properties distinguishing an object from diverse objects' are such as subsist in the object cognised; while in the fourth kind, the 'perception' and 'non-perception' subsist in the cognising person; and it is only by reason of this difference or peculiarity that these have been mentioned separately.

The definition common to all forms of Doubt comes to be this:—'Doubt is a wavering judgment which arises from the apprehension of things possessed of common properties, proceeding from the cognition of common properties, and depending upon the remembrance of specific properties '

Prayojana-Motive

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As before, the definition proceeds in accordance with the order in which the several categories have been mentioned in the opening Sūtra

Sūtra 24

That object, aiming at which one acts, is called 'Motive'

BHĀṢYA

An object is capable of being either acquired or rejected, and when a person determines or fixes upon an object as to be either acquired or got rid of, he has recourse to the means of acquiring or getting rid of it, and that object is called the 'motive', simply because it forms the cause of that activity of the agent. An object is said to be 'aimed at' when there is a *determination* on the part of the agent with regard to it in the form, either

* The *Bhāṣya* regards the 'uncertainty attaching to Perception and the ' uncertainty attaching to non-perception ' as distinct and independent causes of Doubt, and so proceeds to show here that the Doubts aroused by these uncertainties cannot be included in those aroused by the cognition of ' common character ' or of 'characters distinguishing the object from diverse objects.' This view is controverted by the *Vārtika* (Page 99, Line 21, *et. seq.* Bib. Ind. Ed.)—*Tātparya.*

The *Vārtika* takes the first *samānadharma* as a Bahuvrīhi compound.

that 'I shall acquire it', or that 'I shall get rid of it' ; as it is only when an object is thus *determined* that it comes to be 'aimed at.'

DṚṢṬĀNTA—EXAMPLE

Sūtra 25

That is 'Example' with regard to which both parties—the ordinary man and the trained investigator—entertain similar ideas.

BHĀSYA

Those men are called '*laukika*', 'ordinary,' who are not above the capacities of an average man, *i.e.*, those who are not possessed of any particular superiority of intelligence, either inherently or through hard study ;—and the opposite of these are '*parīksaka*,' 'trained investigators' ; so called because they are capable of carrying on the investigation of things by means of reasonings and proofs. And that object forms an 'Example' which is understood and known by the ordinary man just as it is by the trained investigator. The purposes served by the 'Example' are :—(i) the contrary opinions are overthrown by being shown to be contradictory to, and incompatible with, the Example ;—(2) one's own opinions are confirmed by being shown to be compatible with, and supported by, the Example ; and (3) the Example is utilised as the corroborative Instance or Illustration, which is one of the essential factors of the inferential process

LECTURE V

The Basis of Reasoning

Siddhānta—Doctrine

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

We now proceed to define Doctrine, *Siddhānta*. The word '*Siddhānta*' is made up of the two words '*siddha*' and '*anta*', of these the word '*siddha*' denotes all those things with regard to which people have the idea that 'this is so and so,' 'this thing has such and such a character ;' and the word '*anta*' denotes the conviction or opinion that people have with regard to the particular character of those things * This *Siddhānta* is thus defined :—

* The word '*siddha*' literally means *accomplished*, hence *anything* that has come into existence, and it is only with regard to such a thing that any

Sūtra 26

Doctrine is a theory or conviction in regard to the exact nature of a thing dealt with by Philosophy.*

INTRODUCTCRY BHĀṢYA

By *tantrasaṁsthitiḥ in the Sūtra* 27 is meant the conviction resting upon the direct assertions of philosophy; the word '*tantra*',

opinion can be held as to its exact nature; the word '*anta*' means *end*; by which, in the present context, is meant that *final* and well-determined conviction which people have with regard to the exact nature of any particular thing.

In regard to these lines of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Tātparya* has remarked that 'the author of the *Bhāṣya*, without mentioning the Sūtra containing the general definition of *Siddhānta*, has given an explanation of its import.' This has been taken by some writers to mean that there was some other *Sūtra* now lost to us, which contained the said general definition As a matter of fact, however, *Sūtra* 26 itself supplies,—specially according to the explanation of the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*—the general definition of *Siddhānta*; so that all that the *Tātparya* means is that the explanation of the general definition by the *Bhāṣya*, instead of following the Sūtra, precedes it

* The *Vārtika* has taken the two Sūtras 26 and 27 together; so the *Vārtika* appears after Sū. 27. The translation of the *Sūtra* is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Vārtika* and *Tātparya*; which explain the compound '*tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṁsthitiḥ*' by taking '*tantrādhikaraṇa*' as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound—'*tantram adhikaraṇam yeṣām*'; and this, with the rest of the word, as a genitive *Tatpuruṣa*. The exact position of the *Bhāṣya* appears to be doubtful. If we take the *Bhāṣya*, appearing after Sū 26 as explanatory of Sūtra 26, then, it is clear that it takes '*tantrādhikarṇābhyupagama*' as a *Dvandva*, and thereby connects each of these severally with the word '*saṁsthitiḥ*' According to the *Bhāṣya* then, the translation of the *Sūtra* 26 would run thus—*Doctrine is conviction resting upon philosophy, on implication and on hypothesis*'. We have given preference to the *Vārtika* interpretation, because by the *Bhāṣya* the Sūtra is made to contain an enumeration of the different kinds of *Siddhānta*; while by the *Vārtika* interpretation this *Sūtra* supplies a general definition; and the several kinds are enumerated in the next Sūtra 27 It is this interpretation by the *Bhāṣya* which affords occasion to the objector in the *Vārtika* to put the question as to the Sūtra being a general definition or an enumeration. According to the *Tātpraya*, however, the *Bhāṣya*, appearing after Sū. 26 is explanatory, not of *Sūtra* 26, but of *Sūtra* 27. Just as the sense of Sūtra 26, which contains the general definition of Doctrine, is given by the *Bhāṣya* before the *Sūtra*, so of *Sūtra* 27 also the sense is explained before the *Sūtra*. As this interpretation reconciles the *Bhāṣya* with the *Vārtika*, we adopt it; and therefore take the said lines of the Bhāṣya as explanatory of *Sūtra* 27.

'philosophy', standing for the teachings in connection with things connected with one another ; [this includes the first two kinds of theory mentioned in Sūtra 27]—'*adhikaranasaṁsthitiḥ*' is the conviction resting on implication, and not on direct assertion ;—and '*abhyupagamasaṁsthitiḥ*' is the hypothetical and tentative acceptance of an opinion not duly ascertained, [and not directly stated in philosophy]—such acceptance being for the purpose of examining the detailed particulars of the theory.

Doctrine thus is of four kinds, on account of diversity among the several philosophies,—as described in this *Sūtra*. And each of these four kinds is quite distinct.

Sūtra 27

Doctrine is of four distinct kinds:—(1) Doctrine common to all philosophies, (2) Doctrine peculiar to one philosophy, (3) Doctrine resting on implication, and (4) Hypothetical Doctrine.

BHĀSYA

These are the four kinds of Doctrine ; and among these—

Sūtra 28

(1) The 'Doctrine Common to all Philosophies' is that philosophical conviction, or theory, which is not incompatible with any philosophy.

As for example, such opinions as 'the olfactory organ and the rest are Sense-organs', 'odour and the rest are the objects apprehended by means of these Sense-organs', 'the Earth and the rest are material substances', 'things are cognised by means of the Instruments of Cognition'

Sūtra 29

(2) That which is accepted by only one Philosophy, and is not accepted by any other Philosophy, is called the Doctrine peculiar to one philosophy.

BHĀṢYA

For example, the following doctrines are peculiar to the *Sāṅkhyas* :—'An absolute non-entity can never come into existence', 'an entity can never absolutely lose its existence', 'intelligences are unmodifiable', 'modification belongs to the three gross

products, Body, Sense-organ and Mind, and also to the subtle causes of these (in the shape of *Buddhi Ahankāra* and the five Rudimentary Substances)'; and also the following which are peculiar to the *Yoga* * philosophers ;—'The entire elemental creation is due to the influenee of the past deeds of men', 'the defects of men and also their activity are the cause of Karman', 'intelligent beings are endowed with their own respective qualities', 'that thing alone is produced which had no existence before', 'that which is produced is destroyed'

Sūtra 30

(3) That is called 'Doctrine resting on Implication' on the knowledge or acceptance of which depends the knowledge or acceptance of another fact †

BHĀṢYA

When it so happens that a certain fact having become established or known, other facts become implied,—and without these latter facts the former fact itself cannot be established,—the former, constituting the basis of these latter, is called 'Doctrine resting on Implication' or 'Implied Doctrine;' *e g*, when the fact that the *cogniser* is distinct from the body and the sense-organs is proved or indicated by the fact of one and the same object being apprehended by the organs of vision and touch,—the facts implied are .—(1) that there are more sense-organs than one, (2) that the sense-organs operate upon particular kinds of objects, (3) that they have their existence indicated by the apprehension of their objects, (4) that they are the instruments bringing about the cognitions of the cogniser, (5) that the substratum of qualities

* Some people take this to mean 'Vaiśeṣika philosophy', on the ground that what is ordinarily known as the 'Yoga' philosophy does not hold the view that '*asat utpadyate*'.

† In connection with this *Sūtra* the *Pariśuddhi* adds an interesting note: "Bhūsana and others have provided two explanations of this *Sū.* (1) When an object endowed with the quality of omniscience is known, then alone is known the fact of Earth and the rest having a creator; so the former is an Implied Doctrine; and (2) the knowledge of the fact of Earth &c. having a creator includes that of the fact that there is an omniscient being,— the latter being implied by the former, and here the former is an Implied Doctrine The *Bhāṣya* and its followers have not given this twofold explanation, as there is not much real difference between the two".

is a substance other than the qualities of odour and the rest, and (6) that intelligent beings cognise only particular objects. All these facts are included in the aforesaid fact (of the cogniser being distinct from the body &c. &c.); as this fact would not be possible without all those other facts.

Sutra 31

(4) When a fact is taken for granted without investigation,* and thence proceeds the Examination of its particular details, we have a case of Hypothetical Doctrine.

BHĀSYA

When a fact is taken for granted without investigation, this constitutes what is called 'Hypothetical Doctrine' *e g.* it is taken for granted, without investigation, that Sound is a substance, and thence proceeds an investigation as to whether Sound is eternal or non-eternal,—in which investigation are examined such details of Sound as its eternality or non-eternality. An author has recourse to this kind of Doctrine with a view to show off the cleverness of his own intellect and through utter disregard for the intellect of others

Lecture VI

Reasoning

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

We next proceed to describe the Factors of Inference.

Sutra 32

(1) Statement of the Proposition, (2) Statement of the Probans, (3) Statement of the Corroborative Instance, (4) Reaffirmation, and (5) Final Conclusion,—These are the Factors of Reasoning.

"Some logicians declare that there are *ten* Factors: viz.—(1) Desire to know, (2) Doubt, (3) Capacity to accomplish what is desired, (4) Purpose and (5) Dispelling of the Doubt (in addition to

* The Vārtika explains '*aparīksita*' as '*not mentioned in the Sūtras*; but it appears simpler to take it as meaning 'not investigated.' The *Tātparya* construes the *Sūtra* thus—*asūtritābhyupagamād hetoḥ yatah tadviśeṣaparīkṣanam kriyate tasmāt viśeṣaparīkṣanāt jñāyate aśāstritamapi abhyupagatam sūtrakārena.*

the five mentioned in the *Sūtra*) ;—why should not these additional five have been mentioned ? " *

To the above question the *Bhāṣya* makes the following answer :—(1) As for *Desire to Know*, it is only that which urges, or brings forward, the purpose meant to be accomplished by the cognition of a thing not already cognised. Why does a person *desire to know* what is cognised ? He does so simply with the view that when he comes to know it in its true character, he will either abandon it, or acquire it, or treat it with indifference ; so that the ideas of abandoning or acquiring or treating with indifference are the purpose served by the true knowledge of the thing ; and it is for the sake of this purpose that the man *desires to know* the thing ;—and certainly this *desire* does not *prove* anything [and as such can- not be regarded as a factor of reasoning, which is meant to *prove* the conclusion]. (2) As for *Doubt*, which forms the basis of the *desire to know*, it apprehends mutually contradictory properties; and as such it can be regarded as only proximate to true cognition ; as of two contradictory properties only one can be true ; † So that even though Doubt has been dealt with separately, as a category by itself [it will not be right to regard it as a Factor

* The Jaina logician, Bhadrabāhu (B. C. 433—357), who wrote the *Daśavaikālikaniryukti*, lays down ten Factors, though another Jaina logician Siddhasena-Divākara (A. D. 1-85) mentions only five. The ten factors of Bhadrabāhu are :—(1) *Pratijñā*, Statement of the Proposition ; (2) *Pratijñā-vibhakti*, Limitation of the *Pratijñā ;* (3) *Hetu*, Statement of the Reason, (4) *Hetuvibhakti*, Limitation of the *Hetu*, (5) *Vipakṣa*, Counter-proposition, (6) *Vipakṣapratiṣedha*, Denial of the Counter-proposition, (7) *Dṛṣṭānta*, Example ; (8) *Ākāṅkṣā*, Doubting the Validity of the Example ; (9) *Ākāṅkṣā-pratiṣedha*, Dispelling of the Doubt ; (10) *Nigamana*, Final Conclusion. The *Saṁśayavyudāsa*, of the *Bhāṣya* stands for the '*Ākāṅkṣāpratiṣedha*', and '*Saṁśaya*' for the '*Ākāṅkṣā*', of Bhabrabāhu. But here the parallel ceases. It would seem therefore that the *Bhāṣya* had in view a writer other than Bhadrabāhu.

† The Puri manuscript reads *vyāhatadharmopasaṅghātātattva* Though the grammatical construction of this reading becomes difficult, the sense becomes clearer. With this reading, the translation should run as follows — ' Doubt is nearer to Wrong Cognition ; *i. e.*, to that form of Wrong Cognition which apprehends two contradictory properties at the same time ; for the simple reason that of the two contradictory properties only one can be true ; so that not being of the nature of true Cognition, Doubt cannot prove anything. '

of Reasoning, as] it cannot prove anything (not being of the nature of true cognition). (3) As regards *Capacity to accomplish what is desired*,—as for instance the Instruments of Right Cognition have the capacity of accomplishing, for the cognising agent, the apprehension of the objects of cognition,—this could not form part of an argument put forward for proving a proposition, in the manner in which the statement of the Proposition forms part of it. (4) As for *Purpose*,—which consists in the ascertaining of the real nature of the thing sought to be known,—this is the *result*, and not *a factor*, of the argument put forward to prove a proposition. (5) Lastly, as for the *Dispelling of Doubt*,—which consists in the setting forth of the counter-proposition and then denying it,—this only tends to lend support to some other Instrument of Right Cognition; and it cannot be regarded as a part of the argument put forward to prove a proposition. [Though *Desire to Know* and the rest cannot be regarded as Factors of Reasoning] yet *Desire to Know* and the rest have their use in Discussions; specially as they help the thing concerned to become known. As for the *Statement of Proposition* and the rest, on the other hand, inasmuch as these tend to bring about the true cognition of the thing, they are regarded as *parts* or factors, of the argument that is put forward to prove a proposition †

From among those (Factors) as divided above—

Sūtra 33

The 'Statement of the Proposition' consists in the assertion of what is to be proved,—the Probandum.

That is, the 'Statement of the Proposition' is that assertion which speaks of the Subject which is intended to be qualified by that property which has to be made known or proved (by the reasoning),—this is what is meant by the words of

† The *Pariśuddhi* notes that the difference between the two lies in this that while *Desire to Know* and the rest help the Discussion by their mere *presence*, the *Statement of the Proposition* and the rest help by their *cognition*. If the Desire to know is *present*, the Discussion proceeds; it is not necessary to know or apprehend the Desire. But the Statement of the Proposition, the Statement of the Probans and the rest, should be themselves *known*, before they can lead to the final cognition of things.

the *Sūtra* that '*Pratijñā* consists in the mention of the Probandum'. [As an example of this, we have the statement] 'Sound is non-eternal'

Sūtra 34

The 'Statement of the Probans' is that which Demonstrates the Probandum, through its similarity (*i.e* a property common to it and) to the Corroborative Instance

BHĀSYA

That which 'demonstrates'—*i. e.* makes known, or proves—the 'Probandum'—*i. e.*, the property to be proved (as belonging to the Subject),—through a property common to the Corroborative Instance,—is the 'Statement of the Probans' That is to say, when one notices a certain property in the Subject (with regard to which the conclusion is to be demonstrated)* and notices the same property also in the Corroborative Instance, and then puts forward that property as demonstrating (or proving) the Probandum,—this putting forward of the said property constitutes the 'Statement of the Probans' As an example (in connection with the proposition 'Sound is not eternal') we have the Statement 'because sound has the character of being a product, as a matter of fact everything that is a product is not eternal'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

"Does the aforesaid definition (stated in Sū 34) constitute the entire definition of 'Statement of the Probans'?" No

"What then?"

Sūtra 35

And also through dissimilarity

BHĀSYA

That is to say, the 'Statement of the Probans' is that also which demonstrates the Probandum *through dissimilarity* to the Corroborative Instance (*i.e.*, through a property that belongs to the Instance and not to the Probandum). "How?" For example,—'Sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced,—that

* The term *Sādhya* is used in the present context rather promiscuously. It stands for the *probandum*, the character to be demonstrated, the predicate of the conclusion,—as also for the *Subject*, the thing in regard to which that character is to be demonstrated.

which has *not* the character of being produced is always eternal, *e. g.*, such substances as the Soul and the like.'*

Sūtra 36

That Familiar instance,—which, through similarity to what is to be proved (*i. e.* the Subject). is possessed of a property of that (Subject)—constitutes the 'Statement of the Corroborative Instance.'

BHĀSYA

† '*Similarity to what is proved*' consists in the presence of the same property in both; when by reason of this similarity, the

* The reading of the Vīzia. Edition is defective; the proper reading is '*anityah śabdah, utpatti-dharmakatvāt anutpattidharmakam nityam, yathā ātmādidravyam,*' as found in the Puri MSS.

† The wording of this *Sūtra* is not clear. The meaning is clear enough.—that is the right example which possesses two properties in common with the Subject,—one property whose presence in the Subject is to be proved, and the other that which is already known to subsist in it. But the difficulty arises from the presence of the word '*sādhya*' in the Sūtra. Ordinarily this word stands for the Probandum, that whose presence in the Subject is to be proved, that the word cannot mean this in the present Sūtra is made clear in the *Vārtika*. The translation has adopted the explanation provided by the *Tātparya*, as follows —'*Sādhyasādharmya*' must mean the similarity of the Instance *to the Subject*,—this similarity, in the case of the reasoning 'Sound is non-enternal because it is a product,' consisting in the presence of the property of *being produced*, which is the Probans; this is *equally* present in the Subject, Sound, *which is to be proved* as 'non-enternal,' and in the Instance, dish, &c, and on the basis of this similarity, the Instance is found to possess *another* property meant to belong to that same Subject (Sound),—that is, *that* the connection of Sound with which is to be proved, *e.g.* the property of non-enternality; and the dish, &c., are actually found to be possessed of this last property.

There is yet another difficulty,—*udāharana*, as a factor of reasoning, is a *verbal statement*, how can a familiar instance, which is an object possessing certain properties, be called a 'statement'? This difficulty has been sought to be cleared by the *Vārtika*.

The translation has adopted the interpretation of the *Vārtika* and the *Bhāṣya*. But the Sūtra is capable of a much simpler interpretation—*Sādhyena* (*dharmena anityatvena*) *sādhāranyāt* (*sāmānādhikaranyāt, sādhyasamānādhikaranam dharmāntaramutpattidharmakatvamavalambya*) *taddharmabhāvī* (*sādhyadharmavān*) ;—translated thus—' That familiar instance which possessing a property that is known to be co-existent or concomitant with

familiar instance is found to be *possessed of a character of that same*,—i. e., the character of what is to be proved. '*What is to be proved*' is of two kinds—(a) in some cases it is the property as qualified by (belonging to) the object;—as when we assert the 'non-eternality *of Sound*'; and (2) in others it is the object as qualified by the property, as when we assert that 'sound is non-eternal'; and it is this latter that is referred to by the pronoun '*tat*' [in the compound *taddharmabhāvī*] (in the *Sūtra*) [and not the *probandum*, which is what is usually spoken of as '*sādhya*'] "How do you know that it is this latter that is meant by the word '*sādhya*' here?" For the simple reason that we find the 'property', '*dharma*', mentioned separately from 'that', '*tat*' [so that '*tat*' and '*dharma*' could not be the same]; the word '*taddharmabhāvī*' means 'that which has the *bhāva* or presence of the *dharma* or property of '*tat*' or 'that'; that is to say, that familiar instance which is possessed of a property that belongs also to the Subject; and it is such an instance which can be spoken of as 'possessed of a property of the Subject', in virtue of its similarity to that Subject. For instance, in the reasoning 'sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced', what the *probans*, 'being produced', means is that *being produced, it ceases to be*,—i. e. *loses itself*,—i. e. is *destroyed*. here we find that *being produced*, is meant to be the *means of proving* (i e the Probans) and *being non-eternal* is what is *proved* (the Probandum); and the notion that there is the relation of *means and object* between the two properties can arise only when the two are found to co-exist in any one thing; and it arises only by reason of the 'similarity' (of a number of things, in every one of which the two properties are found to co-exist), so that when one has per-

the probandum, possesses also the probandum'. The *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* appear to have been led away by the impossibility of there being any '*Sādharmya*' (similarity) between the Instance (which is an object, a *dharmin*) and the Probandum (which is a property, a *dharma*). But the *Bhāṣya* itself affords an explanation (below) which shows that '*Sādharmya*' *means* 'concomitance in a single substratum', and not *similarity*; and that this concomitance is between the two properties—*e. g.* non enternality' (probandum) and 'being produced', both of which, known to be concomitant, should subsist in the Instance

ceived the said relation in the familiar instance, he naturally infers the same in Sound also;—the form of the inference being 'Sound also is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced, just like such things as the dish, the cup and like'. And this is called 'Statement of the Corroborative Instance', '*udāharana*' because it is what is the means of establishing, between the two properties, of the relation of means and object.

Sūtra 37

And the other kind of 'statement of Corroborative Instance' is that which is contrary to what has been described in the foregoing Sūtra.

BHĀṢYA

What is meant to be described is that 'familiar' instance which constitutes the 'Statement of Corroborative Instance'; so that what the Sūtra means is that the other kind of Statement of the (heterogeneous) Instance consists in *that familiar instance which, through dissimilarity to what is to be proved, is not possessed of a propert of that Subject* *E. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal', because it has the character of being produced,- *everything not having the character of being produced is eternal, for instance, the 'Soul and the rest'*;—here 'Soul and the rest' constitute the required 'familiar instance,' which, through their 'dissimilarity to what is to be proved'—*i e.* on account of their not having the *character of being produced*,—are not 'possessed of the property of the Subject,'—*i. e* the property of *non-eternality* When we find that in the case of the Soul, the character of *being produced* being absent,* it does not possess non-eternality, we infer the contrary in the case of Sound,—' because Sound is possessed of the character of *being produced*, Sound is non-eternal'.†

* The reading *sya—bhāvāt*' is wrong , the correct reading given in the Puri Ms is ' *syābhāvāt* ,.

† The *Tātparya* takes exception to the example cited in the *Bhāsya* — " Both the examples cited in the *Bhāṣya*—that of the Homogeneous Instance as well as that of the Heterogeneous Instance—are those of the 'affirmative-negative' kind , and in the latter case it has declared that the absence of the property to be proved is due to the absence of the character which proves it , and this is not right, as in the case of the ' affirmative-negative ' reasoning, even though a heterogeneous Instance be available, the right course is always to cite the homogeneous Instance ; as the *dissimilarity* of a

When the Probans is stated with a view to similarity—*i. e.* in the affirmative form,—what constitutes the *Statement of the Instance* is that familiar instance which, through its similarity to what is to be proved, is possessed of a property of the Subject; and when the Probans is stated with a view to dissimilarity,—*i e.* in the negative form—the *Statement of the Instance* consists of that familiar instance which, through its dissimilarity to what is to be proved, does not possess the property of the Subject. In the former case, the observer perceives, in the Instance, that it possesses two properties so related that the presence of the one proves the presence of the other, and from this he comes to infer that in the case of the Subject also the presence of the one should prove the presence of the other ,—and in the latter case he observes in regard to the Instance that there are two properties so related that the absence of one proves the absence of another, and from this he comes to infer that in the case of the Subject also the said properties are similarly related, the absence of one proving the absence of the other.

The process(of corroboration by means of familiar instances) is not possible in the case of fallacious Probans; and it is for this reason that they are regarded as 'fallacious', as not true probans

The subject of this related capacity of the Probans and the Instance is very subtle and difficult to grasp ; it can be rightly understood only by exceptionally wise and learned men.

thing is recognised always after its *similarity* , so that it is not right to have recourse to the roundabout way when a straight road is available for the same purpose.'' This contention appears to be favoured by the *Vārtika* also, which says that an instance of the heterogeneous Instance is to be found cited in connection with the '*Negative*' reasoning. The instance that the *Tātparya* would have is found in the following reasoning—'The living body is with Soul because otherwise it would be without the life-breath,—like the *jar* ', where the ' property ' of the Subject—the living body —*having* the *life-breath*—is not present in the jar. What the *Bhāsya* itself proceeds to explain in the next sentence shows that the instance cited cannot be the right one ; if it is true that ' when the Probans is stated affirmatively, the Instance cited should be homogeneous ', then in the case of the reasoning ' Sound is non-eternal, *because it has the character of being produced* '—where the probans is stated affirmatively—the right example could not be the *heterogeneous* one ; while if the reasoning is put forward in the form ' the living body is with Soul, as *otherwise it would be without the life-breath* '—where the probans is stated *negatively*—we would have the heterogeneous Instance of the *jar* as cited by the *Tātparya*.

Sūtra 38

The 'Re-affirmation' is that which, on the strength of the Instance, re-asserts the Subject as being 'so' [*i.e.*, as possessing the character which has been found, in the Instance, to be concomitant with the Probandum]—or as being 'not so' [*i.e*, as not possessing the character which has been found in the Instance to be concomitant with the negation of the Probandum.]

BHĀṢYA

The term '*udāharnaasāpēkṣaḥ*' means 'depending on the Instance'—*i.e.* on the strength of the Instance.

(*a*) When the Instance cited is the homogeneous one, which is similar to the Subject,—*e. g.* when the Dish is cited as the example to show, that it is a *product* and is *non-eternal*—we have the 'Re-affirmation' stated in the form, 'Sound *is so*'—*i. e.* 'Sound *is a product*'; where the character of *being a product* is affirmed of the Subject *Sound.* (*b*) When the Instance cited is the heterogeneous one, which is dissimilar to the Subject,—*e. g.* when the Soul is cited as an example of the substance which, *not being a product*, is eternal,—the 'Re-affirmation' is stated in the form 'Sound is not so'; where the character of *being a product* is reasserted of the Subject, Sound, through the denial of the affirmation of the character of *not being produced*. Thus there are two kinds of *Reaffirmation*, based upon the two kinds of *Instance*.

The term '*upasamhāra*' (in order to be made applicable to the *Verbal* re-affirmation) should be explained as *that by means of which there is reassertion* (*upasaṃhriyate anena*). *

* On this Sūtra, the *Pariśuddhi* remarks as follows —When the Sūtra speaks of the two kinds of Re-affirmation, it refers to the definitions that it has given of the two kinds of Instance in the two preceding Sūtras. The two kinds of Instance have been defined separately; but the corresponding two kinds of *Re-affirmation* are defined in one Sūtra. The *Tātparya* observes that the definition common to both kinds of Re-affirmations would be in the form—उदाहरणापेक्षः उपसंहारः (साध्यस्य) उपनयः—*i. e.*, Re-affirmation consists in the re-assertion of the Subject (as possessing the Probans), on the strength of the Instance.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Even though the Statement of the Probans and Re-affirmation are both of two kinds, yet of one uniform character is—

Sūtra 39

the Final Conclusion, which is the re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the Probans.*

The Probans having been stated either *per* similarity or *per* dissimilarity, we have a recapitulation (of the entire reasoning) in accordance with the Instance, and this recapitulation constitutes the Final Conclusion, which is in the form—'Therefore, having the character of product, Sound is non-eternal.' This has been called '*Nigamana*' (Final Conclusion), because it serves to connect or string together (*nigamyante' anena*) the Proposition, the Statement of the Probans, the Statement of the Example and the Re-affirmation; the word '*nigamyante*' being synonymous with the '*samarthyante*', (are 'supported') and '*sambadhyante*' ('are connected')

When the Probans has been stated *per* similarity, the *Proposition* is in the form of the Statement 'Sound is non-eternal';—the *Probans* is stated in the form 'because it has the character of being a product';—the *Instance* is in the form 'things like the dish, which have the character of being a product, are all non-eternal', the *Re-affirmation* is in the form 'Sound also has the same character of being a product';—and the Final Conclusion is in the form 'therefore, having the character of being a product Sound is non-eternal' Similarly, when the Probans is stated *per* dissimilarity, the *Proposition* is in the form 'Sound is non-eternal';—'because it has the character of being a product, (*Probans*)',--'such things as the Soul which are not products are eternal' (*Instance*);—'Sound is not a thing that is not a product (*Re-affirmation*);—'therefore not being a non-product, Sound is non-eternal' (*Final Conclusion*).

* As a matter of fact, the Final Conclusion is what is established or proved, while the Proposition asserts what is yet to be proved; but the two refer to the same thing, that which appears in the conclusion as *proved* is precisely what has appeared before in the Proposition as *to be proved.* So that there is no incongruity in speaking of the Conclusion as being the Proposition.

In every inferential statement, which consists of the (five 'Factors,') several distinct *pramānas* commingle and co-operate towards the accomplishment of the end (in the shape of inferential cognition). There is 'commingling' in the following cases–(*a*) In the inference bearing on Sound, the *Proposition* ('Sound is non-eternal') comes under verbal cognition, and verbal assertion, unless it is heard directly from a Ṛsi,—cannot by itself be accepted as 'trustworthy'; and it stands in need of corroboration by Perception and Inference, (*b*) in the *Statement of the Probans* we have an 'Inference', being deduced, as it is, from the cognition of similarity by the Statement of the Instance.* this has been explained clearly in the *Bhāsya* dealing with the *Statement of* the *Instance*,· (*c*) the *Statement of the Instance* represents 'Perception'; the deduction of the unseen (unknown or uncertain conclusion) from the seen (what is perceived in the Instance) being only natural;-(*d*) the *Re-affirmation* is in the form of 'Analogy', as it is expressed in the form 'as that *so this*', or ' this is not as that is', when there is denial of the analogous character; in which case the *Re-affirmation* is in the form of the denial of the contrary character; (*e*) the *Final Conclusion* serves to show how all the Factors combined are capable of bringing about the cognition of a single object (in the shape of the *Probandum* through that of the *Probans*).

There is mutual co-operation also among the five 'Factors'; *e g* (*a*) If there were no *Proposition*, there would be no basis on which the *Statement of the Probans* and the other Factors could proceed; (*b*) if there were no *Statement of the Probans*, the instrumental efficiency of what (towards the bringing about of the cognition) could be shown (by the Inference) ?--what again would that be whose connection with the Instance and the Probandum could be shown ?—on the basis of what again could there be the *Final Conclusion* consisting in the re-statement of the Proposition ?—(*c*) If there were no *Statement of the Instance*, what would that be to which there would be similarity, or dissimilarity, of what is put forward as the means (Probans) of proving the Pro-

* The Probans is recognised as such only when the reasoner has become cognisant of the invariable concomitance between the Probandum and the Probans as perceived in the thing that is cited as the Instance.

bandum?—on the strength of similarity to what too would the final recapitulation proceed?—(*d*) If there were no *Reaffirmation*, the character put forward as proving the Probandum, not having its presence in the Probandum reasserted, could not accomplish its purpose;—(*e*) lastly, in the absence of the *Final Conclusion*, there would be nothing to indicate the mutual relationship among the Proposition and the other Factors, or the fact of their combining to accomplish a common purpose; and what too would it be that would be declared as proved by means of such expressions as 'so is this'?

We now proceed to show the purpose served by each of the five 'Factors of Reasoning.'* (*a*) The *Proposition* serves the purpose of mentioning the relation between the character to be proved and the *Subject*; (*b*) the *Statement of the Probans* serves the purpose of stating the fact of a certain character, which is either similar or dissimilar to what is stated in the *Instance*, proving what is to be proved; (*c*) the *Statement of the Instance* serves the purpose of indicating the presence, between the two characters, of the relation of 'proof and proved' (Probans and Probandum), as manifested in a single substratum; (*d*) the purpose served by the *Reaffirmation* is to indicate the co-existence (in the Subject) of the character put forward as Probans with that put forward as the Probandum;—(*e*) and the *Final Conclusion* serves the purpose of showing that it is not possible to deny, in regard to the particular Probandum (and Subject), the relation of 'proof and proved' which has been found, in the Instance, to subsist between the two characters †

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* Though the purpose of each Factor has already been shown under the *sūtra* defining each of them, yet the Author proceeds to explain it again, for the good of his disciples.—*Tātparya*.

† The *Final Conclusion* thus is not the same as the *Proposition*, the latter puts forward the fact only tentatively, as requiring confirmation by the reasoning with the aid of the Probans and the Instance, while the former puts it forward as one fully established, and thus precluding the possibility of the truth being contrary to it. This cannot be done by the *Proposition*; as, if it did, then the rest of the Factors would be entirely futile.-*Tātparya*.

The above remarks of the *Tātparya* show that the writer was conscious of the objection that every syllogism involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*; and has supplied a reasonable answer.

When the Probans and the Instance have been duly put forward in the correct form, in the manner described above, there is no opportunity for the Opponent to urge (against the reasoning) any 'Futile Rejoinder,'–in the shape of urging contrary arguments vitiating either the similarity or the dissimilarity of the Probans—or any one of the many 'Clinchers.' The Opponent who has recourse to 'Futile Rejoinder' does so (with effect) only after he has shown the doubtful character of the relation of 'proof and proved' between the two characters as found in the Instance; and as a matter of fact a Probans is put forward as such only when its relation of 'proof and proved' to the Probandum has been duly grasped in the Instance,—and not when its mere 'similarity' or 'dissimilarity' to the character in the Instance has been recognised. [So that when the Probans is duly stated, there can be no room for Futile Rejoinder or Clinchers being urged against it.]

SECTION (7)

Factors Supplementary to Reasoning

Cogitation (Tarka)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

After the Factors of Reasoning, it is necessary to define *Tarka*, Cogitation.* This is what is declared in the next *Sūtra*.

Sūtra 40

When the real character of a thing is not well known, there is put forward, for the purpose of ascertaining that real character, a reasoning (in support of a certain conclusion) which indicates the presence of proof (showing the undesirability or absurdity of a contrary conclusion);—and this is called 'Cogitation.'

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, when the real character of a thing is not well known, there is a desire to know it;—this desire appearing in

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* Because this is mentioned in the opening Sūtra, next to '*Avayava*', and also because it serves the purpose of strengthening the inferential conclusion by setting aside its contrary.

The Viz. Series edition has a superfluous '*tarkaḥ*' here; it is absent in the Puri MSS.

the form 'may I know it.' After this comes the doubt as to the thing possessing this or that particular character— one of two contradictory characters;* this doubt appearing in the form—' is this thing so and so, or is it not so and so ?'; and when one comes to ponder over these two contradictory characters, if he finds proofs in support of one of them, he accepts (or assents to) it,—this assent being in the form 'there are proofs supporting this fact, and as there are proofs, the thing must have this character, and not the other one ' †

As an example of this Cogitation, we have the following (in regard to the cognitive Soul being a product and having a beginning, or being beginningless) :—First of all there arises a *desire to know* the real character of the *cogniser*, the agent who cognises what is to be cognised,—this desire being in the form 'may I know the real character of the cogniser '—Then comes the *doubt* in the form—'has this cogniser a beginning or is it beginningless ?'—thus the real character of the thing being in doubt, and not well known, the enquirer accepts and assents to that particular character in support of which he finds proofs and grounds for acceptance. For instance (in the particular case cited) the proof would be in the following form,—'If the cogniser were beginningless, then alone would *Birth & Rebirth* and *Release* be possible for him;—*Birth & Rebirth* consisting in the functioning, one after the other, of pain, birth, activity, defect and ignorance, among whom that which follows is the cause of that which precedes it; and *Release* consisting in the disappearance, one after the other, of these same (as declared in Sū 1·1·2); and both of these would be impossible for him, if the cogniser had a beginning; for in that case the cogniser would be connected with a particular set of body, sense-organs, intellection and sensations, only when he would come into existence for the first time, so that these, body and the rest, could not be the products of his

* Doubt is a necessary element in *Tarka* , as it is only when there is doubt as to the presence of this or that particular character that we can have a reasoning which shows the impossibility of the presence of one, and hence the certainty of the presence of the other character ; and it is this reasoning that constitutes *Tarka*.

† The proof in support being in the form of the absurdity or impossibility of the other alternative.

own past actions; and further, anything that is born also ceases to be (very soon after), so that, becoming non-existent or destroyed, he would not be these to undergo the experiences resulting from his actions;—thus then for any one cogniser, it would be absolutely impossible to have either connection with more than one body, or disconnection (separation) from any body at all.' If (in another instance) the reasoner finds no such proof forthcoming, he does not accept or assent to the conclusion.* It is reasoning of this kind that is called '*Tarka*', 'Cogitation'

[The *Sūtra* says that *Tarka* is 'for the purpose of knowing the real character of the thing'; against this an objection is raised.]—"Why should this reasoning be said to be for the purpose of bringing about the true knowledge of the real character', and not to be that *knowledge* itself [appearing as it has been represented to do, in the form 'the thing must be so and so, and of no other kind', which is the form in which the knowledge of the real character of the things appears]?"

Our answer to this is that it would not be right for us to speak of the reasoning as embodying the *knowledge* itself, because as a matter of fact, it is indecisive, being purely permissive in it chracter,—the reasoner simply assenting to the assertion of one of the two suspected characters, on the strength of the proof adduced and he does not (by this reasoning alone) accurately determin or decide, or ascertain† that the thing must be so and so.

"How then does the reasoning serve the purpose of bringin about the knowledge of the real character of things?"

The true knowledge arises from the force of the Instrumer of Cognition (which becomes fully operative and effective) whe following after the reasoning, which has been duly considered an found to be free from all defects, and which appears in th form of assent to the conclusion indicated by the said Instrumer

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* The Viz. S. edition reads *taccānujārāti*, which is clearly wrong, th correct reading is *tannānujānāti*, as the Puri MS. and the *Tātparya* read.

† The author puts forth several synonyms with a view to show that th form in which the reasoning appears is totally different from that of a definite, fully ascertained cognition,—says the *Tātparya*.

of Cognition;* and it is in this manner that the reasoning serves the purpose of bringing about the true knowledge of the real character of things. †

Thus then, we find that Cogitation serves the purpose of restoring or resuscitating the *Pramāṇas* or Instruments of Cognition (which have become shaken by doubts in regard to the truth of the conclusions arising from them), and (thereby) assents to and confirms those conclusions; it is for this reason that it is mentioned along with '*Pramāna*' in the Sūtra (I.2 1) which defines *Discussion*.

This Cogitation assents to or confirms the notion as to the real character of a thing whose real character is not known; *i.e.* the idea of the thing *as it really exists*, which is what is meant by its 'real character'; *i e.* the character that is free from all misconceptions with regard to the thing. ‡

Nirnaya-Demonstrated Truth

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In regard to the subject-matter of the above-described Cogitation—

Sūtra 41

"when there is an ascertainment of the real character of the thing after duly deliberating over the two sides of the question—an argument in favour of a certain conclusion and also that in its confutation§—we have what is called 'Demonstrated Truth', 'Nirṇaya'"

* The reading of the Viz S edition is again defective in L 4, for *akṣanānugraho* we should read '*lakṣanādūhā*' as read by the Puri MS., by the *Tātparya* and also by three other MSS. as mentioned in the footnote in the Viz S edition.

† By declaring that the true knowledge arises from the force of the Instrument of Cognition, the author means to lay stress upon the fact that *Tarka* can never, *by itself*, be the independent means of any knowledge—*Tātparya*.

‡ For '*yathābhāva*,' read '*tathābhāva*' which gives better sense and is supported by the *Vārtika*.

§ By '*pakṣa*' and '*pratipakṣa*' here are meant respectively—(1) the argument in favour of a certain conclusion, and (2) the argument against that conclusion. Such is the interpretation by the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*. But the *Nyāyasūtravivarana* of Rādhāmohana takes '*pratipakṣa*' as the argument against the view opposed to the said conclusion.

In regard to every matter of dispute we have two opposite views—one seeks to establish the truth of a certain conclusion with regard to the thing under investigation, and the other denies that conclusion, and seeks to confute the former view; and, these two,—the arguments favouring and the arguments demolishing—are based upon—*i. e* put forward with a view to—the 'conclusion' (*pakṣa*) and its 'confutation' (*pratipaksa*); and the two sets of arguments themselves, when appearing together,—*i.e.* when put forward side by side,—come to be spoken of respectively as the '*paksa*' (a certain view) and '*pratipakṣa*' (the contrary view) And of these two views, it is necessary that one should be rejected and the other confirmed; and when one is confirmed, the '*ascertainment*' with regard to that is called '*Demonstrated Truth*', '*Nirnaya*'.

An opponent [being misled by the terms '*paksa*', 'one view', and '*pratipakṣa*', 'contrary view' to think that the whole definition refers to *Discussion*, and it implies the presence of an element of *Doubt*] urges the following objection:—"It is not possible to have the said *ascertainment* by means of the '*paksa* and *pratipakṣa*'. In every Discussion what happens is as follows:—(A) At first, one disputant states one view and supports it* with arguments, and rejects all the objections that the other party could bring against that view,—(B) the second disputant thereupon refutes the arguments put forward by the former in support of his view, and also answers the arguments urged against the objections put forward by himself—(C) so it goes on, until one (set of arguments) stops; and when one has stopped, the other becomes established; and it is by means of this latter set of arguments *alone* (and not by both, as said in the *Sūtra*) that we have that 'ascertainment of the real character of the thing'. which is called 'Demonstrated Truth'. [So that it is not right to speak of the 'ascertainment' as obtained through both '*pakṣa and pratipaksa*']; specially as in a *bona-fide* discussion, both parties are equally *certain* as to the truth of their allegations, and there is no element of *Doubt* in their minds; or else, they would not engage in the Discussion."

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* The Viz. S. Edition reads a superfluous '*tam*' here, which is not found either in the Puri MS. or in the reading adopted by the *Tātparya*.

The answer to the above is that, as a matter of fact 'ascertainment' is got at through both "How is this proved?" In the following manner, we reply. Every Discussion ends in showing the possibility or reasonableness of one view and the impossibility or unreasonableness of the 'confutation' of (the arguments against) that view, [or *vice versa*, the reasonableness of the confutation and the unreasonableness of the original view]; and it is only when we have *both* of these—the *reasonableness* and *unreasonableness*—that they *conjointly* set aside the doubt or uncertainty attaching to the real character of the thing; while if we do not have them both, the uncertainty continues to remain

'*After deliberating*'—*i e.*, after having carried on due deliberation This 'deliberation' consists in the bringing to light—*i.e.*, formulating—the two sides of the question, whereby it provides the occasion for reasonings to operate,—*i e*, to be put forward (with a view to ascertain the truth)

What is declared here in this *Sūtra* must be taken as referring to mutually contradictory views pertaining to one and the same thing When it is found that the two contradictory characters subsist in *similar* things (and not in the *same* thing), then both being possible, both are accepted; for the simple reason that due investigation has shown such to be the real state of the things, for example, when the definition of *Substance* is stated in the form 'Substance is that which has Motion,' it is found that a Substance, for which Motion is possible or certain, 'has motion,' while at the same time, there are substances for which no activity is possible, and these certainly 'have no motion' [so that in regard to this case both views 'Substance has motion' and 'Substance has no motion,' are admissible, and as such cannot be called 'contradictory views']. Even with regard to the same thing, if the two contradictory characters are predicated in reference to different points of time, then there is an option with regard to time [both being accepted as true, in reference to different points of time]; *e g.*, the same substance which, at one time being moving, is said to 'have motion,' may be admitted to 'have no motion' at another time, when either the motion may not have yet appeared, or it may have ceased.

When the *Sūtra* declares, that '*Demonstrated Truth is that ascertainment which is got at after duly deliberating the two sides of a question,*' it is not meant to apply to *all kinds of Demonstrated Truth*; for in the case of Perception, which is born of the contact of the sense-organ with the object, the *Demonstrated Truth* consists simply in the 'ascertainment of the object';—it is only in regard to a thing in doubt, which is under investigation [and with regard to which a Cogitation has been put forward], that *Demonstrated Truth* consists in *the ascertainment got at by duly deliberating the two sides of the question*; while lastly, in regard to the subject-matter of Discussion and the Scriptures there is no 'deliberation' (or doubt).*

Thus ends the First *Daily Lesson* in the First *Discourse* of Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*

DISCOURSE I

Second Daily Lesson

LECTURE (1)

Controversy

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

†There are three kinds of Controversy—(1) Discussion, (2) Disputation and (3) Wrangling. Of these—

* In the case of Perception we have neither 'deliberation' nor the 'two sides of the question',—in the case of things under investigation we have both; while in the case of Discussion, we have the 'two sides of the question,' but no 'deliberation,'—as each party is equally certain of his view, and in the case of Scriptures, there may be 'two sides', but there is no 'deliberation' or 'doubt'

The *Nyāyasūtravivarana* remarks that in the case of 'Inference for one's own benefit, also, there is neither 'doubt' nor 'two sides.'

† The connection of the two Daily Lessons is thus explained in the *Parisuddhi*—The entire method of reasoning with all its accessories has been explained in the First Daily Lesson. All this reasoning helps the reasoner to arrive at a definite conclusion either by himself alone, or by holding a consultation with others In the latter case there arise occasions for discussion and mutual criticism; and it is this latter method of arriving at a conclusion that constitutes the subject-matter of the Second Daily Lesson. Controversy, according to a certain writer, whom the *Parishuddhi* calls the प्रौडगौडनैयायिक, is of four kinds–जल्पः,—प्रतिपक्षस्थापनहीनो जल्प;—वादः–and प्रतिपक्षस्थापनहीनो वादः; while according to the "Bāhyas" (outsiders, *i. e.* Bauddhas) there is only one kind of Controversy,

Sūtra 1

Discussion consists in the putting forward (by two persons) of a conception and a counter-conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings,—neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine (or thesis), and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the Five Factors.

When two contrary particular characters are alleged to subsist in the same substratum, they are called '*pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*', 'conception and counter-conception', being, as they are, like opponents to each other; *e. g.* when we have two such allegations as—' soul is ' and ' soul is not '; when, however, the contrary characters are conceived to subsist in different substrata, they are not called ' conception and counter-conception '; *e. g.* such conceptions as ' Soul is eternal ' and 'Buddhi is non-eternal ' *Parigraha* ', ' *putting forward*,' means asserting, or laying stress upon, the thing being of a particular character. And it is this asserting of two contrary characters that constitutes Discussion.

The distinctive features of this Discussion are next put forward:—*In which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings*—i e in which a conception is supported by means of proofs and reasonings, and also condemned by means of proofs and reasonings, so that what is meant is that both the *supporting* and the *condemning* are done by means of proofs and reasonings.* ' Supporting ' here stands for establishing,

* The footnote in the Vizianagram Sans. Series says that the 'supporting' is done by means of proofs only and the 'condemning' is done by means of reasoning only. But this is contrary to what follows in the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*. The last says—Though in Wrangling also there is putting forward of conception and counter conception, yet herein we have no 'supporting' of the counter-allegation; as in Wrangling there is only demolishing of each other's positions, and no supporting at all;—though in Disputation there is supporting of the counter-conception, yet the supporting and condemning are not always by means of such reasonings as have all their factors entirely valid. So that from both Wrangling and Disputation Discussion becomes distinguished by reason of its having both the supporting and condemning done in accordance with reasonings and proofs. The *Vārtika* explains the compound '*pramānatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ*' somewhat differently It takes it as a *madhyamapadalopī* compound, expounding it as '*pramānatarkasādhanah pramānatarkasādhanopālambhaśca*'—*i. e.* the supporting is done by means of proofs and reasonings, and the condemnation of that supporting is also done by means of proofs and reasonings.

and 'condemning' for denying or rejecting. These two, 'supporting' and 'condemning' of the two conceptions, proceed hand in hand, in a connected manner,—until one of the two conceptions becomes rejected and another established; so that there is ultimately 'condemnation' of that which has been rejected and 'supporting' of that which remains unshaken.

As a rule *Clinchers* are employed in Disputation; so that their use is precluded from Discussion. But even though Clinchers are, as a body, precluded from Discussion, yet the use of some of them is permitted;—that is what is meant by the qualification 'not opposed to the main doctrine'; *—for instance, it is permitted to employ, in Discussion, the Clincher, in the shape of the Fallacy of 'Contradiction,' which has been defined (in Sū. 1-2-6) as 'that which contradicts the accepted thesis.' Similarly the qualification 'carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the Five Factors' has been added with a view to indicate that it is permitted to employ, in Discus-

* The *Vārtika* does not accept this interpretation; according to it, this qualification is meant to exclude the *Apasiddhānta*.

The *Pariśuddhi* thus explains the difference in the two interpretations:—We have a general rule that 'no animals should be killed,' then we have the exception 'the *Agnisomīya* animal should be killed'; so here we have the general rule that in वाद् no clinchers are to be put forward, and then there is the exception, that the *Apasiddhānta* clincher should be urged. Thus according to the Bhāsya. According to the *Vārtika* the sense is that there is a natural tendency to urge *all* clinchers in वाद; and hence there is the exclusive selection of the *Apasiddhānta* as the only one of the clinchers to be urged.

The *Pariśuddhi* goes on—'From among the 22 clinchers, there are *six* that cannot by their very nature, be urged in वाद—(1) प्रतिज्ञाहानि, (2) प्रतिज्ञासंन्यास, (3) निरर्थक, (4) अर्थान्तर, (5) अविज्ञातार्थ and (6) अपार्थक;—there are *seven* which, even though possible, should not be urged—(1) प्रतिज्ञान्तर, (2) हेत्वन्तर, (3) अज्ञान, (4) अप्रतिभा, (5) विक्षेप, (6) मतानुज्ञा, (7) पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षण;—there are *seven* again which *may* be urged—(1) विरोध, (2) अप्राप्तकाल, (3) न्यून, (4) अधिक, (5) पुनरुक्त, (6) अननुभाषण, (7) अपसिद्धान्त;—there are *two* which, when urged, put an end to the controversy—(1) हेत्वाभास, (2) निरनुयोज्यानुयोग.

sion, the two Clinchers of 'Deficiency,'—which is defined as 'that which is wanting in any one of the factors of reasoning' (Sū. 5-2-12)—and 'Redundance'—defined as 'that which puts forward superfluous Probans and Example.' (Sū. 5-2-13).

[One purpose of the term 'in which the supporting and condemning are by means of proofs and reasonings' having been already explained, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to point out other purposes served by the same term.]—(1) Even though 'proofs and reasonings' are included among the 'Factors' [so that the presence of 'proofs and reasonings' is already implied in the qualification 'in accordance with reasoning through the Five Factors'], yet 'proofs and reasonings' have been added separately, with a view to indicate that the proofs and reasonings urged by the two parties should be inter-related (and not independent of one another); otherwise it would have to be regarded as 'Discussion' when both parties go on urging arguments, each in support of his own view (without any regard to arguments propounded by the other).*—(2) In some cases, it is found that even without the use of the 'Factors of Reasoning', several Proofs accomplish their purpose (of determining the real nature of things); so that it would be real Discussion also when the 'supporting' and 'condemning' are carried on by means of such proofs (as are independent of the Factors);—and it is this fact that is indicated by the adding of the term 'by means of proofs and reasonings' [while, in the absence of this term, the said form of Discussion would not be included in the definition, which, in that case, would make the presence of the 'five factors' essential].—(3) Lastly, the term 'in accordance with proofs and reasonings' has been added for the purpose of precluding the notion that Disputation does not admit of those Clinchers that are employed in Discussion,—Disputation being defined (in the next Sūtra) as 'that in which the supporting and condemning are carried on by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers'; that is to say, this definition of Disputation might

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* For instance, when one party goes on propounding, from his own standpoint, arguments in support of the eternality of Sound, and the other person putting forward from his point of view alone, arguments in support of its non-eternality; and neither takes any account of the arguments urged by the other.

give rise to the notion that Disputation is that wherein the supporting and condemning are carried on by means of Casuistry &c. only (and never by means of proofs and reasonings); while wherever the supporting and condemning are carried on by means of proofs and reasonings, it is *Discussion* always (and never *Disputation*);—and with a view to preclude this notion, the Sūtra has added the term 'by means of proofs and reasonings'. [The sense being that, as a matter of fact, some of the Clinchers employed in Discussion may be employed in Disputation and *vice-versa*, and yet there is this distinction that, in Discussion the supporting and condemning are done strictly in accordance with proofs and reasonings, while in Disputation, they are done by means of Casuistry, etc., *also*.]

Sūtra 2

Jalpa-Disputation

Disputation is that which is endowed with the said characteristics and in which there is supporting and condemning by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers (also)

BHĀṢYA

'*Endowed with the said characteristics*',—*i.e.* (*a*) it puts forward a conception and counter-conception,—(*b*) consists in supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings,—(*c*) is not opposed to the main doctrine,—and (*d*) is carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through Five Factors

'*In which there is supporting and condemning by means of Casuistry &c.*'—*i.e.* the peculiarity of Disputation (as distinguished from Discussion) lies in this that here the supporting as well as the condemning are done also by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers.

An objection is raised—"As a matter of fact, no *supporting* of anything is ever done by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers; all these serve the purpose only of condemning (or opposing) things; as is distinctly expressed in their general definitions as well as detailed classifications: For instance, the general definitions of these (as provided in the *Nyāya Sūtra*) are—

(*a*) 'Casuistry consists in opposing an assertion through the assumption of an alternative meaning' (1. 2. 18),—(*b*) 'Futile Rejoinder consists in opposing an assertion through similarity and dissimilarity', (1. 2. 10),—and (*c*) 'Clincher consists in the indicating of the disputant's misunderstanding and failing to understand the point at issue'. (1. 2. 19); and in the detailed classification of each of these also it is clear that every one of them serves the purpose of only opposing assertions. There is nothing in the Sūtra as we have it from which one could understand that Casuistry &c., serve to *support* conceptions through opposing (their contraries); this sense could be got at only if we had the Sūtra in the form that 'in Disputation, *opposing* is by means of Casuistry, &c.' (dropping the term '*supporting*' altogether)."

[The answer to the above objection is as follows]—As a matter of fact, both *supporting* and *condemning* are done by means of *proofs*; and Casuistry, &c., come in only as auxiliaries, serving the purpose of guarding one's own view; and they never, by themselves, serve as the means of supporting. That is to say, when a person *supports* by means of proofs, Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers are employed as auxiliaries,† serving, as they do, the purpose of guarding one's own view;—as a matter of fact, whenever these are employed they guard one's own view by attacking or opposing the other view. This is exactly what is declared later on in the Sūtra—'Disputation and Wrangling serve the purpose of safeguarding the conception of truth—just as the fencing of thorny boughs serves the purpose of safeguarding the sprouting of seeds.' (4-2-50). Similarly when a person condemns a counter-conception by means of proofs, if he employs Casuistry &c., they become helpful in setting aside or warding off the attacks that might be made against that condemnation. So that Casuistry, &c, are employed only as subsidiary auxiliaries; [there is this difference, however, that] as regards *supporting*, they never by themselves serve as the direct means (always serv-

† The words न स्वतन्त्राणां साधनभावः यत् तत् प्रमाणैरर्थस्य साधनं तत्र छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानामङ्गभावः स्वपक्षरक्षणार्थत्वात् are wanting in the Puri manuscript; but this must be due to लेखकप्रमाद, caused by the same word रक्षणार्थत्वात् occurring twice.

ing as subsidiary auxiliaries),—but as regards *condemning*, they do by themselves, serve as the direct means also.*

Vitaṇḍā-Wrangling

Sūtra 3

That same Disputation is Wrangling when there is no establishing of the counter-conception. †

BHĀṢYA

The aforesaid Disputation becomes 'Wrangling';—with this further qualification that it is without any establishing of the counter-conception. That is to say, out of the above described two allegations in regard to two contrary characters as subsisting in the same substratum,—which have been called above, 'conception and counter-conception'—the Wrangler does not establish one (that which he himself holds), but only goes on to criticise the (proofs adduced for establishing the) conception of the other person

"In that case the definition of Wrangling had better be stated in the form that it is that Disputation *which is without a counter-conception.*"§

But as a matter of fact, the statement that the Wrangler makes in attacking his opponent's view could constitute his own 'view', and what is meant (by there being no establishing of the counter-conception) is that he does not proceed to establish the proposition which he lays down as to be proved by himself. And

* The *Vārtika* has taken exception to the whole of this question and answer in the *Bhāṣya*. It is interesting to note that the न्यायसूत्रविवरण takes साधनोपालम्भ as साधनाय उपालम्भः *attacking for the purpose of supporting*.

† The 'Sacred Books of the Hindus' edition reads the *Sūtra* as 'स्वप्रतिपक्ष'. This is not supported by any of the available commentaries, nor by the Puri manuscripts, nor by the explanations given by the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*. The last says—'The *conception* of the critic himself is what is called *counter-conception* here,—as opposed to the view that he is criticising.'

§ When there is no *establishing* of the critic's own view, it follows that he has no *view* of his own to establish; for unless an attempt is made by a person to establish a certain idea, the idea cannot be called a 'pakṣa', a *view*.

(for this reason) it is better to have the definition as it stands in the Sūtra.

SECTION (2)

Of the Fallacious Probans.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The '*Hetvābhāsas*,, 'Fallacious Probans', are so called because they do not possess all the characteristics of the true Probans, and yet they are sufficiently similar to the Probans to *appear* as such. And these—

Sūtra 4

(1) The Savyabhicāra (Inconclusive), (2) The Viruddha (Contradictory), (3) The Prakaraṇasama (Neutralised), (4) The Sādhyasama (unknown), and the Kālātīta (Mistimed)—are the Fallacious Probans

The Inconclusive Probans (1)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

From among the aforesaid five Fallacious Probans--

Sūtra 5

† The Inconclusive is that which is tainted by indecision.

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* When the wrangler confines himself to merely criticising the opponent's view, he does so with the idea that when the opponent's view has been rejected as wrong, it would follow as a necessary consequence that his own view is right, so that he does have a *view* of his own; but it is stated in wrangling, only in the form of the attack on the other view, this 'criticism, being figuratively spoken of as his 'view'.—So that the meaning is that though the wrangler has a view of his own, yet he does not make any attempt at *establishing* it, apart from the attack that he directs againt the other view. Hence it is only right to speak of there being no *establishing* of his own view but it would be wrong to say that *there* is no other view.—*Tātparya*

† The term, अनैकान्तिक is explained by the न्यायसूत्रविवरण as follows—'एकस्य,' साध्यस्य साध्याभावस्य वा 'अन्ते' अधिकरणमात्रे यस्तिष्ठति स 'एकान्तः'। तदन्यः 'अनैकान्तः'. एकस्मिन् अन्ते यो नियतः स एकान्तः—says the *Bhāṣya* below. On this Sū. the *Tātparya* remarks that the terms 'inconclusive' and 'indecisive' being synonymous—which is the term defined and which is the defining term should vary with the student. If he knows the meaning of 'inconclusive' and not that of 'indecisive' then the latter shall be for him the defined term, and the former the defining term, and so *vice versa*

The term '*vyabhicāra*', 'indecision', means *non-fixity on any one point* * ; and that which is accompanied by this 'indecision' is the 'indecisive'. As for example, in the reasoning 'Sound is eternal *because it is intangible*—the jar which is *tangible* has been found to be non-eternal,—and Sound is *not tangible*,—therefore, being intangible, Sound must be eternal',—we find that the character of *intangibility* has been put forward as proving the character of *eternality*; while as a matter of fact the two characters do not bear to each other the relation of *proof and proved* (Probans and Probandum); [as all *non-eternal* things are not *tangible*, *e.g.* Buddhi is non-eternal and yet it is intangible]; for we find that the *Atom* is tangible and yet eternal. If the Soul and such other things (which combine *eternality* with *intangibility*) be cited as the instance (supporting the reasoning), then—inasmuch as the Probans has been defined (above, in Sū. 1-1-34) as 'that which establishes the Probandum through similarity to the instance',—'intangibility' will have to be regarded as the Probans; and this would be found to be not necessarily concomitant with *eternality*,—*e.g.* in the case of *Buddhi*, which is *intangible* and yet *non-eternal*. So that in both kinds of instance [in that of *dissimilarity*, in the case of *jar* cited before, which is tangible and non-eternal,—and in that of *similarity*, as in the case of *Soul*, which is intangible and eternal], there is 'indecision', non-concomitance, between *intangibility* and *eternality*; and thus they cannot be accepted to be related as *probans* and *probandum*; and thus, not fulfilling the conditions of the Probans, what is cited in the above reasoning cannot be a true Probans.

[If the term 'अनैकान्तिकः' be taken as embodying the definition and 'सव्यभिचारः' as the term defined, in that case the word अनैकान्तिकः should be explained as follows:]—In the reasoning cited, 'eternality' is one '*anta*', *point*, and 'non-eternality' is another one '*anta*', *point*; that which subsists in—is concomitant with—*one point* would be '*ekānta*', *one-pointed*; and the contrary (that is not concomitant, with *one*) would be '*anaikānta*', *not one-pointed*; as this would be concomitant with both (the Probandum, *eternality*, and its contrary, *non-eternality*)

* *I. E.* When a probans is found to be concomitant with neither *the probandum only*, nor the *negation of the probandum only*,—but with *both*—then it is said to be 'tainted by *vyabhicāra* or indecision'

Sūtra 6

The Contradictory Probans (2)

A certain doctrine (or view) having been accepted, the probans that is contradictory to it is called the 'Contradictory'.

BHĀSYA

The term '*tadvirodhi*', 'contradictory to it', means *that which contradicts it, i.e.* that which contradicts (sets aside, renders impossible*) the doctrine that has been accepted. *E. g.* [When the author of the *Yogabhāsya* on Yogasūtra III-13† makes the two statements]—'This world, being a modification, ceases from manifestation, because its eternality is denied'—and—'Even when thus ceasing, it continues to exist, because its utter destruction is denied.' Here we find that what the Probans in the former reasoning—'because its eternality is denied'—means is that 'no modification can be eternal'; and this is certainly contradictory to the doctrine enunciated in the second statement, that 'even when ceasing, the modification continues to exist' "How?" Well, the 'manifestation' of a thing is only the *attaining of existence*, and 'ceasing' is *falling off*; so that if the modification when *fallen off* (*apeta*, ceasing) *from its existence* (*vyakteh*, from manifestation), does 'continue to exist', then it is not possible to deny its eternality; because the very fact that the modification continues to exist even after manifestation should constitute its *eternality*; and 'denial of its eternality' should necessarily imply the possibility of the modification falling off from its existence; as it is only what actually falls off from existence that has been found to be non-eternal; while that which *still exists* does not fall off from existence;—so that 'continuing to exist' and 'falling off from existence' are two mutually contradictory concepts; and as such can never co-exist. Thus it is found that the Probans put forward ('denial of eternality') actually sets aside the

* In *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 5-2-4, "is contradicted" has been explained as "is rendered impossible".

† The real words of the योगभाष्य are तदेतत् त्रैलोक्यं विकारो etc. as quoted in the *Vārtika*.

very doctrine (*of continuity of existence*) on whose basis it is put forward.*

Sūtra 7

(3) *The Neutralised Probans—the Third Fallacious Probans*

The Neutralised Probans is that which is put forward to establish a definite conclusion, while it is one that only gives rise to suspense (and vascillation) in regard to the point at issue

BHĀSYA

The term '*prakarana*', 'point at issue', stands for the two opposite views on a doubtful question, neither of which is definitely ascertained ;—the '*cintā*', 'suspense', in regard to such point at issue, consists in that desire to ascertain the truth, that whole process of investigation, which, starting with the doubt, ends with the definitive cognition ;—now that Probans which really only gives rise to the said suspense, if put forward as leading to

* There is a marked difference between the Bhāsya's account of the Contradictory Probans and that given by the later Logicians. It is clear from the Bhāsya that what is meant is that the Probans is contradictory to some doctrine that its propounder has already accepted. The later Logicians define it as *that which proves the contradictory of the proposition which it is put forward to prove*. The earliest mention of this later view is found in the *Vārtika*, which puts it forward as an alternative explanation of the definition given in the Sūtra The words of the Sūtra afford directly the meaning assigned to them in the Bhāsya , but how the words may be made to yield the later view is thus explained in the न्यायसूत्रविवरण—वादिना न्यायादिबोधितसिद्धान्तं तत्प्रतिज्ञातसाध्यरूपमभ्युपेत्य—अनूद्य—तद्रक्षणाय प्रयुक्तः तद्विरोधी साध्याभावव्याप्यप्रकृतहेतुः विरुद्धः । [When the opponent repeats the view he is going to refute and then propounds the refuting reason, this reason is contradictory.] अथवा साध्यमभ्युपेत्य उद्दिश्य तत्साधनाय प्रयुक्तो यो वस्तुगत्या साध्याभावव्याप्यो हेतुः । [That which really happens to prove a conclusion contrary to what it is meant to prove.] The former of these two explanations is not right , the latter represents the generally accepted view.

The *Pariśuddhi* thus distinguishes '*Virodha*' from '*Apasiddhānta*'—'We have *Apasiddhānta* when the assertion made goes against what the speaker himself has declared previously on the basis of a more authoritative *pramāṇa* ; while there is *Virodha* when the assertion itself contains within itself the elements of contradiction, when one part of it asserts one thing and another part a totally contradictory thing.'

definitive cognition, does not differ (in point of being doubtful), from the point at issue; as both sides would be equal (equally doubtful); and thus being *similar* (*sama*) *to the point at issue* (*prakarana*), it does not lead to any definite conclusion. *

Example—'Sound is non-eternal, because we do not find in it the properties of the eternal thing; and we have found, in the case of such things as the Dish and the like, that what is not found to possess the properties of an eternal thing is non-eternal.'

That reasoning, in which what is put forward as the Probans is the character that is admitted (by both parties) to be common (to the Probandum and its Reverse), is 'equal to doubt' (in not leading to a certain conclusion); and such a Probans, therefore, has been called 'Indecisive';—[in the case of the *Prakaranasama*], on the other hand, what gives rise to the '*prakarana*', the *point at issue*, is (not *Doubt* but) only that factor of Doubt which consists in the fact of there being found nothing which could favour either of the two opposite views; *e.g.* in regard to the reasoning cited, we find that in *Sound*, properties of an *eternal* thing are not found, just as properties of a *non-eternal* thing are not found; and this not finding of peculiarities favouring either of the two views

* The two opposite views, which constitute the 'point at issue', have been here called '*prakarana*' in the sense that these views are what are *made the probandum* (*sādhyatvena prakriyate*) by the two parties The 'suspense' in regard to these views, is due to the real truth on the point being not known, *e.g* when a man puts forward the fallacious reasoning—'Sound is *non*-eternal because the properties of an eternal thing are not found in it'—the person to whom this is addressed falls into a suspense, as he does not find, in Sound, either such properties as are invariably concomitant with *eternality*, or such as are inseparable from non-*eternality*; having therefore his doubts thus aroused, he proceeds to enquire and investigate. So that the urging of *the non-finding of the properties of an eternal thing*, as brought forward to prove *eternality*,—while it leads only to a doubt as to *eternality* and *non-eternality*,—constitutes the Fallacious Probans called '*Prakaranasama*' 'Both sides would be equal'—*i.e.* just as the *not finding of the properties of the eternal thing* would indicate *non-eternality*, exactly in the same manner would *the not finding of the properties of a non-eternal thing* indicate *eternality* ....The explanation of the term as '*similar to the point at issue*' (*prakaranasya samaḥ*) is only by way of indicating what the etymology of the word signifies; it is not meant that *similarity to the point at issue* constitutes the denotation of the term; in fact what the term really denotes is only *being neutralised* (having an opponent equally strong)—*Tātparya*.

gives rise to 'suspense in regard to the point at issue.' "How?" Because in the contrary case (*i.e.* in the case of our finding peculiarities favouring either of the two views), there would be an end to the 'point at issue' (one of the views being definitely ascertained); for example, if we actually found, in Sound, properties of the *eternal* thing, it would no longer be a 'point at issue'; or if we found in it properties of the *non-eternal* thing, then also it would cease to be a 'point at issue' Thus then we find that, inasmuch as such a Probans gives rise to (lends support to) both the pposite views, it cannot lead to a definitive cognition in regard to either one of them *

Sūtra 8

(4) The Unknown Probans

The Unknown Probans is that which, being still to be proved, is not different from the Probandum.†

* The difference between the Inconclusive and the Neutralised probans, as brought out in the Bhāsya, is thus explained in the *Tātparya*—The Probans in the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, because properties of an eternal thing are not found in it' would be called 'Inconclusive', only if the *not-finding of the properties of an eternal thing* were known to subsist in a thing which is admitted by both parties to be *eternal*, or the not-finding of the properties of the non-eternal thing were known to subsist in a thing admitted by both parties to be *non-eternal*. As it is, however, neither of these two conditions is fulfilled by the case cited, in which all that we have is that in Sound, there is *not-finding of the properties of the eternal thing*, and also the *not-finding of the properties of the non-eternal thing*. that is all; and these two circumstances neutralising one another, we call the Probans 'neutralised.'

† 'That whose subsistence in the Subject is as unsettled as that of the Probandum'—says the न्यायसूत्रविवरण. The *Tātparya* has the following notes on the text of the Sūtra :- The definition here provided is meant to include all the four kinds of असिद्ध– स्वरूपासिद्ध, एकदेशासिद्ध, आश्रयासिद्ध, अन्यथासिद्ध; as every one of them is *still to be proved* and as such similar to the Probandum. If the definition had been stated simply as—'the *sādhyasama* Probans is that which is unknown', then, we could not include in this that Probans which is unknown to only one of the parties (and *known* to the other); while this becomes included when we add साध्याविशिष्ट, as the Probandum also is unknown to only one of the two parties. And if we had only the term साध्याविशिष्ट then this would apply to the अन्यतरासिद्ध only; as it is only this that is exactly similar to the Probandum,— in that both are unknown

BHĀSYA

[As an example of this Fallacious Probans, we have the reasoning]—'Shadow is a substance',—the Probandum; to prove which is put forward the Probans 'because it has 'motion'; and this Probans does not differ from the Probandum, inasmuch as it is still to be proved; and hence it is an 'Unknown' Probans. Because that Shadow 'has motion' is not known, and it has got to be made known, just as much as the Probandum (that Shadow is a substance). What has got to be 'known' or ascertained is the following—'Does the shadow move, like the man? or is it that as the object obstructing the light moves along, there is a continuity of the obstruction, which leads to the continuity of the *absence of the light*, and it is this *absence of light* which is perceived (as the shadow)?' What actually happens is that as the object moves along, it obstructs certain portions of light, and what is perceived as 'shadow' is only the continued absence of those portions of light that are obstructed (by the moving object), as 'obstruction is only *negation of approach* *

Sūtra 9

(5) The Belated or Mistimed Probans.

The Belated or Mistimed Probans is that which, as adduced, is behind time

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before proof (by one party only) and both become known after proof, and all the other kinds of 'unknown' would become excluded. Hence the Sūtra has added the term '*sādhyatvāt*', *being still to be proved*; the Probandum also is *still to be proved*; or else it would not be a '*probandum*' at all; hence the Probans is called 'unknown' because it is *still to be proved*; and some of the 'unknown' are such as are wanting in proof only temporarily (such as अन्यतरासिद्ध) while others have this want permanently, not being capable of being proved at all; and to this latter class belong the स्वरूपासिद्ध and the आश्रयासिद्ध. It might seem that the definition applies to all *that is to be proved*, and hence it applies to the Probandum also. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the definition has to be taken as subject to the general definition of 'Fallacious Probans'; so what the definition means is that the 'Unknown' is that *probans* which etc. etc., and this cannot apply to the Probandum.

* In the last sentence, the readings adopted in the body of the *viz.* text are defective; the correct readings are supplied in the footnotes; and these are supported by the two Puri Mss. also.

BHĀṢYA

When one factor of the thing adduced as Probans is found to be affected by lapse of time, it is said to be adduced 'behind time;' and it is then called 'Belated.' Example—'Sound is eternal, *because it is manifested by conjunction*, like Colour; the Colour that is *manifested by the conjunction* of light with the jar is one that was in existence before, as well as after, its *manifestation*: similarly the Sound also that is *manifested by the conjunction* of the drum and the stick, or by the conjunction of the wood and the axe, is one that is in existence before and after its *manifestion*; so that, being *manifested by conjunction*, Sound must be regarded as *eternal*.'—This is not a valid Probans; because *when adduced, it is behind time.** In the case of Colour, the time at which the

* It is clear from this passage and from the explanation of the कालातीत हेत्वाभास as given here and in the *Vārtika*, that the conception of this fallacy has undergone a complete change at the hands of the later logicians. The latter regard that Probans as कालात्ययापदिष्ट which is found to be opposed to a well-ascertained fact; when, for instance, the *coolness* of fire is adduced as *Probans*; in accordance with this view they have given to their fallacy the name of बाधित, 'annulled', while what the *Bhāṣya* means is that we have the कालातीत fallacy when one part of the Probans is found to be such as is not true at the time in connection with which it is put forward; *e. g.* 'manifested by conjunction,' as adduced to prove the eternality of sound, is found to be a Probans of which one part, *conjunction*, is not present at the time that Sound appears, though it was there *before* that appearance; so that it is behind time, 'belated.' The name कालातीत—Belated—can rightly be applied to only this, the बाधित of the moderns was never *true*; so that the name 'belated' cannot apply to it. With a view to meet this discrepancy between the two views, the *Tātparya* has adopted the method of a very forced interpretation of the Bhāsya. It says that the opening sentence of the Bhāsya states both views—the '*svamata*,' his own view, as also the '*paramata*,' the view of others; the *Tātparya* taking care to brand what clearly is the Bhāsya view as '*paramata*,' and the modern view as '*svamata*'. and it gets the two views out of the two meanings of the word *artha*, 'thing,' in the *Bhāṣya*. According to the view of the *Tātparya*, 'thing' stands for the *Subject* of the Proposition, in which the Probans should subsist; and the *Subject*—like every other thing—has two factors, the thing itself and its qualities: and when one of these factors—the quality—is found to be affected by lapse of time, we call it 'belated; *e. g.* when *coolness of fire* is urged as proving its eternality, we find that the *coolness*, which is adduced

manifesting *conjunction* appears does not go beyond (*i. e.* does not differ from) that at which the manifested *colour* exists; as it is only during the time at which the conjunction of the light and jar is present that colour is perceived; while Colour is not perceived when the conjunction has ceased to exist. The case of Sound, however, is entirely different; for instance, it is only after the conjunction of the drum and stick has ceased that Sound is heard by the man at a distance, in fact it is heard at the time of the Disjunction (*i.e.* at the time that the stick has ceased to touch the drum); so that the manifestation of Sound is *beyond the time*

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as a quality of the subject, *Fire*, is 'belated,' because its contrary has been already definitely ascertained By the view of the *Bhāṣya* itself the 'thing' is the *Probans* itself, and it is called 'belated,' when not the whole of it, but only a part of it is found to be *behind time*, as in the case of the Probans 'manifested by conjunction', where it is found that though the *manifestation* is true, the *conjunction* has passed off when the Sound appears. And when the *Tātparya* finds the example given in the *Bhāṣya* not fitting in with its own view, it seeks to meet this difficulty by saying that the example according to the true view has not been given in the *Bhāṣya*, because several examples of it have already been given; when for instance it has been said that no conclusion can be deduced from what is contrary to well-ascertained facts of perception or to scripture; so that the *Bhāṣya* cites an example only according to the *paramata*. This method, however, is not quite in keeping with the practice of *Bhāṣyas*. All *Bhāṣyas*—that of *Vātsyāyana* among them—err more on the side of diffuseness than of conciseness. ||

The *Bhāṣya* view really does not lend support to the modern view of the fallacy of Annulment; if only a *part* of the Probans is 'behind time,' it cannot be said to be contrary to, and hence *annulled* by, well-ascertained facts of perception etc.; so in order to remove this difficulty, the *Tātparya* has taken the term 'one part' of the *Bhāṣya* to refer to the *Subject*, and not to the *Probans*. As regards the objection that might be urged against the *Bhāṣya* that it does not—if its own explanation of the Sūtra is accepted—mention the 'annulled' at all among the Fallacious probans,—it has to be borne in mind that a true *Fallacious Probans* is that which has some semblance of being a valid Probans, and as a matter of fact, anything so absurd as the *coolness of fire* cannot be said to have any 'semblance' to a valid Probans. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that we can apply the term 'behind time' or 'belated' to only what was true before, but is not true at the time in connection with that with which it is adduced; and this also can never apply to anything so absurd as *coolness* of fire. So that the modern view would appear to be unsupported, not only by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika*, but also by the *Sūtra*.

of the conjunction ; and as such it cannot be *caused* by that conjunction ; because as a rule when the *cause* has ceased to exist, the *effect* does not appear [so that if conjunction were the cause of the manifestion of Sound, the latter should cease after the former has ceased]. Thus then, it is found that what is adduced as the Probans is not 'similar to the example'; and as such it cannot prove the Proposition ; hence it is a Fallacious Probans.*

[The Bauddha logician has defined the 'Belated Probans' as that which is adduced at a time other than that at which it should be adduced ; *e. g.* when one party has urged the reasoning simply as 'Sound is eternal, like the jar', and he adduces the Probans, 'because it is a product', only *after* he has been asked 'Why ?' Having thus explained and exemplified the *Sūtra*, the Bauddha has found fault with it as follows :—The question—'Why ? '—that the Opponent puts—is it put *after* the first party has completed his say, or *before* that ? If the former, then the first party is open to the clincher of 'Deficiency', his reasoning being *deficient* in that it does not state the *Probans* at all, and hence it cannot be a case of Fallacious Probans being urged. If on the other hand the question is put *before* the first party has completed his say, then the *Probans* does not cease to be a truly valid Probans, simply because it is urged after some time ; if it fulfils all the conditions of the valid Probans, it does not lose its validity simply because of the interruption by the over-zealous Opponent. This is met by the *Bhāṣya* by rejecting the suggested interpretation of the *Sūtra*] —The Sūtra does not mean that 'belatedness' consists in the

* The *Tātparya* remarks that the Fallacious Probans as here explained would only be a form of the *Unknown* Probans, and as such the 'Belated' should be the same as the 'Unknown'; and the fact that even though this objection should have been brought forward by the *Bhāṣya* if the explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya* was really *paramata*, yet it has not been urged—has been met by the specious reasoning that the defect was so apparent that the *Bhāṣya*, did not think it worth while to urge it. But we have to remember that the 'Belated' as explained by the Bhāṣya, is not included in any of the three kinds of 'Unknown' accepted by the older logicians स्वरूपासिद्ध आश्रयासिद्ध and अन्यथासिद्ध (see above) ; it falls under what the later logicians have called the भागासिद्ध the *partly* 'unknown', of which however no mention is found either in the *Bhāṣya* or in the *Vārtika*.

reversing of the order of the Factors of Reasoning. Why? Because we have the general law that—'when one thing is by its inherent capability connected with another thing, the connection subsists also when they are remote from one another, and on the contrary, when the two things are not connected at all, mere proximity is ineffective';—and according to this law even when the Probans is stated in an order other than the usual one, it does not lose its character of the 'Probans'—which consists in its *similarity* or *dissimilarity* to the Example (Sū. 4-1-34 and 35); and so long as it does not lose the character of the 'Probans', it cannot be called a '*Fallacious*' Probans. And further, the 'reversing of the order of the Factors' is what has been stated (in Sū. 5-2-11) as constituting the *Clincher* of 'Inopportune'; so that if the same were mentioned here (as a 'Fallacious Probans'), that would be a needless repetition. Thus we conclude that such is not the meaning of the Sūtra.*

SECTION 3

CASUISTRY

Sūtras 10—17

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Next we proceed to describe *Casuistry*. †

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* The examples of 'annulment' by the more authoritative contrary cognition of the Subject are thus supplied by the *Pariśuddhi*—(1) 'The jar is all-prevading, because it is an entity, like Ākāśa'—when the all-prevadingness of the jar is opposed to what we know of the jar by preception;—(2) 'the atom is made of component parts, because it is corporeal, like the jar'—where the conclusion is opposed to what we know of the atom by Inference;—(3) 'the Meru consists of stone, because it is a mountain, like the Vindhya'—where the conclusion is opposed to what we know of the Meru from the scriptures. The following is an example of the annulment of the conception of the Probans as adduced—(1) 'Water and Air are hot, because their touch is different from that of Earth, like Fire'—where the fact of the touch of Air being different from that of Earth is opposed to our perception; and so on.

† The sequence is thus explained by the *Pariśuddhi*—When the disputant finds that his reasoning is vitiated by a fallacy, and he finds himself unable to remove the fallaciousness, he, still desperately trying to snatch victory to himself, puts forward improper answers—of which there are two kinds—Casuistry and Futile Rejoinder. The former comes first, as though wrong in sense, it is verbally and apparently right, while *Jāti* is more absurd, as it involves the contradiction of one's own assertions.

Sūtra 10

Casuistry consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than the one intended.

It is not possible to cite specific examples in connection with the general definition; they will be cited along with the definition of the several kinds of Casuistry.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The division of Casuistry is as follows—

Sūtra 11

It is of three kinds—(A) Vākchala, Verbal Casuistry, (B) Sāmānyacchala, Generalising Casuistry, and (C) Upacāracchala, Figurative Casuistry.—

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

From among these—

Sūtra 12

(A) Verbal Casuistry consists in assuming a meaning other than that intended to be conveyed by a word,—when the meaning (intended) is not definitely specified.

For instance, when the proposition is put forward in the form—'*Navakambalo' yam māṇavakaḥ*,' where what the speaker means is that 'the young boy is one *whose blanket is new*,' the compound word '*navakambalaḥ*' being equivalent to the expression '*navaḥ kambalo yasya*',—though this latter uncompounded expression sufficiently clearly defines the particular idea desired to be conveyed, the same is not done by the *compounded* word '*navakambalaḥ*' (which is ambiguous, being capable of affording more than one meaning);—and what the Casuist does is to assign to the compounded word a meaning other than the one intended by the speaker, and expounding the compound as '*nava kambalāḥ yasya*', takes it to mean that the young boy is one who *has nine blankets*, and says—'you say that the young boy has nine blankets';—having thus imposed upon the man an idea that he never intended to convey, he proceeds to oppose the assertion by showing its absurdity—'this boy has only *one* blanket, where are the *nine* blankets?' Thus this is a case of Casuistry which is urged on the occasion of an ambiguous word being used; and being based upon a *word*, it is called '*Verbal*' Casuistry.

This Casuistry is to be met by urging the necessity of the Casuist himself pointing out the peculiar circumstances favouring his own interpretation of the ambiguous word; for instance, the word '*Navakambalaḥ*' is ambiguous,—signifying 'one who has a *new* blanket' and also 'one who has *nine* blankets'; under the circumstances, when you take it to mean 'one who has nine blankets' (and then turn to me and say that the man has only *one* blanket, and not *nine*), this is hardly fair; as it is necessary to point out the peculiar circumstances that favour either of the two possible significations,—from the statement of which peculiar circumstances it would be known that the word (in the context in question) expressed that particular meaning;—as a matter of fact you have no such peculiar circumstances that you could urge (in favour of your own interpretation); so that what you have brought against us is a false and futile attack. *

Further, the connection of a word with its denotation is well known in the world to consist in the conventional restriction of a certain word having a certain denotation—in the form that 'of such and such a verbal expression such and such is the denotation'; and this conventional restriction is found to be general (wide) in the case of general terms, and particular (specialised) in the case of particular terms; and whenever these words are used, they are used according to previous usage, and never in a way in which they have never been used before; the use of a word again is only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of its meaning, and it is only when the meaning has been comprehended that there follows any activity (as resulting from the hearing of that word) Thus the use of words being for the sake of bringing about the comprehension of its meaning, the exact usage of the general term is determined by the force (of circumstances); *i.e.* when such expressions are used as—'take the *goat* to the village,' 'bring *butter*', 'feed the *Brāhmaṇa*'—every one of these words ('goat', 'butter' and 'brāhmaṇa') is a general or common term, and yet it is applied, in actual usage, to particular individuals composing what is denoted by that term; and to what particular individuals it is applied is determined by the force of circumstances; the term is applied to that particular

* The Puri MS. reads '*abhiyoga*' for *niyoga*.

individual (goat, for instance) with which it is found possible to connect the direction of the particular activity (of *taking to village*, for instance); it being absolutely impossible for the entire community (of *all goats* f. i.) to be connected with the direction expressed by the words ['take to the village',] [no one man at any one time could take to a village all the goats that there are in the world, all of which are denoted by the general term 'goat']. Similarly the term under discussion,—'*navakambalaḥ*' is a general term [as it has two significations]; and as such, when it is used it has to be taken as applied to that to which it has the capability to apply, under the circumstances;—so that when it is addressed in regard to a person having only one *new* blanket, it has to be taken as signifying 'one who has a new blanket'; and under the circumstances, the *possessing of nine blankets* being found impossible, the word cannot signify 'one who has *nine* blankets'. Thus when you assign to your opponent's word a meaning that it cannot possibly convey, your attack must be regarded as entirely futile *

Sūtra 13

(B) Generalising Casuistry consists in the urging of an absurd signification, which is rendered possible by the use of a too generic term.

BHĀṢYA

When one man says—' Oh, this Brāhmaṇa is endowed with learning and character', and another replies—' learning and character are quite natural to a Brāhmaṇa', – the latter assertion is met by opposition, by assigning to the word ('*Brāhmana*') a

* At the time that the exact denotation is fixed by convention for the first time, it is not said to pertain to any particular individual; the denotation fixed is entirely generic in its character; and it comes to be applied to particular individuals only through the force of such circumstances as the particular context in which the term is used, the particular person using it, the particular person to whom it is addressed, the particular time and place at which it is used, and so on. So that when the speaker has used a general term on a particular occasion and under particular circumstances, his exact meaning can be easily determined; and the fact that the word has a vague generic denotation is not his fault; the fault lies with the original convention that fixed that denotation; and as this convention is fixed by persons other than the particular speaker who uses the word, he cannot be blamed for making use of such a word: blaming him for it is altogether unfair.—*Tātparya*.

meaning other than the one intended,—that is by assigning to it an entirely absurd meaning;—this opposition being in the following form—'If learning and character are natural to the Brāhmaṇa, then they should be found in the delinquent * Brāhmaṇa also; as he also is a *Brahmaṇa*'.

That word is called 'too generic' which, while applying to the thing desired to be spoken of, also over-reaches it; *e. g.* the *Brahmaṇahood*—which is denoted by the term '*Brāhmaṇa*'—is, sometimes found to be concomitant with 'learning and character' and sometimes it is found to over-reach it, *i. e.* not concomitant with it. And as the opposition offered is based upon this 'too generic' character of the term used, it has been called the '*Generalising* Casuistry.'

This Casuistry is to be met by pointing out that what the speaker (of the second sentence) means is not to propound a reason (for what the previous speaker has said with regard to a particular Brāhmaṇa being endowed with learning and character), but only to make a *reference* (*i e.* a *representation* of what has been asserted in the previous sentence); as the second assertion is meant to be mere praise (of the *particular* Brāhmaṇa mentioned in the preceding sentence); so that there is no room for the assigning of the absurd signification. For instance, when one says 'corns grow in this field', another man may say 'in this field even seeds do not have to be sown,'—it is certainly not meant that seeds are not to be sown in the field; and yet what is said clearly is that they are not necessary; and by this the field, which is the receptacle of the growing corn, is praised, so that the assertion 'seeds do not have to be sown in this field' is meant to be a *reference* to the particular field with a view to praise it; and though the growing of the corn depends upon the seeds, this is not what is meant to be expressed by the sentence. Similarly in the case in question, by the assertion 'learning and character are only natural to the Brāhmaṇa', what is meant is that the particular Brāhmana possesses learning and character, and not that he possesses them *because he is a Brāhmaṇa*; what is meant to be expressed is not the *cause* (of the man's possessing learning

* The Brāhmaṇa who has not gone through the rites and ceremonies essential for all Brāhmanas is called a '*vrātya*' 'delinquent.'

and character); the assertion is a reference to a particular object which it is meant to eulogise; the meaning being that 'it is because the man is a Brāhmaṇa that the causes bringing about learning and character have become effective'; so that when the man praises the particular object, he does not deny the operation of causes leading up to the result (that makes the object worthy of that praise). Thus it is not right to offer opposition to the assertion by assigning to it an absurd signification.

Sūtra 14

(C) A Statement being made on the basis of the secondary (figurative) denotation of words, if it is opposed by a denial of the existence of what is asserted (on the basis of their primary denotation),—this constitutes Figurative (or shifting) Casuistry. *

BHĀṢYA

By the term '*dharma*' in the Sūtra is meant that property of the word which consists in its use in accordance with its primary denotation; but sometimes [when the primary denotation is

* The meaning of the Sūtra is not quite clear, the translation is in accordance with the explanation given by the *Bhāṣya*; according to the *Vārtika* (on Sū 16), the term अर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध here means 'the denial of the presence of the thing; and this suggests to the mind a very much simpler interpretation of the Sūtra itself 'when the statement is made in regard to the 'धर्म' *property*, of a thing, if this is opposed by the denial of the *thing* itself, we have the Shifting Casuistry'. This appears to be more in keeping with what follows in the next two *Sūtras*; and it is also supported by the *Vārtika* where it says that in the Shifting Casuistry what is denied is the *object* 'the *thing*,' *dharmin*. Though this statement, not being found to be in keeping with the interpretation of the Bhāsya, has been twisted by the *Tātparya* and the *Pariśuddhi* to mean something totally different.

The explanation of the *Sūtra* provided by the *Nyāyasūtravivarana* is as follows 'Dharma' stands for one of the two denotations of a word—primary or secondary,—*tasya*, 'of that'—*vividhah kalpaḥ*, 'more than one alternative meaning'—*yatra*, 'in which'; *nirdeśe, vādyuktaśabde-sati i. e., 'the words used by the first party being such as admit of more than one meaning'; —'arthasadbhāvena, tādṛśaikataravṛttyā sadarthatātparyaprayuktavākye, aparavṛttyā arthāntaratātparyakalpanayā pratiṣedhaḥ,—the statement declaring the existence of a thing by one denotation, if the existence of that is denied in accordance with the other denotation,—it constitutes figurative casuistry.*

found inapplicable] this property (usage) becomes subject to option (in the shape of a second denotation); and this secondary usage consists in using a word, which has been found to have one primary denotation, in a sense different from that denotation;—and when a statement is made in accordance with this secondary denotation, we have what has been called in the *Sūtra* '*dharmavikalpanirdeśa*' * *e. g.* When the statement is made 'the platforms are shouting', (which is made on the basis of the secondary meaning of the term 'platforms', which here stands for the *men* on the platforms);—and it is opposed by a denial on the basis of the primary meaning [*i e* taking the word as if it had been used in its primary denotation, this denial being in the form 'Certainly it is the men seated on the platforms that are shouting, and *not the platforms themselves.*'

"But in this case, where is 'the assumption of a contrary meaning' [which, according to *Sūtra* 1 2-10, is a necessary condition in all Casuistry]?"

It consists in assigning to the word a meaning different from that with reference to which it has been used; *i e.* the word having been used in reference to its secondary meaning, the Opponent assigns to it the primary meaning,—and as this Casuistry pertains to the figurative or secondary signification of words, it is called 'Figurative Casuistry.' What is meant by '*upacāra*', 'secondary or figurative denotation' is that meaning which is indicated by such causes as *association* and the like: and we have the *figurative use* of a word only when there is such a meaning indicated by *association* &c. [so that figurative significations cannot be had recourse to at random]

This third kind of Casuistry is met in the following manner:—Whenever a statement is made, a concurrence with, or denial of, the words used, and their significations, should be in accordance

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* The words of the *Bhāṣya* are '*tasya nirdeśe*' 'when there is a statement *of that*'—*i. e.* of the secondary meaning; but as the statement is not *of the meaning*, the *Tātparya* has taken the words to mean '*tena*'—'*dharmavikalpena*'—'*nirdeśe*'—'*vākye*'; so that the meaning is 'when there is statement in accordance with the secondary meaning.' The *Pariśuddhi* remarks that all this twisting of the words of the *Bhāṣya* has been done with a view to reconcile the *Bhāṣya* to the *Vārtika*. But we fail to see much difference between the two.

with the intention of the person making that statement,—and not at random, according to one's own wish. * It is well known in common parlance that a word may be used either in its primary direct sense or in its secondary figurative sense, and when such usage is generally accepted, if a certain word is used, the concurrence with it, or the denial of it, should be in keeping with the speaker's intention, and not at random; so that when the speaker uses a term in its primary sense, the concurrence with, or denial of, his statement should be in reference to that sense of his words, and not in reference to any sense that the Opponent may choose to impose upon it. similarly if he uses the term in its secondary sense, it is this sense that should be concurred with or denied. On the other hand, when the speaker uses a term in its secondary sense, and his Opponent denies it in reference to its primary sense,—then this denial becomes a mere arbitrary denial, and it cannot be regarded as an opposition to the first party.

Sūtra 15

[An objection is raised]—

" Figurative Casuistry is only verbal Casuistry; as it does not differ from it. "

BHĀSYA

[An objection is raised]—"Figurative Casuistry does not differ from Verbal Casuistry; as the assigning of a different meaning (from the one intended by the speaker) is common to both. For instance, in the example cited,—in the statement 'the platforms are shouting,' the word ('platform') intended to be taken in the secondary sense of *the persons* occupying the place (on the platform) is assumed to have the primary sense of the *place* itself; and the opposition offered is based upon this assumption"

* The *Tātparya* takes छन्दत: to mean छद्मना, *by trick*. But the ordinary meaning of छन्द appears to be more suitable. The sense is that you should concur with, or deny, the statement in the form and in the sense in which it is made by the speaker, and you are not to impose your own reading or your own interpretation on it

Sūtra 16

[Answer]—

It is not so ; as there is a difference in it.

BHĀṢYA

[The answer to the objection urged in the preceding *Sūtra* is that] Figurative Casuistry is not the same as Verbal Casuistry ; as in the former, *the denial of the presence of the thing* constitutes a difference. "Difference from what ? " From the mere assumption of a different meaning (which is found in Verbal Casuistry) ; as a matter of fact the 'assumption of a different meaning' is one thing, and the 'total denial of the presence of the thing denoted' is something entirely different

Sūtra 17

If the two were to be regarded as non-different on the ground of some kind of similarity,—there would be only one kind of Casuistry.

BHĀṢYA

What the Opponent in *Sūtra* 15 has done is to accept the twofold division of Casuistry and to deny the third kind ; this denial being on the ground of some sort of a similarity (between the third and the first kinds). But just as this reason (the presence of some sort of similarity) serves to set aside threefoldness, so ought it to set aside twofoldness also ; as there is some sort of similarity between these two (first and second kinds) also. If the mere presence of some similarity cannot do away with the twofold division, then it should not do away with the threefold division either. '

SECTION 4

[*Sūtras 18–20*]

Defects of Reasoning due to the Incapacity of the Reasoner.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Next to Casuistry—

Sūtra 18

Futile rejoinder is that objection which is taken on the basis of mere * similarity and dissimilarity.

* The *Nyāyasūtravivarana* explains that Futile Rejoinder is that which is urged on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity *only*,—*i.e.* irrespectively

When a certain reasoning has been put forward, the objection to it that *follows, takes birth* (jāyate)—is called '*Jāti*', 'Futile Rejoinder.' This objection is in the form of opposition, an attack, a denial—on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity. That is to say, when the Probans put forward by the first party is one that is intended to prove the conclusion through its *similarity* to the Example,—and an objection is taken on the basis of its *dissimilarity* (to that Example);—or when the Probans put forward is intended to prove the conclusion through its *dissimilarity* to the Example,—and an objection is taken on the basis of its *similarity* to it;—we have what is called '*Jāti*' (Futile Rejoinder), because it comes up—*is born*—as an opponent (to the original reasoning).*

Sūtra 19

It is a case of Clincher when there is misapprehension, as also when there is incomprehension †

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of any idea of invariable concomitance, in fact, it continues, 'similarity and dissimilarity' do not enter into all cases of Futile Rejoinder; as is clear from the definitions and examples provided under Adh. 5; it makes a Futile Rejoinder when no notice is taken of invariable concomitance. This is what has led the modern Logicians to define *Jāti*, Futile Rejoinder, simply as '*asat uttaram*' 'wrong answer', *i. e.* an answer which is either incapable of shaking the opposite view, or which is vitiated by self-contradictions.

The *Tātparya* has an interesting note. It is not always reprehensible to put forward a Futile Rejoinder, for instance, when a man, upholding the authority of the Veda, is met by a series of arguments against its authority, and at the spur of the moment he does not find proper answers to these arguments, he is fully justified in urging what is really a Futile Rejoinder, if he feels that by so doing he will stave off the atheistic tendency of the audience produced by his opponent's arguments But in other cases a Futile Rejoinder is urged only unknowingly

* In view of the real nature of several Futile Rejoinders—which are not urged on the basis of a similarity or dissimilarty to any *Example* at all,—the *Vārtika* says that when the *Bhāṣya* talks of similarity or dissimilarity to the Example, it is only by way of illustration. As there are several Futile Rejoinders that are urged on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity to other things also.

† The *Pariśuddhi*, not satisfied with the *Sūtra* as it stands, takes it as implying the following generalised definition:-'When a controversy has been started, any action that is indicative of either party's ignorance constitutes a *Clincher*.' It further says that Clincher is treated of last, as it puts an end to all controversy; no further discussion can proceed when once one of the parties falls into a Clincher.

BHĀṢYA

'Misapprehension' is that comprehension which is either wrong or reprehensible. * The man who misapprehends things becomes defeated; and 'Clincher' consists in this defeat. It is a case of 'incomprehension' when, the subject being one on which something has to be said, if the person does not say anything; that is, for instance, if he either does not oppose what has been sought to be proved by the other party, or does not meet the objections that have been urged against himself.

The non-compounding (of the words '*vipratipattiḥ*' and '*apratipattiḥ*', whose compounding would have made the Sūtra terser) is meant to indicate that these two are not the only Clinchers [there being several others, as described in detail in Adh V. all which become implied by the use of the particle '*ca*'].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

A question arises—"*Example* has been described as of one kind only; are Futile Rejoinder and Clincher also each of one kind only? Or are these of diverse kinds, like *Doctrine*?"

The answer to this is provided in the following Sūtra.—

Sūtra 20

There is a Multiplicity of Futile Rejoinders and Clinchers, owing to there being several and diverse varieties of both.

As 'Objection taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity' can be of several diverse kinds—there must be several varieties of Futile Rejoinder. Similarly as 'misapprehension and incomprehension' are of several diverse kinds,—there must be several varieties of Clincher also The term '*vikalpa*' stands for *several varieties* or *diverse varieties*. As examples of the diversity of Clinchers (defined in Sū. 5, 2 1—24)—the Clinchers of *Ananubhāṣaṇa*, *Ajñāna*, *Apratibhā*, *Vikṣepa*, *Matānujñā* and *Paryanuyojyopekṣana*, are indicative of *incomprehension*; while the rest are indicative of *misapprehension*

Thus have *Pramāṇa* and other categories been (*a*) 'mentioned' (in Sū. 1. 1. 1) and (*b*) 'defined' in the order of their mention; and they will (in the next four Adhyāyas) be (*c*) 'examined' in accordance with their definitions Thus is the threefold function of the Scientific Treatise to be regarded as duly fulfilled.

Thus ends the first Adhyāya of Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-Sūtra*.

* A misapprehension is called simply 'wrong', when the subject-matter is something too subtle to be grasped by an ordinary intellect; it is called 'reprehensible' when it pertains to something gross, an ordinary thing quite within the range of ordinary minds.—*Tātparya*.

ADHYĀYA II

Daily Lesson I

SECTION 1

Detailed Examination of Doubt

[Sūtras 1—7]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After this proceeds the *detailed examination of Pramāṇa* and the other categories. And, inasmuch as every definitive cognition has been declared (in Sūtra 1-1-41) to consist in the 'ascertainment of the real character of a thing after duly *deliberating* over the two sides of the question,' (whereby *deliberation* or *Doubt*, is made the precursor of all Definite Cognition)—it is Doubt that is examined first of all. *

Sūtra 1

" **No Doubt can arise either from the certain cognition of properties common to several objects, or from the certain cognition of characters belonging to only one of the objects.**"†

(*a*) " As a matter of fact, Doubt arises from the *cognition* of common properties, and not from the *properties* only‡;—(*b*) or

* The *Vārtika* gives further reasons for beginning the *detailed examination* with Doubt, even though the *enunciation* has begun with *Pramāṇa*.

† Sūtras 1 to 5 embody the *Pūrvapakṣa* view—which traverses the explanation of Doubt provided in Sū. 1-1-23

‡ This opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is a little obscure. The words of the *Sūtra* apparently mean that 'Doubt *does not arise* from the *cognition* of common properties'; while the *Bhāṣya* represents the sense to be that 'Doubt *arises* from the cognition of common properties'. The explanation given in the Footnote (in the *Vizianagram Series* Edition) is in itself a forced one · but it would be acceptable if it did not make this opening sentence identical in sense with what follows as the fourth alternative explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya* below. Both the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* have felt this difficulty. The former characterises this first statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* as '*Yathāśruti utthānam,*' and the latter remarks that the statement is made regardless of the explanations that have been provided under Sū. 1-1-23. The real explanation is as follows, as is made clear in the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

The present Sū. 1 contains three statements—I समानधर्माध्यवसायात् न संशयः (this denies the first statement in Sū 1-1-23, *viz*. समानधर्मोपपत्तेः

again, as a matter of fact, we do not find any Doubt arising from the mere cognition of the property and the things possessing that property;—*i. e.* no Doubt is found to arise at the time that the observer has the idea 'I perceive a property common to these two things' * ;—(c) or it is not possible for any Doubt to arise from the cognition of common properties, when the thing (in regard to which the common properties are perceived) is different:; *e. g.* when the cognition of common properties appears in regard to one thing for instance *Colour*, the Doubt cannot arise in regard to another thing, for instance *Touch* ;—(*d*) or lastly, from *Adhyavsāya*,—which stands for *conviction, certain cognition*,—there cannot arise *Doubt*, which stands for *uncertain* cognition ; as in this case there would be no affinity between Cause and Effect (which is essential).

"These same objections apply also to the view that Doubt arises *anekadharmādhyavsāyāt*, *i.e.*, from the conviction of the properties of several things.

"Nor does Doubt ever arise from the cognition of the properties of any one out of two things; on the contrary, from such cognition there arises the *certain* cognition of that one thing."†

संशयः) this is interpreted by the Bhā. as representing the four *pūrvapakṣas*.—(*a*) taking उपपत्ति of Sū. 1-1-23 to mean mere *presence* or *connection*, and denying that mere presence of common properties gives rise to Doubt, which only arises when these properties are duly recognised ; (*b*) taking उपपत्ति to mean *cognition*, and denying that any doubt can arise even from the recognition of common properties in only one of the two things that enter into the doubt ; (*c*) taking उपपत्ति = *definite ascertainment* ; and (*d*) stating the objection in a different manner from (*c*). II. अनेकधर्माध्यवसायात् न संशयः (this denies the अनेकधर्मोपपत्ति of Sū. 1-1-23), which containing the same term उपपत्ति is open to all the four *pūrvapakṣas* that have been urged above. III. अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायात् न संशयः

* This thing (which is seen) and that thing (which is remembered); इमं विशेषेण पश्यन् इम च विशेषेण स्मरन् कथं संशयीत—says *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† This alternative takes '*aneka*' as equivalent to '*anyatara*,' one of the two similar things.

Sūtra 2

(*f*) "Nor from the cognition of diversity of opinions, or from that of uncertainty."

(1) "Doubt does not arise either from 'diversity of opinions' only, or from 'uncertainty' only; in fact Doubt appears in a man who knows of the 'diversity of opinions';—similarly it appears in one who is cognisant of the uncertainty.' * (2) Or, how could any Doubt arise from the certain cognition of the fact that 'some people think that the Soul exists, while others think that it does not exist'? Similarly, † in regard to the 'uncertainty of perception' (which has been held in Sū. 1-1-23, to be a cause of Doubt). What happens in the case of *uncertainty* is that the observer duly recognises that there can be no certainty as to the thing being *perceived* (actually cognised as possessed of a certain character) and also that there is no certainty as to its being *not perceived* (actually cognised as *not* possessing a certain character); and when each of these facts is duly cognised, there can be no Doubt.§"

Sūtra 3

(*g*) " Also because in a case of Diversity of opinions there is certainty of conviction."

" That which you regard to be a case of 'diversity of opinions' is a case of *certain conviction*; it represents the certain conviction of two persons in regard to two opposite ideas [one man being *certain* of the *existence* of the Soul while the other is *certain* of its

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* The *Bhāṣyacandra* says that this Pūrvapakṣa emanates from one who does not rightly comprehend the meanings of the two terms '*vipratipatti*' and '*avyavasthā*' as contained in Sū. 1-1-23, and hence denies the fact of Doubt proceeding from these.

And here also in the Bhāṣya, the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* (1) proceeds on the basis of the term '*upapatti*' being taken to signify mere *presence*, while that in (2) is based upon '*upapatti*' signifying *cognition*.

† तथा gives better sense—and is found in the Puri Mss. as also in three other Mss.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* interprets '*upalabdhi*' as the means of cognising a thing as possessing a character, and '*anupalabdhi*' as a means of cognising it as not possessing it. So that in cases of uncertainty all that the observer feels is that there is neither any proof nor disproof of a certain fact; and what this means is that the man will have no idea at all, and not that he will have a *doubt*.

non-existence, each man having a firm conviction in regard to his own opinion, which is contrary to the opinion of another person.] So that if Doubt arose from 'diversity of opinions,' it would arise also from 'certain conviction' (which is absurd.)"

Sūtra 4

(*h*) "**Further, because uncertainty itself is quite certain in its uncertain character [no Doubt can arise from it].**"

"*No Doubt can arise*—this has to be added to the Sūtra. The meaning is this :—If the *Uncertainty* (that has been held to be the cause of Doubt) is, in itself, quite *certain*, then, inasmuch as there is *certainty*—it would not be a case of *Uncertainty* at all; so that there should be no Doubt possible If, on the other hand, the *Uncertainty* is not quite certain in its own character, this would mean that it is not a real *Uncertainty* at all, being not certain in its uncertain character ; and in this case also no Doubt should arise. "

Sūtra 5

(*f*) "**Lastly, Doubt would never cease ; inasmuch as the property (whose cognition gives rise to the Doubt) continues to exist** "

BHĀṢYA

" You hold that Doubt arises from the cognition of a common property ; now on this theory Doubt should be absolutely persistent ; * for inasmuch as the cognition of the common property (which is the cause) does not cease to exist, there should be no cessation of the Doubt (which is the effect). As a matter of fact, even while one is pondering over a certain thing (the Post, for instance), this thing does not cease to be known as possessing the (common) property (*Tallness* for instance, whose perception may have given rise to Doubt) ; in fact it always retains that property [so that when the cause is there, the effect, in the shape of the Doubt, must be there also]. "

* *I. E.* It should continue even when the distinguishing feature of any one thing would be clearly perceived.

To the above detailed Objection (embodied in Sūtras 1–5), the following is the reply briefly stated (in one Sūtra)—

Sūtra 6

When Doubt is held to arise only from such cognition as has been described (in Sū. 1-1-23) as not apprehending the specific character of any one object, *—there is no possibility of either there being no Doubt at all, or of there arising a Doubt that would be unceasingly persistent. †

There arises no such contingency as that no Doubt should arise, or that (when arisen) the Doubt should never cease.

"How so?"

(*a*) Well, it has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that 'what is the cause of Doubt is the *cognition* of the common property, and not the common property itself';—and this is quite true. "Why then is not this fact clearly mentioned (in the Sūtra)?" For the simple reason that this is already implied in the term '*viseṣāpeksah*'; 'in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting' (Sū. 1-1-23). By the '*apekṣā*' of the 'specific character' is meant the *wanting to know it*; and this is real and effective (and possible only while the specific character is *not perceived*;) and when the *Sūtra* does not use the term '*samānadharmāpekshah*', 'wanting the cognition of the common property'; this omission means that there is *no wanting* of the cognition of the common property; and this *no wanting* would be possible only when there is direct cognition of the common property; so that by the force of this (omission of the *wanting of the cognition of the common pro-*

* Though this is a qualification of *Doubt*, it may be regarded as qualifying the *Source of Doubt* also—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† *The Nyāyasūtravivarana* explains the term '*viśeṣāpekṣah*' of this Sūtra to mean 'depending upon such peculiar circumstances as the non-realisation of the difficulties caused by the remoteness of the object (and such other conditions which obstruct the correct perception of it)'.

perty) it is implied that there is *cognition of the common property*, from which cognition the Doubt arises. *

As a matter or fact however, the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is set aside by the presence of the term '*upapatti*' itself in the Sū. (1-1-23). What the Sūtra says is that Doubt arises from the '*upapatti*' of the common property; and there can be no *upapatti* of a thing apart from the *cognition of its existence*; for a common property whose existence is not cognised would be as good as *non-existent*.

Then again [even granting that the term '*upapatti*' denotes mere *presence*, and not *cognition of existence*], a term that expresses an object also generally denotes the *cognition* of that object; *e. g* when in ordinary parlance people say, 'fire is inferred from smoke' what this assertion is understood to mean is that 'Fire is inferred from the *perception of smoke*', and why is it so? Simply because the man makes the inference when he perceives the smoke, and not while he does not perceive it; and yet in the said assertion, we do not find the term 'perception' though everyone admits that that is what the assertion means; from which it is clear that the person who hears and understands the said assertion admits that a term expressing the *object* also denotes the *cognition of that object* Similarly in the case in question, the term 'common property' may be taken to denote the *cognition* of the common property

(*b*) It has been urged in the *Pūrvapakṣa Bhāṣya*, that—"No doubt is found to arise at the time that the observer has the idea 'I perceive a property common to these two things', wherein there is an apprehension of the property and the things possessing it."—But what is here asserted refers to what is perceived before (the appearance of Doubt),—the idea present in the observer's mind (at the time that Doubt appears) being in the following form—'I am perceiving now a property that is common to two things known to me (perceived by me before),—and I am not perceiving any property that belongs to any one of them specifically,—how may I find some such specific property

* This answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* proceeds on the admission that the word '*upapatti*' in Sū. 1-1-23 means *presence*—the meaning assigned to the term by the Pūrvapakṣin The real answer, however, is that the term '*upapatti*' itself means *cognition*; and this answer follows in the next sentence.

whereby I may be certain as to one or the other?' And certainly a Doubt in this form does not cease merely on the perception of a common property bringing to the mind that property and the thing possessing that property.

(*c*) Thirdly, it has been urged that—"Doubt with regard to one thing cannot arise from the certain conviction with regard to another."—This could be rightly urged only against one who holds the view that mere certain conviction with regard to one thing is the cause of Doubt [and we do not hold any such view].*

(*d*) Fourthly, it has been urged that—"(From the certain cognition of common property Doubt cannot arise), as in this case there would not be that affinity between cause and effect (which is essential).†" —But what constitutes the 'affinity' between cause and effect is only the fact that the presence and absence of the effect are in accordance with the presence and absence of the cause, and further, when between two things it is found that if one comes into existence the other also comes into existence, and if the former does not come to existence, the latter also does not come into existence,—then the former is called the 'cause' and the latter the 'effect', this is what constitutes another 'affinity' or 'homogeneity' (between cause and effect);§ and certainly there is this 'affinity' between Doubt and its cause (the Perception of Common Property)‡.

* Our view being that Doubt arises regarding a thing with specific properties, when what is perceived is only a thing as possessing properties common to more than one thing -- *Bhāṣyacandra.*

† The certain cognition of common property apprehends the *presence* of such property, while Doubt apprehends the *absence* of such property; and no affinity is possible between two such heterogeneous cognitions:—this is the meaning of the *Pūrvapakṣa-Bhāṣyacandra.*

§ According to the *Bhāṣyacandra*, there are two *affinities* pointed out here as expressed in the translation. It may however be simpler to take the *second* as only explanatory of the *first*, the only *affinity* consisting in the fact that the presence and absence of the one are in accordance (simultaneous) with the presence and absence of the other, that is to say, the affinity consists in the fact that when one comes into existence, the other also does the same &c, &c

‡ The *Vārtika* does not accept this view of 'affinity', according to it the homogeneity between *Doubt* and its cause in the shape of the Cognition of common property consists in the fact that in both the Cognition of specific properties is wanting. The *Tātparya* adds that according to the view expressed in the *Bhāṣya*, the case of all *eternal* causes would be excluded; as they never *come into existence and cease to exist.*

(*e*) The above reasoning also serves to answer the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument that no Doubt can arise from the cognition of the property of several things.

(*f*) It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (under Sū 2) that —"No Doubt can arise from the Cognition of either diverse opinions or uncertainty."—Our answer to this is that, (as regards the case of ***Diverse opinions***) when the Doubt appears, the idea present in the observer's mind is as follows—'From two contradictory statements I find the thing to be possessed of contradictory properties,—and I do not know of any specific circumstance attending it,—nor do I perceive any such property whereby I could be certain with regard to one or the other of the two properties,—what specific circumstance could there be, whereby I could become certain with regard to one or the other?'—And such being the well-known form of the Doubt brought about by the ***Diversity of Opinions*** (as helped by the non-cognition of special conditions), it cannot be rejected simply by reason of the comprehension (by the third party) of the diversity of opinions *

The same holds good also with regard to what has been urged against Doubt arising from the 'uncertainty in regard to Perception and Non-perception' † [In this case also the particular form in which the Doubt appears makes it clear that it arises from the ***cognition of uncertainty*** as helped by the non-cognition of special circumstances And this Doubt also cannot be rejected merely by reason of the cognition of uncertainty]

(*g*) It has been urged (in Sū 3) that—"Because there is certainty of conviction in the case of Diversity of opinions (no Doubt can arise from this latter) "—Now what is held to be the

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* विप्रतिपत्तिसंशय of the *Viz*. Edn. gives no sense The Puri MSS. read विप्रतिपत्तिसम्प्रतिपत्ति. The meaning is that the presence of Doubt in the mind of the observer, the third party, is not incompatible with his comprehension of the fact that these two persons hold two different opinions on this point.

† 'Perception' here stands for 'proof in support' and 'non-perception' for 'proof against'; there is 'uncertainty' in regarding these when the observer does not find either; and this certainly gives rise to Doubt.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

cause of Doubt is the Cognition of that which is denoted by the term 'Diversity of opinions;' this Cognition being wanting in the conception of any specific character (favouring any one of the opinions); and certainly it is not fair to discard the view merely by thrusting a different name (to what is meant by 'diverse opinions'); that is to say, the term 'diverse opinions' stands for *contradictory assertions with regard to one and the same thing*; what gives rise to Doubt is the Cognition (by the third party, the enquirer) of such assertions, as helped by the non-cognition of any special circumstances (in favour of one or the other), and it cannot cease to give rise to doubt merely by your giving to it a different name, so that this argument of the Pūrvapakṣin can only delude the ignorant *

(*h*) It has been urged (under Sū 4) that—"Because uncertainty itself is quite certain in its uncertain character (it cannot give rise to Doubt)"—Well, in arguing thus it is admitted that there is such a thing as the 'Cause of Doubt,' and also that it is of the nature of 'uncertainty' essentially; all that is done is to give it a different name 'certainty', ('without denying the thing itself') —and this name can apply to the said thing only in a sense different from its natural signification [*i e* *Uncertainty* can be called 'certainty' only in the sense of *fixity*, *definiteness*, and not in the sense of *freedom from doubt*]; and this assumption of a different name also is absolutely futile; for a *certainty* can never be 'uncertainty', being as it is, *fixed* in its own (certain) character. So that the assertion made by the Opponent does not deny the fact that Doubt is produced by the fact of perception and non-perception pertaining to both existence and non-existence (of the thing with regard to which the Doubt arises), as accompanied by the fact of a specific circumstance in favour of either not being available,—and in so far as the said *uncertainty* is fixed in its *uncertain* character, it does not lose its own character. hence the 'uncertainty' is admitted by (the Opponent's own assertion).—Thus it is found that even though a different name is assumed, it

* It is true that the individual upholder of each of the diverse opinions has a certain conviction on the point; there is however no such conviction in the mind of the third party, who only hears these opinions expressed, and cannot find any special circumstances in favour of either.

does not prove anything different (from the conclusion to which exception is meant to be taken).

(*i*) It has also been urged (in Sū. 5) that—"Doubt would never cease, as the property continues to persist".—But as a matter of fact, Doubt is produced, *not* merely by the *common property*, etc. (whose persistence would make the Doubt persistent), but by the *cognition of the common property*, as accompanied by a *remembrance of the specific characters*, (as shown under Sū. 1-1-23); so that there is no possibility of the Doubt being unceasingly persistent

(*j*) Lastly, it has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"Doubt never arises from the cognition of the properties of any one out of two things" —This objection is not well taken; for it has been distinctly stated (in Sū 1-1-23) that Doubt is that wavering judgment which is *wanting in the cognition of the specific character of a thing*, and as the 'specific character' can only consist in the 'property of one out of two things', when there is a cognition of such property, there can be no 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character' [and as such it would not be a Doubt at all].

Sūtra 7

Wherever there is Doubt, there is possibility of the aforesaid questions and answers

BHĀṢYA

Wherever the Investigation carried on is preceded by Doubt, —either in a scientific Treatise or in a Controversy—the Opponent will try to deny the very existence of the Doubt (in the manner of the above Pūrvapaksa); and in that case he should be met with the answer (detailed above). * It is for this reason that as pertaining to all Investigations, *Doubt* has been examined first of all.†

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* The *Nyāyasūtravivarana* remarks that this advice applies to the case of the examination of every one of the sixteen categories,—the examination of *Pramāna* also is preceded by the doubt as to whether there are 2 or 3 or 4 Pramānas and so forth, in regard to every one of such Doubts, the *Pūrvapakṣin* may try to deny the very existence of Doubt, and then he is to be met in the manner explained here.

† The *Pariśuddhi* offers another interesting explanation of this *Sūtra* (7) It takes it to be a sort of an explanation provided for the Sūtra undertaking

SECTION (2)

Detailed Examination of Pramāṇas in General.

Sūtras 8–20

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Next follows the detailed *Examination* of *Pramāna*.*—

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to enter into a thorough *examination* of *Pramānas* and a few other categories only, and omitting such others as *Prayojana* and the like. The Sū is taken to mean that a thorough *examination* is called for only in regard to matters in regard whereto there are doubts. As a matter of fact, the nature of *Prayojana* and the other categories, whose *examination* has been omitted, is fully known to all—from the learned philosopher down to the mere cow-herdess, so that no thorough examination is necessary in their case. Then again, the method of examination employed in regard to *Pramāna*, &c. may be applied to these other categories also, this is what the *seventh* Sūtra means—"Whenever there is any doubt in regard to any category we should employ the method of examination which consists of questions and answers."

The *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks as follows—"The Sūtra is meant to be an advice to the Pupil to the effect that it is not right to deny the existence of Doubt as a preliminary accessory of all Discussion; the sense being that, inasmuch as Doubt is such an accessory whenever any Discussion is started, one should not meet it with the preliminary objection that the very Doubt, on which the Discussion proceeds, is not possible; the right course is to supply answers to the questions raised This advice being summed up in three verses —'The dull ignoramus and the man who has reached the highest pinacle of wisdom, these two persons are happy, persons falling between these two extremes always suffer (1).—The man whose mind is in doubt is beset with difficulties at each step. freedom from Doubt represents highest bliss this being the form of the Supreme Self (2)—For these reasons, you should listen to all theories, and then having raised questions in regard to these, you should enter into the discussion with qualified persons and thereby ascertain the truth (3)."

* In the case of Doubt, it was necessary to alter the order in which the categories had been mentioned in Sū. 1-1-1; because Doubt forms the starting-point of all investigations. Among the rest of the categories, there is no reason for dealing with any of them out of its proper place; so the Author now takes up the examination of *Pramāna*. There again, he begins with the examination of the character of *Pramāṇa* in general, before proceeding with the particular Pramāṇas. The *Pramāṇa*, in general, may be defined as the Instrument of Cognition; and these instruments are Perception and the rest.—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 8

" Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of Cognition, on account of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time "—*

" The character of Instrument of Cognition cannot belong to Perception, &c., as it is impossible to connect them with any of the three points of time, that is to say, it is not possible for them either to precede or to synchronise with or to follow (the *objects* cognised)."†

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

What has been stated above in a general way is next explained in detail (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) -

Sūtra 9

"If the Pramāṇa exists already before (the Object), then perception cannot be produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object "—

"Perception is the Cognition of such objects as Odour and the rest ; if this Perception (*Pramāṇa*) exists already, and Odour,

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* The Sūtra denies the very existence of Pramāṇas, on the ground that they do not prove the existence of these objects at any point of time — *Bhāṣyacandra*

† The *Tātparya* thus sums up the *Pūrvapakṣa* embodied in Sūtras 8–11 – This Pūrvapakṣa emanates from the *Mādhyamika* Bauddha, and may be explained as follows – "Though our firm conviction is that nothing in the world can bear any investigation,—so that so far as we ourselves are concerned, *Pramāṇa* also is a subject that cannot bear any examination, - yet we proceed to show that *Pramāṇas*, as accepted by other people, are untenable and this we shall show on the basis of those same Pramāṇas that are held by those same people, and thus it is a fault of the Pramāṇas themselves that they melt away by their own inner contradictions. The argument against Pramāṇa may be thus formally stated -Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Pramāṇa, because they cannot prove or indicate the presence of their objects at any point of time,—anything that does not prove its object at any time is not regarded as Pramāṇa, for instance, the conception of Hare's Horns,—Perception, &c, are such- therefore they cannot be regarded as Pramāṇa.'

It is interesting to compare this statement of the *Mādhyamika* view with the Vedānta view expressed in *Khandanakhandakhādya*, Trans Vol. I, Para 79

&c , come into existence *after* it, then the Perception cannot be said to be produced by the contact (with the sense-organ) of those things, Odour, &c."*

Sūtra 10

" If the Pramāṇa comes into existence after (the Object), then the existence of the Object of Cognition cannot be dependent upon Pramāṇas.†—

" While the Pramāṇa does not exist, by whose instrumentality would the thing be *cognised*, and thereby become the *object of cognition* ? It is only when a thing is cognised by the instrumentality of Pramānas, that it comes to be known as *'prameya'*, *object of cognition* "

Sūtra 11

"If the two come into existence simultaneously, then, inasmuch as each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no sequence among cognitions "§

BHĀṢYA

" If it be held that the *Pramāna* and its *Object* both come into existence at the same time,—then, inasmuch as all cognitions pertain to their own particular object, it would be possible for them to come into existence at the same time ; and therefore, *inasmuch as each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no necessity of sequence among cognitions*. As a matter of fact, all these cognitions are found to appear with regard to their objects, one after the other ; but this sequence would not be necessary (if the cognition and its object were to appear at the same time). And further, [even if such sequence be not considered essential] this simultaneity of cognitions would contradict

* I. E. The Substance can have no connection with the operation (which is absurd)—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The meaning of the Sūtra is as follows -As a matter of fact, Pramāna is an Instrument, and the Instrument is a particular kind of substance accompanied by a certain action or operation ; neither the *operation* alone nor the substance alone can be called ' Instrument '; if then, this substance, along with the operation of bringing about the cognition, is already there, before the Object has come into existence,—then the said cognition cannot be regarded as brought about by contact with that object.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ ' Cognition ' in this *Sūtra* stands for '*Pramāna*', which, as explained before, stands for the *means* of *cognition*, and also the *cognition itself*.

what has been declared (under Sū. 1-1-16) to the effect that 'the presence of the Mind is indicated by the non-simultaneity of cognitions.'"

"The aforesaid are the only three possible alternatives in regard to the existence (or relation) of *Pramāna* and its *Object*; and every one of them has been found to be untenable; so the conclusion is that Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as '*Pramāna*'."

The answer to the above is as follows:—

* *As a matter of fact between what is called the 'cause or instrument of apprehension' and what the 'object of apprehension',—there being no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before, or after, or simultaneously with the latter, we take each case on its own merits, just as we find it, and assert accordingly (either precedence or sequence or simultaneity of the one or the other).* That is to say, in some cases the Cause of Apprehension appears first, and then its object; *e. g.* in the case of the apprehension of things coming into existence while the Sun is shining [in which case the sunlight, which is the cause of the perception, is already there, when the things are coming into existence];—in other cases the Object appears before and the Cause of its apprehension afterwards; *e g.* when the lamp (just lighted) illumines, and makes perceptible things already in existence;—in other cases again the Cause of apprehension and its Object come into existence together; *e.g.* when the apprehension of fire is brought about by means of smoke.† Now '*Pramāna*' is the name of the *cause of apprehension*, and '*Prameya*' that of the *Object of apprehension*; so that (as shown above), there being no restriction as to exact precedence or sequence or simultaneity between the two, we have to take each case just as we find it.§ So that there

* The Viz. Edition prints this and some other passages in thicker type;—see in this connection our note on Sū. 15, below The whole of the italicised portion occurs as a *Sūtra* in the सूत्रपाठ attached to Puri MS. B. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also appears to regard this first passage as a *Sūtra*.

† The apprehension of fire synchronises with the apprehension of smoke.

§ 'Such is the sense of the Sūtra'—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*; and from this it appears that the passage containing the term *vibhāgavacanam* constitutes a Sūtra.

is no ground for the entire denial (of Pramāṇas) (which you have put forward); specially in view of the fact that you yourself admit the (efficiency of) *Pramāṇas* in general (in the shape e. g. of your own words) and then go on to deny the efficiency of all Pramāṇas without exception.*

† Secondly, *as the grounds on which the names ('Pramāṇa' and 'Prameya') are based pertain to all three points of time, the name also should be accepted as such.* That is to say, it has been urged (in Sū. 10) that—" if the Pramāṇa be held to come into existence *after* the Prameya, then, at the time that the Pramāṇa is non-existent, (*i e.* not actually bringing about the apprehension at that time) the object could not be called '*Prameya*'; as it is only when an object is actually apprehended at the time by means of

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* The reading खलु विभज्य is difficult to construe. What the Pūrvapaksin has done is to take no account of the particular facts of each case and has roundly denied the efficiency of all Pramānas promiscuously; so that the correct word would appear to be अविभज्य. The mistake may be due to the mis-reading of खलु for खल्व ; लु and ल्व being very nearly alike in Matihilī and Bengali scripts But the *Bhāṣyacandra* accepts the reading खलु विभज्य and supplies a reasonable explanation. It remarks that the passage points out an inconsistency (*vyāghāta*) on the part of the Pūrvapaksin. He denies all Pramāṇas, but certainly accepts his own word embodying this denial as a very valid Pramāna.

† The italicised portion occurs, as Sūtra in the सूत्रपाठ attached to Puri MS B. The *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks—This refers to the following argument of the oppenent—" There are four kinds of basis for the application of verbal names; these being—(1) the presence of *Genus i.e.* this is a '*Cow*', 'this is a *Brāhmana*' &c., (2) Presence of *Quality*; 'the cow is *white*', 'the Brāhmana is *patient*', (3) Presence of certain things; 'the Brahmana *has a stick*', and (4) Presence of action; 'this is a *doer*', 'this a *cogniser*' and so forth So that the name 'Pramāṇa' also must have for its basis the actual *presence* of the *action of apprehension* at the same time, and it is therefore not right to say 'the *Prameya* is apprehended by the *Cogniser*, by means of the *Prāmana*'.—The answer to this, given in the Bhāsya, is that the application of the name is not based upon the actual *presence of the action at the time*; it is based upon the *potentiality* of the thing to bring about the action; e.g. we speak of the 'cook' though he is only *going to do the cooking*; or we say 'the cook is bathing', where even though the *action* present is that of *bathing*, yet the name applied to the man is 'Cook'. This 'potentiality' consists in the mere form of the thing concerned, as aided by the necessary accessories.

Pramāna that it is known as '*Prameya*' "* ;—but as a matter of fact. the application of the name '*Pramāna*' is due to the fact of what is so named being the *cause of apprehension* (*i. e.* being endowed with the potentiality of bringing about the cognition), and this fact pertains to all three points of time, for instance, [when we give the name 'Pramāṇa' to the cause of apprehension] we make use of either of the three expressions 'this *has brought* about the apprehension (therefore it is *Pramāna*)', or 'this *brings* about the apprehension (hence it is *Pramāna*)'; or 'this *will bring* about the apprehension (hence it is *Pramāna*)'; so that the grounds of the naming pertaining to all three points of time—past, present and future—, the name also should be taken as pertaining to all points of time † So that when we apply the name '*Pramāna*', what is meant is that the object *has been apprehended* (in the past) by its means, or that the object *is apprehended* by its means (in the present), or that the object *will be apprehended* by its means (in the future) Similarly when we apply the name '*Prameya*', what is meant is that it *has been apprehended*, or that it *is apprehended*, or that it *will be apprehended* by the *Prameya*. Such being the case, an object can very well be known as '*prameya*' when we have such ideas as 'the apprehension of this thing *will* be brought about by the *right cause* [Pramāṇa, when it comes into existence]', 'this *will* be apprehended', and so forth.

If this applicability of a name on the basis of the possibility of the requisite operation at all three points of time is not admitted, then much of ordinary usage would be impossible That is to say, if one were not to admit the application of names as described above, for him no such expressions would be possible as—'bring a *cook*, he *will do* the cooking', 'bring in a *wood-cutter*, he *will do* the cutting.'

Further, the assertion (made in Sū 8) that—'Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of Cognition, on

* सिद्धावसति प्रमाणे is the reading of all manuscripts but one, as also of the two Puri MSS., we have adopted this, specially as सति प्रमाणे of the Viz. text does not give good sense.

† And when in defining 'Pramāna' we have said that it is *what actually brings about the cognition*—it is only by way of an illustration; and we do not mean to restrict the name *pramāna* only to what actually at the time brings about Cognition—*Bhāsyacandra*.

account of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time'—apparently denies all 'Pramāṇa' entirely ;—the person making such an assertion should be asked—what do you mean to accomplish by this denial? Do you mean to set aside the possibility or very form (of the Pramānas, Perception, &c.)? Or to make known their impossibility or absence of any form? If the former, then the possibility or form of the Pramāṇas is admitted [as it is only what exists that can be *set aside*),—and the possibility or form being there, Perception and the other Pramānas cannot be denied entirely If, on the other hand, the denial is meant to make known their impossibility, then the denial itself becomes endowed with the character of '*Pramāna*' (Instrument of Cognition, being that which *makes known* things): * as the denial becomes the cause or instrument of the Cognition of the 'impossibility of Pramānas'

[Even knowing this inconsistency, the Opponent asks]—"What then?"—[The answer comes in the next Sūtra].

Sūtra 12

There can be no Denial, as it is impossible to connect it with any of the three points of time.

BHĀSYA

[The Opponent having asked—"What is the harm if the Denial becomes endowed with the character of Pramāna?"—the answer is given by the Sūtra]. The detailed explanation here is the same (as in the Pūrvapaksa-Sūtra 8) [*i e*, inasmuch as the Denial has become a Pramāṇa it becomes open to the arguments that the Pūrvapaksin has urged against the possibility of Pramānas so that] if the *Denial* [which *ex hypothesi* is only an instrument of right negative cognition] exists before the thing *Denied*, then, what would be there that would be denied, while the thing denied [*i e.*, the object of the negative cognition] is not in existence? On the other hand, if the Denial came after the thing *Denied*, then while the Denial is not in existence, the thing could not be 'denied' Lastly, if both the *Denial* and the *Denied* came into

* लक्षणं प्राप्त', the reading of all Mss. save one, gives better sense than लक्षणप्राप्तः.

existence simultaneously, then as the thing will have been already recognised as 'denied', the Denial would be absolutely futile.

Thus then, the assertion (of the Pūrvapakṣin) embodying, as it does, a *Denial*, being (as just shown) found to be impossible,—it becomes established that Perception and the rest are genuine *Pramāṇas*.

Sūtra 13

Because all Pramāṇas have been denied, the Denial itself cannot be established.*

BHĀSYA

"Why (can the Denial not be established)?"†—asks the *Pūrvapakṣin*. [For the following reason, we reply]—You have put forward (in Sū 8) as your reason, 'because it cannot be connected with any of the three points of time'; now if in support of this reason you can cite an Instance, then it behoves you to show (on the strength of perceptional or other valid cognition) that what you have put forward as your Reason (i.e your Minor Premiss) does hold true in the case that you cite as the corroborative Instance; and if you do this, you cannot deny the character of Pramāṇa (Proof) in regard to all Perception and the rest [as at last one such Perception you will have employed to prove the truth of your Reason] And if Perception and the rest were absolutely no proof, then what you would cite as an Instance would also not *prove* anything [as that also would only be a perceptional or other valid cognition]; so that your reason, in that case, would be nullified by all Pramāṇas, and, as such, cease to be a proper Reason; in fact, such a Reason would be a "contradictory Reason";—that has been defined as the 'contradictory Reason or Probans' 'which contradicts a certain doctrine that has been previously admitted' (Sū 1. 2 6); and what is put forward by the opponent in the assertion made by him constitutes his 'doctrine',

* Later Commentators—for instance the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha and the *Nyāyasūtravivarana*—do not have this as a *Sūtra*. The *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* however cites it as a *Sūtra* and so also the *Bhāṣyacandra*, which remarks that this Sūtra puts forward another 'self-contradiction' involved in the Pūrvapakṣa stand-point.

† According to the *Bhāṣyacandra* this '*Katham*' is an attack on the opponent :—'How can you reasonably deny all Pramāṇas ?'

and this assertion is that 'Perception and the rest do not prove the existence of anything'; and yet the several reasoning factors [the Premisses etc., which represent Pramāṇas] have been put forward (in the reasoning urged in Sū. 8) with a view to prove (i.e. *make known* to others) your own conclusions.*

If, on the other hand, the Instance (corroborative of the Reason put forward in support of the Denial of Pramāṇas) is not cited (as representing a *valid cognition, pramāna*) then you are faced by the difficulty that until you have shown the truth of your Reason, or Minor Premiss, in a certain well-known Instance, your assertion cannot prove your conclusion for you; so that the Denial of the Pramāṇas cannot be established, for the simple reason that the reason or premiss put forward does not possess the character of a really valid 'Reason'.

Sūtra 14

If the character of Pramāna in the case of the reasoning-factors is admitted,—then your Denial becomes restricted to only a few from among all Pramāṇas, [which would not be right] †

BHĀSYA

If you admit that the 'character of Pramāna' really belongs§ to these *Perception and the rest* that are embodied in the reason-

* The statement of the Probans, which is the principal reasoning-factor, embodies facts ordinarily perceived—*e. g.* 'because Perception, &c., cannot be connected with any point of time' represents a number of facts perceived in ordinary experience. Now the Proposition is that 'Perception, &c , do not prove anything,' and yet the said Perception—that the Perception, &c., cannot be connected with any point of time—has been urged with a view to prove the conclusion. Thus the Reason, as put forward, is entirely a contravention of the Proposition.

The *Vārtika* in quoting this passage reads प्रमाणानाम् for अवयवानाम् and the *Tātparya* explains प्रमाणानाम् as referring to the *Avayavas*. The *Bhāsyacandra* reads अवयवानाम्. The sense remains the same.

† It appears simpler to interpret the Sūtra as—'the Denial does not apply to all Pramānas'. But the *Bhāsya* has made capital out of the prefix वि in विप्रतिषेध; in view of which the translation has had to be put in a roundabout fashion, though the sense remains the same.

§ The reading of the Viz. edition नामप्रामाण्ये is wrong. Both Puri Mss. read नां प्रामाण्ये, which is the right reading

ing-factors or premises involved in your negative argument (against Pramāṇas, in Sū. 8),—then you will have to accept the 'character of Pramāṇa' also in those *Perception and the rest* that would be embodied in the reasoning-factors that might be urged (against you) by your Opponent; as there would be no difference between the two sets of 'premises' And this would mean that you do not deny all Pramānas (but only some of them; for which restricted denial there can be no justification). In the term '*vipratiṣedhaḥ*' (in the Sūtra) the prefix '*vi*' signifies *affirmation* ('*vipratiṣedha*' meaning *viśeṣeṇa pratiṣedha*, denial by selection) and not *negation* (*vipratiṣedha* in that case being construed as *vigataḥ pratiṣedhaḥ–negatived denial*), * as there can be no sense in such an expression †

Sūtra 15

There should be no denial (of Pramāṇas and Prameyas) in regard to all three points of time; § as their existence (as cause and effect) is proved in the same manner as that of the musical instrument is proved by its sound

BHĀSYA

[An objection is raised at the very outset]—"Why should this be repeated (in the *Sūtra*,) when it has already been stated before, in the *Bhāsya*?" ‡

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* If वि signified denial, then विप्रतिषेध: would mean 'denial of the denial', Denial being the object of Denial, and this would be absurd as coming from the Pūrvapakṣin. For purposes of *denial*, one always uses the term 'na'— says the *Bhāṣyacandra*

† For in that case the expression in the Sūtra '*na vipratiṣedhaḥ*' would mean that 'the denial is *not negatived*,' which would be the reverse of what is intended by the Siddhāntin—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ That is, it is quite possible for Pramāṇa and Prameya to be related to each other as 'cause and effect' and also as 'means of Cognition' and 'object of cognition'— *Bhāṣyacandra*

‡ From what we read here, there appears to be a confusion in regard to the exact position of the Sūtra and portions of the *Bhāṣya* It has been remarked by several writers that the *Bhāsya* contains certain passages, which form part of an older *Vṛtti* on the Sūtras. The editor of the Vizianagram series has made an attempt to indicate some of these passages by printing them in thicker type The wider aspect of this question shall be dealt with in a suitable place. But in connection with the present

The answer is that this serves to confirm what has been said before. That is to say, we have stated above (Bhā. 2. 1. 11) that—'*between the cause of apprehension and the object of apprehension there is no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before or after or simultaneously with the latter, and we take each case on its own merits just as we find it, and assert accordingly*',—and the present Sūtra serves to show that this assertion of ours had its source in this Sūtra [By the presence of this Sūtra] it is made clear that the Sage (Gautama) himself does not admit of any restriction (as to priority &c between the *Pramāna* and its *Prameya*), and hence firmly rejects the opponent's denial—by asserting that 'the denial in regard to all three points of time is not right'

Out of the three possibilities (of priority, posteriority and simultaneity), the *S'ūtra* cites the example of one—*In the same manner as that of the musical instrument is proved by its sound.* In the case cited we find that *by means of* the Sound, which comes into existence after the musical instrument, we infer the existence of the musical instrument, which has been in existence prior to the Sound; and here the musical instrument is what is *to be made known*, and the Sound is the *means* by which it is made known [and here the *Pramāna* is posterior to the *Prameya*],—this refers to a case where the musical instrument being hidden from view, its presence is inferred, and the inference is that the lute is being played,' or 'the flute is being blown',—the particular instrument being inferred by the peculiarity of the Sound. Thus

passage, the following appears to be noteworthy. The objector asks why this Sūtra should be here, when what is herein said has already been said before. This question would imply that the two assertions—Sū 15, and the Bhāsya-passage on Sū 2, 1, 11—stood on the same level, being the work of the same writer; this also would appear to be the implication of what follows in the *Bhāṣya* on the present Sūtra. But the answer that the *Bhāṣya* gives to the objector's question is that the former statement, has its source or authority in the present Sūtra—that is why the fact previously asserted is asserted again. Now what does this mean? It apparently means that the present declaration is a 'Sūtra', and the former declaration was 'Bhāsya' which derived its authority from this Sūtra. This is clearly stated in the *Bhāṣyacandra*, which says—'The Bhāsya has already shown that there is no restriction as to precedence, sequence or simultaneity among Pramānas and the *Sūtra* now proceeds to show one of these three methods'.

then, here we have a case where we apprehend the 'object of cognition' (the musical instrument) which has a prior existence, by means of the 'means of cognition' (Sound) which comes into existence after the former.

The Sūtra has cited this one instance (of the posteriority of Pramāṇa) by way of illustration; as examples of the other two ways (priority and simultaneity of Pramāṇa and Prameya), we may take those that have already been cited above.

"Why are not those examples cited here (rather than there)?".

We are only explaining here what has already been stated before. All that we have got to do is to state the facts; it does *not make any difference whether it is stated here or on the previous occasion.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The names '*Pramāna*' and '*Prameya*' are applied according to circumstances; such application depending upon certain causes that go to determine the name; such cause or circumstance, in the case in question, consists in the fact that (a) that which is the *means* of bringing about an apprehension is called '*Pramāna*', (b) that which is the object apprehended is called '*Prameya*', and (c) when that which, though itself an *apprehended object*, happens to be the *means* of the apprehension of something else, then that same thing may be called '*Pramāna*' as well as '*Prameya*.' This is the fact brought out in the following *Sūtra*.

Sūtra 16

The weighing balance, which is a Pramāṇa, [the means of ascertaining the weight of things], is Prameya also, [as regards its own accuracy]. *

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* All the Mss. of the *Bhāṣya*, except one read प्रमेया; so do also the *Tātparya*, the *Nyāyasūcinībandha* and the *Bhāsyacandra*. But some Mss. of the *Vārtika* and all the later commentators read प्रमेयता. The sense is that प्रमेयता also belongs to Pramānas, as we find in the case of a particular Pramāṇa, the Balance. प्रमेयता च भवति, यथा तुलाख्ये प्रमाणे दृश्यते; in this case तुलाप्रामाण्यवत् is a compound word. With the reading प्रमेया the construction is तुला प्रमाण्यवत् प्रमेया च भवति, यथा इयं प्रमाणम्भवति तथा प्रमेया ऽपि; in this case तुला and प्रामाण्यवत् are not taken as a compound. The purport of the Sūtra is the same in both cases.

BHĀṢYA

The weighing balance is called '*Pramāṇa*' when it is the *means* of bringing about the cognition of the exact weight (of the thing weighed),—in which case the object of cognition is the weighty substance, gold and the like (which is weighed), which therefore is called '*Prameya*';—but when the gold thus weighed is made the means of testing (ascertaining the accuracy of) another balance, then in the cognition (of the accuracy) of this other balance, it becomes the '*Pramāṇa*', and the other balance becomes the '*Prameya*'.*

What we have just said (in regard to the application of the names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Prameya*' depending on circumstances) applies to all topics of the *S'āstra*.† For instance, the Soul has been prominently mentioned among 'Prameyas', because it is an object of cognition; but it is '*Pramātṛ*', 'Cogniser', also, inasmuch as (in regard to the action of *cognising*) it is the independent agent;—similarly *Buddhi*, 'Apprehension', (of Invariable Concomitance, for instance) is '*Pramāṇa*', inasmuch as it is the means of cognising things; and yet it becomes '*Prameya*', when it is itself *cognised*; and it comes to be called mere '*Pramiti*', 'apprehension', when it is neither the *means* nor the *object* of any cognition. Similarly, the conditions governing the application of the names in question may be applied to other particular catigories (of Doubt etc.) also.

As a matter of fact, the names of the several case-relations or active agencies (*Kārakas*) are applied (promiscuously) through varying causes (depending on the character of the things concerned). For instance, when we say 'the tree stands',§ (*vṛkṣaḥ*

* When we are weighing gold, the Balance is a pure '*Pramāṇa*', being the *means* whereby we know the weight of the gold But when doubts arise as to the accuracy of a balance, then what is done is that a piece of gold, whose weight has been already ascertained by means of a reliable balance, is weighed again in the balance of doubtful accuracy; and if the weights tally, the balance is proved 'accurate'; so that in regard to its accuracy, the balance becomes an 'object of cognition', 'Prameya', the resultant cognition in this case being in the form, 'this balance is accurate'.

† In this passage the Author reminds us of what he has already said in the *Bhāṣya* or Sū. 1-1-1'—says *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes *tiṣṭhati* as 'lives'.

tiṣthati'), the *tree*, (*vṛkṣa*) is called the 'nominative', because in regard to its own action of *standing*, it is 'independent' [thus fulfilling the conditon of Pāṇini's definition of the Nominative as that which is *svatantra*, 'independent agent'];—when we say 'he sees the tree' ('*vṛkṣam paśyati*'), the same tree comes to be called the 'objective', because it is that which is 'most desired' to be got at by the action of 'seeing' [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Objective as that which is 'the most desired to be got at' by the Agent];—when we say 'he indicates the Moon by (*i e.* with the help of, *through*) the tree', the same tree is called an 'Instrument', because it is the 'principal means of accomplishment' employed by the person doing the indicating [and thus fulfills the condition of Pāṇini's definition as that which is the 'principal means of accomplishment'];—when we say 'he is pouring water for the tree' ('*vṛkṣāya udakam āsiñcati*'), the tree is called the 'Dative', as it is that which is 'intended to be benefited' by the water that is poured [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Dative as what is intended to be benefited by the action]; —when we say 'the leaf falls from the tree', ('*vṛkṣāt parṇam patati*'), the tree is the 'Ablative,' as it is 'what remains fixed while there is movement of the other thing',—such being the definition of the Ablative, - lastly when we say 'birds are on the tree' ('*vrkṣe vayāmsi santi*'), the tree is the 'Locative, being the receptacle (of the birds),—and the 'Locative' has been defined as 'receptacle'

* From all this it is clear that '*Kāraka*', 'case relation' (or 'active agency') is a name given, not to the mere *substance* (as held by the *Mādhyamika*), nor to the mere *action*, but to that which, while being endowed with a particular action of its own, becomes the means of the accomplishment of the other (principal) action; *e. g.* the name 'Nominative' applies, neither to the substance alone, nor to the action alone, but to that which, independently by itself

* According to the *Bhāṣyacandra*, we have a Pūrvapaksa argument from here down to l. 5 on P. 85, and the Siddhāntin's answer begins on l. 5, p. 85 with '*Asti bhoh*',—and then the *Pūrvapakṣa*-argument again with '*Se-yamupalabdhiḥ &c.*' (l. 4, p 85),-while according to the *Vārtika* and the we have here, in the passage beginning with p. 84, l. 13, to p. 85, l. 5, a *Tātparya*, statement from the Siddhanta stand-point, applying the general principle of '*Kārakas*' to the case of 'Pramāṇa and Prameya'.

(*i e.* by its own action), becomes the means of accomplishing the other act;—similarly the name 'objective' applies to that which is the most desired to be got at by the action, and not to mere substance or to action; and so with what is the 'principal means of accomplishing', and so on. In these cases we have found that, just as *in point of fact* the names of the active agencies (*Kārakas*) are applied, neither to the mere substance, nor to the mere action, but to that which, being endowed with a particular action of its own, helps in the bringing about of some other action,—so also the same follows from the definitions of the 'active agencies'; and as the words '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Prameya*' also are expressive of active agency (case-relation; '*Pramāna*' being the *Instrument* and '*Prameya*' the *Object*, of cognition), they cannot renounce what is in the very nature of 'active agencies.'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

The Pūrvapaksin urges the following argument:—

"Well, Sir, we admit that the *Kāraka*-names are used according to their capacity; so that Perception and the rest are '*Pramāna*', 'Instruments of Cognition' as they are the cause of the action of cognising, and they are also '*Prameya*', 'object of cognition', as they are the objects of the action of *cognising*; thus then Perception and the rest are *objects* of cognition as well as *instruments* of cognition;* as is vouched for by such specific assertions (met with in common parlance) as—(*a*) 'I know this *by* Perception', 'I know this *by* Inference', 'I know these *by* Analogy', 'I know this *by* Word', [where Perception etc. figure as the *means*],—or (*b*) 'My cognition (which is apprehended) is Perceptional', 'My Cognition is Inferential', 'My Cognition is Verbal', [where they are apprehended as the Object of Cognition]. So also when these same, Perception and the rest, are described by their definitions—e.g., 'the cognition produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ' and so forth—they come to be specifically *known* [in which case they themselves form the *objects* of cognition]. Now the question arises—Is this *Cognition*

* According to the *Bhāṣyacandra*, the term '*pramānāni*' here stands for (1) *Instruments of Cognition*, and (2) *Cognition*;—reading the passage as संवेद्यानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि च.

of Perception etc. brought about by the instrumentality of another set of Pramāṇas? Or without other Pramāṇas, independently of all instruments? 'What difference would that make?' [The Pūrvapakṣin explains this in the following Sūtra] :—

Sūtra 17

" If the Instruments of Cognition are cognised by means of Instruments of Cognition,—then this involves the possibility of other Instruments of Cognition."

BHĀṢYA

"If Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition are apprehended by means of Instruments of Cognition, then this means that the Instruments by whose means they are apprehended are distinct from Perception and the rest; and this involves the postulating of other Instruments of Cognition (distinct from Perception etc., enumerated in Sū. 1-1-4); and this means that there would be an infinite regress, one Instrument of Cognition being apprehended by means of another, this latter again by means of another, and so on and on, *ad infinitum*. And it is not right to admit of such an infinite regress, when there is no justification for it."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

"In order to avoid this it might be urged that the cognition of the Instruments of Cognition is brought about without other Pramāṇas or Instruments of Cognition, independently of all instrumentality. But in that case—

Sūtra 18

" If (in the cognition of the Instrument of Cognition) another Instrument of Cognition is not operative, then, just as the cognition of the Instrument of Cognition would be accomplished (without the operation of an Instrument of Cognition), so would the cognition of the Object of Cognition also."

" If another Instrument of Cognition is not operative in the cognition of Perception etc., then there should be no operation of any Instrument of Cognition in the cognition of the Soul and other Objects of Cognition;* as the two cases are exactly alike."

The answer to this is that this would mean the total abolition of all Instruments of Cognition;—this is what is explained in the following Sūtra:—

* आत्माद्युपलब्धावपि is the correct reading as found in the Puri Mss.

Sūtra 19

Not so: as the apprehension of the Instruments of Cognition is similar to that of lamp-light.

BHĀṢYA

Lamp-light, being an aid to the act of Perception, is a *Pramāṇa*, an Instrument of Cognition, in the seeing of the visible object: [when *f.i.*, the object is seen with the help of the lamp-light]; and yet it is itself also cognised by the instrumentality of another *Perception*, through its contact with the Eye [when, *f.i.*, the lamp-light is itself seen];—similarly, knowing the fact that the presence and absence of *seeing* is in accordance with the presence and absence of the lamp, this lamp is *inferred* as the cause of the seeing (of itself as also of other objects) [where the lamp-light is cognised by means of *Inference**]; similarly, when we hear the words 'fetch a lamp in the dark,' we cognise the *lamp* by means of Words. [Just as in the case of lamplight, we find that though it is itself an Instrument of Cognition, it is yet cognised by means of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition],—in the same manner Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition also would be cognised by means of Perception, etc. [and not by other Instruments of Cognition]. For instance, in the case of Perception [in which there are the following factors—(*a*) the sense-organs, (*b*) the objects perceived, (*c*) the sense-object contact, and (*d*) the cognition produced by this sense-object contact] we find,—(*a*) that the sense-organs are cognised by means of Inference based on the fact of their respective objects being duly apprehended [the inference being in the form—'the sense-organ of the Eye exists, because we have cognition of *Colour*, which could not be possible except by means of the Visual Organ, and so on];—(*b*) that the Objects are cognised by the Perception itself,—(*c*) that the sense-object contacts are cognised by means of Inference based upon obstruction.† [This

* That is, the fact of the Lamp-light being the cause of the seeing is inferred.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The reading of this passage is doubtful; the Viz. text reads सन्निकर्षास्त्वावरणेन; the Puri MS. A reads सन्निकर्षात्स्वावरणेन; and Puri MS. B reads सन्निकर्षात्स्यावरणेन. The two latter do not give any sense. We have therefore adopted the reading of the Viz. text.

inference being in the form, 'the Perception must be due to actual contact of the object with the sense-organ, because we find that there is absence of Perception whenever sense-object contact is absent by reason of obstructions to such contact'];*—(d) that the Cognition is produced by the sense-object contact is apprehended,† just like pleasure, etc., through its inherence in the Soul as accompanied by a peculiar contact of the Mind with the cognising Soul (as encased in the bodily membrane).§ Similarly may every other Instrument of Cognition be analysed [and found to have several factors apprehended by means of one or the other of the four ordinary Instruments of Cognition].

Thus then, [the meaning of the Sūtra is that] in the case of the lamp-light it is found that while it is itself visible (*object* of vision), it is also the *means* of the seeing of other visible things, and thus it comes to be called the 'object,' or the means' of *Cognition*, according to circumstances; similarly any other thing, though an *object* of Cognition, may also be the *means* of the Cognition (of something else), and thus come to be called the 'object' or the 'means' of Cognition, according to circumstances. So that the Cognition of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition also is actually found to be brought about, *not* by a

* The Eye and all its auxiliaries being present, if it is found that there is no *seeing*, and it is also found that the range of vision is obstructed by a wall which is actually seen to intervene between the Eye and the Object sought to be seen, and again it is found that when the wall is not there the Object is seen all right,– these facts lead to the conclusion that in every case of *seeing* there is actual contact of the Object with the sense-organ. The *Bhāṣyacandra* formulates the *inferences* as follows – (1) 'The Wall is actually in contact with the Eye, because it is *seen*,—what is not in contact with the Eye is not seen, as we find in the case of things hidden behind the wall';—(2) 'the Eye is in contact with the wall, because it is the instrument bringing about the perception of the wall,—whenever an organ is instrumental in bringing about the perception of a thing, it is in contact with the thing, as we find in the case of the organ of Touch;—(3) 'Sense-organs must be in contact with the Object because they are instruments, like the Axe', and so on.

† That is *perceived*—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes संयोगविशेषात् as meaning संयोगविशिष्टात् and as qualifying आत्मसमवायात्; and the last च in the sense of emphasis only.

different set of Instruments of Cognition, nor entirely without the aid of all instrumentality.

The Opponent might urge that—"there can be no apprehension of a thing by itself"; but our answer to this will be that the argument is not right, as the things are really different from one another, and they are only similar in character. What the Opponent means to urge is that—"it is not right to hold that Perception etc. are apprehended by means of Perception etc. themselves, for a thing is always apprehended by means of something other than itself";—but this argument is not right: as in reality there *is* difference among the individual things, which however are possessed of a similar character (by virtue of which they have a common name); so that (in the case in question, it is found that) the character of 'Perception' belongs to, and includes, several individuals (i.e. particular perceptions); and among these one individual (Perception) could well be apprehended by means of another individual (Perception); and in this there could be no incongruity;—similarly in the case of Inference and the other Instruments of Cognition;—(to take a homely instance) we find that by means of the water brought out (of the well) we have the cognition (inferential) of water in the well itself [where we have the apprehension of *water* by means of *water* itself]. The same we find to be the case with the Cognising Soul and Mind: When we have such cognitions as 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy', we find that the cogniser (the Soul) is apprehended by himself; and in the case of Mind also we find that it has been declared that 'the non-simultaneity of cognitions is an indicative of the Mind' (Sū 1-1-16), which means that the inference of the Mind is brought about by means of the Mind itself;—so that there is non-difference between the *cogniser* and the *cognised* (in the case of the Soul), and between the *means* of apprehension and *object** of apprehension (in the case of the Mind).

* The Viz. text reads ग्राहकस्य which is evidently wrong; the Puri MSS. read ग्राह्यस्य; and this has the support of the *Tātparya* also; which has the following observations on this paragraph of the *Bhāṣya*—It is not quite right to speak of the Soul as the *objective* of the action of *cognition*; for the *objective* is that which bears on itself the action of something other than itself; the real objective of the cognition 'I am happy' is the *happi-*

The Opponent might urge that in the cases cited the auxiliary conditions are different; but our answer to this will be that so it is also in the case of Perception etc. It is true that in the case of the cognising Soul, the Soul does not cognise itself (i.e. becomes the *object* of cognition) except under conditions different (from those under which it is the *cogniser*),—similarly the Mind also is apprehended by means of the Mind under entirely different conditions; but precisely the same is the case with Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition; for when Perception etc. are apprehended by means of Perception etc. themselves, we are cognisant of total difference between the two* individual perceptions (the Perception cognised and the Perception by means of which it is cognised).

Then again, there is no possibility of there being anything that cannot be apprehended by Perception etc. If there were any such thing as is not apprehended by Perception and the other three Instruments of Cognition, then there might be some ground for the postulating of additional Instruments of Cognition; but as a matter of fact no one can point out any such thing, for the simple reason that everything, existing as well as non-existing,† is actually found to be apprehended by Perception etc,—as we find to be the case in ordinary experience

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some people have taken up the example (cited in the preceding Sūtra) by itself, quite detached from any reasonings,—*i. e.* as proving the conclusion (that Pramāṇas are self-illumined) by itself, without reference to any particular reasoning; and they have interpreted the Sūtra to mean that—'just as the lamp-light is seen without the light of any other lamp, so also are the

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ness, and the Soul only figures in the cognition as the illumining factor. The Mind is certainly an *instrument* in the cognition of itself and is also the *object*, yet this does not involve the incongruity of a thing operating upon itself; because it is by its own *existence* that the Mind is the *instrument* of its own *cognition*; and certainly the *existence* of the Mind is something entirely different from the *Cognition* of the Mind.

* The Viz. text wrongly retains the न; all MSS. including the two Puri MSS. have dropped it. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also has no न.

† How the non-existent thing forms the object of Pramāṇas has been shown in the introductory *Bhāṣya*.

Pramāṇas apprehended without other Pramāṇas'.* But such an argument—

Sūtra 20

Cannot be conclusive ; as in the case of certain things we find that other instruments are inoperative, while in others it is found that they are not inoperative.

BHĀṢYA

(A) The said fact (of independence of other Pramāṇas), which is deduced from the absence of operation (of other lamps in the case of the lamp illumining things by its light), has been urged (by the writers referred to) with a view to prove similar independence in the case of the Instruments of Cognition ;—but the same fact might be urged (with equal reasonableness) to prove similar independence in the case of the Objects of Cognition also ; as there is nothing to distinguish this latter case from the former [*i.e.* just as it is argued, from the case of the lamp being independent of another lamp, that Pramāṇas are independent of other Pramāṇas, so may it also be argued, that Prameyas also are independent of Pramāṇas,—which would mean that Pramāṇas are not necessary for anything].—(B) Further, it may be argued that so far as the cognition of the *objects of cognition* is concerned, it is found that for the apprehension of such things as the colour of a Dish and the like, one does require the operation of such aids as the light of a lamp [so that the example of the *lamp* proves the necessity of such aids in the case of the cognition of *objects of cognition*] : and the same might be said in regard to the cognition of the Pramāṇas also, whose case does not differ from the former case. [The argument would be that, just as in the case of the apprehension of *objects of cognition* such aids as lamp-light &c. are necessary, so in the case of the apprehension of the Pramāṇas also, such other aids would be necessary]—.† [Thus then, the example of the Lamp as interpreted by the said writers being

* This is the argument propounded by those who regard all Pramāṇas to be *self-illumined—i.e.* the Vedāntins and *Mīmāṁsakas*.

† According to the *Bhāṣyacandra* the meaning of this passage is as follows :—The *colour of the Dish* is perceptible by itself, and yet for being *illumined* it requires the aid of the Lamp-light , so the Pramāṇas also, even though they may be self-illuminated, may stand in need of other Pramāṇas.

found to support both views—unless the said example is taken in reference to a particular reasoning (as we have taken it), there could be no justification for accepting its force in one case and not in the other; as there is no reason why the force of the Example should be admitted in one case and not in the other.

*On the other hand, if the Example (of the lamp) is taken in reference to a particular reasoning (as we have taken it), it is found to point to a single conclusion, and as such it is not open to the objection just mentioned.** That is to say, when the example is taken as bearing upon a particular reasoning, it is found to point to a single conclusion (that one Instrument of Cognition is independent of other Instruments of Cognition); and under the circumstances, the Opponent cannot very well refuse to accept its force.† Such being the case, this interpretation is not open to the objection that the Example is not conclusive.

"But if Perception &c. were apprehended by other Perception &c., then there would be an infinite regress." Not so, we reply; as all usage could be rightly explained on the basis of the distinction that the said Perception &c., are apprehended (in one case) as the *objects* cognised and (in another case) as the *instruments* of the cognition. For instance, when we have such notions as 'I cognise the thing *by means of Perception*', 'I cognise the thing *by means of Inference*', Perception &c. are cognised as the *instruments* of cognition; and when we have such notions as 'this cognition of mine (which I now cognise) is perceptional', 'this cognition is inferential', 'this cognition is verbal', Perception &c., appear as the *objects* of cognition,—so that when we actually recognise them thus (differently in the two cases), it becomes possible for us to carry on all business for the purpose of acquiring merit, prosperity, happiness and Final Release, and also for the purpose avoiding the contraries of these. And as all business and usage can be explained on the basis of the said distinction, there is nothing to be accomplished by the infinite regress, for the accomplishment of which it would be necessary to postulate the said infinite regress (of Perception &c.)

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads this as Sūtra.

† 'ज्ञातुम्' of the Viz. text is wrong. The Puri MSS. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* support the reading अननुज्ञातुम्.

SECTION (3)

Detailed Examination of Perception.

Sūtras 21–33

BHĀṢYA

The Pramāṇas have been examined in a general way: They are now going to be examined in detail.

Sūtra 21

Pūrvapakṣa :—**"The statement of the Cause (in Sū. 1.1.4) of Sense-Perception is untenable, as it is an incomplete Statement."**

BHĀṢYA

"That is to say, another cause (of Perception)—the contact of the Mind with the Soul—has not been mentioned."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Pūrvapakṣa (continued)—" As a general rule, unless an object is in contact with something, there cannot be produced in it any such quality as can be produced by contact ;—and we know that the quality of 'Cognition' is produced in the Soul ;—so the conclusion is that the contact of this Soul with the Mind is a cause of that Cognition Then as regards the Sense-Mind contact, if the cause of Cognition consisted in Sense-object contact, independently of the Sense-Mind contact, it would be possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously ; and (since this is impossible : vide Sū. 1-1-15) therefore Sense-Mind contact also should be regarded as a cause of Perception."

What has been just said constitutes the anticipated Bhāṣya on the next Sūtra.

Sūtra 22

" Perception cannot be brought about unless there is contact of the Soul and of the Mind. (hence of the contact of these should have been mentioned in the Sūtra 1.1.4).

" Just as no Perception is brought about until there is contact of the Sense and the Object, so also no Perception is brought about unless there is contact of the Soul and of the Sense-organ. (Hence this latter also should be mentioned among the 'Cause of Perception')."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Pūrvapakṣa having been stated, and the trend of the Siddhānta having been already indicated in Sū. 1–1–4, an interested outsider, listening to the discussion, says]—"These people assert that because Cognition is found to appear when there is sense-object contact, this latter should be regard as the *cause* of that Cognition ; but if this reasoning were true—

Sūtra 23

"The same might be said of Space, Place, Time and Ākāś'a also"—

BHĀSYA

"As a matter of fact, Cognition appears only when Space, &c. are present ; so that these also should be *causes* of Perception. [If not, then the contact of the Mind and Soul, Mind and Sense, or Sense and Object, need not be regarded as the 'cause' of Perception]."

(The answer to the above reasoning of the Outsider is as follows)—

Even if Space &c., are not regarded as the 'cause' of Perception, Cognition would appear during their existence, for the simple reason that the proximity or duration of Space &c., is unavoidable. That is to say, even though Space &c., may not be regarded as 'cause' in the appearance of Cognition yet it need not be denied that whenever the Cognition appears it must appear while Space &c , are present ; as the duration of Space &c. can never be avoided (being as they are eternal and omnipresent). [But their existence at the time does not make them causes]. Such being the case, it would behove you to point out the reason by virtue of which you could say—'for this reason Space &c. should be regarded as causes of Cognition'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The side-objection of the Outsider having been disposed of the Pūrvapakṣin turns towards the Siddhāntin)—"Under the circumstances (there being reasons for regarding the Contact of the embodied Soul, the Mind, the Sense-organ and the Object, as the cause of Perception), the Mind-Soul Contact should be mentioned (under Sū. 1–1–4). "

In answer to this, we have the following Sūtra—

Sūtra 24

Cognition forming the characteristic feature of the Soul, there can be no non-inclusion of it.

BHĀṢYA

Cognition is a characteristic feature of the Soul, because it is its quality; and (as has been said above, unless an object is in contact with something, there cannot be produced in it any such quality as can be produced by Contact. (Which shows that Soul-Contact is essential).

Sūtra 25

Nor (is there a non-inclusion) of the Mind, as the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is indicative of it

BHĀṢYA

The 'non-inclusion' of the preceding Sūtra is to be construed here also. It having been already declared (under Sū 1-1-16) that the non-simultaneity of cognitions is indicative of the Mind, it follows from this that when cognition is brought about by *Sense-object contact*, the latter is dependent upon (and helped by) the *contact of Mind.*

Sūtra 26

(The Final Siddhānta)

Inasmuch as it is only the contact of the Sense-organ and the Object that forms the (distinctive) Cause (or feature) of Perception, it has been mentioned (in the Sūtra) by means of words directly expressing it.

BHĀṢYA

(The question now arises—"Just as Mind-contact is not mentioned directly because it is indirectly implied, in the same manner, the Sense-object contact is also implied; and as such why should this be mentioned ?"—The answer is given in the Sūtra, as follows)—The contact of the Mind and of the Soul is the (common) cause of Perception, as well as Inferential, Analogical and Verbal Cognitions; while the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object is the distinctive cause of *Perception only*; thus the two do not stand on the same footing; and being thus differently circumstanced from the other contacts, the Sense-object contact has been directly mentioned in the Sūtra.

Sūtra 27

Also because, in the case of persons whose Mind is asleep or preoccupied, (Perception is held to be) brought about by means of the contact of the Sense-organ and Object (only)

BHĀṢYA

We have (in the definition of 'Perception') the mention of the Sense-object contact, and not that of Mind-Soul contact, also because &c. &c (A) Sometimes a man goes to sleep after having determined that he would wake up at a certain time,—and by force of this determination (which gives rise to the effort necessary for bringing about the requisite Mind Soul Contact) he wakes up at that time; but sometimes it happens that during sleep he is awakened either by a very loud sound or by a forcible shaking; and in these cases the waking Cognition (of Sound and Touch) by the sleeping man is brought about (primarily) by the Contact of the Sense-organ: so that predominance belongs, not to the contact of either the Cognising Soul or the Mind, but to the Contact of the Object with the Sense-organ; because in such cases there is no *desire to know* on the part of the Soul, to give rise to its effort which could urge the Mind and bring it into Contact with it (and it is only when this happens that Mind-Soul contact is possible)

(B) In other cases what ordinarily happens is that when the man, though having his Mind entirely occupied with the Cognition of one thing, *desires* to cognise (think of) another thing, there appears his effort, which brings about the contact of his Mind with that thing, of which he then becomes duly cognisant (and in this case we have the Contact of the Mind and of the Soul also) Now in the case in which the man having his Mind entirely preoccupied, there appears in him a Cognition brought about by the forcible, sudden impact of the Object, without any *desire to cognise* or *mental effort* on his part,—the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object is the principal cause of the Cognition; as in this case there is no *desire to cognise* on the part of the man, and hence no *effort*, which could urge the Mind (into Contact with the undesirable object). And because it is the principal cause, it is the Sense-object contact that should be mentioned (in the definition of

Perception), and not the Mind-Soul contact, which is only a subordinate factor.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

There is another reason for regarding the Sense-object contact as the predominant factor.

Sūtra 28

And also because Individual Cognitions are named after these.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact we find that individual cognitions are named after the Sense-organs and the Objects concerned. "How so?"

For instance (*a*) when one smells with the olfactory organ, his Cognition is called '*olfactory* Cognition' and 'Cognition of *smell*;' (*b*) when he sees with the Visual-organ the Cognition is called '*visual* Cognition' and Cognition of '*colour*', (*c*) when he tastes with the Gestatory organ, the Cognition is called '*gestatory* Cognition' and 'Cognition of *taste*' Further, Perception is held to be of five kinds, simply because of the number of Sense-organs and that of perceptible objects being each five-fold. And all this goes to prove that in the bringing about of Perception, the Sense object contact is the principal cause.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent says.—"It has been urged by the Siddhāntin (in Sū. 26) that the mention of *Sense-object Contact* is necessary, not that of the Mind-soul Contact, because in the case of the man whose mind is asleep or pre-occupied, Perception is brought about by the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object (only) But this—

Sūtra 29

"Is not a sound reasoning, as it involves self-contradiction."

BHĀṢYA

"If you do not accept Mind-soul contact to be the cause of any Perception, this would be contradictory to what has been said before (in Sū. 1-1-16) to the effect that *the non-simultaneity of*

cognitions is indicative of the Mind; as in accordance with this latter statement, it is clear that Sense-object contact stands in need of Mind-contact; for if Mind-contact were not necessary, it would be possible for (all five) cognitions to appear simultaneously. If, on the other hand, with a view to avoid this self-contradiction, it be held that of all cognitions the contact of the Mind and the Soul is the cause, then our objection remains in force,—that being the cause of cognitions, the Mind-Soul contact should be mentioned (in the definition of Perception)."

Sūtra 30

There is no self-contradiction; as the case we have cited is due to the special force of a particular object.

BHĀSYA

The answer to the Pūrvapakṣa argument (in Sū 28, is as follows)—Our view does not involve a self-contradiction; for we do not deny that Mind-Soul contact is *a cause* of perception;—all that we mean is that Sense-object contact is *the principal cause*. (As for the instance that has been cited by us in Sū. 26)—in the case of the man whose Mind is asleep or preoccupied, the cognition that appears sometimes is entirely 'due to the force of the particular object'; the term 'particular object' denotes a certain object of sense-perception; its 'force' stands for '*tīvratā*', *intensity*, and '*paṭutā*', its vigour; and this 'force of the object' affects the Sense-object contact, and not the Mind-soul contact, which shows that Sense-object contact is the more important of the two.

(An objection is raised)—"In the case where the Mind of the man being asleep or pre-occupied, though there is no effort and no desire on his part, the cognition that arises from the Sense-object contact, must also have Mind-contact for its cause (even though a subordinate one);—now it behoves you to explain to what this action of the Mind is due?"

(The answer to the above is as follows)—Just as (in a case of ordinary cognition) what urges the Mind forward (to contact) is only that particular quality of the Soul which is called 'effort', and which is brought about by that cognitive Soul's Desire,—so, in all cases, what brings about the experience of the Soul is that

quality of it which is produced by the defects (of Passion etc.) in its activity (this quality being in the shape of 'Adṛṣṭa', 'Unseen Force', Destiny); and it is by this quality that the Mind would be impelled (in cases where there is no effort or Desire) and come into contact with the Sense-organs. If the Mind were not impelled by this quality, then (as there would be nothing else that could urge it into contact) there would be no contact, no cognition would appear; so that the said quality would fail to be universally effective (in regard to all Substances, Qualities and Actions);—and yet it is essential that this particular quality of the Soul (Adṛṣṭa) should be all-effective towards Substances, Qualities and Actions; for otherwise, as there would be nothing else to give rise to the (initial) activity (motion) of the four minutely material atoms, or of the Minds (at the beginning of Creation), there would be no possibility of any such thing being produced as the Body, the Sense-organs and the Objects.

Section 4

Consideration of the view that Perception is the same as Inference.

Sūtra 31

Pūrvapakṣa—"Perception is only Inferential Cognition, —as it is a cognition that proceeds from the Cognition of a component part."

BHĀṢYA

(The Pūrvapakṣin says)—"The cognition—'this is a tree'—arising from the contact of the object and the sense-organ is what is called (by you) 'Perception'. But (according to us) this is only an *Inference* How so? Because the (said) cognition of the *tree* proceeds from the apprehension of one of its parts. When the observer cognises the tree, what he actually *perceives* is only its part nearest to himself; and certainly that *one part* is not the 'tree'. So that (when the man cognises the 'tree' as a whole) what happens is that there is an inference of it (from the perception of its one part), just like the inference of *fire* from the apprehension of *Smoke*."

(The Siddhāntin meets the Pūrvapakṣa with a question)—What is that *something* different from the perceived part, which you regard as being the object of *Inference* (and *not* of *Perception*)?

(The Opponent answers)—"There are two views in regard to the constitution of Objects: By one view an Object is only an aggregate of certain component parts; while by the other it is a distinct *Composite Substance* produced out of its component parts;—now according to the former view, what are *inferred* from the apprehension of one part are the other component parts (other than the one that is perceived); while according to the other view, what are *inferred* are those other parts as well as the Composite whole made up of the parts."

(Now the Siddhāntin urges his real objection against the Pūrvapakṣa view)—(*a*) According to the view that the *Object* is only an aggregate of parts,—it would not be possible for any cognition of the 'tree' to proceed from the apprehension of any one part; for just as the perceived *part* is not the 'tree', so the *unperceived part* also is not the 'tree'. (So that the inference of the unperceived part cannot be regarded as the 'cognition of the *tree*', which thus becomes impossible).

"What happens is that from the apprehension of one *part* proceeds the inference of another *part*; and this is followed by a remembrance of all the conglomerated parts; which ultimately brings about the cognition of the 'tree'."

In that case the 'cognition of the tree' cannot be called *inferential* (as it would be pure *remembrance*).

(*b*) According to the other view,—that the Object is a *composite substance* made up of component parts,—it would be impossible for the composite whole to be *inferred*; for (even according to you) if the composite *whole* is to be *inferred* from the apprehension of a part, there must be a previous *perception* of that whole as related to that part (as without the perception of such relation no inference would be possible);—and if the Composite Whole is *perceived*, then, being as much perceived as the *one part*, it cannot be held to be an object of *inference*.

Thus the conclusion is that the cognition of the 'tree' cannot be regarded as *inferential*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In Sū. 31, the Pūrvapakṣin has admitted the cognition of a part and then argued that Perception is only Inference; but this

Sūtra 32

—cannot be; as even that cognition (from which the inference is held to proceed) is itself perceptional.

BHĀṢYA

Perceptional cognition cannot be regarded as Inferential. "Why?" Because the apprehension is actually of the form of Perception; *i.e* the 'cognition of component part', which has been accepted by the Pūrvapakṣin (as the basis of the inferential cognition of the object) is itself a cognition of the form of Perception; and that cognition could not be without an object; hence that object (the part of the tree) which would be apprehended by this cognition being thus admitted (to be *perceived)* establishes the existence of Perception (as apart from Inference).

"But what else is there apart from the Object (*i.e.* the cognised component parts of the Tree) (which would be the Object of the cognition of the 'Tree')?"

Well, there is the *composite whole*, or (if you do not accept such *a whole*) the aggregate of the component parts. And you cannot escape from this difficulty by holding that the initial cognition of the component part also is *inferential*: because it is not possible to have an inferential cognition in the shape of cognition of the single component part; for the simple reason that there is no Probans whereby such an inference could be got at. [As such a Probans could only be in the form of the cognition of another part; and for proving this latter to be inferential, yet another cognition would be required as the Probans, and so on *ad infinitum*; and this infinite regress makes the postulating of any such Probans impossible; so that the cognition of the component part cannot but be regarded as pure Perception.]

There is yet another reason why Perception cannot be regarded as Inference; that is, because Inference is always preceded by (and based upon) Perception. As a matter of fact, Inference is preceded by Perception; for instance, it is only when the observer has *percieved* fire and smoke to be related to each other, and again *perceives* smoke (in the Subject), that there is *Inference* in regard to Fire (which is not in contact with any sense-organ as the time);—now here we find that no Inference can follow in the absence of the *Perception* (in the *Example*)

of the Probandum and Probans as related to each other or in that of the (subsequent) *perception* (in the Subject) of the Probans by itself;—and certainly these two *perceptions* cannot be regarded as Inference; for the simple reason that they are brought about by the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object; and Inference does not proceed from any such contact of the Object of inference with the Sense-organs. This is an important point of difference in the characters of Inference and Perception; and this has to be accepted.

Sūtra 33

Nor is there the cognition of one component part, as the composite whole is also there (and this also is cognised).

BHĀṢYA

[The Author points out another weak point in the Pūrvapakṣa argument of Sū. 30]—In no case is there a cognition of any single component part only; in fact there is cognition of one component part, and of the composite which is inseparable from (composed of) that component part. "How so?" *Because there is the composite whole*, as a matter of fact there is the *composite whole*, which is something distinct from the *component parts*; and when this *composite* occupies the same point in space as the component part, it should be amenable to all the conditions of perceptibility (to which the component part is amenable); and under the circumstances, when there is *perception* of the *component* part, it is not possible that there be no *perception* of the *composite*.

"But there is no apprehension of all (the parts)".—This is not right; as the 'one part' (of the Composite whole) has no existence apart from its (constituent) cause. (The sense of the Pūrvapakṣa argument now put forward is as follows)—"As a matter of fact, *all* the component parts are not perceived; some parts being hidden from view by other parts; and under the circumstances, the whole of the Composite (even if such Composite were admitted) could never be perceived; specially as the Composite does not subsist in its entirety in any of those parts that *are* perceived; so that the 'cognition of one part' still remains (as the cause of the inference of the entire Composite whole)."

But, says the Siddhāntin in answer to the above, the term 'entire' ('whole') is used only when (of several things) all are meant, and the term 'non-entire' ('partial') is used when a few of them are left out (and only a few are meant); thus then, both these terms ('entire' and 'non-entire') are applicable only to several things, which are perceived when not hidden, and are not perceived when hidden (and certainly the Composite is never hidden by its component parts).

You please answer the following question.—When the Composite is perceived, what of it is there which is not perceived, which could justify your assertion that there is cognition of only the part (and not of the *whole*)? Certainly, of the Composite whole there are no 'parts' apart from its constituent causes (its components); and it is not right to regard the *composite* as of the same nature as the component parts. The character of the *Composite* is such that it is perceived as along with those parts that are perceived, and it is not perceived as along with those that are not perceived, on account of obstruction. Certainly this (perception and non-perception) does not bring about a diversity (in the Composite).

[The Siddhāntin next takes up the view that the Composite is nothing but the aggregate of component parts]—The *composite* 'Tree' (according to this view) would consist either—(*a*) in the entirety (multiplicity) of the components, or (*b*) in the conjunction (combination) of the components;—in either case apprehension of it would not be possible. That is to say—(*a*) either the *composite* 'Tree' would consist in the entirety of the root, the trunk, the branch, the leaves and other components,—or it would consist in the conjunction of these components; in either case any apprehension of the 'Tree' as a *composite* whole would be impossible; as in the first place, certain parts (the back part, for instance) would always be hidden from view by the obstruction of other parts (for instance, the front part);—which would make it impossible for the parts to be apprehended *in their entirety*; and secondly, as for the *conjunction of the parts*; this also could not be apprehended, for the simple reason that all the conjuncts (parts) are not apprehended.

Thus then, the conclusion is that the cognition of the 'tree', accompanying (and following from) the 'cognition of one part'

can be explained only on the theory that the 'Tree' forms a distinct object (by itself, independently of the component parts),—and not on the theory (held by the Pūrvapakṣin) that it is a mere aggregate *of the parts*.

[Thus ends the Examination of the View that Perception is only a form of Inference.]

SECTION (5)

Examination of the Nature of Composite Wholes.

[Sūtras 34—37]

Sūtra 34

Pūrvapakṣa:—**"As the Composite Whole is still to be proved,* there must be a doubt with regard to it."**—(Sū. 34)

BHĀṢYA

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* says]—"It has been said (in Sū. 32) that [there can be no cognition of one part only] *because the Composite Whole is also there*,—but this is not a valid reason†; as the '*Composite Whole*' is still *to be proved*; that is to say, it still remains to be proved that out of the constituent particles a distinct substance, in the shape of the 'Composite Whole', is produced;—as a matter of fact, this has not yet been proved; and so long as it has not been proved beyond doubt, all that can be said is that there is a *diversity of opinion* in regard to it;

* This word '*Sādhya*' has, as we learn from the *Vārtika*, given rise to confusion. The real sense is thus explained by the *Tātparya*:—The term *Sādhya* here simply means that the Composite Whole is *a-siddha*, *not-admitted*, by the Opponent; who argues thus—"Things are to be accepted exactly as they are; an Idea can establish the existence of that only which it apprehends; and what is apprehended by the Idea is that which imparts its form to the Idea. Such being the case, as a matter of fact, in the Idea of a certain thing, we do not find any other form apart from the continuously appearing atoms of Colour &c., and no Idea is ever found to have the form of the 'Composite Whole', or any thing apart from the said atoms. Though the atoms, each by itself, are devoid of magnitude and volume, yet when they appear in a group, they appear as having magnitude." The Opponent entertaining such notions in regard to the Composite Whole, it is only right to regard this as *not-accepted* by him; and as such open to a diversity of opinion, specially in the absence of any proofs one way or the other.

† 'For us'—says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

and on account of this *diversity of opinion*, there should be Doubt in regard to the subject (according to Sū. 1-1-23)."

Sūtra 35

[*Siddhānta*] If there were no Composite, there would be non-apprehension of all things.*

BHĀṢYA

If there is no Composite, there will be non-apprehension§ of all things. "What *all things*?" Such things as Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Individuality and Inherence. "With what idea [do you say this]?"† Well, as for Substance in its atomic condition, this could never be an object of perception, as atoms are beyond the reach of the sense-organs;—as for any other form of Substance, [this could only be a composite of atoms, and] no Composite substance exists (according to the Pūrvapakṣin), which could be the object of perception; and yet as a matter of fact, all these, Substance and the rest, are found to be objects of perception, and actually apprehended as such —But if these were without a substratum (in the form of the Composite), they could not be apprehended:—and yet there *are* such apprehensions as—(*a*) 'this is a jar—(*b*) dark in colour—, (*c*) one in number—(*d*) large in size—(*e*) conjoined (to something else)—(*f*) *moving*,—(*g*) *existing* and—(*h*) made of clay'; and every one of these—the quality (of colour, number) &c.,—is a property (of some Composite substance). So that, inasmuch as we have the apprehension of all these things, we conclude that there is such a thing as the *Composite*; apart from the Components.

Sūtra 36

Also as there is possibility of holding and drawing,—

BHĀṢYA

the Composite is something actually‡ *different from the components.*||

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* The *Vārtika* proposes another interpretation—'there would be non-apprehension by means of any Instrument of Cognition.'

§ 'Non-apprehension' stands for all kinds of phenomenon.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains *Kṛtvā* as '*matvā*'.

‡ This Sūtra is an answer to the view that the conception of 'composite' is illusory. '*Bhūta*' denotes *actuality*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

|| These words complete the sentence of the Sūtra and, according to the Vārtika, are implied by the particle च in the Sūtra; the whole sentence being—.

[The Opponent objects to the reasoning as follows]—" As a matter of fact, the *Holding and Drawing* are due to *adhesion*,—this *adhesion* being a particular quality (of the components themselves) which is concomitant with (their) *conjunction*, and which is produced by viscidity and fluidity, through the contact of water, in the unbaked jar, and through the contact of fire in the baked jar. If these two (Holding and Drawing) were due to the (fact of the thing being a) Composite, then they could be perceived even in such things, as a *heap of dust* (which cannot be either *held* or *drawn*, simply because there is no *adhesion* among the dust-particles); and they could not be possible in the case of several things, like the straw, stone and wood, packed up together by means of lac,—where the packed up bundle does not become a new substance (different from the component *wood* etc.). [So that the case of this bundle is not analogous to that of the Jar composed of atoms, which is held to be something different from the component atoms ; and yet the said bundle of wood etc. is capable of being *held* and *drawn* ; simply because there is *adhesion* due to the lac.] "*

'The Composite must be something different, because there is possibility of its being held and drawn.' The *Pariśuddhi* remarks that in the form in which the Probans—*possibility of drawing and holding*—is put forward, it is one that does not subsist in the Subject, 'Composite', the proper probans should be धारणाकर्षणवत्त्वात्, 'because it is possessed of the capability of being held and drawn'. This same difficulty is avoided by the *Tātparya* by formulating the reasoning in the *negative* form—'The Jar and other things that we see, which are suspected to be mere aggregates of atoms, *cannot be non-composites*,—because, *if they were so there would be no possibility of their being held and drawn*,—as we find that whatever is non-composite, like Cognition, is never held and drawn,—while Jar and such other things are always capable of being held and drawn,—hence these latter cannot be non-composites.'

* Thus by the two examples of *Dust-Heap* and *Straw-wood-bundle*, it is shown that what is invariably concomitant with Holding is *adhesion*, and not *Composite* character.

For अवयविकारिते some Mss. read अवयवकारिते.

It is noteworthy that the *Bhāṣya* contents itself with this *Pūrvapakṣa* argument, and does not supply the answer to it. It would appear, from this, that the objection has the acceptance of the *Bhāṣya-kāra*. Vāchaspati Misra says that this दूषणम्, objection to the reasoning of the Sutra, is

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—" The man who denies the Composite, and, with a view to avoid the contingency of Perception becoming impossible, holds that what is perceived is the *aggregate of Atoms*,—what is there to urge against such a man ? "*

Answer †—Such a person should be asked to explain what is the object of the unitary conception that we have in the idea of 'one thing'; the question put to him being in the form—does the Unitary Conception refer to (*i.e.* apprehend) a *non-diverse* (single) thing, or to diverse (several) things ? If it be said to refer to a *non-diverse* thing, then, this view would admit the *non-diverse thing* to be something different (from the components, which are *diverse*) ; so that what we call the 'composite' would be admitted ;—if, on the other hand, it be held to refer to

परमतेन, from the standpoint of the Opponent ; but in that case the answer should have been given ; as it has been given in the Vārtika. The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains that the Pupil, upon hearing the aforesaid reasonings of the opponent, puts the question embodied in the next sentence of the *Bhāṣya* as to what answer should be given to these arguments of the opponent. Then comes the answer from the stand-point of the *Siddhāntin*. (See below.)

It is well worth considering whether or not we can, in some way, interpret the *Bhāṣya* as putting forward an argument in support of the *Siddhānta* view. We have a clue to this in the reading of some Mss., which read अवयवकृते for अवयविकृते. Accepting this reading we can translate the whole passage in the following manner, and thus make it an argument in support of the *Siddhānta*—'Holding and Drawing are always found to be due to *massiveness* ; this *massiveness* is a distinct quality concomitant with *conjunction*, which is produced by *viscidity* and *fluidity*, through contact of water, in the unbaked jar, and through contact of fire, in the baked jar ; if Holding and Drawing were due to the *components* themselves (and not to a *massive* substance composed of them), then they would be possible in the Dust-heap also (where the component dust-particles are present, even though there is no massive substance) ; and would not be possible in the case of straw-stone-and-wood bundled together with lac ; as in this case (even though there is a massive substance) there is no *component* [the several heterogeneous substances not constituting one homogeneous whole, and as such not entitled to the name 'component'.]

* This question is addressed by the Pupil who has heard the above arguments on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa and is anxious to learn how to meet them.

† The Teacher teaches the following answer.

diverse things (the many components), then, it would be a case of *many things* (Atoms) being perceived as *one*, which would be an absurdity (a case of pure misconception); as we never come across any such (right) notion as that of 'one' in regard to the *many*.

Sūtra 37

[In answer to what has been just urged by the Siddhāntin, the Pūrvapakṣin might urge that]—" the said conception (of 'one' in regard to the Many) would be similar to the notion that we have in regard to such (collective) things as the 'Army' and the 'Forest' ",—but even so the conception would not be possible, as Atoms are beyond the reach of the senses

BHĀṢYA

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"In the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest' it is found that when, on account of remoteness, the distinctness (and diversity) of the component factors is not perceived, the conception of their being 'one' becomes possible, analogously, many Atoms being massed together, when their distinctness (and diversity) fail to be perceived, the notion of these being 'one' becomes possible."

But in the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest' what actually happens is that the diversity of the component factors of these is such as is ordinarily perceptible, but it fails to be perceived on account of an extraneous cause in the shape of *remoteness*;—similarly when there are several trees, the particular species to which each belongs—such as, '*Palāśa*', '*Khadira*' &c.—is such as is ordinarily perceptible, * but it fails to be perceived on account of remoteness;—similarly again in the case of such things as have their (diverse) movements ordinary perceptible, the (diverse) movement fails to be perceived on account of remoteness; and in all these cases what happens is that the (diverse component) things themselves are perceived, but their diversity fails to be perceived on account of remoteness, which (non-perception

* Some printed texts read '*agṛhyamāṇa*'; the MSS. do not show the 'a'; and in the sentence preceding and following this, we have '*gṛhyamāṇa*'; the *Vārtika* also explains the term as '*upalabhyamānajatīnām*.' The translation has for these reasons adopted the reading without 'a'.

of diversity) makes it possible for the notion of 'one' to appear in regard to them, in a secondary (indirect, figurative) sense. The case of Atoms is entirely different;—in regard to these it is not true that their diversity is ordinarily perceptible; so that it cannot be said that the figurative notion of 'one' becomes possible when, for some reason, the said diversity fails to be perceived;—this cannot be said, for the simple reason that Atoms are 'beyond the reach of the senses' (and hence their diversity cannot be said to be ordinarily perceptible).

Further [the Opponent is not quite right in citing the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest', for] what is being discussed (by us) is just this—whether or not the unitary conception refers to the 'mass of small particles'; and the 'Army' and the 'Forest' also are just such 'mass of small particles' [so that these are as much open to discussion as any other *Composite*]; and certainly it is not right to put forward as an example (in proof of a Proposition) something that is itself open to discussion; as such a thing is in the same position as what is meant to be proved (by the citing of that example). *

It might be argued that what has been put forward is what is actually seen (by all parties)—But even so it would not be right; as what is being discussed is just what exactly forms the object of the 'seeing' or 'perception'. That is to say, the Opponent might argue as follows. "It is a fact actually perceived that in the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest', the distinction among the component parts not being perceived, the parts come to be looked upon as *non-different*,—which gives rise to the idea of these being 'one', and certainly what is actually perceived cannot be denied." But this is not quite right; what forms the object of perception is just what is being discussed [and has still got to be ascertained]; the precise object of perception is what

* What the *Bhāṣya* means is that no corroborative example can be available for the Opponent who denies the 'compositeness' of all things; so that for him, every conceivable thing has its nature and constitution entering into the subject of his reasoning; his Proposition being that "*all things* in the world are mere masses of imperceptible small particles." When 'all things' enter into this Proposition, either no corroborative instance is available; or if any were cited, such citing would be clearly wrong.—*Tātparya*.

is being discussed, the point at issue being the notion of 'unity' that is actually perceived ; has this notion for its object only the 'mass of small particles', or something different from the particles ? So that mere seeing or Perception could not establish any conclusion one way or the other. In fact, inasmuch as the 'small particles' or 'Atoms' are *many*, if there does arise an idea of 'unity' in regard to them, by reason of their distinctness not being perceived, and hence their being regarded as non-different,—such an idea must be regarded as being a notion of something (the *many* atoms) as what it is not (*i.e one*), just like the notion of the *Post* as a *Man*, [and as such, it must be a clearly *wrong* cognition, a misconception] "What if it is so ?" —Well, inasmuch as the notion of something as what it is not must be dependent upon an original prototype, the appearance of such a notion establishes the existence of such a prototype , and the basis of a misconception can consist only of a true *conception* ; so that the conception of the *many* as *one* proves the reality of the conception of the really *one* as *one*, which proves the existence of a really *single object*, apart from its *many* components.—"But what is the Prototype for the conception of the *Post* as *Man* ?"—This prototype consists in the conception of the real *Man* as *Man* ; it is only when there is such a conception that a conception of '*Man*' can arise in regard to the Post from the perception of certain points of similarity (between the real *Man* and *Post*). Similarly it is only if there were a true conception of what is the really *one* as 'one,' that there could arise the conception of 'one' in regard to the *many* atoms, from the perception of certain points of similarity* (between the *many* Atoms and what is *really* 'one'). But inasmuch as there is no possibility (for the opponent) of any *true* conception (of unity) arising in regard to anything,—as there is nothing according to the Opponent that is realy apprehended as *one*,—it follows that the idea of *non-difference* (unity) embodied in the unitary conception really arises in regard to a thing that is really *non-diverse* in its character.

* The correct reading is not प्रामाण्य, but सामान्य as found in all Mss. and also in the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

"What forms the necessary Prototype is the notion of *non-diversity* (*i. e. unity*) that we have in the case of things perceived by other sense-organs."

This also cannot be right; as until special reasons are put forward, the mere citing of an example cannot establish any conclusion. What the Opponent means is as follows—"In the case of the object perceived by the other organs—e. g. Sound, perceived by the auditory organ—we find that there is unitary conception in regard to Sounds which are non-diverse in character (even according to us); *—and this unitary conception would be the Prototype of the unitary conception in regard to the *many* (atoms, for instance)." But even so, the mere citing of an example would not lead to any definite conclusion; for the simple reason that no special reason is adduced (in support of the conclusion). That is to say, the question being—the unitary conception that there is in regard to the massed atoms, is this a conception of something as what it is not, like the conception of Post as 'Man'? or is the actual state of things really as represented by the conception, and hence the conception is of something as what it actually is, like the notion of 'one Sound' in regard to Sound which is really *one*? Until special reasons are adduced (in support of one view or the other), mere Examples only tend to accentuate the uncertainty Further, as a matter of fact, the *Odour* (Sound and the rest), which are 'things perceived by other sense-organs' adduced as examples by the Opponent, also are mere *masses* or *aggregates* of (diverse) things, like the jar, and as such cannot form correct examples (of unitary conception in regard to non-diverse things) †

* According to the Pūrvapaksin, all sounds are one and the same and hence conceived of as *one*. This is a case of really non-diverse things conceived as one—a true unitary conception, which will supply the Prototype for the unitary conception in regard to the diverse atoms.

† The Vaiśesikas hold that Sound is produced, not only from Ākāsa, but also from such conglomerations of material substances as the Cloth for instance. So that according to them, Sound is only a conglomeration of diverse things. Thus the notion of 'one' in regard to them cannot be correct, and unitary conception in regard to Sound cannot be the prototype of such conception in regard to the *many* atoms. According to the Naiyāyika also, *unity*, which is a quality, cannot belong to Sound, which itself is a

The (well-known) conceptions of (A) Magnitude, (B) Conjuction, (C) Motion, (D) Community and (E) Specific Individuality should also be urged against the person who denies the 'composite,' as what has been urged in connection with unitary *conception* is applicable to these conceptions also. *

† The unitary conception (whenever it arises) must be regarded as arising in connection with what is really *one*, being the conception of something as what it really is: the special reason for this consisting in the fact that the said conception is co-extensive with the conception of *magnitude*. As a matter of fact, the two conceptions—'this is *one*' and 'this is large'—pertaining to the same object, become *co-extensive*; and from this it is known that 'that which is *large* is *one*'

"But the 'conception of Magnitude' consists only in the cognising of a certain peculiarity in the *aggregate of Atoms*."§

[The answer to this is as follows]—The said 'conception of magnitude', appearing in regard to Atoms which by their very nature) have no magnitude, will only be a conception of something as what it is not (*i. e.* a *wrong* conception).—"What if it be so?" Well, the (wrong) conception of something as what it is not must be dependent upon a prototype; so that the existence of the prototype becomes established; which

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quality; as no quality can subsist in a quality. So that according to both parties the unitary conception in regard to Sound is as 'secondary' or 'indirect' as that in regard to the Atoms.—*Tātparya*.

The *Pariśuddhi* adds—The notion of 'number', wherever and whenever it appears, is regarded as *true* when it is not sublated by any subsequent conception; and when it is found to be so sublated, it is regarded as wrong. According to this principle the notion of 'one' in regard to Sound, as also in regard to Atoms, must be wrong; as in both cases, there is the subsequent notion that they are *many*, not *one*.

* If you do not admit the 'composite' thing, you cannot account for such notions as (*a*)—'this thing is large', (*b*) 'this is in contact with that', (*c*) 'the horse (the individual animal that belongs to the community 'Horse') (*d*) is running'. As none of these could ever appear in regard to mere Atoms, which are imperceptible.—*Vārtika*.

† This anticipates the following question—"According to you also, how do you account for the notion of *unity* in connection with the *many* trees—there being, as you say, no special reason in favour of one view or the other?"

§ 'And it is not a particular kind of Dimension.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

means that there must be a right conception of 'magnitude' in regard to something really possessed of magnitude [which conception alone could be the prototype of the wrong conception of magnitude in regard to Atoms, which have no magnitude]. [And this proves that there must be some such substance as is really possessed of magnitude, and all the world does not consist of mere atoms.]

"With regard to Sound we have the conception of 'small' and 'large', and this conception of both 'smallness' and 'magnitude' (appearing in regard to the same thing, Sound) would be the prototype of the notion of 'magnitude' in regard to the small Atoms"—That cannot be; as the said conception (in regard to *Sound*) apprehends (*i. e.* pertains to) only *faintness* and *loudness*, for the simple reason that they do not pre-suppose the ascertainment of the exact dimension or extent of the Sound, as is done in the case of similar conceptions in regard to *substances*. [That is to say, when one speaks of Sound as being 'small', what is meant is that it is weak, *faint*; and when one speaks of Sound being 'large' what is meant is that it is powerful, *loud*;—and the reason why this must be the meaning lies in the fact that the said conceptions do not pre-suppose the definite cognition of the exact extent or dimension of the Sound.] For instance, when one conceives of the Sound as 'large' he does not have the idea that the Sound *extends so far*,—the idea that he has in the case of (the conception of the *largeness* of) such things as the *Badara*, the *Āmalaka* and the *Bilva* fruits (whose exact sizes are known).*

The conception that 'these two (visible) things are in contact' involves the cognition of contact having the same substratum as Duality [*i. e.* it implies the cognition of the *contact of two things*, which proves that these two things must be *composites*, and not mere *atoms*].†

* The *Tātparya* remarks that the cognition of the exact extent of a thing is possible only when the size or dimension of that thing is perceptible. And certainly this is not possible in the case of either Sound or Atoms.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* formulates the argument thus:—"The conception of 'these two' must be right, because it is co-extensive with the notion of 'these are in contact,'—that which is not so co-extensive is not right notion—as the notion of 'two moons'.

"But the substratum of Contact consists of the two *masses* (of component atoms, and not of *composite substances*)."—Now what is this 'Mass'?

"The *Mass* (or Aggregate) may be either (*a*) the '*prāpti*', combination, of several (components),—or (*b*) the manifold combinations of a single substance."*

[As regards] (*a*) what we would urge is that, there is no cognition of the contact as subsisting in combinations; as a matter of fact, when one has the conception that 'these two things are in contact', he has no idea of two 'combinations' being in contact.†

(*b*) "In that case we shall define *Mass* as the manifold combinations (of a single substance)"—This also cannot be

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* This passage of the *Bhāṣya* is not quite in keeping with what we find in the *Vārtika*. The two alternatives as put in the *Vārtika* are—(*a*) अनेकस्य प्राप्तिः (which is the same an in the *Bhāṣya*) and (*b*) अनेकः समुदायी; in the *Bhāṣya*, we should have something corresponding to the latter,—now from what follows in the *Bhāṣya*, later on, it is clear that the second alternative meant by the Bhāsya is that the *Mass* is अनेकसमूहः—*i.e.*, simply the group of several components; and this is just the second alternative as represented in the *Vārtika*. The only way in which the present passage of the *Bhāṣya* can be construed to afford the two alternatives of the *Vārtika* is as follows—कोऽयं समुदायः। (*a*) प्राप्तिरनेकस्य or (*b*) अनेका वा।. And then the Opponent accepts the former alternative.—which statement of the opponent ends with चेत्,—*to* which the Siddhāntin replies with प्राप्तिरग्रहणम् &c. &c That such are the two alternatives is shown also by the Bhāsya, under Sūtra 33. But, in this construction, a new difficulty presents itself: The words in which the Opponent accepts the first alternative are read in the text, in all Mss., as प्राप्तिरेकस्य समुदायः, while according to the explanation we have provided, they should be प्राप्तिरनेकस्य समुदायः, which is the first alternative suggested by the Siddhāntin, and which the Opponent accepts.

We have however translated the passage in accordance with the explanation provided by the *Bhāṣyacandra*, and though this is not quite in keeping with the *Vārtika*, it is the only sense that can be deduced from the words of the *Bhāṣya* as they stand.

† If the *Mass* is only the 'combination of particles,' then, when one cognises *two masses in contact*, he should have the notion of two 'combinations' being in contact. As a matter of fact, however, no one has any such notion.

accepted; as the contact is cognised as subsisting in the same substratum with Duality; when we have the conception—'these two things are in contact,' we do not cognise the *contact* as subsisting in any manifold combinations of things. [The cognition is always of the contact as subsisting in *two* things.] These *two things* perceived could not be in the shape of '*two Atoms*', as no perception of 'two atoms' is possible (atoms being entirely imperceptible). From all this the conclusion is that what form the substratum of the contact are two such substances as are possessed of magnitude and form the substratum of Duality (*i.e., two large substances, not many small atoms*).

"As a matter of fact, Conjunction is only proximity culminating in impact; it is not something different (from the objects that are in contact)."—This is not true; as Conjunction does actually serve to produce (in things) something entirely different (from those things themselves); for instance, Conjunction is found to be the cause (productive) of a sound (when the contact of the stick with the drum makes the the drum sound), of colour (when the contact of the Jar with fire produces red colour in the Jar), and of motion (when the contact with the ground of the ball thrown down makes the ball rebound);—and unless an entirely distinct quality (in the shape of Conjunction) appeared in the two things (in contact), it could not be possible to ascertain what is the cause of the appearance of the said *sound*, *colour* and *motion*;—from all this it follows that Conjunction is a quality, distinct (from the conjoined things); and it is also directly perceived as such.* (In common parlance) we have the denial also (of Conjunction),—for instance, when we say—'the Teacher is with the ear-ing, and the Pupil is without the ear-ing' (where the former phrase affirms and the latter denies the conjunction of the Ring) [and what is thus denied must be something different from the Pupil's ear and the Ring]; if a distinct quality (other than the two things) were not the object of the conception of 'Conjunction', then the said denial must pertain to something else; and in that case it behoves you to explain what it is that is denied (by the phrase 'the pupil is without the ear-ring');

* *Pratyaya* stands for *pratyakṣa*, says *Bhāṣyacandra*.

that is to say, you should explain what is that something else (other than a distinct quality in the shape of 'Conjunction') which you recognise in another case, where two things are in contact, and which is denied by the phrase in question ('the pupil is without the ear-ring'). [And as a matter of fact no such explanation is possible.]

[Thus then, Conjunction being a quality, distinct from the objects in contact) whenever Conjuncion is perceived, it is perceived as subsisting in two *large* substances (and never in atoms); so that it can never be regarded as subsisting in Atoms [all which goes to prove the existence of the Composites as the substratum of Conjunction.]

Lastly, (to be consistent) you have to deny the existence of 'Communities', which from the basis* of all comprehensive or inclusive conceptions; but if these were denied, you could not have such limitation to cognitions as we have [in the shape of the restriction of the conception of 'horse' to only particular individual animals, and not to others; this restriction being possible only by the fact of those animals alone belonging to the *Community* 'Horse'].

[The existence of Communities being thus undeniable] Inasmuch as no Community could be manifested (or perceived) without a substratum, it is necessary to explain what that substratum is.

If it be held that—"what forms the said substratum is only the Atoms arranged or grouped in a certain manner (and not any *Composite* substance)",—then it behoves you to explain whether the Atom to which the capability (to manifest the Community) belongs is itself in contact (with the perceiving organ) or not; that is to say, when a particular Community is cognised, is it, or is it not, cognised as subsisting in the Atom-groups that are themselves in contact with the perceiving organ? If it be held that it is cognised as subsisting (and perceived) in the *unperceived* atoms,—then it would be

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* The *Bhāṣya* uses the term '*liṅga*', which the *Vārtika* explains as '*nimitta*', *basis*. The *Tātparya* however explains it as 'probans'; by which the passage would mean that the existence of communities is *proved* by comprehensive cognitions.

possible to perceive even such atoms as are hidden from view, that is to say, it would be possible to perceive the Community as subsisting in atoms hidden from view. If, on the other hand, it be held that the Community is perceived as subsisting in the *perceived* atoms, then it could not be manifested in the inner and back parts (of the thing), which (not being in contact with the perceiving organ) are *not perceived* (and this would be absurd).—".But there would be manifestation of the Community in that much of the thing as is perceived"—In that case only that much of the Atom would be the substratum (of the Community); and it would come to this that the substratum of the Community is only that much of the Atom as is perceived and in which that Community is cognised. And this would mean that when a certain *mass of atoms* is perceived, there is a diversity of things in it (that much which is perceived being one and that much which is not perceived being another)! That is to say when a certain mass of atoms in the shape of a *Tree* is perceived, there is perceived a plurality of trees—and each of those portions of the mass wherein the community 'Tree' is perceived would be a distrinct Tree! [which is absurd.]

From all this we conclude that what serves to manifest a particular community is some such entirely distinct substance as subsists in the aggregated Atoms; and this distinct substance is the *Composite* (as something different from the component atoms).

SECTION 6

Examination of Inference

Sūtras 38–39

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Perception has been examined; we now start the examination of Inference.

Sūtra 38

***Pūrvapakṣa*—"Inference cannot be an Instrument of Right Cognition,—as [in the particular instances cited of the three kinds of Inference] the Premises are untrue—in view of Obstruction, Demolition and Resemblance."**

BHĀṢYA

"The word '*Apramāṇam*' in the Sūtra means that Inference cannot even once be the means of the (definite) right cognition of anything. *

"(*a*) [Under Sū. 1-1-5 the *Bhāṣya* has cited as an instance of the '*S'eṣavat*' Inference—the inference of the fact of it having rained up the river from perceiving the river to be full;—now] as a matter of fact, the river may be seen to be full also by reason of its course being blocked (by a dam); hence from the mere perception of the fullness of the river, to conclude that 'the Rain-god has rained in the regions up the river' cannot be a correct Inference.

"(*b*) [As an instance of the '*Pūrvavat*' Inference some writers have cited the inference that 'it is going to rain' from perceiving the ants running away with their eggs; now] as a matter of fact, the running about of the ants with their eggs might be due to the *demolition* of their nests; so that from seeing the ants running about with their eggs, to conclude that 'it is going to rain' cannot be a correct Inference. †

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* The *Tātparya* says that प्रतिपादकम् of the *Bhāṣya* must be taken in the sense of निश्चायक; because (the *Pariśuddhi* adds) some sort of cognition may be brought about by even wrong premises. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also explains प्रतिपादकम् as प्रमितिकरणम्.

† '*Pūrvavat*' Inference consists in the inferring of the effect from the perception of its cause; but as a matter of fact, the running about of the ants with the eggs cannot be regarded as the cause of rain; for the simple reason that there is rain even without the running about of the ants. The fact however which makes the ants running about an indication of coming rain is the fact that what brings about rain is some sort of commotion in the elements, in the form, for instance, of the rising of heat-waves below the earth's surface; but before this commotion brings on rain, it produces certain other phenomena also; and the running about of the ants is one of these phenomena;—the ants being turned out of their nests underground by the sudden rising of the heat-waves, and thus carrying away their eggs outside. So that the appearance of ants thus running about leads to the inference of the elemental commotion, which is the precursor and cause of rain; and from this we go on to the inference that 'it is going to rain.' In this manner alone can we regard the instance as one of *Pūrvavat* Inference. But it is possible that a man may infer the coming of rain, without regarding the ants running about as the *cause* of rain; that is,-

(c) "[Some writers have cited the inference of the *presence of the peacock*—from the hearing of the peacock's scream; but] as a matter of fact, a man might be mimicking the peacock's scream; so that on account of this *resemblance* (between the real peacock's scream and the man's mimicking of it), the inference of the peacock's presence from hearing of what sounds like its scream cannot but be incorrect."*

Sūtra 39

[*Reply to the Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtra*]—**Not so; because [what are the real Probans in the three Inferences cited] are entirely different from—(*a*) such (rise of water) as is restricted to one place, (*b*) such (running about of ants with their eggs) as is due to fright, and (*c*) such (Peacock's scream) as is a mere resemblance of it.**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the 'falsity' that has been urged does not apply to Inference; it is clear that what is not an Inference has been mistaken for Inference (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*). "How so?" Well, in reality, what can be rightly regarded as the Probans of an Inference is not anything in its mere unqualified (vague, general) form. For instance, [in the case of the three Inferences cited], (*a*) when one infers that 'the Rain-god has rained in the regions above the river', from the fact that the river is full, he does so, not by merely perceiving *a rise in the river*, but by perceiving that the water previously existing in the river has become qualified (augmented) by rain-water,

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it may be an act of simple inductive reasoning; in which case this would be an instance of the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* Inference.

As a matter of fact the instance of *Pūrvavat* Inference cited by the *Bhāṣya* under 1-1-5 is the inference of coming rain from the gathering of clouds. The case of the ants running leading to the inference of coming rain has been cited by other writers.

* The *Vārtika* takes this third instance as the inference of the presence of the peacock; hence we have adopted that view in the translation. But the fact appears to be, as pointed out by later commentators on the *Sūtra*, that the inference is of the *presence of clouds*; so that the three cases could be then of past, future and present rains. But by the *Vārtika's* interpretation also the third would be a case of inference of something *present*; the difference being that while the other two refer to *rain*, the third refers to something else.

that the velocity of the stream-current has increased, and that the stream is carrying along in its course flakes of foam, fruits, leaves and logs of wood;*—(b) when one infers 'coming rain', he does so from the fact that whole hosts of ants are running about† (calmly and peacefully) with their eggs,—and not only a few ants;—(c) and lastly, the third Inference (that of the presence of the Peacock from hearing the Peacock's scream) is wrong only when the scream is in reality not that of a Peacock, and the observer fails to perceive the fact that 'this what I am hearing is not the screaming of the Peacock, but some other sound resembling it'; but when the observer hears a particular (qualified) kind of Sound (i. e., a Sound in the musical tone called '*ṣadja*', in which the peacock's scream is always pitched), he realises that what he is hearing is that peculiar Sound which can emanate only from the peacock, and then what leads to the right Inference of the peacock's presence is that particular kind of Sound (pitched in the 'Ṣadja' tone, and not what merely resembles it vaguely);§ such infallible Inference of the peacock's presence from its scream is drawn by serpents (who can never mistake any mimicking Sound to be the 'peacock's scream'). Thus then, it is clear that when a person tries to infer, from the perception of an *un-qualified* thing, something that can be inferred from the perception of a *particular qualified thing*, the fault lies with the inferring person, not with the Inference itself.

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* All these additional ideas do not arise when the rise is due to some obstruction placed in the course of the stream.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains प्रायस्य as प्रीतियुक्तस्य समवायस्य: 'a large number of ants running about in friendly groups.'

And when the running about is due to fright caused by the demolition of the nests, there would be only a few of them running about, distractedly, and not hosts of them, calmly and peacefully.

§ So also in the *first* Inference, it would be wrong *only* if the man *failed to notice that the rise in the river was due to its course having been obstructed*; and the *second* Inference would be wrong *only* if the man failed to perceive that only a few ants were running about through fright caused by the destruction of a particular ant-nest.

SECTION 7

Examination of the nature of Time—specially the Present.

Sūtras 40–44

BHĀṢYA

It has been asserted (in the *Bhāṣya*, under Sū. 1.1.5) that Inference is applicable to all three points of time *because it apprehends the three points of time.* Against this also* the following objection has been raised (by the Bauddha)—

Sūtra 40

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"**There is no Present (Time); for when an object falls, the only possible points of time are—that which has been fallen through, and that which has to be fallen through.**"†

BHĀṢYA

"When the fruit becomes detached from the stalk (it falls and) comes gradually nearer and nearer to the ground; now while it is so nearing the ground, the space above the fruit (and below the tree) is *space traversed*; and the time related to that *traversed* space is "*that which has been fallen through*" (i.e. the *Past*); and the space below the fruit (and above the ground) is the space *to be traversed*; and the time related to this latter space is '*that which has to be fallen through*' (i.e. the *Future*);—and (apart from these two) there is no third space, in relation to which there could be the notion of *being traversed*, which would give rise to the conception of the *Present* Time. From this we conclude that there is no such thing as *Present* Time."

Sūtra 41

[Answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—**[If there is no 'Present' Time] the other two ('Past' and 'Future') also would be inconceivable; as these are relative to that.**

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* interprets the *cha* to mean that the opponent objects to the three points of time, just as he does to the three kinds of Reason (dealt with in the preceding Section).

† Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana finds in this Sūtra a distinct reference to the माध्यमिकसूत्र. The mere mention of a doctrine, however, does not justify us to regard it as referring to any particular work.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, Time is not manifested by (conceived of in relation to) *Space*; it is manifested by *Action** *of falling*, f.i.; so that we have the conception of the *time that has been fallen through* (i.e. *Past* Time) when the *action of falling*,—which is expressed by the phrase 'it *falls*'—has ceased: and when that same action is *going to happen*, we have the conception of Time *that has to be fallen through* (*i.e. Future* Time); and lastly, when the *action* of the thing is perceived as *going on* at the time, we have the conception of '*Present*' Time. Under the circumstances, if a person were never to perceive the *action* as 'going on' at the time, what could he conceive of as 'having ceased' or as 'going to happen'? For as a matter of fact, what is meant by 'time having been fallen through' is that the *action* of 'falling' is over, has ceased, and what is meant by 'time to be fallen through' is that the action is going to happen; so that at both these points of time (Past and Future) the object is devoid of the *action*; whereas when we have the idea that the thing 'is falling', the Object is actually connected (imbued) with the *action*; so that what the *Present* Time apprehends (indicates) is the actual existing connection of the *Object* and the *Action*; and thus it is only on the basis of this (existing connection and the time indicated by it) that we can have the conception of the other two points of Time (Past and Future); which latter, for this reason, would not be conceivable if the 'Present' Time did not exist. [Thus then all the *three* points of Time being realities, there is nothing wrong in the idea that 'Inference is applicable to the three points of Time'.]†

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* It is true Time is conceived of only in relation to some *Kriyā*, but *Kriyā* stands for *action in general*, not for mere *motion*, as the opponent has taken it.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The reality of the conception 'the thing *is falling*'—on which the idea of *Present* Time is based—cannot be denied; as it is attested by direct Perception—says the *Pariśuddhi*. If the *present action* were not there, what would be there that is produced by the gravity of the thing when its support has been removed (and when it falls)? Whose effect would it be that the thing touches the ground? Neither the *Past* nor the *Future* could be the effect or the cause; as they are non-existent at the time.—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 42

Then Again—

As a matter of fact, the conceptions of 'Past' and 'Future' cannot be merely relative to each other.

BHĀṢYA

If the conceptions of 'Past' and 'Future' could be merely relative to each other,—'accomplished on the basis of each other',—then we might accept the rejection of the 'Present'. As a matter of fact, however, neither the conception of 'Future' can be based upon the conception of the 'Past', nor that of the 'Past' can be based upon that of the 'Future'. By what reasoning and by what means would the conception of 'Past' be obtained?—How too in relation to the notion of 'Past' would you obtain the notion of 'Future?'—Or by what means would you get at the conception of the 'Future' at all? That is to say, all this cannot be explained, if you reject the 'Present' time.

It might be urged that—"there are several such pairs of relative conceptions as '*long and short*', '*ground and underground*', '*light and shade*', where one is merely relative to the other; and in the same manner the conceptions of '*past and future*' could be accomplished entirely in relation to each other."

This, however, cannot be accepted, in the absence of special reasons That is to say, just as you have cited some examples (of relative terms), so could we also cite some counter-examples (to show that conceptions do not arise merely in relation to each other); for instance, just as the pairs of conceptions as '*colour and touch*', '*odour and taste*' are such in which the conceptions are not merely relative to each other, in the same manner the conceptions of '*past and future*' also could not be accomplished entirely in relation to each other. [And unless you have adduced some special reason in favour of the effectiveness of your examples, we cannot accept them in the face of these counter-examples.] [We have answered your argument after assuming that the instances you have cited are really those of purely relative conceptions.] As a matter of fact, however, there can be no conceptions which are accomplished merely in relation to each other; for if one were entirely dependent upon the other, then, the negation of one would

imply the negation of the other, and thus there would be negation of both ; that is to say, if the existence of one were entirely dependent upon the other, then, upon what would the existence of the former be dependent?—And if the existence of the former depended upon the other, on what would the existence of this latter depend ?--And thus as in the absence of the one, the other could not be possible, the result would be that both would be impossible.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Further, *Present* Time is indicated by the *existence* of things ;—as we find in such conceptions as 'the Substance *exists*', 'Quality *is* there', 'Motion *is* there', and so on * So that for one who does not admit this—

Sūtra 43

There being no 'Present', there could be no cognition of anything (by any Instrument of Cognition), as no 'Perception' would be possible. †

BHĀṢYA

Perception is brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object ; ‡ and that which is not *present*—that is (*ex-hypothesi*) which is *non-existent*—cannot be in contact with a sense-organ ; and there is nothing which our Opponent accepts as *present* or *existing* ; so that for him there can be no *cause of perception* (in the shape of sense-object contact), no *object of perception* (in the shape of existing things), and no *perceptional cognition*. And there being no Perception, there could be no Inference or Verbal Cognition, as both of these are based upon Perception. Thus all Instruments of Cognition becoming impossible there could be no cognition of anything at all.

* That is to say, the Present Time is indicated, not only by the notion of *Falling*, but also by the *existence* of things.—i.e. by the action of *Being*. This is meant to be an introduction to the following *Sūtra*.—*Tātparya*.

† The actions of *Falling* and the like are such as appear and disappear [so that they do not extend over all *present* things] , but the action of *Being* is one that extends over all *present* things , so that if you deny the *Present*, which is indicated by an action (of *Being*) that extends over all things, you make 'Perception' impossible, and thence every other form of cognition also becomes impossible.—*Tātparya*.

‡ 'Which presupposes the *present* existence of the *Object*, the *Organ* and the *Contact*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Then again, as a matter of fact, the *Present* Time is actually recognised in two ways;—sometimes it is indicated by the *existence of things* (*i.e.* by the mere action of *Being*),—as for instance, in the conception 'the Substance *exists*,'—and sometimes it is indicated by a *series of actions*,—*e.g.* in such conceptions as 'he *is cooking*', 'he *is cutting*', ; this 'series of actions' may consist, either in several actions bearing upon a single thing, or in a repetition of the same action (on the same thing); of the former kind is the action spoken of as 'is cooking', which consists of several actions bearing upon the same thing—the action of 'cooking' comprising the actions of *placing the pot upon the oven, pouring water into the pot, putting rice into it, fetching fuel* *, *lighting the fire, stirring with the ladle, straining the gruel, and bringing down the pot from the oven*;—in the action of '*cutting*' on the other hand, we have a repetition of the same action; for a man is said to be 'cutting' wood when he repeatedly raises the axe and lets it fall upon the wood. Now (in both these cases) that which is *being cooked* and that which is *being cut* is that which is *being acted upon* [*i.e.* connected with an action *at the 'present' time*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Inasmuch as it is only in connection with what is *being done* (being operated upon by an Action) that,—

Sūtra 44

—we have the conceptions of 'has been done' and 'to be done'—it follows that the idea (of the Present) is established in both ways

BHĀṢYA

When the 'series of actions' (comprising *Cooking*) is not yet commenced and is only intended *to be done*, it is spoken of as 'will cook'; which denotes the 'Future' Time;—when the 'series of actions' has ceased and its purpose accomplished, it is spoken of as 'has cooked'; which denotes the 'Past' Time;—and lastly, when the 'series of actions' has commenced (and has not ceased), it is spoken of as 'is cooking'; which denotes the 'Present' Time. Now of these, that which has ceased is what is

* The fuel-fetching and fire-lighting should come first; as they do in the *Vārtika*.

spoken of as 'has been done'; that which is intended to be done (and not yet commenced) is what is spoken of as 'to be done'; and that which is going on (has been commenced and has not ended) is spoken of as 'being done'. Now we find here that the collocation of the three points of time is with reference to a 'series of actions' (of Cooking), and is possible only when it is conceived of as 'present', being spoken of either as 'is cooking' or as 'is being cooked'; wherein what is expressed is the *continuity* of the series of actions, and not either *non-commencement* or *cessation*. This 'Present' is conceived of in both ways—*i. e.* (1) as not mixed up with the notions of Past and Future, and (2) as mixed up with them;* that conception of Present which is *unmixed*, we find in such expressions as 'the substance exists', where the *Present* is indicated by the mere *existence* (continuity of the Substance); while such expressions as 'is cooking', 'is cutting' and the like indicate the *Present* as involving all three points, of Time, and as expressing the continuity of a *series of actions*.† There are other ways also of this involved use of the Present Tense, met with in ordinary usage;—when, for instance, it is used with a view to denote proximity (to Past or Future), and such other ideas.‡

From all this the conclusion is that there *is* such a thing as the 'Present' Time.

SECTION 8

Examination of Analogical Cognition

Sūtras 45–49

Sūtra 45

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"**There can be no Analogy on the basis of either perfect or partial resemblance.**"—§

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* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*apavṛktaḥ*' and '*vyapavṛktaḥ*' as '*rahitaḥ*' and '*sahitaḥ*'.

† When we say 'he is cooking', some of the actions composing the composite act of cooking have been done, while some are being done and some are yet to be done.

‡ For examples, see *Vārtika*.

§ When one perceives the resemblance in the animal before him, of the bull, and remembers at the same time the advice that 'as is the bull so is the *gavaya*',—this perception of resemblance along with the remembrance becomes the means that accomplishes the cognition of the connection of

BHĀṢYA

"(A) There can be no Analogy on the basis of *perfect or absolute resemblance*; for certainly there can be no such conception as 'as the bull so the bull' [and this would be the sense of the sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*', if *perfect resemblance* between the two were meant]. (B) Nor can Analogy be based upon *partial resemblance*; for there is no such conception as 'as the bull so the buffalo' [and this is what the sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*' might mean, if the sense conveyed were that of *semi-perfect resemblance*; as the buffalo has many points of resemblance to the bull]. (C) Nor lastly can Analogy be based upon *partial or slight resemblance*; for all things cannot be conceived of as resembling one another [and such would be the said *Analogy*, if it were based upon slight resemblance, for all things are similar in some way or the other]."

Sūtra 46

[*Purvapakṣa answered*]—**Inasmuch as Analogy is based upon such resemblance as is actually recognised, there is no room for the objection that has been urged.***

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the name 'gavaya' with the animal perceived. So that this recognition of the connection of the name is 'Analogical Cognition'; and the means by which this is brought about has been called 'Analogy.' This, the Pūrvapakṣin says, is not right; for does the advice upon which the cognition is based—'as the bull so the *gavaya*'—denote *perfect* resemblance, or *semi-perfect* (almost perfect) resemblance, or only *slight*, partial, resemblance? Neither of these is possible.

* The exact sense conveyed by a sentence depends upon the context and such other circumstances; so that what particular sort of ressemblance is expressed by a certain sentence will be contigent upon these, *e.g.*, when the advisory sentence 'as the bull so the gavaya', is addressed to a person who knows such animals as the buffalo and the like, *it is semi-perfect resemblance* that is meant; so that when the man sees the *gavaya*, and finds that it has several points of resemblance to the bull, he recognises it as the 'Gavaya'; even though there is similar resemblance between the bull and the buffalo, the man will not recognise the animal as a 'buffalo', for, as already pointed out, he perfectly knows what a buffalo is; then under the special circumstances of the case, the sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*', could never be understood to mean 'as the bull so the buffalo.'—*Tātparya*.

The Sūtra speaks of 'such resemblance as is recognised'; and the *Pariśuddhi* adds that what is meant is that resemblance of which the idea is derived from the particular advisory sentence—*e.g.* 'as the bull so the *gavaya*'.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Analogy (mentioned in the advisory sentence) does not proceed on the basis of either *perfect* or *semi-perfect* or *slight* resemblance ; it proceeds with reference to (*i. e.* as indicative, and on the basis, of), such resemblance as is actually recognised (from the advisory sentence), and which arises in reference to (*i. e.* as indicative of, pointing to) the relation of cause and effect* [between the Analogy and the recognition of the connection of the particular name with the particular thing].† And in a case where these conditions are found to be present, Analogy cannot be denied. For this reason the objection that has been urged (in Sū. 44) is not relevant.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

[The Pūrvapakṣin says]—"In that case, Analogical Cognition may be regarded as purely *inferential*" :

Sūtra 47

"Because it consists in the cognition of what is not perceived by means of what is perceived"

BHĀSYA

"That is to say, just as the cognition of Fire, which is not perceived, by means of Smoke, which is perceived, is *Inferential*,—so the cognition of the unperceived *gavaya* by means of the perceived *bull* should be *inferential* ;—so that Analogical Cognition does not in any way differ from the Inferential "‡

* That is, the relation subsisting between what *is known* and *what makes it known*'.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† That is to say, there can be no restriction as to any particular sort of resemblance upon which Analogy can be based. What happens is that when one has become cognisant of some sort of resemblance, by means of the advisory sentence, he comes to recognise the relation of cause and effect, between the *resemblance* and the cognition of the connection of the particular thing and the particular name. And what precise sort of resemblance is recognised will depend upon circumstances ; so that there can be no such restriction as that Analogy is based upon *perfect resemblance only*, or on *semi-perfect resemblance only*, or on *slight resemblance only*.—(*Tātparya* and *Pariśuddhi*).

‡ The sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*' describes the unperceived *gavaya*, through the perceived bull ; and one who has heard this sentence, when he comes to *perceive* the *gavaya*, he does not apprehend anything

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Siddhāntin answers—*Analogical* Cognition does differ from the *inferential*. "By what reasoning do you arrive at this conclusion ?". [The answer is given in the Sūtra.]—

Sūtra 48

In regard to the 'Unperceived' Gavaya we do not find any use for the particular Instrument of Cognition called 'Analogy.'

BHĀṢYA

[What actually happens in Analogical Cognition is as follows]—A person, who has seen the Bull and has been apprised of the resemblance (between the Bull and the Gavaya), comes to *perceive* an animal (of unknown name) resembling the Bull, and then arrives at the cognition, 'this is *gavaya*,' in which he recognises the application of the name 'gavaya';—now this certainly is not *Inference*.*

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more than what he has learnt from the said sentence; even the connection of the name '*gavaya*' with the particular animal is known only from that sentence. So that in analogical cognition, the cognition of the perceived *bull* gives rise to the cognition of the *animal bearing the name of 'gavaya'*, which is not perceived [Even though the *gavaya* is actually *perceived* when the analogical cognition appears, yet the animal *as bearing the particular name* can never be said to be *perceived*; for the application of the name depends entirely upon the advisory sentence, so that when the qualifying *name* is not-perceived, even though the animal itself is *perceived*, yet *as along with the qualification*, the animal is '*not perceived*'.] Thus, being the cognition of the unperceived by means of the perceived, Analogical Cognition is purely *inferential*. Such is the sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.—*Tātparya*.

* The species '*gavaya*' is that to which the name '*gavaya*' belongs; this is not cognised by means of the sentence 'as the bull so the *gavaya*'; all that this sentence expresses is the resemblance to the bull of a certain unknown animal; nor does the word '*gavaya*' as occurring in the sentence denote the said resemblance, so that at the time that the sentence is heard, the man does not become cognisant of the connection between the name '*gavaya*' and the unknown animal; and what actually happens in *analogical* cognition is that, when the particular animal comes to be actually *seen*, the species to which that animal belongs becomes *perceived*; and thence results the cognition that this animal belongs to the species named '*gavaya*'; and this is the operation of 'analogy', which is thus found to operate upon the *perceived*, and not *unperceived gavaya*.—*Tātparya*.

[There is a further difference between Analogical and Inferential Cognitions]—Analogy is (propounded) for the sake of another person; that is to say, it is propounded by a person who knows both members (of resemblance), for the benefit of another person to whom one member, the *upamēya* (the object that is described as resembling a known thing), is not known *

Says the *Opponent*,—"If what you mean is that Analogy is for the benefit of another person, then what you say is not right; for as a matter of fact, the cognition arising therefrom belongs to the man himself, certainly, my good Sir, when the man propounds the analogy in the words, 'as the bull so the *gavaya*', the cognition produced by it arises in the man himself (just as much as in another person) [so that being for one's own benefit as well as for that of another person, Analogy is exactly like Inference]."

We do not deny that the resulting cognition arises in the man also; what we mean is that the propounder's own cognition is not *analogical*; for 'Analogy is that which accomplishes what has to be accomplished on the basis of well-known resemblance' (says the Sūtra, 1-1-6); and certainly for the man to whom both members of the analogy are well-known, and as such fully *accomplished*, there can be no relation (between Analogy and the Cognition) of what is *to be accomplished* and the *means* accomplishing it.

Further—

Sūtra 49

Inasmuch as Analogy is always stated in the form 'as—so,' it cannot be regarded as non-different (from Inference).

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, Analogy is always stated in the form 'as—so', by means of which the common property (constituting resemblance) is mentioned; so that it cannot be the same as Inference. This also is what constitutes a difference between Analogy and Inference.

* उपमेय is the better reading as found in the Puri Mss. For प्रसिद्धोभयेन also the Puri Mss. read प्रसिद्धोपमेयेन ; but from what follows in L. 4 below प्रसिद्धोभयेन appears to be the better reading.

SECTION 8

Examination of Word (in general).

Sūtra 50–57

Sūtra 50

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—" **'Word' is 'Inference',—(I) because its objective is such as is amenable to Inference only,—being (as it is) not apprehended (by Perception)."—**

BHĀṢYA

(I) " Word is only Inference, and not a separate Instrument of Cognition 'Why so?' Because the objective of (object cognised by means of) Word is such as is amenable to Inference. 'How do you know that it can be inferred?' Because it is not apprehended by means of Perception In the case of Inference what happens is that the *Subject*, which is not already apprehended by means of Perception, comes to be cognised afterwards by means of the already known* Probans;—such is the process of Inference;—and in the case of Word, also an object which is not already known (by means of Perception) comes to be cognised afterwards, by means of the already-known Word,—such is the process of verbal cognition. Thus we find that 'Word' is only 'Inference' (and Verbal Cognition is purely Inferential) †

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

For the following reason also 'Word' is only 'Inference'—

Sūtra 51

(II) "Because cognitions do not involve two diverse processes "

"When the 'Instruments of Cognition' are different from one another, the cognition (brought about by them) involves two distinct processes, for instance, the cognitional process

* 'Perceived'—says *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The Probans put forward in the Sūtra, is the fact of the object *not being perceptible.*—says the *Vārtika* That cognition is called Inferential which apprehends an object not cognisable by Perception, and appears in the wake of Perception (of the Probans in the Inference, of the Word in Verbal Cognition); and a Verbal Cognition fulfills these conditions, it is purely inferential.—*Tātparya*.

involved in the case of Inferential Cognition is different from that involved in that of Analogical Cognition, as has been pointed out above (by the Siḍḍhāntin himself). In the case of *Verbal* and *Inferential* cognitions we do not meet with any such diversity in the cognitional process; the process in the case of Word being the same as that in the case of Inference. Hence, as there is nothing to distinguish the one from the other, Word must be regarded as the same as Inference."

Sūtra 52

III. "Also because of the presence of relationship."*

BHĀṢYA

III. "The clause—'Word is the same as Inference' (of Sū. 49) should be construed with this Sūtra also. As a matter of fact, we find that the Cognition of a thing by means of a Word appears only when there is a relationship between the *Word* and the thing denoted by it, and this relationship is fully known; exactly in the same manner as the Cognition of the Probandum by means of the inferential Probans appears only when there is a relationship between the Probans and the Probandum, and this relationship is fully known"

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been urged (in Sū. 49) that—"(Word should be regarded as Inference) because its object is such as is amenable to Inference" But this is not right;† [because]

Sūtra 53

[As a matter of fact]—the Right Cognition of a thing arises from Word on the strength of the assertion of a trustworthy person.§

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* 'That is, the relation of invariable concomitance.'—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

† 'तन्न' is the right reading found in the Puri Mss; and supported by the *Vārtika* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*; which latter remarks that *'tanna'*, 'this is not right', is the proposition in proof of which the reason is propounded by the Sūtra.

§ Sutra MSS. A and B and also the Benares edition of the *Vārtika* read अर्थे सम्प्रत्ययः instead of अर्थसम्प्रत्ययः

The *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* explain this *Sūtra* simply to mean that what is essential in Verbal Cognition is the connection of a trustworthy person; which is not necessary in the case of Inferential Cognition. The

(I) In the case of such imperceptible things as 'Heaven', the 'Celestial Nymyhs', the 'Uttara-Kuru', 'the world as consisting of the Seven Continents and the Oceans',*—the right cognition that we have does not arise from the mere Word as the Pūrvapakṣa argument implies); it arises from the fact that the Word is pronounced by a reliable person (who cannot pronounce a word unless there is a real thing corresponding to that word); we conclude this from the fact that there is no right cognition when the Word is not known to be pronounced by a reliable person. And certainly this circumstance (connection of the reliable person) is not present in the case of Inference.

(II) As for the argument (put forward in Sū. 50) that *the Cognitions do not involve two diverse processes*,—well, what we have just pointed out constitutes, in itself, a diversity in the processes of *inferential and verbal* cognitions, such being the points of difference between the two, it is not a valid reason that has been urged (by the Pūrvapakṣin in *Bhāṣya*) to the effect that *there is no difference* between them.

(III) As regards the third *Pūrvapakṣa* argument—*because of the presence of relationship*,—what we would point out is that between the Word and its Denotation, while there is one kind of relationship that we admit, there is another that we do not admit; that is to say, we do admit that there is such relation between them as is expressed by the assertion 'such is the deno-

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Tātparya, however, more in keeping with the form of the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument, interprets it to mean that the cognition produced by Word in regard to imperceptible things is got at, not by means of Inference, but through the injunctions of a trustworthy person; and inasmuch as these injunctions are embodied in *Word*, the resultant Cognition cannot be regarded as *Inferential*. It proceeds to show that the relation between the Word and the Verbal Cognition is not the same as that between the Probans and Inferential Cognition; for in the latter the Probans must subsist in the Subject of the Inferential Cognition; while Word never subsists in the subject of Verbal Cognitions. Such being the material difference between Inference and Word, the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* have put forward the connection of Word with a reliable person as what distinguishes it from Inference, simply by way of adding a further reason.—says the *Tātparya*.

* The right reading is supplied by the *Bhāṣyacandra*–सप्तद्वीपसमुद्रो लोक &c.

tation *of the Word'*, where 'word' is in the Possessive case (taking the Genitive case-ending); but we do not admit that between them there is any such relation as consists in *Contact* [or *Inherence*;* and it is only on the basis of some relationship of this latter kind that verbal cognition could be regarded as *inferential*]. "But why is such relation not admitted?" *For the simple reason that no such relation can be recognised by means of any Instrument of Cognition.*† For instance,§ the Contact between the Word and its denotation cannot be recognised by means of Inference, as it is beyond the reach of the sense-organs, that is to say, the object denoted by the Word is beyond the reach of that sense-organ by which the Word itself is apprehended; and [not only this, but] there are also many objects (of verbal cognition) that are absolutely beyond the reach of any sense-organ; and as a matter of fact, only such contact is apprehended by the sense-organs as holds between objects perceptible by the same sense-organ

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Then again, if the relation comprehended as between the Word and the thing denoted by it were in the form of 'contact', then (*a*) either the thing would go over to (come into juxtaposition with) the Word,—or (*b*) the Word would go over to the thing, —or (*c*) both would go over to both Now in regard to these, we find that—

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* *Prāptih samyogasamavāyānyatarah*—'*Bhāṣyacandra*'.

† In both editions of the *Vārtika* this is printed as a *Sūtra* But it is not found either in the *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, or any of the Sūtra Mss.

§ Why the *Bhāsya* selects for attack the relation of *contact* is thus explained by the *Tātparya*—The natural (permanent) relationship between Word and its denotation could be only one of the following kinds—(*a*) it might be of the nature of identity, or (*b*) it might consist in the relation of denoter and denoted, that which makes cognisable and that which is cognised, or (*c*) it might be in the nature of contact Now, that the relation cannot be that of identity we have already shown under Sū. 1-1-4. while explaining the term '*avyapadeśyam*' occurring in the definition of Perception. As for (*b*), though we admit of this relationship, we do not admit it to be eternal, as the Mimāmsakas hold; this we shall show later on (*vide Tātparya*, P. 290, L. 18. *et. seq*) So that all that remains to be refuted is the relation of *Contact*

Sūtra 54

There can be no such relation [between the Word and its Denotation] also because we do not find (actual) filling, burning and cutting (a);

*And because the place (of utterance) and the cause (human effort) are not coexistent** (*b*);—this (additional argument) is what is indicated by the particle '*ca*', 'also' in the Sūtra.†

[It has been shown that the 'contact' between the Word and the thing denoted by it cannot be cognised by means of Perception.]—(*a*) Nor can it be known by means of Inference that the thing goes over to the Word; for if it did so, it would mean that the thing goes over to the Word; and as the Word is uttered *in* the mouth§ and *by* the effort (subsisting in the Soul of the Man pronouncing the word), there should be *filling* of the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Food',—*burning* in the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Fire'—and *cutting* in the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Sword' [as the things, *food*, *fire* and *sword*, which are denoted by the three words, would, under the theory, go over to the Word, which has appeared in the mouth], as a matter of fact, however, no such effects are perceived, so that, inasmuch as no such effects are produced, the conclusion is that there is no such relation of contact (between the Word and the thing denoted; in the sense that the thing goes over to the Word).

(*b*) As regards the second alternative—that the Word goes over to the Thing,—if this were so, then no utterance of the Word would be possible, as neither the place (of utterance) nor its cause would be co-existent (at the place where the Thing is);—the 'place' of utterance is the throat and such other parts of the body, and its 'cause' consists of the particular effort of man; and neither of these would subsist where the Thing exists.‡

* *Parasparasāmānādhi-karaṇyam na sambhavati-ityarthaḥ-Bhāṣyacandra.*

† The first alternative (*a*) is not possible, because of the reason given in the Sūtra, the second alternative (*b*) is not possible, because of the reason added in the *Bhāṣya*, as implied by the particle '*ca*'. These reasons are explained by the *Bhāṣya* in the next sentence

§ आस्यस्थान is the right reading, supported by all but three Mss. and also by the *Vārtika*.

‡ Both—place of utterance and human effort—subsist in the man's body, while the Thing is outside.

(c) Lastly, as each of the two alternatives has been found to be untenable individually, it is not possible to accept the third alternative, that both (the Word and the Thing) go over to both.

The conclusion thus is that there can be no 'contact' between the Word and the Thing.

Sūtra 55

[Says the Opponent]—"From the fact of there being a limitation upon the denotation of Words, there can be no denial (of relationship between them)"

BHĀṢYA

"Inasmuch as we see that there is a limitation as to the cognition of certain things arising from certain words, we infer that what causes this limitation is some sort of relationship between the words and the things denoted by them;—for if there were no such determining relation, every word would denote every thing. For this reason there cannot be a denial of the said relationship."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The answer to the above argument of the Opponent is as follows—

Sūtra 56

The reasoning cannot be accepted; as the cognition of the denotation of a Word is based upon Convention.

As a matter of fact, the restriction that we find in connection with the denotation of words is due, not to any (eternal) relation between them, but to *Convention*. When we said on a previous occasion (*Vide* above) that *we do admit that there is such relation between them as is expressed by the assertion 'such is the denotation of this Word', where Word is in the Possessive case*,—what we referred to was this Convention. "But what is this *Convention*?" 'Convention' is the ordinance restricting the denotation of words by such injunctions as 'such and such a thing is to be denoted by such and such a word'. And as a matter of fact, it is only when this ordinance is known that there arises any cognition from the use of a word; while if the ordinance is not known, even though the word is heard pronounced, it does not give rise to any Cognition

(it expresses nothing). This fact (that verbal cognition arises only when one knows that 'such and such a thing is denoted by such and such a word') cannot be denied by even one who holds that there is an (eternal) relationship between the Word and the thing denoted by it. Ordinary men come to recognise this Convention (which is the ordinance of God) bearing upon words by observing their use in common parlance*; and it is for the preserving of this God-made Convention that we have the science of Grammar, which explains and determines that form of speech which consists of *single Words*—[by showing that a word can be regarded as *correct* only when used in the form and in the sense imparted to it by God, when propounding the ordinance and thereby fixing the Convention upon that word,—and it is incorrect when used in another form or another sense]; and of that form of speech which consists of *sentences*, the only explanation or.definition possible is that it is 'such collection of connected Words as expresses one complete idea.'

Thus we conclude that, even though the Wood is denotative, there is not the slightest reason† (or use) for the inferring of any (permanent) relationship in the form of *Contact*.‡

Sūtra 57

Also because there is no such limitation (in actual usage) among different people.§

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* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains प्रयुज्यमान as नियुज्यमान, 'the person to whom a direction is addressed', the sentence, according to this, would mean—'the relationship is recognised by watching the action of the man to whom the verbal direction is addressed.'

† Both Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read अर्थंतुषोऽपि, which gives good sense 'not the *slightest tittle* of reason or use'; while अर्थजुषोऽपि can be made to give some sense only by a forced construction. The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains 'अर्थ' as प्रयोजन, *purpose, use.*

‡ Such being the case, inasmuch as there is no natural relationship between the Word and its denotation, it is not right for the Opponent to urge such relationship with a view to identify Word with Inference, which is based upon the natural relationship between the Probans and the Probandum.—*Tātparya.*

§ It is noteworthy that the word '*jāti*' here stands for *people*, and not *caste*; as the *Bhāṣya* paraphrases the term as referring to Ṛṣis, Āryas and Mlēchhas.'

BHĀṢYA

[Because there is diversity in actual usage among diverse people,] the denotation of things by words must be regarded as based upon convention, and not upon any natural relationship. As a matter of fact, we find that among such diverse people as Sages, Āryas and Mlēchchhas, they make use of words for expressing things in any way they choose (without any restriction); and if there were any natural relationship between Words and their denotations, no such arbitrary usage would be possible ; for instance, in the case of the *light* of fire, we find that its capability of being the cause of making colour cognised (where the relationship is natural and eternal), does not fail among any particular people at all *

SECTION 10

On 'Word' in Particular [i. e. Scripture]

Sūtras 58-69

[*Pūrvapaksa*]—"In the Scriptural texts dealing respectively with—(*a*) the *Putrakāma Isti* (the sacrifice laid down for the purpose of obtaining a son), (*b*) the *Havana* (oblations) and (*c*) Repetitions—

Sūtra 58

"That (Word) cannot be regarded as an Instrument of Right Cognition, because of such defects as (A) Falsity, (B) Contradiction and (C) Tautology."

BHĀṢYA

The pronoun 'that' in the Sūtra is meant by the revered author of the Sutra to refer to a particular kind of Word

Word cannot be regarded as an Instrument of Right Cognition (i e. trustworthy) Why ?

* (*a*) The word '*yava*' is used by the *Āryas* to express *barley*, and by the *Mlēchhas* to express *long-pepper* , (*b*) the word '*trivrt* is used by *Ṛṣis* in the sense of *nine hymns*, and the *Āryas* used it in the sense of a *particular creeper*. Such diversity of usage could not be possible if there were a natural relationship between Words and their denotations. For Light, which bears a natural relation to the illumining of things and rendering colour cognisable, cannot be made to be connected with Taste or Odour by even thousands of artists. This diversity of usage in the case of Words can be explained only on the basis of Convention, which can vary among different peoples.— *Tātparya*.

(A) Because of the defect of Falsity—as found in the case of the text dealing with the *Putrakāma* Sacrifice. The text declares that, 'One who desires a son should perform the Putreṣṭi, and yet we find that even when the Sacrifice has been finished, no son is born; and thus finding a text laying down something for a visible purpose to be false, we naturally conclude that other texts,—which deal with acts for invisible (transcendental) purposes—such texts, for instance, as 'One should perform the Agnihotra (for the purpose of attaining heaven)'—are also false.

(B) Secondly, because we find the defect of *Contradition* (by one text) of what has been enjoined (by another). For instance, in regard to the (Agnihotra) Oblation, we find such injunctions as—(*a*) 'The oblation should be offered *after* sunrise', (*b*) The oblation should be offered *before sunrise*', (*c*) 'the oblation should be offered at a time when the stars have ceased to be visible and the sun has not become visible';—and after having laid down these points of time, other texts go on to say—(*a*) 'If one offers the oblations *after sunrise*, the oblations are eaten up by Shabala (the Dog of variegated colour)', and (*c*) 'if one offers the oblations at the time when the stars have set and the sun has not risen, the oblations are eaten up by both Śyāva and Śabala',—and as there is apparent contradiction among these (pairs of) texts, one or the other must be *false*.

(C) Lastly, because we find the defect of *tautology*, in those texts that lay down repetition; in the text—'One should repeat three times the first verse, and three times the final verse', we find the defect of tautology; and certainly a tautological assertion can proceed only from a demented person.

From all this the conclusion is that Word is not an Instrument of Right Cognition (i.e it is not *trustworthy*); as it is beset with such defects as 'falsity, contradiction and tautology'.

Sūtra 59

Siddhānta—(A) Not so; as the failure is due to deficiencies in the Action, the Agent and the Means.

BHĀṢYA

The text bearing upon the Putreṣṭi cannot be regarded as 'false' "Why?" Because *the failure is due to deficiencies in the*

Action, the Agent and the Means. (What the text declares is that) the parents, becoming connected with the particular sacrifice (by performing it), give birth to a son; so that the *sacrifice* is the *instrument*, the 'means',—the *parents* are the 'Agents', and their connection with the sacrifice is the 'Action'; and the son is born when all these three are perfect; but when they are not perfect, no son is born.

In regard to the Sacrifice itself, there is 'deficiency' in the *action*, when there is non-performance or omission of its details;—there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when the performer happens to be illiterate and of immoral character; there is 'deficiency' in the *means* (*a*) when the material offered is not duly sanctified or has been desecrated, (*b*) when the mantras recited are shorter or longer (than their correct forms), or devoid of proper accent or the necessary syllables, or (*c*) when the sacrificial fee is such as has been acquired by unfair means, or is too small, or consists of deprecated material.

In regard to the act of procreation itself, there is 'deficiency' in the *act* when the method of intercourse is wrong;—there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when there are uterine diseases (preventing conception) or defective semen; and 'deficiency' in the *means*, has been described in connection with the Sacrifice.

In regard to ordinary actions of the world, we have the injunction, 'Desiring fire one should rub together two pieces of wood'; and in connection with this, there is 'deficiency' in the *act* when the rubbing is done in the wrong manner,—there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when there is some remissness in his knowledge or in his effort; and there is 'deficiency' in the *means* when the wood is wet and with holes (worm-eaten).

Now, when there are these deficiencies, the result is not achieved; but that does not make the said injunction ('Desiring fire one should rub together two pieces of wood') *false*; as when everything is perfect, the result does become accomplished. And in no way does the case of the injunction (of the Vedic sacrifice)—'Desiring son one should perform the Putreṣṭi'—differ from the said injunction (of the worldly act of rubbing the wood-pieces for obtaining fire).

Sūtra 60

(B)—The deprecatory assertion applies to the changing of a particular time after having (once) adopted it ;—

BHĀṢYA

'So that there is no *contradiction* in texts bearing upon the Agnihotra oblations'—this has to be supplied to the Sūtra (in order to complete the sentence). The deprecatory text—'When a man offers the oblations after sunrise, they are eaten up by the Śyāva dog'—is meant to point out that it is not right to change the time that has been once adopted ; as is done when a person, having in the first instance made the offerings at one time (e. g. *before* sunrise), changes it subsequently and makes them at another time (e. g. *after* sunrise). So that the text only serves to deprecate the *abandoning of the enjoined procedure* (and there is no 'contradiction' in this).

Sūtra 61

(C)—It may be rightly regarded as a useful reiteration.

BHĀSYA

What is referred to in this Sūtra is the Purvapaksa argument that the Veda is tainted with 'tautology' by reason of the repetitions that it lays down (Su. 58) (It has to be borne in mind, however, that) it is only *needless* repetition that constitutes 'tautology'; there is, however, repetition with a *purpose*, which is called 'anuvāda', 'Reiteration'. Now, the repetition that is laid down in the Vedic text 'One should recite the first verse thrice and the final verse also thrice'—is of the latter kind, 'Reiteration'; as it is done *with a purpose* ; the purpose being that by repeating the first and final verses thrice each, the number of the *Sāmidhenī* verses becomes *fifteen* ; and it is with reference to this that we have the following description of the 'mantra' (the 'kindling' verses)—'By means of this verbal thunderbolt with its *fifteen* spokes I attack my enemy who hates me and whom I hate' ; where the name 'mantra-thunderbolt' refers to the *fifteen* 'Sāmidhenī' verses ; and this number 'fifteen' could not be obtained without the aforesaid repetition (of the first and final verses) (the actual number of verses being only eleven).

Sūtra 62

Specially as a classification of the texts is accepted on the basis of (diversity in their) purpose.

BHĀṢYA

(*As a classification of the texts is accepted on the basis of diversity in their purpose*, therefore) Vedic texts must be regarded as 'instruments of right cognition', just as is done in common parlance (where every word serving a useful purpose is accepted as an instrument of Right Cognition)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The 'classification' of Vedic Brāhmaṇa texts is three-fold, as follows :—

Sūtra 63

The texts being employed as (A) 'Injunctions', (B) 'Descriptions' and (C) 'Reiterations with a Purpose'.

Vedic texts are employed in three ways—(A) as 'injunctive', (B) as 'descriptive' and (C) as 'reiterative',—assertions.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Of these three—

Sūtra 64

The injunction is that which prescribes (a certain act).

BHĀṢYA

That text which *prescribes*—i e. urges or incites (the Agent to activity)—is called 'Injunction'; and this Injunction is either mandatory or permissive , e g. such texts as 'One desiring heaven *should offer* the Agnihotra oblations'.

Sūtra 65

The Descriptions are—Valedictory, Deprecatory, Illustrative and Narrative

BHĀṢYA

(*a*) That text which eulogises a certain Injunction by describing the (desirable) results (following from the enjoined act) is called 'Valedictory'; such a text serves two purposes : (1) it serves the purpose of inspiring confidence, whereby the agent comes to have faith in what is thus eulogised (and is thereby led to perform it) ; (2) it also serves the purpose of persuading ; whereby on knowing the result following from a certain

act, the agent is persuaded to do it: e.g. such texts as—'As the gods cognised all beings by means of the Sarvajit sacrifice, this sacrifice accomplishes the purpose of cognising all beings and obtaining all things; by means of this a man obtains all things and conquers all beings' &c., &c.

(*b*) The text that describes the undesirable results (following from the act enjoined) is called 'deprecatory'; it serves the purpose of dissuasion; whereby the agent may not do the act deprecated; *e.g.* such texts as—'That which is known as the Jyotiṣṭoma is the foremost of all sacrifices, one who, without performing this, performs another sacrifice, falls into a pit, the act perishes and the man is destroyed', and so forth

(*c*) That text which describes a contrary (different) method of action adopted by a certain person is called 'illustrative'; *e.g.* such texts as—'Having offered the oblation, people pour out the fat, and then the mixture of ghee and coagulated milk, but the Caraka priests pour this mixture first and they say that this mixture constitutes the very life of Agni', and so forth.

(*d*) The text that describes a method as adopted traditionally is called 'narrative'; *e.g*, such texts as—'Thus it is that Brāhmaṇas have adopted, in their hymns, the Bahispavamāna Sāma, thinking that in so doing they were performing the Sacrifice in its very womb', and so forth

"Why should the illustrative and Narrative texts be regarded as 'Descriptive' (and not 'Injunctive')?"

These are regarded as 'Descriptive', firstly because they are connected with *praise* or *deprecation*, and secondly because they indicate something connected with (bearing upon) some other Injunction (to which, therefore, they are supplementary)

Sūtra 66

(C) When the Injunction and the Enjoined are mentioned again, it constitutes 'Reiteration (with a purpose)'.

BHĀSYA

The compound '*vidhividhitānuvacana*' means the '*anuvacana*', re-mention, of (*a*) the 'vidhi', Injunction and (*b*) the 'vihita', Enjoined;—the former being verbal 'reiteration', and the latter material 'reiteration'; so that just as there are two

kinds of 'Repetition' so are there two kinds of 'Reiteration' also.

"Why should the *enjoined* be 'reiterated'?"

It is reiterated for the purpose of *reference*; it is in reference to what is *enjoined* that we have either (*a*) praise (of the act) or (*b*) deprecation (of the omitting of the act), or (*c*) a supplementary detail is laid down; and (*d*) some times Reiteration is for the purpose of indicating the sequence between two enjoined acts, and so on other purposes may be found out.

In common parlance also, we have three kinds of assertions —*injunctive*, *descriptive* and *reiterative*. (*a*) 'One should cook rice' is an *injunction*, (*b*) 'Long life, glory, strength, pleasure, intelligence—all this resides in food' is a *description* (of the food whose cooking has been enjoined); (*c*) we have the 'reiteration' (of the enjoined cooking) in the following forms: 'cook, cook, please', where we have repetition; 'cook quickly', 'do please cook', in the form of entreaty; and 'you must cook', for the purpose of emphasising.

Thus then, as in the case of ordinary assertions, Words are accepted as 'Instruments of Right Cognition', when it is found that they are classified according to the diverse purposes served by them,—exactly in the same manner, inasmuch as Vedic texts also are capable of being classified according to the different purposes served by them, they may be regarded as 'Instruments of Right Cognition' (as pointed out above, under Su 63).

Sūtra 67

(The Opponent says)—"There is no difference between 'Reiteration' and 'Repetition'; as both consist in the restating of the same word."

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, no distinction is possible as that Repetition' is *wrong* and 'Reiteration' *right*. Because in both cases a word, whose meaning has been already comprehended, is repeated; so that by reason of the same word being repeated, both are equally *wrong*."

Sūtra 68

(Answer)—(Reiteration is) not the same (as Repetition), as (in the former) the re-mention (of the word) is like the exhortation to go 'more quickly'.

BHĀṢYA

'Reiteration' cannot be regarded as the same as 'Repetition'; —Why?—because when the re-mention of a word serves a useful purpose, then it is 'Reiteration'; so that even though in 'Repetition' also we have the re-mention of words, the re-mention in this case is entirely useless; while 'Reiteration', serving a useful purpose, is *like the exhortation to go 'more quickly'*; that is to say, when one is exhorted in the words 'go quickly, quickly', the meaning is 'go more quickly'; so that the re-mention (of the word 'quickly') serves the purpose of indicating a peculiarity in the act (of *going*; which purpose could not be accomplished by the single mention of the word 'quickly'). This exhortation is cited only as an instance; there are several other instances of re-mention with a purpose; *e.g.* when it is said 'he cooks and cooks', what is meant is that the act of cooking is unceasing; 'village upon village is pleasant' means that every village is pleasant; 'God rained round and round the Trigarta country (the modern Jullundhur)' means *exception* (that rainfall avoided that country); 'Seated near and about the Wall' means *proximity*; 'there are bitters and bitters' means that there are several kinds of bitterness.

Thus then, we conclude that Reiteration is meant to be a *reference*, for the purpose of praising or deprecating, or laying down a supplementary detail, or pointing out the sequence of what has been enjoined (as explained under Su. 66).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—"Does then the trustworthiness of Word (Scripture) become established simply by setting aside the arguments against its trust-worthiness"?—

Answer—It becomes established also by the following positive argument:—

Sūtra 69

The Trustworthiness of the Word (of the Veda) is based upon the trustworthiness of the reliable (veracious) expositor, just like the trustworthiness of Incantations and of Medical Scriptures.

BHĀṢYA

"In what does the trustworthiness of the Medical Scriptures consist ?"

It consists in this fact that, when the Medical Scriptures declare that 'by doing this and this one obtains what he desires, and by avoiding this and this he escapes from what is undesirable'—and a person acts accordingly,—the result turns out to be exactly as asserted ; and this shows that the said Scriptures are *true*, not *wrong*, in what they assert.

In the case of *Incantations* also it is found that whenever they are used for the purpose of averting such evils as poison, ghosts and thunderbolt, they are found effective, in bringing about that result ; and this fact establishes the 'trustworthiness' of the Incantations.

"But to what is all this *trustworthiness* due ?"

It is due to the trustworthiness of the veracious expositor.

"And in what does the trustworthiness of veracious expositors consist ?"

It consists in the following facts—that they have a direct cognition of the real essence of things—they have compassion on living beings,—and they are desirous of describing things as they really exist. As a matter of fact, veracious persons (*a*) have a direct perception of the real essence of things,—that is, they know that such and such a thing should be avoided by man, and also the method of avoiding it,—that such and such a thing should be acquired by man, and also the method of acquiring it,—(*b*) they take compassion on living beings,—that is, they feel as follows:—'These poor creatures being by themselves ignorant, there is no other means, save instruction, available to them for knowing things; until they know, they cannot either perform or avoid any acts, and unless they do perform acts, it cannot be well with them, and there is no one (save myself) who would help them in this matter ;—so, well, I am going to instruct them about things as they exist and as I know them , having listened to these instructions, these creatures will understand things, and thereby they shall avoid what should be avoided and take up only what should be take up.' It is on this basis that the instruction of veracious persons proceeds ; and when an act is known on

this threefold authority of the Veracious Expositor, and is performed accordingly, it actually accomplishes the purpose (it is meant to accomplish). From this it follows that the instruction of veracious persons is trustworthy; and this leads to the veracious expositors themselves being regarded as trustworthy.

Thus (trustworthiness having been found in) the instruction of the Veracious Expositor, in the form of the Medical Scriptures (that part of the Veda which treats of the Medical Science,) which deal with visible things,—from this we infer the trustworthiness of those parts of the Veda also which deal with invisible (transcendental) things; as the ground of trustworthiness —which consists in the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor—is equally present in both. In fact some texts of the latter section of the Veda also are found to deal with visible things, e.g., the text 'One desiring to acquire a village should perform sacrifices'; and on seeing this coming out true, we can infer, from this also, the trustworthiness of the other Vedic texts (dealing with purely invisible things).

In ordinary worldly matters also, a large amount of business is carried on on the basis of the assertions of veracious persons; and here also the trustworthiness of the ordinary veracious expositor is based upon the same three conditions—he has full knowledge of what he is saying, he has sympathy for others (who listen to him), and he has the desire to expound things as they really exist;—and on the basis of these the assertion of the veracious expositor is regarded as trustworthy

The inference (of the trustworthiness of all Vedic texts, from that of the medical texts) proceeds on the basis of the seer and expositor being the same (in both cases). That is to say, the omniscient Expositor and the Seers are the same veracious persons in the case of the Vedic texts and that of the Medical Scriptures; so that from the trustworthiness of the latter we can infer that of the latter also.

(The Mīmāṁsaka objects)—"Inasmuch as the trustworthiness of Vedic texts is due to their eternality, it is not right to say that their trustworthiness is *due to the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor.*"

But as a matter of fact, the trustworthiness or efficiency of words in the denotation of things is due to their denotative potency,—and not to their eternality; for if it were due to their eternality, then (all words being equally eternal, *ex hypothesi*) all things would be denoted by all words; and there would be no restriction as to words and their significations.

" But if words are not eternal, they cannot be expressive at all. "

This is not true; ordinary words (in common usage) are actually found to denote their meanings (and certainly these words are not eternal). "These words also are eternal (just like Vedic words)." This is not possible; as in that case the disagreement with facts that we find in the case of the assertions of untruthful persons would be inexplicable; as being eternal, every word should be trustworthy (*i.e.* true, in equal agreement with facts). "This (common) Word cannot be eternal." But you do not point out any difference; it behoves you to show cause why the assertion of the untruthful person in common parlance is not eternal (while all other words are eternal). Then again, in the case of Proper names, it is found that their trustworthiness depends upon their denoting the things named,—and this denotation is in accordance with the convention applying the name to a particular thing (and as such these cannot be eternal); so that it is not right to attribute *trustworthiness* to *eternality* That is to say, in common parlance when the proper name is denotative of the thing to which it has been fixed by convention, it does so by reason of this convention, and not by reason of its eternality.

In fact all that can be meant by the Veda being 'eternal' is that there has been continuity of tradition of the texts and activity according to them is uninterrupted through all ages, past and future.

Thus we find that if we attribute the trustworthiness of Words to the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor, it meets the case of Vedic as well as ordinary words (while if we attribute it to *eternality*, it cannot apply to the case of ordinary words).

(Thus ends the First Daily Lesson of the Second Discourse in the Bhāṣya)

DISCOURSE II

SECOND DAILY LESSON

SECTION 1

The Exact Number of Means of Right Cognition

Sūtras 1–12

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The opponent, thinking that the division of 'Means of Right Cognition' (into Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word) is not right, urges the following objection.—

Sūtra 1

"The Number (of Means of Right Cognition) cannot be four (only); as Tradition, Presumption, Deduction and Antithesis are also Means or Instruments of Cognition."

BHĀṢYA

"There are not only *four* Instruments of Cognition, in fact there are four more, in the shape of Tradition, Presumption, Deduction and Antithesis; why have not these been mentioned?

(A) When there is a regular handing down of the assertion of a certain fact, in the form 'so they say', and the exact person who asserted the fact is not definitely known, we have a means of cognition which is called 'Tradition'.

(B) 'Presumption' consists in the 'āpatti', *presuming* (of a fact) *on the basis of another fact*, 'arthāt';—'āpatti, *is getting at*, i.e., *implication*; when a certain fact having been asserted, another fact is *implied*, we have the Means of Cognition called 'Presumption'; *e. g.*, when it is asserted that 'there is no rain when there are no clouds' what is *implied* is that 'there is rain when there are clouds'.

(C) When the cognition of the presence of one thing follows from the cognition of another thing, which is invariably concomitant with the former, we have the means of congnition called 'Deduction'; *e.g.*, from the congition of the presence of the 'Quarter Maund' follows that of the presence of the measure of 'Two Seers and a Half'; and from this latter follows the cognition of the presence of the 'Seer'.

(D) 'Antithesis' is contrast; as between what *exists* and what does *not exist*; (we have this as a Means of Cognition) when the *non-existent* action of *raining* brings about the cognition of the *existence* of the connection of the clouds with high winds; as it is only when there is some such obstruction, as the connection of the cloud with high winds, that there is no *falling* of the rain-drops, which would otherwise be there by reason of the force of gravity in the drops."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(The answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa is that) it is quite true that Tradition and the rest are 'Means of Cognition'; but it does not follow that they are distinct Means of Cognition, (quite apart from those enumerated in Su. 1-1-3). In fact the denial (in the foregoing Sutra) of the four-foldness of Instruments of Cognition is based upon the assumption that Tradition and the rest are distinct (from Perception &c);—and this

Sūtra 2

is not a correct denial; as 'Tradition' is not different from 'Word'; and 'Presumption', 'Deduction' and 'Antithesis' are not different from 'Inference'.

BHĀṢYA

The said denial of four-foldness cannot be right "Why?" 'Word' having been defined as 'the assertion of a reliable person,' this definition does not fail to include 'Tradition'; so that the *difference* (between the two, which the opponent relies upon) is found to be engulfed in non-difference. Then again, 'Inference' consists in the cognising, through the perceptible, of the imperceptible related to it; and precisely the same is the case also with 'Presumption', 'Deduction' and 'Antithesis'. What happens in the case of 'Presumption' is that—on our cognising what is asserted by a certain sentence, there arises the cognition of what is not asserted by it,—this cognition being due to the relation of 'opposition', (negative concomitance) subsisting between what is asserted and what is not asserted; and this is only a case of 'Inference.' Similarly what happens in the case of 'Deduction' is that, the Composite and the Component being related to each other by the relation of invariable concomitance, the cognition of the former gives rise to the cognition of the

latter ; and this is only a case of 'Inference'. Lastly, (what happens in the case of 'Antithesis' is that) it being found that of two things, while one is present the other cannot be present,—and thus the two being recognised as *contraries*,—if it is found that a certain effect does not come about (even when the necessary cause is there), we conclude that there must be something obstructing the cause (this something being what is *contrary* to the effect); and this is pure 'Inference'.

Thus we conclude that the said division of the Means of Cognition (into *four*) is quite right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(Says the opponent)—"It has been asserted (in the Bhāṣya) *that it is true that Tradition and the rest are Means of Cognition ; but it does not follow that they are distinct Means of Cognition* ;—now this admits that Tradition &c. are real means of Cognition ; but this admission is not right ; because—

Sūtra 3

"Presumption cannot be a true Means of Cognition as it is uncertain (not always true)".

BHĀṢYA

"From the assertion—'there is no rain when there are no clouds'—it is presumed that 'there is rain when there are clouds'; as a matter of fact, however, sometimes it happens that even though clouds are present there is no rain ; so that Presumption is not always a true Means of Right Cognition."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(Our answer to the above objection is as follows:)—There is no uncertainty attaching to Presumption ;—

Sūtra 4

It is on account of what is not Presumption being regarded as Presumption (that there arises the idea of its being not always true).

BHĀṢYA

(What the particular instance of Presumption cited is meant to indicate is the general principle that) from the assertion that 'when the cause is absent the effect is not produced', we presume its obverse that 'when the cause is present the effect is produced'; *existence* being the obverse of *non-existence* ; and certainly this

presumption of the production of the effect when the cause is present is never found to fail in any single case of the *presence of the cause*; that is, there is not a single case in which the effect is produced when the cause is *not present*; so that Presumption cannot be regarded as uncertain or *not always true*. As for a certain contingency under which, even when the cause (clouds) is present, the effect (rain) does not appear, by reason of the causal operation being obstructed by something (high winds, for instance),—this is a characteristic of all causes; and this is not what forms the subject of Presumption. "What is it that forms its subject?" The principle that 'the effect is produced when the cause is present'; i. e., that the production of the effect is never unconcomitant with the presence of the cause,—this is what forms the subject of Presumption. Such being the fact, it is clear that when the Opponent denies the truth of Presumption, he regards as Presumption what is not real Presumption. The characteristic of all causes (mentioned above) is what is actually seen, and hence cannot be denied.

Sūtra 5

Further, the denial itself is invalid,—being uncertain (not universally true).

BHĀṢYA

The denial (by the Opponent) is in the form of the sentence " Presumption cannot be a true Means of Cognition, as it is uncertain" (Su 3); and what this denies is only the fact of Presumption being a true Means of Cognition; it does not deny the *existence* of Presumption; and as such this denial itself becomes 'uncertain'; being 'uncertain', it is invalid; and being invalid, it cannot serve the purpose of (rightly) denying anything.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

You might argue as follows:—"Particular assertions relate to only certain subjects; and their 'certainty' or 'uncertainty' also can be in relation to those particular subjects only; and in the case in question the mere *existence* (of Presumption) is not the subject of our denial (hence any 'uncertainty' relating to that *existence* cannot affect the validity of our denial."

To this our answer would be as follows:—

Sūtra 6

If the denial is valid, there can be no invalidity in Presumption.

BHĀṢYA

Of Presumption also what forms the subject is the fact that 'the appearance of the effect is never inconcomitant with the existence of the cause'; and not that the said concomitance is a character of the cause (*i.e.*, it does not mean that whenever the cause is present, the effect *must appear*); because as a matter of fact the cause does *not* produce the effect when there is an obstacle to its operation

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(Having failed in regard to Presumption, the Opponent next directs his attack against the validity of 'Antithesis.')—"Well, then, what you have said (Bhāṣya) admits the validity of 'Antithesis' as a Means of (Cognition); and this is not right. Why? Because—

Sūtra 7

"Antithesis cannot be regarded as a valid Means of Cognition; as there is nothing that can be the object of cognition by its means."

BHĀSYA

(Our answer to this is as follows)—As a matter of fact there are many things that are found, in ordinary experience, to be the objects of Cognition by means of 'Antithesis'; and in view of this fact, it is through sheer audacity that you make the assertion that "Antithesis cannot be regarded as valid Means of Cognition, *as there is nothing that can be the object of cognition by its means.*"

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Of the vast number of things (cognised by means of Antithesis), a portion is exemplified:—

Sūtra 8

Certain things being marked, those not marked, being characterised by the absence of that mark, come to be regarded as the object of cognition by the said means (of Antithesis).

BHĀṢYA

That is to say, there are things that actually become the objects of cognition by means of 'Antithesis' or 'Negation'. "How so?" When certain things,—some pieces of cloth, which are indicated as not required—are marked, those (pieces of cloth) that are indicated as required and are not similarly marked are characterised by the absence of that mark; *i.e.*, they are recognised by the absence of that mark. So that when both (the marked and the unmarked pieces) are present, and a man is asked to 'bring the unmarked pieces of cloth', he recognises the unmarked pieces by the *absence* of the mark in them; and having recognised them, he brings them And a 'Means of Cognition' is only that which brings about cognition [so that, as bringing about the 'cognition' of the required pieces of cloth, the *negation* of marks must be regarded as a Means of Cognition]

Sūtra 9

If it be urged that—"When the thing is non-existent, there can be no Antithesis (or negation) of it",—our answer is that this is not right, as it is possible for the thing to exist elsewhere

BHĀṢYA

(The Opponent says)—"Where a certain thing, having existed, ceases to exist, there alone its antithesis is possible; in the case of the unmarked cloth-pieces, however, (where the marks have never existed), the marks have not ceased to exist *after having existed there*; so that any antithesis of the marks is not possible in this case."

Our answer to this is that *this is not right, as it is possible for the thing to exist elsewhere*. That is to say, what happens is that the man (asked to bring the unmarked cloths) sees the presence of marks in certain pieces, and does not perceive it in others,—so that perceiving the absence (antithesis, 'previous negation', non-appearance) of the marks in these latter, he cognises, by means of this antithesis, the thing required (i e., the *unmarked* cloths)

Sūtra 10

(Says the Opponent)—"The presence of the mark (in the unmarked things) cannot be the means (of any cognition) in regard to the unmarked things."

BHĀṢYA

"The presence of the marks is in the *marked* cloths; and the Antithesis is not of these marks; in fact the Antithesis of those marks present in the marked cloths is in the *unmarked* cloths; and this Antithesis cannot be the means (of a cognition). Those that are present, to speak of the Antithesis of those would involve contradiction in terms."

Sūtra 11

This is not right; as the possibility of the cognition is in view of the actual presence of the marks (elsewhere)

BHĀṢYA

We do not say that there is antithesis (absence, non-existence) of those marks that are present (in that same thing where the antithesis is conceived of); what we say is that the marks being present in some and not present in other things, when a person, looking for the marks, does not find them present in these latter things, these things he comes to recognise by means of that *absence* (antithesis) of the marks. (So that the absence becomes the means of the cognition of those things.)

Sūtra 12

Then again, the antithesis of a thing is possible before it comes into existence

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, there are two kinds of Antishesis; one consisting in the non-existence of the thing before it has come into existence, and another consisting in its non-existence after having come into existence, due to its destruction;—now the 'Antithesis' of the marks that there is in the *unmarked* things is that of the former kind,—that consisting in their non-existence before they have come into existence; and not of the other kind (so that the objection urged in Su 9 does not lie with our view at all).

SECTION (2)

Non-Eternality of Words.

Sūtras (13–38)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Sūtra 1-1-7 says '*āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*', 'Word is the assertion of a reliable person,' meaning that it is only Sound of a

particular kind that can be the Means of Right Cognition; which implies that there are several kinds of 'Śabda, Sound.' Now in regard to all this 'Śabda, Sound', in general, we proceed to consider whether it is eternal or non-eternal.

On this point Doubt arises, on account of there being a difference of opinion caused by such reasons being adduced as tend to produce uncertainty (in men's minds)

(The following are the different opinions that have been held on this point) —(1) "Sound is a quality of Ākāśa, it is all-pervading and eternal, and it is liable to manifestation only." (The Old Mīmāmsaka view)—(2) "Sound lies latent in (five) Substances, along with, and in the same manner as, Odour and other qualities, and is liable to manifestation only." (The Sānkhya view)—(3) "Sound is the quality of Ākāśa liable to production and destruction." (The Vaiśesika view)—(4) "Sound is produced by disturbance in the basic elemental Substances, it does not subsist in anything, it is liable to production and also to destruction." (The Bauddha view).

In view of this diversity of opinion, there arises a doubt as to what is the real truth.

Our answer is that Sound is *non-eternal*. "Why?"

Sūtra 13

(A) Because it has a cause,—(B) Because it is apprehended through a sense-organ,—and (C) because it is (conceived and) spoken of as a product.

BHĀṢYA

(A) The term 'ādi' in the Sūtra stands for *cause*,—the etymological signification of the term being 'that wherefrom a certain thing is drawn out or produced', '*ādīyatē asmāt*'. As a matter of fact, it is found that what has a cause is non-eternal;—so that as Sound is *produced* by conjunction or disjunction—and as such *has a cause*—it must be non-eternal. "What is the meaning of the assertion that Sound *has a cause*?" The meaning simply is that, inasmuch as Sound is liable to origination (to be produced, or brought into existence), it is *non-eternal*,—that is, after having come into existence, it ceases to exist; that is, it is liable to destruction.

(B) As it might be still regarded as an open question, as to whether Sound is actually *produced* by conjunction and disjunction, or it is only *manifested* by them,—the Sutra adds the second reason—*Because it is apprehended through a sense-organ*;—*i.e.*, it is apprehended by means of the contact of a sense-organ.

(In regard to Sound, the real question at issue is)—'Is Sound *manifested* and apprehended like the qualities of Colour and the rest, in the same place as its manifester? or, Is it that the initial Sound is *produced* by contact, and it, in its turn, gives rise to a series of Sounds, and the Sounds thus reaching the auditory organ, become apprehended?'

The answer to this is that Sound can never be apprehended in the same place as its manifester; as it is apprehended after the conjunction or impact (which is its *manifester* or *originator*) For instance, when a piece of wood is being cut, the Sound that arises from the impact of the axe with the wood is heard by the person at a distance, after that impact has ceased,—and it is never found possible for a manifested thing to be apprehended after its manifester has ceased to exist; so that the Impact cannot be regarded as a mere *manifester*:—on the other hand if the Impact is the *producer* of the Sound, what happens is that the Impact having produced the initial Sound, this latter gives rise to a series of Sounds, and what is apprehended is that particular Sound of the series which happens to reach the Auditory Organ; so that in this case it would be quite possible for the Sound to be apprehended after the Impact has ceased.

(C) For the following reason also Sound is *produced*, not *manifested*.—*Because it is conceived and spoken of as a product.* In common parlance, it is only a product that is spoken of as 'acute' or 'dull',–as we find in such expressions as 'acute pleasure', 'dull pleasure', 'acute pain', 'dull pain';—and in regard to Sound also we have such expressions as 'acute Sound', 'dull Sound'. (Hence Sound must be a *product*). "But as a matter of fact, the *acuteness or dullness* belongs to the *manifester*, whence arises the acuteness or dullness of the apprehension; just as in the case of Colour &c." This cannot be; as there is suppression. What the opponent means is as follows:—"The acuteness or dullness

belongs to the manifesting Impact ; from that arises the acuteness or dullness of the apprehension of the manifested Sound, and there is no difference in the Sound itself ; just as in the case of Colour, (the Colour remaining the same), its apprehension is heightened (rendered more acute) or lowered (rendered dull) by the light that manifests it."—But this cannot be, as there is suppression (in the case of Sound) ; that is to say, it is only when the Sound of the drum is acute that it suppresses the duller Sound of the lute, and not when it has been deadened and dull (this well-known fact cannot be explained on the hypothesis of the opponent ; for) the *suppression* could not be done by the apprehension of the Sound ; and as for the Sound itself, it is the same in both cases (according to the Opponent, whether the Sound of the Drum is acute or dull, it is the same Sound that has continued all along : and hence dull or acute, it should always suppress the sound of the lute); if, on the other hand, the Sound, in the two cases, be regarded as different, the said phenomenon of suppression becomes quite explicable. From this it follows that Sound is *produced*, not *manifested*. Then again, (according to him) the Sound being manifested in the same place as their manifester, there could be no contact (between the two, and hence no suppression of the one by the other) ; so that according to the view that Sound is manifested in the same place as its manifester, no supression would be possible , as the Sound of the lute (which is manifested in the lute) cannot be got at by the Sound of the Drum (which is manifested in the Drum) If it be urged that there could be suppression even without the one getting at the other,—then (our answer would be that) in that case there would be suppression of all Sounds The Opponent might think that—"even though one Sound is not got at by another, there could be suppression" ;—but if this could be possible, then just as the drum-Sound suppresses one lute-Sound—*i e* , that which has its manifester near the manifester of the drum-Sound —so would it suppress all lute-Sounds,—even those whose manifesters would be at a distance from the Drum ; as the condition of *not being in contact* with the drum-Sound would be the same in the case of all lute-Sounds ; so that when a Drum would be sounded at any one place, it should render inaudible the Sound of all the lutes that might be sounded at the time anywhere, in all

regions of the world ! On the other hand, (according to our view), the Series of Sounds (produced in each case) being distinct, it becomes possible for only a certain Dull Sound to be suppressed by a certain Acute Sound,—this being dependent upon their reaching the auditory organ at the same time. "What is it that you call *suppression* ? " The *suppression* of a thing consists in its being not apprehended, by reason of the apprehension of a similar thing ; as for instance, the light of the torch,—which would be (otherwise) visible,—is suppressed by the light of the sun (so that there is suppression of one Sound by another, when, being otherwise audible, it is rendered inaudible by another Sound)

Sūtra 14

[Objection]—"(A) Because the destruction of the Jar is eternal, (B) because Community is eternal,—and (C) because even eternal things are conceived and spoken of as non-eternal [what has been urged in the preceding Sutra cannot be accepted as conclusive] "

BHĀSYA

" (A) Sound cannot be regarded as non-eternal on the ground of its *having a cause* (as urged in Sū 13). 'Why ?' Because the premiss (upon which that reasoning is based) is not universally true . In the case of the 'destruction of the Jar' we find that even though it has a cause (and a beginning), yet it is *eternal* [Hence the premiss that 'all that has cause is non-eternal' is not true]. 'But how do you know that the 'destruction of the Jar' has a cause ?' [We know this from the fact that] the Jar ceases to exist only when there is a disruption of its (component) causes (in the shape of the clay-particles making up the Jar). 'But how do you know that this *destruction of the Jar* is eternal ?' [That we infer from the fact that] when the Jar has once ceased to exist on the disruption of its component causes, this non-existence of that particular Jar is never again set aside by its existence [i. e. the Jar that has once been destroyed never comes into existence again.]

" (B) The second reason urged as proving the non-eternality of Sound is that *it is apprehended through a sense-organ.* But here also the premiss is not true ; as we find that *Community*, though eternal, is yet apprehended through sense-organs.

" (C) The third reason urged is that Sound is *conceived* and *spoken of as non-eternal* ; here also the premiss is not true ; for we find even eternal things conceived and spoken of as non-eternal. *E. g.* just as we speak of the 'part of a tree', and the 'part of a blanket', so also do we speak of the 'part of Ākāśa', the 'part of Soul' [where Ākāśa and Soul, both eternal things, are spoken of as having *parts* ; which means that they are non-eternal]."

Sūtra 15

[Answer]—Inasmuch as there is a clear difference and distinction between the real (direct) and the figurative (indirect) [denotation of the term 'eternal'], the premisses (urged in Su. 13) are not untrue.

BHĀSYA

When a thing is spoken of as 'eternal', what is the 'real' connotation of that term ? As a matter of fact what is meant by the thing being 'eternal' is that it is a thing* which has the character of having no beginning, and for which there is no possibility of its losing itself.† Now this connotation of the term 'eternal' cannot apply to Destruction [for Destruction, though having no end, does have a beginning]. The term could, however, be applied to Destruction in its 'figurative' (or indirect) connotation ; that is to say, when Jar has lost itself,—*i e.* having existed, it has ceased to exist,—and it does not come into existence again,—this negation or destruction of the Jar comes to be spoken of as 'eternal'; which can only mean that it is *as good as eternal*‡ [because having had a beginning, the Destruction could not be 'eternal' in the real sense of the term]. And as a matter of fact, we do not find any *product* which is similar to Sound (in having a cause and a beginning) fulfilling the said conditions of true eternality ; hence the premiss (that 'what has a cause is not eternal') cannot be untrue.

* The right reading is अर्थान्तर for आत्मान्तर.

† 'Being destroyed'.—*Bhāṣyacandra.* It adds that *eternality* consists in being without beginning and without end.

‡ The correct reading is नित्य इव नित्यो as read in several Mss. ; and supported by the *Vārtika.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the argument of the Opponent (urged in Su. 14) that Community is eternal (and yet perceptible by the Senses),—when we urge the ***sense-perceptibility*** of Sound as proving its non-eternality, what we mean is that it is apprehended through sense-contact, and—

Sūtra 16

—inasmuch as this is urged only as leading to the inference of the series (of Sounds),—

BHĀṢYA

the premisses are not untrue, in their bearing upon eternal things —this much has to be brought in from what has gone before.*

We do not mean that Sound is non-eternal simply by reason of its being apprehended by the senses ; what we do mean is that the fact of Sound being apprehended through sense-contact leads to the inference that in every phenomenon of Sound, there is a series of Sounds ; and this fact of there being a series of several Sounds (appearing one after the other) proves that each of these Sounds is *non-eternal*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

The second argument urged by the Opponent (in Sū 14) is that "even eternal things are conceived and spoken of as non-eternal" Now this also is not right

Sūtra 17

Because what the term 'part' really denotes is the constituent cause ;—†

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* The printed text (Benares) reads नित्ये व्यभिचार इति प्रकृतम्. The right reading is supplied by the *Bhāṣyacandra*—नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचार इति प्रकृतम् ; it explains प्रकृतं as अनुवृत्तम्. It calls these words as पूरक, completing the Sūtra

† In the printed text (Benares), the text of the Sūtra is lengthened by the expression नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचारः. But this expression does not appear in the body of the Sūtra itself either in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, or in the Puri Sūtra MS., or in Sūtra MS. B. The *Tātparya* also quotes this Sūtra (on p. 317) as ending with धानात्. We have, therefore, taken नित्येष्वव्यभिचार as the opening words of the Bhāsya on the *Sūtra*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also calls these words "supplementary" to the Sūtra.

BHĀṢYA

So that in its bearing on eternal things [*Ākāśa*, *f.i.*, where with the word 'part' cannot be used in its real connotation; though it may be used in a figurative sense hence] the figurative use of the term 'part' cannot vitiate our premiss (that 'what is spoken of as product must be non-eternal'). Now, in the expressions cited by the Opponent '*part of Ākāśa*' and '*part* of the Soul',—the term 'part' cannot be taken as denoting the *constituent cause* of Ākāśa and Soul, as it is taken to mean in the case of products (like *Tree* and *Blanket*), for how could the word denote what does not exist? That the *constituent cause* of Ākāśa or Soul does not exist we learn from the fact that no such cause can be known by any of the means of cognition "What then does the word 'part' mean in those expressions?" It only means that its contact is no pervasive [As a matter of fact, such expressions as 'part of *Ākāśa*'are used only in connection with the contact of substances with *Ākāśa*, and] in such cases all that is meant by saying that 'contact subsists in *a part of Ākāśa*' is that the contact *does not pervade over the whole Ākaśa*; the sense being that the contact of *Ākāśa* with any substance of limited extension does not extend over the entire *Ākāśa*; it subsists in it without extending over the whole of it. And herein lies a point of similarity between *Ākāśa* and ordinary Products; the contact between two berries, for instance, does not extend over the entire berries So that it is on the basis of this similarity that we have such expressions as 'part of *Ākāśa*', where the word 'part' is used in its figurative sense (and not in its real denotation of *constituent cause*)

This same explanation applies also to the expression 'part of the Soul'.

Like *Contact*, Sound (in *Ākāśa*) and Cognition* (in the Soul) also subsist only partially in—not extending over the whole of—their substratum

[The instances of eternal things being spoken of as non-eternal, that have been urged by the Opponent have been shown to be purely figurative.] On the other hand, [when Sound is spoken of as 'acute' or 'dull', the properties of *acuteness and*

* This includes Pleasure, Pain &c. also,—says the '*Bhāṣyacandra*.

dulness, that can belong only to a non-eternal thing, are such as have been proved above to belong to Sound in reality, and not attributed to it merely figuratively. [Hence our original reasoning remains unshaken].

"But how is it that we do not know of any Sūtra of Gautama's to this effect [(1) that *Ākāśa* and *Soul* cannot have *parts*, in the real sense of the term, and (2) that Sound appears in a series] ?"

Well ; it is in the nature of the revered Gautama, that in many sections (he does not actually assert and prove certain facts) ;* so that in the present connection also he does not actually assert and prove the said two facts ; and the reason is that he thinks that the student will be able to learn these truths from the doctrine of the *S'āstra* ;—this 'Śāstra-doctrine' (in the present instance) consists of inferential reasonings that the Author has put forward (under Su. 16 and 17),—these reasonings having, as they have, several ramifications in the shape of implications; [the implication of Sū. 16 being that *there are Sound-series*, and that of Sū. 17 that *Ākāśa and Soul can have no constituent parts*. And inasmuch as these facts are already implied in the said Sutras, the Author does not find it necessary to assert them in so many words].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Further we ask—How is it to be known that a certain thing exists and another thing does not exist ? "Well, when a thing is apprehended through a Means of Cognition [it is recognised as *existing*], and when it is not apprehended by a Means of Cognition [it is recognised as *non-existing*]" In that case *your Sound would have to be regarded as non-existent*,—†

* For instance, under Sū. 3-1-1 he implies that 'Substance' is distinct from 'Quality' ; but he nowhere says this in so many words—*Pariśuddhi*.

† Those who regard Sound as eternal are asked to explain how it is to be ascertained whether or not a certain thing exists or not Their answer naturally would be that when a thing is apprehended it is recognised as existing, and when it is not apprehended it is recognised as non-existing By this criterion, the Siddhāntin rejoins, Sound will have to be regarded as non-existing before it is uttered, because of the reasons put forward in the following Sūtra (18)

The *Vārtika* suggests another introduction to the Sūtra. The Siddhāntin asks—When you regard the Jar as non-eternal, how do you know that it is

find that the two letters (*i* and *ya*) being amenable to different instrumental forces, the utterance of one is possible without the utterance of the other; that is to say, as a matter of fact, the lettet '*i*' is amenable to the instrumentality of what is called the 'open articulation' (applicable to vowels), while the letter '*ya*' is amenable to the instrumentality of the 'slightly touched articulation' (applicable to semi-vowels); so that these two letters are pronouncible by two different kinds of 'effort', called 'instrumentality'; and this is what makes it possible for one of them being uttered while the other is not uttered [and all this shows that *ya* is only the *substitute*, and not the *modification*, of *i*]*.—(C) *Thirdly*, the case in question (that of *ya* in *dadhyatra*) is exactly analogous to that where there is no 'modification'; that is to say, there are cases where *i* and *ya* are not 'modifications' at all (even according to you); e.g., in such expressions as (*a*) '*yatatē*', '*yacchati*', and '*prāyamsta*' (where there can be no chance of *ya* being a 'modification' at all), and, '*ikārah*', '*idam*' (where *i* remains itself, without undergoing any change at all);—and there are well-marked cases where the two do appear like 'modifications'; e g '*iṣṭvā*' (which is derived from the root '*yaj*', and in which therefore, the *i* appears in the place of the *ya* in the root) and '*dadhyāhara*' which is the altered form resulting from the combination of '*dadhi*' and '*āhara*', (of which the *i* is changed into *ya*)—Now as a matter of fact, in both these cases, (of the utterance of *ya* or *i*, appearing by itself or as 'modification'), the effort of the speaker is precisely the same, and precisely the

The *Pariśuddhi* remarks—The term '*vikāra*' in the present context does not stand for 'transmutation,' the total destruction of one thing and the appearance in its place of another thing; as no such '*vikāra*' is admitted by the *Sānkhya*; it stands for that *change* in which the basic element remaining the same, its characteristics appear and disappear. And as there is no such basic element of which '*i*' could be a characteristic detail,—no 'modification' can be possible in this case.

* If *ya* were the modification of *i*, the forces necessary for its utterance would be the same as those necessary for the utterance of *i*, as a matter of fact, however, the force that is put into operation, for the uttering of *ya*, is that in the form of the effort called 'slightly touched articulation'; while in the case of *i*, the effort is that called 'open articulation'. Thus it is that for the uttering of *ya* it is not necessary to have a previous utterance of *i*. And this would not be possible if *ya* were a *modification* of *i*.

same also is the hearing of the hearer. All this shows that (in '*dadhyatra*') we have **substitution** (of *ya*, and not *modification* of *i*).*—(D) *Fourthly*, there is no perception of it in actual usage. That is to say, in actual usage, *i* is never perceived as becoming *ya*;† what *is* perceived, however, is that *ya* is used in the place where *i* had been used before. From this also it follows that *ya* is not a 'modification' of *i*.§

The denial of *ya* being the 'modification' of *i* does not set aside the grammatical law (that '*ik* followed by *ach* becomes *yaṇ*' —Pāṇini, 6-1-77). That is to say, even in accordance with the view that *letters do not undergo modifications*, it is not impossible to have the grammatical law (of letter-changes),—which contingency (of impossibility of the law) should compel us to admit the 'modification' of letters. As a matter of fact, one letter is not the product of another letter; e g *ya* is not produced from *i*, nor is *i* produced from *ya*; each letter emanatss from a distinct spot in the organ of speech and is the outcome of a distinct articulation; so that the correct view is that what happens (in the case of changes) is that *one is uttered in the place of another* [Hence what the grammatical law '*iko yaṇaci*' means is that when *i* and *a* are in juxtapasition, we should use *ya* in the place of *i*, and *not* that *i* is *modified* into *ya*]. And only if these two facts were otherwise, could the change in question be regarded either as a 'modification', or as a case of 'one being produced out of the other'. As a matter of fact, however, these two facts are not otherwise. Hence the conclusion is that there is no 'modification' of letters.

(E) Just as the 'modification' of a group of letters is not, possible, so is the 'modification' of a single letter also not

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* The effort necessary for the uttering of *ya* in '*yatatē*' is exactly the same as that necessary for its uttering in the expression '*dadhyatra*'; similarly the effort required for uttering *i* in '*idam*' is the same as that required for its uttering in '*iṣṭvā*'; which shows that the 'ya' in both cases is of the same kind, *i. e.* just as in '*yatatē*', the *ya* is not a 'modification', so in '*dadhyatra*' also it is not a modification, and so on.

† *E. g.*, we perceive the *gold* becoming the *bracelet*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ In the case of the well-known case of 'modification' of milk into curd, we can perceive the milk becoming curd; in the same manner we should perceive the *i* becoming *ya*, if the letter were a 'modification' of *i*.

that the *non-apprehension of obstruction* is not apprehended?' What is there to be proved in this? This fact is realised by everyone intuitively by himself; just as in all similar cases; that is to say, as a matter of fact, when a man fails to apprehend an *obstruction*, he intuitively realises that *he does not apprehend an obstruction*,—just as (in the reverse case) when he actually finds that a certain thing is hidden behind a wall, he intuitively realises: that he apprehends an obstruction; and just as he knows that there is *apprehension of obstruction*, so he should also know that there is *non-apprehension of obstruction* [but as he does not know that there is *non-apprehension of obstruction*, it follows that there is *no apprehension* of the non-apprehension]."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[To the above argument, the *Siddhāntin* replies]—If what you say is true, then that knocks the bottom completely out of the rejoinder urged by you *

The Opponent accepts, for the sake of argument, what the *Siddhāntin* has just said, and then proceeds with the following reasoning :—

Sūtra 20

"If (as you say), even though there is 'non-apprehension of obstruction,' yet this 'non-apprehension of obstruction' exists,—then, in that case, the mere non-apprehension of 'obstruction' cannot prove the non-existence of the 'obstruction'."

BHĀṢYA

"That is to say, just as (according to you) the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' exists, even though it is not apprehended,

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when the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' is *not-apprehended*, it follows that the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' does not exist, which means that the 'obstruction' *is apprehended*; which again proves that the 'Obstruction' exists; for when we have the conception of the 'apprehension of obstruction', this conception cannot be entirely baseless.

* The Opponent has declared that the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' can be realised intuitively.—If that be so, then that demolishes the whole Rejoinder put up by him, as this rejoinder based itself entirely upon the *non-apprehension* of the 'non-apprehension of obstruction'. The term '*uttaravākyam*' in the *Bhāṣya* stands for '*jātyuttara*', the Futile Rejoinder contained on Sū. 19.

exactly in the same manner, the 'obstruction' also exists, (as urged by me) even though it is not apprehended. Now if you admit that, 'even though not apprehended,—the *non-apprehension of obstruction* exists',—and having admitted this, still go on to argue (as you have done in Sū. 18) that 'as non-obstruction is apprehended, it does not exist',—then, under such a system of confession (and counter-confession), there can be no certainty as to any particular view being held by any person."*

Sūtra 21

[Reply to Sū. 19 and 20]—Inasmuch as the 'non-apprehension (of obstruction)' is of the nature of 'negation of apprehension (of obstruction)', the reason (put forward in Sū. 19) is not a true one.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, that which is *apprehended* (by means of a *positive* Instrument of Cognition) is accepted as *existing*, while that which is *not-apprehended* (i. e., apprehended only by means of a *negative* Instrument of Cognition) is regarded as *non-existent*. Such being the case, that which is of the nature of the 'negation of apprenhension' should be regarded (by all parties) as a *non-entity* Now [turning to the case in question] 'non-apprehension' is merely the 'negation of apprehension'; and being purely negative in its character (and as such having no positive form), it cannot be apprehended (by means of any *positive* Instrument of Cognition) On the other hand, inasmuch as *obstruction* is (according to you) an *existent* (positive) entity, there should be *apprehension* of it ;—as a matter of fact, however, it is *not-apprehended*; —hence the conclusion is that it is *non-existent* Under the circumstances,† it is not right to assert that 'the non-apprehen-

* Sutras 19 and 20 are meant to point out that the reasoning urged by the *Siddhantin* in Su. 18 is *non-conclusive*. —*Tātparya*.

For '*pratipattiniyamah*' in the *Bhāṣya*, the *Bhāṣyacandra* reads '*pratiniyamh*', and explains it is *matpakṣapratiṣedhaniyamaḥ* ; according to this the passage means—'*it does not necessarily follow that it is our view that is wrong, and not yours*.'

† तत्र is the right reading for तच.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the examples of the 'modification' of Substances, cited by the Opponent,—our answer is that—

Sūtra 44

It is not right; as 'modifications' always emanate from such original bases as are unequal [and they are always in conformity with these latter].

BHĀṢYA

Substances that constitute the origin (from which *modifications* emanate) are such as are not equal (to them); and yet the modifications are always in conformity with their original bases.* In the case in question, however, we find that the letter *ya* is not always in conformity with (does not necessarily emanate from) the letter *i*.† Hence the citing of the example of the modification of substances is not effective against us.

Sūtra 45

[*Objection*]—"**Just as there is diversity in the character of the modification of Substances, so is there diversity in the modification of Letters also**"

BHĀṢYA

"Just as in the case of Substances, the modification differs from its original, even though both equally are *Substance*,—so in the case of Letters also, though both equally are '*Letter*,' yet the modification differs from the original."§

* E. g. From the small banyan-seed emanates the large banyan-tree; and yet from that seed will emanate only the *banyan*, and never the cocoanut tree.

† This is what we mean by what we have urged in Sū. 40, as regards the modifications following their origins; and not that the largeness and smallness of the modification follows those of the origin. If we meant this latter, then alone could the argument urged against us by the Opponent in Sū. 42 be effective.

§ "In the case of Substances also it is not true that the modification always follows its original; because as a matter of fact, we often find that there is a diversity between the modification and its original; so that, even though the *ya* does not follow the *i*, in its length or shortness, yet it may be its modification."

"The sense of the argument is as follows When the modification is spoken of as *following* its original, is it meant that the *following* or conformity is absolute?—or that it is only partial? If the former, then no such conformity would be possible in the case of substances also. If the latter, then in the case of Letters also, there is conformity so far that both are 'Letter'."—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Sūtra 46

[*Answer*]—**That cannot be; as the real character of 'Modification' is not possible (in the case of Letters).**

BHĀṢYA

In the case of Substances in general we find the character of 'Modification' to be as follows:—When a Substance, gold or clay, undergoes *modification*, what happens is that the general character of that substance (Gold or Clay) remaining constant, one form or shape of it (*i.e.* the *Lump* of Gold or Clay) disappears and another (*i.e.* the Ring or the Jar) comes into existence; and this latter they call 'modification.' In the case of Letters on the other hand (such for instance as the letters *ya* and *i*), there is no such general 'Letter'-character which, remaining constant, would give up its '*i*'-form and take up the '*ya*'-form.* So that, just as in the case of the Ox and the Horse, even though both are 'Substance,' yet, by reason of the diversity in their character, one is not regarded as the 'modification' of another,—simply because they do not fulfil the conditions of the true 'modification', —exactly in the same manner, the letter *ya* cannot be regarded as the 'modification' of the letter *i*, for the simple reason that the conditions of the true 'modification' are not fulfilled in this case.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also Letters cannot have modifications:—

Sūtra 47

[As a matter of fact] when things have undergone 'modification', they cannot revert to their original form.

BHĀṢYA

Reversion (to the original form) is not possible [for real modifications; *e.g.*, Curd cannot again become Milk]. "How do you know that?" We know this because there is no proof for such reversion That is to say, there is nothing to prove—no reasoning available for the view—that "what happens (in the case

* For it is only the particular letter *i* that is held by the Opponent to be modified into another particular letter '*ya*'; while in the case of substances the *Gold* lump becomes modified into the *Gold*-ring; the *Gold-character* being *common*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Pupil,—or when the Pupil is *taught*, he only imitates what he finds in the Teacher, as is the case with the *teaching* of Dancing; and by reason of this doubt, *being taught* cannot be a valid basis for the inference of Sound being "imparted."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent says]—"Well, in that case the following shall be the reason (proving the persistence of Sound)"—

Sūtra 29

"Because there is repetition."

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, we have found that what is repeated persists; *e. g.*, when one sees a certain colour *five times*, repeatedly, it means that what is seen is the same Colour that persists during all that time;—we have similar repetitions in connection with Sound; *e. g.*, people speak of having read a certain Chapter *ten times* or *twenty times*; which must mean that there is repeated reading of what persists during all that time."

Sūtra 30

This cannot be right; for the term 'repetition' is used figuratively also, in cases where the things concerned are different (not the same).

BHĀṢYA

Even in cases where it is not the same thing persisting all the same, people speak of 'repetition'; *e. g*, in such assertions as —'please dance *twice*', 'please dance *thrice*', 'he danced *twice*', 'he danced *thrice*', 'he offers the Agnihotra *twice*', 'he eats *twice*' [in all which cases the acts, of *dancing*, *offering* and *eating* spoken of as 'repeated' are not the same, the first *dancing* being different from the second *dancing* and so forth.]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent's reasoning having been thus shown to be based upon false premises, he proceeds to object (by verbal casuistry) to the use of the term '*anya*', 'different'

Sūtra 31

"When a thing is 'different', it is 'different' from something that is 'different' (from it);—and what is 'different' from the 'different' must be 'non-different';—so that there is nothing that can be regarded as (purely) 'different.'"

BHĀṢYA

That which you regard as 'different' is *non-different* from itself; hence that cannot be regarded as 'different'; [and, as the Sūtra says, what is *different* from the 'different' is *non-different* also; hence that also cannot be regarded as 'different']; so that there is no possibility of anything being regarded as (purely) 'different'. Hence what has been urged (in Sū. 29)—that 'the term *repetition* is used figuratively also in cases where the things concerned are *different*'—is not right. [The very conception of 'difference' being impossible].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In answer to the Opponent who has objected to the use of a word (by the Siddhāntin, in Sū 29), the Siddhāntin urges an objection against the use of a word (by the Opponent himself, in Sū 30)—

Sūtra 32

If there is no conception of the 'different', there can be none of 'non-difference'; as the two conceptions are mutually relative.

BHĀṢYA

You are urging that the 'different' is 'non-different'; and having urged that you deny the conception of the 'different', you yet admit the conception of the 'non-different'; and you yourself actually use the term 'non-different' But as a matter of fact, 'non-different' is a compound word—where the word 'different' is compounded with the negative particle 'non', now if the second term of the compound is impossible (i e. without a real denotation), with what would the negative particle be compounded? In fact, of the two terms 'different' and 'non-different', one is possible only in relation to the other Thus, when you say that 'there is nothing that can be regarded as *different*' you say what if not quite right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent puts forward another argument in support of the eternality of Sound]—"Well, now, we must accept the Sound to be eternal,—

As a matter of fact, the *Ear-ring* and the *Necklet* are forms or properties that subsist in the *Gold*, and not in the *Universal* or generic character of 'Gold'.—Now, what is that Letter of which '*i*' and '*ya*' are properties? They cannot be properties of the genetic character of 'Letter', as this is a *Universal* (and not *something possessed of the Universal.*) [Even granting that these could be properties or forms of the said *Universal*] as a matter of fact, a property or form that is ceasing (or disappearing) cannot form the origin of another forthcoming property; hence in the case in question, the '*i*' that is ceasing (or disappearing) could not be the origin of the forthcoming '*ya*' [which means that '*ya*' cannot be the 'modification' of '*i*'].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also no 'modification' of Letters is possible :—

Sūtra 50

If Letters are eternal, they cannot undergo [or become] modifications ;—if they are non-eternal, they cannot persist (as a constant factor).

BHĀṢYA

According to the theory that Letters are *eternal*, the letters *i* and *ya* should both be eternal; so that neither could be regarded as a 'modification'; for both being eternal, what could be the 'modification' of what? [as all 'modifications' as such must be non-eternal]. If on the other hand, the view is held that Letters are non-eternal, then no persistence or continuity of Letters would be possible. "What do you mean by Letters having no *persistence*?" What is meant by this 'want of persistence' is that having come into existence, they cease to exist; so that (under this theory) it is only after the '*i*', having come into existence, had ceased to exist, that the '*ya*' would come into existence; and the '*i*' would come into existence again only after the '*ya*', having come into existence, had ceased to exist; and under the circumstances (the two never coexisting at any point of time), what would be the 'modification' of what? What we have said (in regard to the *i* and *ya* coming into existence and ceasing to exist) should be taken as referring to the

combining (of the two words '*dadhi-atra*') after having stated them in the disjoined form, and again disjoining them after having combined them.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent makes the following answer† (on the basis of the theory that letters are *eternal*) to the argument (propounded by the *Siddhāntin*.)—

Sūtra 51

" Inasmuchas most Eternal things are beyond the reach of the senses, and yet there are some that are of the opposite character—the denial of Letter-modification is not right."

BHĀṢYA

" It is not quite correct§ to say that *eternal words can never undergo modifications*. [Because] as a matter of fact, we find that, of *eternal* things, while some are *beyond the reach of the senses* (e.g., the *Atom* and *Ākāśa*), there are some that are quite perceptible by the senses (e.g., the *Universal* 'cow' and the like); in fact Letters themselves are perceptible (by the Senses) and yet they are eternal, *ex-hypothesi*); similarly, of eternal things though some (e.g., *Ākāśa*) may be incapable of undergoing modification, yet Letters may be quite capable of doing so "

But the *presence of contrary properties* cannot be accepted as a valid reason; because there is *incompatibility* (between *eternality* and *capability of modification*), [while there is no such *incompatibility* between *eternality* and *perceptibility* or *imperceptibility*]. That which is *eternal* is never born; nor does it ever cease to exist; that which is devoid of the character of *being born* and that of *ceasing to exist* is *eternal*; while that which is possessed of the character of *being born* and of *ceasing to exist* is *non-eternal*; and as a matter of fact, there can be no 'modification' without something being born and something ceasing to

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* When we say '*dadhi-atra*' the *i* comes into existence; when we say '*dadhyatra*', the *i* ceases to exist and the *ya* comes into existence; when we again disjoin the words and say '*dadhi-atra*', the *ya* ceases to exist and the *i* comes into existence.

† This answer is in the form of a Futile Rejoinder—says the *Tātparya*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*vipratiṣedhaḥ*' as equivalent to *apratiṣedhaḥ*.'

for instance, we find that in a case where a man, though close by, fails to hear a Sound emanating on the other side of a wall; while even though the man is at a distance, he does hear the Sound, if there is no obstacle intervening. Then again, when a bell is rung, what is heard is a continuous series of Sounds, as is clear from the fact that the several Sounds heard are of varying degrees of loudness or dullness; now if Sound were *eternal*, it would be necessary,—in order to account for this continuous series of audition—to postulate an equally permanent *Sound-manifester* abiding either in the Bell or in the Sound-series or in something else; [it would be necessary to find some such cause] as it has to be explained how, the Sound remaining the *same* (*ex-hypothesi*), there is a *diversity* in the hearing (as evinced by the varying degrees of intensity perceived). If, on the other hand, Sound is (regarded as) *non-eternal*, [the said phenomenon can be explained by the hypothesis that] there appears (at each stage of the Series) a fresh cause in the shape of a certain continuous stream of momentum, more or less forcible, subsisting in the Bell (as long as the Sound continues to be heard); which acts as an aid to the *contact* producing the initial Sound;—and by reason of this continued appearance of causes, there appears the Series of Sounds, and the greater or less force of the momentum gives rise to the greater or less intensity of the Sound, and this accounts for the aforesaid diversity of audition.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

[The Opponent says]—"But as a matter of fact, no such further cause (of Sound) as 'Momentum' is ever perceived; and as it is not perceived, it cannot exist." [The answer to this is

* *Sound* itself, if eternal, cannot have any diversity, either natural or accidental,—as will be explained later on. As for the *Audition* or *Hearing*, no diversity in this would be possible if the Sound were only *manifested* by some manifester abiding in either the Bell or some other thing. It may be held that what are heard as of varying degrees of intensity are so many distinct Sounds. But in that case, they should all be heard simultaneously; as all of them have been manifested by the same stroke of the Bell, and there is nothing else that could create a diversity. If however it be held that the Sounds are *produced*—not only manifested—by the stroke of the Bell,—which shows itself in a series of momentum,—the diversity in the hearing is easily explained; the Sounds themselves being diverse, having been brought by the diverse moments of varying degrees of intensity.—*Tātparya.*

Sūtra 36

Inasmuch the cessation of Sound follows from the touch of such a cause as the 'Hand' it is not right to say that there is non-perception (of the Momentum).*

BHĀṢYA

A motion of the Hand brings about its contact with the Bell (while it is resounding); and upon this contact no further sound-series is perceived; this is what explains the fact that no further sound (of that series) is heard. And the inference in this case is that the touch of the striking substance (Hand) puts a check upon some cause other than the original cause that gave rise to the initial Sound [as this cause is no longer present at the time that the resonance ceases],—and this other cause is the Momentum (set up in the manner described above);—this Momentum being checked, the Sound-series is no longer kept going;—and this series having stopped, there is no further hearing. This is analogous to the case of the Arrow, which is found to stop, when the Momentum, which is the cause of its continuous motion forward, is checked by the impact of the substance struck by the arrow;—and further, in the case of the metallic vessel, the presence of Momentum is clearly indicated, firstly by the cessation of the vibrations that could be felt by touch, and secondly by the touch of the hand itself.† For these reasons, it is not true that there is no cognition of Momentum as an idditional cause (in the continuance of Sound).

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* The translation of the Sūtra is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*, other commentators have suggested a different explanation,—'Inasmuch as we find the Sound' of the Bell to cease when the Bell is touched by the hand (while it is resounding), it is not right to say that 'we never perceive a cause for the destruction of Sound';—this being an answer to the general Pūrvapakṣa question that "as we can never find a cause that destroys Sound, we cannot regard Sound to be destructible."

† As the passage stands—and all Mss read it as such—the above is the better interpretation. But it gives better sense if we read पाणिसंश्लेषे; the construction being कास्यपत्रादिषु पाणिसंश्लेषे सति स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यस्य कंपसन्तानस्य उपरमः संस्कारसन्तानस्य लिङ्ग भवति; that is,—'In the case of metalic vessels it is found that when they are touched by the hand, there is a cessation of vibration set up in them, and this cessation of vibration clearly proves that there has been a continuous momentum at work.'

is not so.]—From all this it follows that the 'hearing of letters' is not a valid reason for holding that Letters undergo modifications.

Sūtra 53

(1) Inasmuch as, if the Letter is something modifiable, it cannot be eternal,—and (2) as the (so-called) 'modification' appears at a time other than that at which the modifying letter is present,—the objection (taken in Sū. 51) is not a right one.

BHĀṢYA

The objection taken (in Sū. 51) on the basis of the fact that 'eternal things are of opposite characters' is not right (1) Because as a matter of fact, no modifiable thing is ever found to be *eternal*; hence the objection based upon the example of the 'hearing of Letters' is not right. (2) In the case in question, what happens is that, having used the disjoined expression '*dadhi-atra*', the person waits for several moments, and then he pronounces the words in close juxtaposition and uses the form '*dadhyatra*'; so that the letter '*ya*' is used long after the letter '*i*' has disappeared (after the uttering of the disjoined words); and under the circumstances, of which letter could the '*ya*' be recognised as the 'modification'? For the effect (*the modification*, the *ya*) cannot appear at a time when the cause (the modifying original, the *i*) is absent. This is the retort to which the Opponent's argument is open.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

For the following reason also it is not possible to hold that Letters undergo modifications :—

Sūtra 54

Because in regard to letter-modifications, there is no constancy as to the original base.

In one case we find it laid down that '*ya*' is to take the place of '*i*'; and in another it is laid down that '*i*' is to take the

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the passage means as follows.—"The hearing of the modified letter does not bring about the birth of the modified letter after the destruction of that which is meant to have been its original; e.g., if the production or birth of *ya* were brought about by the hearing of the letter after the destruction of '*i*',—then alone could the proposition be held that 'when heard it produces the modified form *ya*'.

place of '*ya*' :—*e.g.*, in the word '*bidhyati*' [which is derived from the root *byadh*, the *ya* of which gives place to *i* in the word '*bidhyati*']. Now, if the letters concerned were 'modifications', there should have been some constancy as to which is the 'modification' and which the 'original'; as is found in the case of all well-known modifications [*e.g.* the Milk is always the 'original', while the Curd is always the 'modification'; it is never found to be the other way about. In the case in question however, it has been shown that there is no such constancy, as in one case '*i*' gives place to '*ya*', while in another '*ya*' gives place to '*i*'].

Sūtra 55

[*The Casuist objects*]—"**As there is constancy in non-constancy, it is not right to say that there is no constancy**".

BHĀṢYA

"It has been urged (by the *Siddhāntin*, in Sū. 51), that there is no constancy as to what is the 'original' and what the 'modification' Now this 'non-constancy' is *constant*; that is, it is constant in regard to each particular subject; and inasmuch as this is constant, there is 'constancy'; so that what has been urged in regard to there being no constancy as to what is original etc, is not true"

Sūtra 56

[*Answer*]—**(A) Inasmuch as 'constancy' and 'non-constancy' are contradictory terms,—and (B) as the 'constancy' (put forward by the Opponent) subsists in the 'non-constancy',—the objection urged is not effective.**

BHĀṢYA

(A) The term 'Constancy' signifies the affirmation of the thing (Constancy); while the term 'Non-constancy' signifies its negation; and as there is contradiction between *affirmation* and *negation*, the two terms ('constancy' and 'non-constancy') cannot be regarded as synonymous; so that *non-constancy* cannot become 'constancy' simply by being *constant* or fixed; though we do not deny that there is no 'constancy' in 'non-constancy'; what we mean is that what is signified by the term 'constancy' may subsist *in non-constancy*, and as such the term 'constancy' may be applied to *non-constancy* [but what we do deny is the possibility of both *Constancy* and *Non-constancy* belonging to the

phenomenon, that in the case of the Sounds of the same form, of the same kind and belonging to the same musical note, we perceive a diversity, due to the varying grades of intensity.* [Both these phenomena would be impossible, in accordance with the Sāṅkhya theory; because] the said phenomena could be possible only if there were *several* Sounds and they were *produced*; and not if there is a *single* Sound and that also is *manifested*. As a matter of fact, however, we know that the said 'division and subdivision' do exist. So that from the existence of these 'divisions and sub-divisions' we conclude that Sound cannot be *manifested* as subsisting, in each substance, along with Colour and other qualities.

SECTION (3)

The Modifications of Sound

Sūtras 40–54

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Sound is of two kinds—Letter-sounds and Sound in general (Noise).† Now in regard to Letter-sounds—

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains 'division' as 'division into Letters' and 'sub-division' as 'Sound and Resonance.'

† 'Letter-sound'—in the shape of *a*, *k* &c.; and 'noise'—the sound produced by conch-blowing, says *Praśastapāda*.

Sound in general has been dealt with up to Sū. 38. The author now takes up the particular kind of Sound, in the shape of Letter-sounds, which form the subject-matter of the present enquiry; as is clear from the fact that the Sound-modifications dealt with are only those pertaining to Letter-sounds.—*Tātparya*.

The connection of the present section with what has gone before is thus explained by the *Tātparya* —The *Sānkhya* view, that 'Sound is manifested as co-existing with Colour and other qualities', having been refuted,—the same *Sāṅkhya* turns round with the view that, "though Sound may not be eternal, in the sense of continuing to exist in the same unchanged form, yet it could be eternal in the sense that it continues to exist and undergo modifications; just in the same manner as Primordial Matter is regarded as *eternal*, just as gold remains gold even in its endless modifications; and in support of this view we may cite the grammatical laws of *sandhi*, by which Letter-sounds undergo certain modifications." With a view to demolish this view, the Author proceeds to show that, in the case of Letter-sounds, there is no such modification, or transmutation, as would justify us in regarding them as having a continuity of existence.

Sūtra 40

There arises a doubt, because there is mention of both modification', and 'substitution'.

BHĀṢYA

In connection with the expression '*dadhyatra*' (as resulting from the combination of '*dadhi*' and '*atra*') some* people hold that the '*i*' (in '*dadhi*') renounces its own form and takes the from of '*ya*',—the sense of this view being that [what the grammatical law lays down is that, when *i* is followed by *a*] there is a *modification* (of *i* into *ya*).—Others†, however, hold that what happens is that, the '*i*' having been used (in the expression '*dadhi atra*'), it gives up its place, and in the place thus vacated the letter '*ya*' comes to be used (in the expression '*dadhi-atra*'),—the sense of this latter view being that [what the grammatical law means is that] when *i* and *a* are in juxtaposition, we use *ya*, and not *i*, so that there is *substitution* (of *ya* in place of *i*). Both these opinions have been held (in connection with the grammatical law embodied in Pāṇini's sutras, '*Iko yaṇaci*' 6.1.77). So that one does not know what the truth is [unless he carries on a full enquiry into the matter].

The true view is that there is *substitution*.

(A) As regards the theory of 'modification',—as a matter of fact, we do not perceive any continuity or persistence; so that there can be no inference of 'modification'. If there were some sort of persistence (of the *i*-sound, even in the form '*dadhyatra*'), it would show that something of it (some part of its character) had ceased and something else come in; and this might justify the inference that there is 'modification';—as a matter of fact, however, no such persistence is ever perceived;—hence the conclusion is that there is no 'modification'.§—(B) *Secondly*, we

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* attributes this view to the followers of Kalāpa and quotes a *Kālāpa-Sūtra*.

† *The followers of Pāṇini*—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ In the well-known cases of 'modification'—e.g. when a lump of gold is transmuted into a pair of ear-rings or bracelets—they are regarded as 'modification', because whatever the particular shape, through everyone of them the character of 'Gold' *persists*. But in 'ya' (in '*dadhyatra*') we do not find any such *persistence* of the 'i'-sound; so that this cannot be a case of 'modification'.—*Tātparya*.

find that the two letters (*i* and *ya*) being amenable to different instrumental forces, the utterance of one is possible without the utterance of the other; that is to say, as a matter of fact, the lettet '*i*' is amenable to the instrumentality of what is called the 'open articulation' (applicable to vowels), while the letter '*ya*' is amenable to the instrumentality of the 'slightly touched articulation' (applicable to semi-vowels); so that these two letters are pronouncible by two different kinds of 'effort', called 'instrumentality'; and this is what makes it possible for one of them being uttered while the other is not uttered [and all this shows that *ya* is only the *substitute*, and not the *modification*, of *i*]*.—(C) *Thirdly*, the case in question (that of *ya* in *dadhyatra*) is exactly analogous to that where there is no 'modification'; that is to say, there are cases where *i* and *ya* are not 'modifications' at all (even according to you); e.g., in such expressions as (*a*) '*yatatē*', '*yacchati*', and '*prāyamsta*' (where there can be no chance of *ya* being a 'modification' at all), and, '*ikārah*', '*idam*' (where *i* remains itself, without undergoing any change at all);—and there are well-marked cases where the two do appear like 'modifications'; e g '*istvā*' (which is derived from the root '*yaj*', and in which therefore, the *i* appears in the place of the *ya* in the root) and '*dadhyāhara*' which is the altered form resulting from the combination of '*dadhi*' and '*āhara*', (of which the *i* is changed into *ya*)—Now as a matter of fact, in both these cases, (of the utterance of *ya* or *i*, appearing by itself or as 'modification'), the effort of the speaker is precisely the same, and precisely the

The *Pariśuddhi* remarks—The term '*vikāra*' in the present context does not stand for 'transmutation,' the total destruction of one thing and the appearance in its place of another thing; as no such '*vikāra*' is admitted by the *Sānkhya*; it stands for that *change* in which the basic element remaining the same, its characteristics appear and disappear. And as there is no such basic element of which '*i*' could be a characteristic detail,—no 'modification' can be possible in this case.

* If *ya* were the modification of *i*, the forces necessary for its utterance would be the same as those necessary for the utterance of *i*; as a matter of fact, however, the force that is put into operation, for the uttering of *ya*, is that in the form of the effort called 'slightly touched articulation'; while in the case of *i*, the effort is that called 'open articulation'. Thus it is that for the uttering of *ya* it is not necessary to have a previous utterance of *i*. And this would not be possible if *ya* were a *modification* of *i*.

same also is the hearing of the hearer. All this shows that (in '*dadhyatra*') we have *substitution* (of *ya*, and not *modification* of *i*) *—(D) *Fourthly*, there is no perception of it in actual usage. That is to say, in actual usage, *i* is never perceived as becoming *ya*;† what *is* perceived, however, is that *ya* is used in the place where *i* had been used before. From this also it follows that *ya* is not a 'modification' of *i* §

The denial of *ya* being the 'modification' of *i* does not set aside the grammatical law (that '*ik* followed by *ach* becomes *yaṇ*' —Pāṇini, 6-1-77). That is to say, even in accordance with the view that *letters do not undergo modifications*, it is not impossible to have the grammatical law (of letter-changes),—which contingency (of impossibility of the law) should compel us to admit the 'modification' of letters. As a matter of fact, one letter is not the product of another letter; e g. *ya* is not produced from *i*, nor is *i* produced from *ya*; each letter emanatss from a distinct spot in the organ of speech and is the outcome of a distinct articulation; so that the correct view is that what happens (in the case of changes) is that *one is uttered in the place of another* [Hence what the grammatical law '*iko yanaci*' means is that when *i* and *a* are in juxtapasition, we should use *ya* in the place of *i*, and *not* that *i* is *modified* into *ya*]. And only if these two facts were otherwise, could the change in question be regarded either as a 'modification', or as a case of 'one being produced out of the other'. As a matter of fact, however, these two facts are not otherwise Hence the conclusion is that there is no 'modification' of letters.

(E) Just as the 'modification' of a group of letters is not, possible, so is the 'modification' of a single letter also not

* The effort necessary for the uttering of *ya* in '*yatatē*' is exactly the same as that necessary for its uttering in the expression '*dadhyatra*'; similarly the effort required for uttering *i* in '*idam*' is the same as that required for its uttering in '*iṣtvā*'; which shows that the 'ya' in both cases is of the same kind, *i. e* just as in '*yatatē*', the *ya* is not a 'modification', so in '*dadhyatra*' also it is not a modification, and so on.

† *E. g.*, we perceive the *gold* becoming the *bracelet*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ In the case of the well-known case of 'modification' of milk into curd, we can perceive the milk becoming curd; in the same manner we should perceive the *i* becoming *ya*, if the letter were a 'modification' of *i*.

possible. In accordance with the rules—'the root *as* becomes '*bhū*,' 'the root *brū* becomes *vac*'—where *as* is changed into *bhū* and *brū* into *vac*,—this change of one set of letters in the root into another set of letters is not in any case regarded either as a 'modification', or as a case of one being produced out of the other; it is only regarded as a case of one set of letters being used *in the place* of another set of letters;—exactly similar should be the case when one *letter* (*i*) is changed into another (*ya*).*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also letters cannot be regarded as undergoing 'modifications'—

Sūtra 41

Because the enlargement of the original cause should always involve a corresponding enlargement in the modification.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we always find that modifications always follow their original base.† In the case in question however we do not find the *ya* following the shortness or length of the *i* [as whether the preceding *i* is long or short, the *ya* is always short];—and it is only if there were such following by the *ya*, that we could infer it to be a 'modification'.

Sūtra 42

[Objection]—"The reason just urged is not a valid one; because, as a matter of fact, Modifications are found to be smaller than, equal to and larger than their original base."

BHĀṢYA

"In the case of Substances, we find that some modifications are smaller than their original base, some are equal to it, while

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* The *Pariśuddhi* formulates this reasoning as follows—'The case of the change of *i* into *ya* cannot be one of modification,—because the two are distinct letters,—just like *bhū* appearing in place of *as*'.

† For instance, the cloth made of long yarns is long, and that made of shorter yarns is shorter—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

some are larger. In the same manner *ya*, as the *modification* (of the long *i*), may be *smaller* (than its basic cause)."*

[*The Vārtika does not notice this Sūtra 42.*]

Sūtra 43

[Answer]—Inasmuch as there is (in the Opponent's reasoning) neither of the two kinds of Probans, the mere example cannot prove anything.

(*a*) In the argument urged by the Opponent (in Sū. 41), we do not find any *Probans* at all,—neither one 'similar' to the example, nor one 'dissimilar' to it [and these are the only two kinds of Probans, as explained under Sū. 1-1-34 and 35];—(*b*) secondly (though an example has been cited) a mere example, unless taken along with a Probans, cannot prove anything;—(*c*) lastly, as counter-instances are available (in support of the contrary conclusion), there would be an uncertainity in regard to the conclusion (sought to be proved); [this counter-instance being as follows :—] it sometimes happens that for the carrying of a load, a horse is yoked in the place of an ox,—and just as in this case the Horse is not regarded as a 'modification' of the Ox, so, when *ya* is used in place of *i*, it cannot be regarded as a 'modification' of *i*. And certainly there is no such rule as that a conclusion can be proved only by an *example*, and not by a *counter-example*.†

* "From the *small* seed of the banyan emanates the *large* banyan tree ; while out of the large cocoanut, which is *larger* than the banyan-seed, comes out the cocoanut tree, which is *smaller* than the banyan tree ; and from cocoanuts of equal size, we get trees of equal size."—*Tātparya*.

It would be more in keeping with the text if we had the following examples—(1) From the small seeds we get the tree, which is the modification of the seed, and is larger than it ; (2) from a large volume of steam we get a small quantity of water, where the water, the modification of the steam, is smaller in volume than the steam ; and (3) when milk turns into curd, the modification, curd, is equal in volume to the milk.

The *Bhāṣyacandra* gives the following examples :—(1) From the *elongated* gold-pieces, we get the *round* ear-ring ; (2) from smooth yarns we get smooth cloth ; (3) from the small ball of cotton we get the long yarns. Al this shows that the modification need not always correspond to its original.

† This Sūtra answers Sū. 41, taking it as an argument advanced to prove the conclusion that *ya* is a modification of *i*. But Sū. 41 may be taken, not as an argument to prove a conclusion, but only as pointing out a defect, a fallacy, in the premiss of the Siddhāntin's reasoning. The answer to this comes in Sū. 44.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the examples of the 'modification' of Substances, cited by the Opponent,—our answer is that—

Sūtra 44

It is not right; as 'modifications' always emanate from such original bases as are unequal [and they are always in conformity with these latter].

BHĀSYA

Substances that constitute the origin (from which *modifications* emanate) are such as are not equal (to them); and yet the modifications are always in conformity with their original bases.* In the case in question, however, we find that the letter *ya* is not always in conformity with (does not necessarily emanate from) the letter *i*.† Hence the citing of the example of the modification of substances is not effective against us.

Sūtra 45

[*Objection*]—"**Just as there is diversity in the character of the modification of Substances, so is there diversity in the modification of Letters also.**"

BHĀSYA

"Just as in the case of Substances, the modification differs from its original, even though both equally are *Substance*,—so in the case of Letters also, though both equally are '*Letter*,' yet the modification differs from the original"§

* E. g. From the small banyan-seed emanates the large banyan-tree, and yet from that seed will emanate only the *banyan*, and never the cocoa-nut tree.

† This is what we mean by what we have urged in Sū. 40, as regards the modifications following their origins; and not that the largeness and smallness of the modification follows those of the origin. If we meant this latter, then alone could the argument urged against us by the Opponent in Sū. 42 be effective.

§ "In the case of Substances also it is not true that the modification always follows its original; because as a matter of fact, we often find that there is a diversity between the modification and its original; so that, even though the *ya* does not follow the *i*, in its length or shortness, yet it may be its modification."

"The sense of the argument is as follows When the modification is spoken of as *following* its original, is it meant that the *following* or conformity is absolute?—or that it is only partial? If the former, then no such conformity would be possible in the case of substances also. If the latter, then in the case of Letters also, there is conformity so far that both are 'Letter'."—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Sūtra 46

[*Answer*]—That cannot be; as the real character of 'Modification' is not possible (in the case of Letters).

BHĀṢYA

In the case of Substances in general we find the character of 'Modification' to be as follows:—When a Substance, gold or clay, undergoes *modification*, what happens is that the general character of that substance (Gold or Clay) remaining constant, one form or shape of it (*i.e.* the *Lump* of Gold or Clay) disappears and another (*i.e* the Ring or the Jar) comes into existence; and this latter they call 'modification' In the case of Letters on the other hand (such for instance as the letters *ya* and *i*), there is no such general 'Letter'-character which, remaining constant, would give up its '*i*'-form and take up the '*ya*'-form.* So that, just as in the case of the Ox and the Horse, even though both are 'Substance,' yet, by reason of the diversity in their character, one is not regarded as the 'modification' of another,—simply because they do not fulfil the conditions of the true 'modification', —exactly in the same manner, the letter *ya* cannot be regarded as the 'modification' of the letter *i*, for the simple reason that the conditions of the true 'modification' are not fulfilled in this case

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

For the following reason also Letters cannot have modifications —

Sūtra 47

[As a matter of fact] when things have undergone 'modification', they cannot revert to their original form.

BHĀṢYA

Reversion (to the original form) is not possible [for real modifications; *e.g*, Curd cannot again become Milk] "How do you know that?" We know this because there is no proof for such reversion That is to say, there is nothing to prove—no reasoning available for the view—that "what happens (in the case

* For it is only the particular letter *i* that is held by the Opponent to be modified into another particular letter '*ya*', while in the case of substances the *Gold* lump becomes modified into the *Gold*-ring, the *Gold-character* being *common.—Bhāṣyacandra*.

of the form '*dadhyatra*') is that the *i* has become *modified* into *ya*, and again becomes *i* (when the expression is again stated in its uncombined form, '*daḍhi-atra*'); and *not* that in the former case *ya* had been used in the place of *i*, and in the latter case it has ceased to be so used."*

Sūtra 48

[*Objection*]—"**Inasmuch as Gold and other things do revert to their original form, the reason urged is not a true reason at all.**"

BHĀṢYA

Says the Opponent—"It has been asserted that there is no reasoning available for our view:—But this is not true: The following is the reasoning that proves it:—In the case of Gold we find that, renouncing the form of the *Ear-ring*, it takes the form of the *Necklet*, and again renouncing the form of the latter it takes that of the former; exactly in the same manner, *i* having taken the form of *ya*, again takes the form of *i*."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—The reasoning put forward is not valid, as it is based upon premises that are not true; for instance, in the case of Curd it is found that the *Milk*, having once become Curd, never again reverts to the form of the *Milk*. "What does that prove?" It proves that in the case of Letters also there is no reversion [and the premiss that 'all modifications revert to their original position', as urged in Sū. 46, is found not true; there being no such reversions in the case of Curd].†

If the meaning of the Opponent's assertion is that the "reversion of '*i*' is analogous to the reversion of Gold [so that

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* The *Bhāṣyacandra* cites an example where there is repeated 'reversion' between *i* and *ya*. From the root '*dhyai*', (to think) we get the word '*dhīḥ*' (intelligence); this latter word being compounded with '*āpti*', we get the form '*dhy-āpti*' (*ya* again); and this compound is explained as '*dhī-āptiḥ*' (*i* again).

† This is the answer to Sū. 48; if the reasoning therein urged is meant to prove that "there is reversion in the case of Letters, because there is such in the case of all modifications." If on the other hand, the Sūtra is to be taken only as putting forward an objection to the arguments of the *Siddhāntin*, then the answer is as given in Sūtra 49.

what is stated in Sū. 45 is not true] ",—then our answer is that, so far as the analogy of the case of Gold is concerned,—

Sūtra 49

There is no analogy at all; as in the case of the 'modifications' of Gold, the 'Gold'-character is never absent.*

In the case of Gold what happens in that the Gold itself remaining the constant factor, it becomes different objects by the renouncing of one character (form) and the taking of another. In the case of '*i*' on the other hand, we do not perceive any such common factor, in the shape of 'Letters in general', which could beeome a different object by renouncing the '*i*'-form and taking the '*ya*'-form. Hence the example of Gold is not applicable to the case in question.

[*Objection*]—" But inasmuchas the General Character of 'Letter' is never absent [in either '*i*' or '*ya*'], it is not right to deny the 'modification of Letters'."†

[Says the Opponent]—" In the case of Letter-modifications also, the generic character of 'Letter' is never absent: exactly in the same manner as the character of 'Gold' is present in all modifications of Gold. [Hence the two cases are exactly analogous]."

[*Answer*]- But a character subsists in that which is endowed with the *Universal*, and not in the *Universal* itself.§

* This appears as a *Sūtra* in the *Nāyāsūcimbandha*, also in the *Vārtika Bhāṣyacandra* and in the two Sūtra Mss. The text of the Sūtra is न तद्विकाराणा सुवर्णभावाद्यतिरेकात्. The Puri Sūtra Ms., however, reads it as न तद्विकाराणा सुवर्णभावाद्यतिरेकात्; which reading is not quite satisfactory; though it may be construed to mean 'the analogy is not true, *because there is a difference* व्यतिरेकात्, inasmuchas in the case of Gold, the gold-character remains constant, throughout.' The *Bhāṣyacandra* adopts this reading.

The न, according to some, forms part, not of the *Sūtra*, but of the *Bhāṣya*.

† This also appears as a *Sūtra*, in the *Vārtika* and the Sūtra Mss.; but not in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, nor in the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ This appears as *Sūtra* in the Sūtra Mss., and also in the *Vārtika*; but not in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, nor in the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

As a matter of fact, the *Ear-ring* and the *Necklet* are forms or properties that subsist in the *Gold*, and not in the *Universal* or generic character of 'Gold'.—Now, what is that Letter of which '*i*' and '*ya*' are properties? They cannot be properties of the genetic character of 'Letter', as this is a *Universal* (and not *something possessed of the Universal*) [Even granting that these could be properties or forms of the said *Universal*] as a matter of fact, a property or form that is ceasing (or disappearing) cannot form the origin of another forthcoming property; hence in the case in question, the '*i*' that is ceasing (or disappearing) could not be the origin of the forthcoming '*ya*' [which means that '*ya*' cannot be the 'modification' of '*i*'].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

For the following reason also no 'modification' of Letters is possible:—

Sūtra 50

If Letters are eternal, they cannot undergo [or become] modifications,—if they are non-eternal, they cannot persist (as a constant factor).

BHĀSYA

According to the theory that Letters are *eternal*, the letters *i* and *ya* should both be eternal; so that neither could be regarded as a 'modification'; for both being eternal, what could be the 'modification' of what? [as all 'modifications' as such must be non-eternal]. If on the other hand, the view is held that Letters are non-eternal, then no persistence or continuity of Letters would be possible "What do you mean by Letters having no *persistence*?" What is meant by this 'want of persistence' is that having come into existence, they cease to exist; so that (under this theory) it is only after the '*i*', having come into existence, had ceased to exist, that the '*ya*' would come into existence; and the '*i*' would come into existence again only after the '*ya*', having come into existence, had ceased to exist; and under the circumstances (the two never coexisting at any point of time), what would be the 'modification' of what? What we have said (in regard to the *i* and *ya* coming into existence and ceasing to exist) should be taken as referring to the

combining (of the two words '*dadhi-atra*') after having stated them in the disjoined form, and again disjoining them after having combined them.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent makes the following answer† (on the basis of the theory that letters are *eternal*) to the argument (propounded by the *Siddhāntin*.)—

Sūtra 51

"Inasmuchas most Eternal things are beyond the reach of the senses, and yet there are some that are of the opposite character—the denial of Letter-modification is not right."

BHĀṢYA

"It is not quite correct§ to say that *eternal words can never undergo modifications*. [Because] as a matter of fact, we find that, of *eternal* things, while some are *beyond the reach of the senses* (e g , the *Atom* and *Ākāśa*), there are some that are quite perceptible by the senses (e g., the *Universal* 'cow' and the like); in fact Letters themselves are perceptible (by the Senses) and yet they are eternal, *ex-hypothesi*); similarly, of eternal things though some (e g., *Ākāśa*) may be incapable of undergoing modification, yet Letters may be quite capable of doing so"

But the *presence of contrary properties* cannot be accepted as a valid reason, because there is *incompatibility* (between *eternality* and *capability of modification*), [while there is no such *incompatibility* between *eternality* and *perceptibility* or *imperceptibility*] That which is *eternal* is never born; nor does it ever cease to exist; that which is devoid of the character of *being born* and that of *ceasing to exist* is *eternal*; while that which is possessed of the character of *being born* and of *ceasing to exist* is *non-eternal*; and as a matter of fact, there can be no 'modification' without something being born and something ceasing to

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* When we say '*dadhi-atra*' the *i* comes into existence; when we say '*dadhyatra*', the *i* ceases to exist and the *ya* comes into existence, when we again disjoin the words and say '*dadhi-atra*', the *ya* ceases to exist and the *i* comes into existence.

† This answer is in the form of a Futile Rejoinder—says the *Tātparya*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*vipratiṣedhaḥ*' as equivalent to *apratiṣedhaḥ*.'

exist. So that if Letters undergo 'modification', they cannot be *eternal*; and if they are *eternal*, they cannot undergo 'modification'. Thus the 'presence of opposite characters' (urged as a reason by the Opponent) is a *fallacious* Probans, being tainted with the fallacy of 'Contradiction.'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent now answers the Siddhānta argument from the standpoint that Letters are *not-eternal*—

Sūtra 52

"Even though non-persistent, Letters may undergo modifications, in the same way as they are apprehended (perceived)."

BHĀṢYA

"Even though letters are non-persistent (transient), yet there is hearing of them (they are heard); and in the same manner their modification also would be possible (even though they are non-persistent.)"*

Our answer is as follows:—The 'hearing of letters' (which has been put forward by the Opponent as a reason for proving the modification of Letters) has, as a matter of fact, no connection at all (with the desired conclusion), and as such it is entirely inefficient. That is to say, the 'hearing of Letters,'—which, on being admitted, would (according to the Opponent) lead to the inference of the fact that 'letters undergo modifications'—can, as a matter of fact, only serve the purpose of bringing about the cognition of what is expressed by those letters, and it has absolutely no connection with the 'modification of letters'; and as such it is entirely inefficient (in the proving of the desired conclusion).† So that the reasoning of the Opponent is exactly

* 'Just as Letters, even though non-persistent, become related to the Auditory Organ and thereby bring about their own cognition,—in the same manner would they bring about modifications also.'—*Tātparya*.

† The best reading of this passage appears to be—अर्थप्रतिपादिका वर्णोपलब्धिः न विकारेण सम्बद्धा असमर्था या गृह्यमाणा वर्णविकारमर्थमनुमापयेत्- The construction being—या वर्णोपलब्धिःवर्णविकारमर्थमनुमापयेत् (सा) अर्थ-प्रतिपादिका विकारेण न-सम्बद्धा (सती) असमर्था. The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads thus, with the exception that for या, it reads चा.

similar (in absurdity) to the following reasoning—'Because the Earth is endowed with the quality of Odour, it must also be endowed with such qualities as Sound, Pleasure, and the like'.—Then again, the 'hearing of letters' does not preclude the possibility of the case being one of the use of one Letter after the cessation of another Letter; we hold that in the case in question what happens is that the letter '*i*' having ceased, the letter '*ya*' is used in its place; and if the possibility of such use were precluded by the fact of *letters being heard*, then there might be some justification for the view that the letter '*i*' itself becomes transformed (modified) into '*ya*'. *—[As a matter of fact however, it

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As for the mere denoting of meanings by letters, this can be done by them, even when they can subsist just for the moment, just long enough for them to be comprehended. In the case in question, however, the letters concerned should have to subsist much longer than that; they should have to subsist through the entire process—of uttering the disjoined words '*dadhi-atra*', the pronouncing of the combined form '*dadhyatra*', and the subsequent analysing into the disjoined form—before any idea could arise as to there being a 'modification.' But as such continuous existence is not possible, under the theory that Letters are non-eternal, the mere 'hearing of letters' can have no connection with the fact of 'modification'.—*Tātparya*.

The translation is in accordance with this interpretation of the *Tātparya*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* construes the passage differently. By this अर्थप्रतिपादिका वर्णोपलब्धिः (न भवति) is one sentence—'The hearing of letters does not serve to prove the desired conclusion (that the original letter undergoes modifications);'—विकारेण सम्बद्धा supplies the reason—'because the said hearing is connected with the *modified* letter (and not with the *modyfying* original)'; असमर्था—'hence it is inefficient; incapable of proving your proposition';—thus being अगृह्यमाणा—'not perceived (along with the modifying original)',—'वर्णविकारं' वर्णविकारत्व, 'अर्थं अनुमापयेत्' सम्भावयेत्—'might lend probability to the modifiability of letters?

This explanation, however, is more far-fetched than the one by the *Tātparya*.

* It might be argued, in favour of the Opponent's view that even though the 'hearing of letters' has no direct connection with the subject of Letter-modifications, yet, inasmuch the fact of hearing precludes the possibility of all other explanations, it may be accepted as justifying the conclusion that Letters undergo modifications. The Author has anticipated this view, and has pointed out that the 'hearing' *does not* preclude the possibility of the explanation supplied by the *Siddhāntin*.

Of this passage also, the *Bhāṣyacandra* supplies a different explanation, reading निर्वार्तिका for निवार्तिका and निर्वर्तते for निवर्तते. According to this,

is not so.]—From all this it follows that the 'hearing of letters' is not a valid reason for holding that Letters undergo modifications.

Sūtra 53

(1) Inasmuch as, if the Letter is something modifiable, it cannot be eternal,—and (2) as the (so-called) 'modification' appears at a time other than that at which the modifying letter is present,—the objection (taken in Sū. 51) is not a right one

BHĀṢYA

The objection taken (in Sū. 51) on the basis of the fact that 'eternal things are of opposite characters' is not right (1) Because as a matter of fact, no modifiable thing is ever found to be *eternal*, hence the objection based upon the example of the 'hearing of Letters' is not right. (2) In the case in question, what happens is that, having used the disjoined expression '*dadhi-atra*', the person waits for several moments, and then he pronounces the words in close juxtaposition and uses the form '*dadhyatra*'; so that the letter '*ya*' is used long after the letter '*i*' has disappeared (after the uttering of the disjoined words); and under the circumstances, of which letter could the '*ya*' be recognised as the 'modification'? For the effect (*the modification, the ya*) cannot appear at a time when the cause (the modifying original, the *i*) is absent. This is the retort to which the Opponent's argument is open.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

For the following reason also it is not possible to hold that Letters undergo modifications —

Sūtra 54

Because in regard to letter-modifications, there is no constancy as to the original base.

In one case we find it laid down that '*ya*' is to take the place of '*i*', and in another it is laid down that '*i*' is to take the

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the passage means as follows —"The hearing of the modified letter does not bring about the birth of the modified letter after the destruction of that which is meant to have been its original; e.g., if the production or birth of *ya* were brought about by the hearing of the letter after the destruction of '*i*',—then alone could the proposition be held that 'when heard it produces the modified form *ya*'.

place of '*ya*'—*e.g.*, in the word '*bidhyati*' [which is derived from the root *byadh*, the *ya* of which gives place to *i* in the word '*bidhyati*']. Now, if the letters concerned were 'modifications', there should have been some constancy as to which is the 'modification' and which the 'original'; as is found in the case of all well-known modifications [*e.g.* the Milk is always the 'original', while the Curd is always the 'modification'; it is never found to be the other way about. In the case in question however, it has been shown that there is no such constancy; as in one case '*i*' gives place to '*ya*', while in another '*ya*' gives place to '*i*'].

Sūtra 55

[*The Casuist objects*]—"**As there is constancy in non-constancy, it is not right to say that there is no constancy**".

BHĀṢYA

"It has been urged (by the *Siddhāntin*, in Sū. 51) that there is no constancy as to what is the 'original' and what the 'modification'. Now this 'non-constancy' is *constant*; that is, it is constant in regard to each particular subject; and inasmuch as this is constant, there is 'constancy'; so that what has been urged in regard to there being no constancy as to what is original etc, is not true"

Sūtra 56

[*Answer*]—**(A) Inasmuch as 'constancy' and 'non-constancy' are contradictory terms,—and (B) as the 'constancy' (put forward by the Opponent) subsists in the 'non-constancy',—the objection urged is not effective.**

BHĀṢYA

(A) The term 'Constancy' signifies the affirmation of the thing (Constancy), while the term 'Non-constancy' signifies its negation, and as there is contradiction between *affirmation* and *negation*, the two terms ('constancy' and 'non-constancy') cannot be regarded as synonymous, so that *non-constancy* cannot become 'constancy' simply by being *constant* or fixed; though we do not deny that there is no 'constancy' in 'non-constancy'; what we mean is that what is signified by the term 'constancy' may subsist *in non-constancy*, and as such the term 'constancy' may be applied to *non-constancy* [but what we do deny is the possibility of both *Constancy* and *Non-constancy* belonging to the

same thing]. Thus the mere presence of *Constancy* in *Non-constancy* does not constitute an effective objection against us.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In fact, what appears (and is regarded) as the 'modification of Letters' is not that one Letter becomes transformed into another, or that one Letter (as product) is produced out of the other (as the constituent cause); what it really is, is shown in the following *Sūtra*—

Sūtras 57

What appears as the 'modification of Letters' involves a change in (one or the other of) the following forms—(*a*) the coming in of fresh properties, (*b*) suppression, (*c*) diminution, (*d*) increase, (*e*) curtailment and (*f*) coalescence.—

BHĀṢYA

What is actually meant by 'the modification of Letters' is that, there is substitution of another cognate letter,—*i.e.*, one cognate letter is used on the cessation of the use of another; and this substitution is in diverse forms;—(*a*) in some cases there is *coming in of fresh properties*; *e.g.*, when the low accent takes the place of the high-pitched accent;—(*b*) in some there is *suppression*; *e.g.*, when one form being dropped, another comes in in its place;—(*c*) in certain cases there is *diminution*; *e.g.*, when the short vowel takes the place of the long one;—(*d*) in others there is *increase*; *e.g.*, when the long vowel takes the place of the short one, or the prolated vowel takes the place of the long and short one;—(*e*) in certain cases there is *curtailment*; *i. e.*, '*staḥ*' (a single syllable) takes the place of '*asti*' (two syllables);—(*f*) in other cases there is *coalescence*; *e.g.*, when there is an augment, either in the base or in the affix. These are the changes that are spoken of as 'modifications'; and these are only *substitutions*. If this is what is meant by 'modification,' then we admit the statement that 'Letters undergo modifications.'

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* What is impossible is the co-subsistence of both, Constancy and Non-constancy, in any one thing, and not the subsistence of Constancy *in* Non-constancy. And this latter fact does not shake our position; as the mere fact of there being Constancy in Non-constancy does not imply that there is constancy as regards the *Original* and *Modification*. It is admitted that there is non-constancy in regard to this; and if the Constancy of this Non-constancy were to imply Constancy as regards the Original and Modification, then it would mean that in regard to this latter there are both Constancy and Non-constancy, which however is impossible.

SECTION (4)

Examination of the nature of Words and their Potencies.

Sūtra 58

These same (Letters), when ending in an affix, are called 'Word'.

BHĀṢYA

Letters, transformed according to law and reason (*i.e.*, by *substitution*, and not by *modification*), when ending in an affix, come to be called 'Word'. Affixes are of two kinds—*Noun-affixes* and *Verb-affixes*, '*brāhmaṇaḥ*' is an example (of a *Word* ending in a noun-affix) and '*pacati*' is an example (of a *Word* ending in a verb-affix)

"According to this definition Prepositions and Indeclinables could not be called 'Word'. Hence it is necessary to propound some other definition of Word'."

But it is with a view to make the term 'Word' (according to the said definition) applicable to Prepositions and Indeclinables that it has been ruled that Indeclinables drop their affixes—[by Pāṇini's Sūtra 2-4-82],—and the reason for this convention lies in the fact that it is only *Words* that can signify (bring about the cognition of) anything [and it is admitted that Prepositions and Indeclinables do signify things].*

* This Sūtra is aimed against the '*Sphota*' theory of the Grammarians. This theory is thus outlined in the *Tātparya*.—

"Things are not signified by *Letters*; as Letters cannot have any connection with anything, either singly or collectively. Nor can things be held to be signified by the last letter as aided by the impressions left by the preceding letters; because Impressions can pertain to their own objects, and not to other things; hence the impression of Letters could bring about the cognition of Letters only, and not of *things*. And yet it cannot be denied that when the Letters '*gha-ṭaḥ*' are pronounced, there comes about the cognition of the Jar. Hence the conclusion is that the letters concerned bring about the manifestation of a peculiar entity in the shape of '*Sphota*'—a kind of conglomerate Sound—which in its turn brings about the cognition of the Jar. That several Letters should give rise to one *Sphoṭa* is just like several Words forming a Sentence. Hence there is no such thing as 'Word,' denoting things."

In answer to this view, we have the Sūtra laying down that the 'Word'—by which things are denoted—consists of the Letters themselves,—and *not* of any such thing as '*Sphoṭa*'. As a matter of fact, when a thing is spoken

The discussion that follows is in regard to Nouns; and we take for our example the particular word '*gauḥ*', 'Cow.'

Now, in connection with this—*

Sūtra 59

There arises a doubt; because the Word is used in reference to the Individual, the Configuration and the Universal, as inseparable from one another.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*sannidhi*' signifies '*inseparable existence*', i. e. invariable concomitance. As a matter of fact, the word 'Cow' is used in connection with the Individual, the Configuration and the Universal,—as inseparable from one another; and it is not definitely known whether what is denoted by the Word is any *one* of these three, or all of them.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀŚYA

What forms the real denotation of a word can be ascertained only from the force of usage And from this it is clear that—

Sūtra 60

(A)—"It is the Individual (that should be regarded as denoted by the Word); because all usage—in the form of (*a*) the term 'that which,' (*b*) grouping, (*c*) giving, (*d*) possession, (*e*) number, (*f*) enlargement, (*g*) contraction,† (*h*) colour, (*i*) compounding and (*j* procreation—appertains to the Individual."

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of by means of a verbal expression, we do not perceive anything except certain *Letters*. Hence we conclude that the name 'Word' must apply to the Letters, though it may not apply directly to them, these being *many*, and the word being *one* only,—yet the name may be applied to them indirectly, on the basis of the fact that though many, they bring about the cognition of a single thing. And so long as we can explain the phenomenon of verbal expression on the basis of the directly perceptible Letters, there can be no justification for the assuming of a superphysical and purely hypothetical entity in the shape of '*Sphoṭa*'.

* तदर्थे is usually printed as part of Sūtra 58, but the न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध and the Puri Sū. Ms. both read the Sū. without तदर्थे which therefore we take as part of the Introductory Bhāṣya. The *Bhāṣyacandra* makes it part of the *Sūtra*.

† The viz. text reads उपचय; the right reading is अपचय as found in the Puri Mss.

(A)—[*The Individualistic Theory is first put forward*]—

"It is the Individual that is denoted by the word. How so? Because such usage as is represented by the use of the term *'that which'* and the rest applies to the *Individual.*

'Upacāra,' 'appertaining,' here stands for *application.*

"(a) Such sentences as *'that which* stands', *'that which* is sitting' can never signify the *Universal*, as in the *Universal* there is no diversity* (which would require specialisation by means of such qualifying terms as *that which stands* and so forth); and inasmuch as what *is* diverse is the *Individual* substance, the said sentence should be taken as referring to this latter. (b) The expression '*group* of Cows' presupposes diversity, and as such must refer to the *Individual things*, and not to the *Universal*, which is one only.† (c) In the expression 'he *gives* the Cow to the *Vaidya*,' the *giving* must be of an *Individual* Cow, and not of the *Universal*; as this latter has no body, and as such cannot be transferred from one person to another (d) '*Possession*' consists in becoming related to proprietory right; it is expressed by such words as 'Kauṇḍinya's cow,' 'the Brāhmaṇa's cow' and so forth; and these latter must refer to the *individual* things, as it is only these that are diverse, and as such can belong to, be possessed by, different persons; while the *Universal* is one only (and as such cannot belong to several persons). (e) '*Number*'. We have such expressions as 'ten cows', 'twenty cows' etc, and these must refer to the *Individual* things—as these alone are diverse,—and not to the *Universal* which is *one* only. (f) '*Enlargement*'—It is only an *Individual* thing, which is a product brought about by (constituent) causes, that can undergo 'enlargement', which consists in the accretion of more and more component particles; as we find expressed in the words 'the cow has grown large', which cannot refer to the *Universal*, which is not made up of component particles (and as such can have no accretions to it). (g) The same remarks apply to '*contraction*'. (h) '*Colour*'—The expressions 'the white cow', 'the tawny cow' and the like must be taken as

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains *abhedāt* as 'because the agent of *standing* and *sitting* is one and the same'. But this is not compatible with the context.

† The Viz. text omits the words गवा समूह इति भेदाद् द्रव्याभिधानं नैव जातेरभेदात् which are found in all Mss.

referring to the presence of the particular quality of Colour in the *individual* thing, and not to the *Universal*. (*i*) '*Compounding*'—such compounds as '*gohita*' (*welfare of the cow*), '*gosukha*' (*comfort of the cow*) *must refer to the connection** of *welfare and comfort* with the *individual* thing, and not with the *Universal*. (*j*) '*Procreation*'—*i. e* reproduction of likes; the expression 'the cow produces cows' must refer to *individuals*, as it is these that are *produced*, and not to the *Universal*, which (being eternal) is never produced Throughout this context the word '*dravya*' is synonymous with '*vyakti*'."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The next *Sūtra* puts forward the refutation of the above -described Individualistic Theory—

Sūtra 61

This is not right, as there could be no restriction —

BHĀṢYA

The *Individual* cannot be denoted by the Word Why? *Because there could be no restriction* --As a matter of fact, the word 'Cow' denotes that which is qualified by the terms 'that whieh' and the rest (mentioned in Sū 57). That is to say, in such expressions as '*that cow* which is standing', '*that cow* which is seated', what is denoted by the word 'Cow' is not the mere *Individual* by itself, without any qualifications, and as apart from the *Universal* (to which it belongs),—but the Individual *as qualified by (and along with) the Universal*. Hence it is not right to say that the Words denote *Individuals* Similarly in the case of the terms 'group etc., (mentioned in Sū 57).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

[*The Individualist objects*]—'If the Individual is not denoted by the Word, how is it that the Word is applied to it?"

Our answer is that we find in actual usage that for certain reasons one thing is spoken of as another, even though it is not usually the same as the latter. [For instance]—

Sūtra 62

In the case of—(*a*) 'brāhmaṇa', (*b*) 'manca' ('platform'), (*c*) 'kaṭa' ('mat'), (*d*) 'rājan' ('king'), (*e*) 'saktu' ('flour'), (*f*) 'can-

* मयोगो is the right reading as in the Puri Mss.

dana' ('sandal'), (g) 'gaṅgā', (h) 'śāṭaka' ('cloth'), (i) 'anna', ('food'), (j) 'puruṣa' ('man'),—there is secondary (indirect) application, due respectively to—(a) association, (b) location, (c) purpose, (d) behaviour, (e) measure, (f) containing, (g) proximity, (h) connection, (i) cause and (j) sovereignty.*

What is meant by 'one thing being spoken of as another which is not the same as that' is that a thing is spoken of by means of a word which is not directly expressive of it.† For example—(a) In the expression '*yaṣṭikām bhojaya*', 'feed the stick', the word '*yaṣṭikā*,' 'stick', is applied to the *Brāhmana* accompanied by (carrying) the stick, by reason of 'association';—(b) in the expression '*mañcāḥ krośanti*' 'the *platforms* are shouting', the word '*mañca*', 'platform', is applied to the *men* upon the platform, by reason of 'location'; (c) when *grass* is being collected for the making of the mat, the man is said to be *making the mat*, [where the word 'mat' is applied to the *grass*] on account of the 'purpose' (for which the grass is collected) ;—(d) the expressions '*yamo-rājā*, 'this king is the Death-Deity', '*kuvero rājā*', 'this king is the Wealth-Deity', the words 'Yama', 'Death-Deity' and 'Kuvera', 'Deity of wealth', are applied to the *King*, by reason of his 'behaviour' (resembling that of the Deities) ;—(e) when the *flour* is weighed by means of the particular measure of 'five pounds', we use the expression 'five-pound-flour,' [where the word 'flour' is applied to the *five pounds*] by reason of its being the 'measure' (of weight) ;—(f) when sandal is held in the balance, it is called the 'balance-sandal,' [where the word 'sandal' is applied to the

* In connection with this Sūtra it may be noted that among the words enumerated, the first, '*Brāhmana*' is that *to* which the figurative term '*yaṣṭi*' is applied, while all the rest are those that are figuratively applied to things other than those directly denoted by them

But this remark applies to the Sūtra only, in view of the way in which the *Bhāṣya* explains the case and the example it has chosen to cite. We may however cite the instance of the case where a man, who is not a Brāhmana, if he is found to be always in the company of Brāhmanas, comes to be regarded as a *Brāhmana*. In view of this example, the Sūtra becomes quite relevant.

† The reading of the Viz. text is corrupt The right reading is इत्येतच्छब्दस्य तेन शब्देनाभिधानमिति, as found in the Puri Mss. and also in the *Vārtika* and the *Bhāsyacandra*.

balance] by reason of 'containing' ;—(g) in the expression 'the cows are grazing in the Gaṅgā,' the word 'Gaṅgā' is applied to the *adjoining lands*, by reason of 'proximity' ;—(h) when the *cloth* coloured black is called 'black', we have the word 'black' applied to the *cloth*, by reason of 'connection' ;—(i) in the expression 'food is life', (the word 'life' is applied to the *food*) by reason of its being the 'cause' (of life) ;—(j) in the expressions 'this man is the dynasty', 'this man is the race', (the words 'dynasty' and 'race' are applied to the *man*), by reason of his 'sovereignty or predominance'.

Now, in the case in question (i.e. of the ordinary noun, 'cow' e.g.) what happens is that the word really denotative of the *Universal* is applied to the *Individual*, by reason of either 'association' or 'connection'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(B) [*The 'Configuration' theory is next put forward.*]—If the Individual cannot form the denotation of the word 'Cow', then—

Sūtra 63

"It may be the 'Ākṛti', 'Configuration', [that is denoted by the Word]; as the determining of the exact nature of a thing is dependent upon that."—

BHĀSYA

"The Configuration of a thing must be what is denoted by the word ('Cow'). Why? *Because the determining of the exact nature of a thing is dependent upon that* The 'Configuration' of a thing consists in the particular disposition (or arrangement) of its component parts and of the component particles of those parts; and it is only when this has been duly recognised that the exact nature of the thing becomes determined, as to its being a *cow* or a *horse* ;—this determining not being possible until the Configuration of the thing has been duly recognised; and the Word can be taken as denotative of only that the recognition whereof leads to the determining of the exact nature of the thing spoken of."

[*The answer to this 'Configuration' theory is as follows] — This is not possible; because as a matter of fact, what happens is that a thing is spoken of as the 'cow', as being qualified by the

* This answer, the *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks, is from the standpoint of the Individualist.

Universal 'cow', only when it is really related to that *Universal*; and certainly the 'disposition of component parts' is *not* related to the *Universal*.*

"What then is it that *is* related to the *Universal*?" What is related to the *Universal* is the substance (or object) composed of definitely arranged component particles. For these reasons we conclude that the 'Configuration' cannot be denoted by the word.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(C) [*The 'Universal' theory is next put forward.*]—

"In that case, it must be the *Universal* that is denoted by the word 'cow'."

Sūtra 64

"Inasmuch as the 'washing' &c. (laid down as to be done to the 'Cow') cannot be done to the 'cow' of clay, even though it is endowed with Individuality and Configuration,—it must be the *Universal* (that is denoted by the word)."

BHĀṢYA

"It must be the *Universal* that is denoted by the word ('Cow').—Why so?—Because, even though the 'Cow made of clay' is endowed with the Individuality and the Configuration of the Cow, it is not possible to do to it the 'washing' or any such act. That is to say, we meet with such expressions as 'wash the cow', 'bring the cow', 'give the cow' and so forth; and certainly none of these can refer to the cow made of clay. And why? Simply because it is not endowed with the *Universal* 'cow'; and yet the Individuality and the Configuration are there. So that, that by reason of whose absence the said actions are not applicable to the cow of clay, must be what forms the denotation of the word 'cow'."

[*Refutation of the* 'Universal' *theory*.†]

Sūtra 65

This also cannot be accepted; because (as a matter of fact) the manifestation (or recognition) of the 'Universal' is dependent upon 'Configuration' and 'Individuality'.

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* As the postulating of such relation would involve an unnecessary multiplication of assumptions,—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† This, says the *Bhāṣyacandra*, is from the standpoint of the Philosopher according to whom the 'Individual qualified by the Universal' is what is denoted by the Word.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the manifestation (or recognition) of the Universal depends upon Configuration and Individuality. That is, unless the Individuality and the Configuration have been apprehended, there is no apprehension of the Universal, purely by itself. Hence the Universal (by itself) cannot constitute the denotation of a Word.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

*But with all this, it is not possible that the Word has no denotation at all; so the question arises—what is the denotation of the Word? [The answer is given in the next Sūtra]

[(D) *The Final Siddhanta View of 'Composite' Denotation.*]

Sūtra 66

In reality, the Individual, the Configuration and the Universal-(all three) constitute the denotation of the Word.

BHĀSYA

The term '*tu*', 'in reality', serves the purpose of emphasis. "What is it that is emphasised?" What is meant to be emphasised is that all the three are denoted by words,—there being no hard and fast rule as to which one is the predominant and which the subordinate factor. For instance, when there is (on the part of the person pronouncing the word) a desire to lay stress upon the difference (of a thing from others)—and when the cognition brought about is also one pertaining to the distinctive features of that thing—then the 'Individual' forms the predominant factor (in the denotation of that word), and the 'Universal' and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors;† when, on the other hand, the difference is not meant to the emphasised,—and the resultant cognition also pertains to the commonalities,—then the 'Universal' is the predominant factor,§ and the 'Individual' and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors. Many instances (of such varying predominance and subservience) may be found in

* This serves to introduce the final *Siddhānta*,—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† When, for instance, we say 'the cow is standing.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ When, for instance, we say 'the cow is eternal'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

actual usage. An example of the predominance of 'Configuration' may also be found.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

"How is it known that the Individual, the Configuration and the Universal are distinct entities?"

We know this from the fact that each has a distinctive character of its own. For instance—

Sūtra 67

The 'Individual' is that composite material body which is the receptacle of distinctive qualities

[Or, *according to the Vārtika,*—**The Individual consists of the specific Qualities, Actions and the Substance containing these.]**

BHĀṢYA

The Individual is called '*vyakti*' because it is manifested, rendered perceptible (*vyajyate*), by the external organs of perception. Every substance is not an 'individual'; that substance alone is called 'Individual' which is a '*mūrti*'—a *material body*, so called because it is '*mūrchitāvayava*,' *composed of parts*—and which, according to circumstances, is the receptacle of the *distinctive particular qualities* of [Odour, Taste, Colour and] Touch [as enumerated in Sūtra 3-1-61], Gravity, Solidity, Fluidity and Faculty, and of the non-pervasive (limited) Dimension.†

Sūtra 68

'Configuration' is that which indicates the Universal and its Characteristics

* When, for instance, one says 'make Cow of flour'—where the configuration of the cow is what is meant by the word 'cow'.

The *Tātparya* has a long note against the view that—of the Universal and the Individual, only one is directly denoted, the other is only indirectly indicated.

† The *Tātparya* remarks that this definition of Individual is meant for those things that combine all these—Individuality, Configuration and Universal. Hence there is no harm if the definition given does not apply to such substances as *Ākāśa*; for *Ākāśa* has no Configuration. This is what the Bhāṣya means when it says that *Every Substance is not an 'individual'*.

It is interesting to note that the *Vārtika* is not satisfied with the *Bhāṣya* interpretation of the *Sūtra*, and therefore puts forward another explanation.

BHĀṢYA

That should be known as 'Configuration' which serves to indicate the Universal and the characteristic features of the Universal. This 'Configuration' is nothing apart* from the particular arrangement of the parts of an object and the components of those parts. As a matter of fact, the Universal is indicated by the particles of the composite substance arranged in a definite manner; e.g., that a certain animal belongs to the genus 'Cow' people infer from the particular kind of head and feet that it possesses; so that it is only when the particles of the body of Cows are disposed in a definite manner, that the Universal 'Cow' can be made known. In cases where the Universal is not indicated by *Configuration*,—e g, in the case of such things as 'Clay', 'Gold', and the like—there is, in fact, no *Configuration* at all; and hence in the case of the words denoting such things, the Configuration does not form a factor in the denotation.

Sūtra 69

The 'Universal' is the cause (or basis) of Comprehensive Cognition.

BHĀṢYA

That which brings about equal or similar cognition in regard to a number of diverse things,—and which never serves the purpose of differentiating several things from one another,—and which (thus) forms the basis of the comprehensive cognition of several things,—is the 'Universal' pure and simple; while that which includes some and excludes others is a Universal partaking of the (mixed) character of both Individual and Universal.

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* The *Vārtika* reads नान्या ; so also Puri Ms. A. This gives better sense than नाना, which is the reading adopted by the *Bhāṣyacandra, and Puri Ms. B*; and it is also in keeping with what the Bhāṣya has said before under *Sū. 63.*

DISCOURSE III

DAILY LESSON I

SECTION 1

Sūtras 1-3

The *Soul is something distinct from the Sense-organs.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Instruments of Cognition have been examined; we now proceed to examine the Objects of Cognition And the Soul being the foremost among the Objects of Cognition,† it is the Soul that we proceed to examine now.

The question to be considered is—Is the Soul (which is spoken of as 'I') only an aggregate of the Body, the Sense-organs, the Mind, the Intellect, and Sensations? or is it something different from these? "Whence does such a doubt arise?" *It arises from the fact that Designation is found to be of both kinds.*§ By 'Designation' here is meant the expressing of the relationship of the Agent with the Action and with the Instrument of that Action. This Designation is found to be of two kinds—(1) In one we have the Composite Whole designated by its component parts—*i.e.*, 'the tree stands by the roots', 'the house stands by

* It is doubtful whether or not the connotation of the term 'Soul' is the same as that of the term 'Ātman'. But we retain the ordinary term 'Soul', as it is more intelligible to the English reader, who applies the term 'when reference is made to continuity of Being beyond the present', in such ordinary expressions as 'the Immortality of the Soul'. 'Spirit' or 'Self' would perhaps be a more apt rendering of '*Ātman*'.

† The Soul is foremost, because it is the most important, and also because it is the most loved by man; 'it is for the sake of the Soul that all things are dear'—says the Upaniṣad; and lastly because in the Enumeration also (in Sū 1-1-9), it is Soul that is mentioned first; hence in the Examination also it is taken up first.—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

The *Tātparya* remarks—'Though it is stated here that the Soul is *going to* be examined, it is the *definition* or differentiating characteristics of the Soul that is going to be examined. This will be clear as we proceed.'

§ That this sentence was regarded, by some people, as a Sūtra is indicated by the *Pariśuddhi*, which remarks that this sentence is *Bhāṣya, not Sūtra*.

the pillars' [where what is spoken of as the Instrument, *i.e.*, the *Roots* or the *Pillars*, is a component part of the Agent, the Tree or the House]; and (2) in the other, we have a thing designated by something totally different from it; *i.e.*, 'one cuts the tree with the axe', 'he sees with the lamp' [where the instrument, Axe or Lamp, is something entirely different from the Cutter or the Seer];—now with regard to the Soul there are such designations as, 'he sees with the eye', 'he cognises with the mind', 'he ponders with the intellect', 'he experiences pleasure and pain with the body'; and in connection with this, it is uncertain whether in these we have the designation of the Aggregate or Composite of Body, Intellect &c by means of its components' [*i.e*, the Body &c spoken of as Instruments are only the component parts of the *Experiencer*, *Seer* &c., which is thus only an Aggregate of the Body &c.], or the designation of one thing (the *Seer* &c.), by means of things different from it [*i e*, the Body &c., spoken of as Instruments are different from the Experiencer, Seer, &c]

Our opinion is that in these expressions we have the designation (of the Agent) by something different from itself [*i e*, the Soul is different from the Body &c.]

"Why so?"

[The answer is supplied by the Sūtra (1)]

Sūtra 1

Because the same thing is apprehended by Sight and by Touch

BHĀṢYA

[As a matter of fact, we find that it often happens that] one thing having been apprehended by Sight, that same thing is apprehended by Touch also, [the idea in the mind of the perceiver being] 'that thing which I saw with my eyes I now touch with the organ of touch', or 'that which I touched with the organ of touch I now see with my eyes'; which means that the latter idea recognises, or recalls, the two perceptions as apprehending one and the same object and having (belonging to) one and the same Agent;—and this one agent cannot be either the *Composite* or *Aggregate* [composed of the Body and the Sense-organs] or the

Sense-organ] * Hence that Agent,—who is the apprehender (perceiver) of the said one thing by Sight and by Touch, and who (in the manner shown above) recognises the two perceptions as apprehending the same object, as having an Agent and as brought about by different Instruments,—is something† entirely different (from the Composite or the Sense-organ); and this is the *Soul*.

"Why cannot the two perceptions be regarded as having their 'one Agent' in the shape of the *Sense-organ*?"

A Sense-organ can recognise or recall only that apprehension which has been brought about by itself, and not the apprehension of another thing, brought about by another Sense-organ.

"Why cannot the two perceptions be regarded as having their 'one agent' in the *Composite* or *Aggregate*?"

As a matter of fact, the Agent must be one who remains the same, while cognising (recalling) two such perceptions as have been brought about by two different Instruments (i.e Sense-organs), and belong to (i e., have been accomplished by the Agency of) that same Agent himself; and certainly the *Aggregate* cannot be such an Agent

"Why?"

Because what we urged above in connection with Sense-organs—that 'one Sense-organ cannot recall the apprehension brought about by another Sense-organ'—does not cease to apply, with equal force, to the case of the *Aggregate* also

Sūtra 2

[Says the Opponent]—" What has been put forward in the preceding Sūtra is not right. for there is restriction as to objects."§

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* Because the Agent must be different from the Instrument'—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*. That is to say, the Sense-organ, being the Instrument in the perception, cannot be the Agent of that perception, nor can the Composite or Aggregate be the Agent, as the Sense-organ, which is the Instrument, forms a component of that Composite, and the Instrument must be quite different from the Agent.

† 'Something', '*bhūta*', here stands for a *real thing*, something vouched for by Valid means of cognition.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ 'Sū. (1) has put forward the fact of 'Recognition' as proving the conclusion that the perceiver is the Soul, something different from the Body and the Sense-organs &c. In this second Sūtra, the Opponent, while admitting the

"The intelligent Perceiver need not be something different from the Composite of the Body etc.—' Why?'—*Because there is restriction as to objects.* That is, the Sense-organs are restricted in the scope of things (perceived by their instrumentality); e.g., Colour is not perceived without the Visual Organ, while it is perceived when the Visual Organ is there; and when between two things it is found that one appears while the other exists, and does not appear when the other does not exist—it follows that one is of (belongs to) the other,* hence the perception of Colour must be regarded as belonging to the Visual Organ; that is, *it is the Visual Organ that perceives the Colour.* Similarly in the case of the Olfactory and other organs Thus then, inasmuch as it is the Sense-organs that perceive their respective objects, these (and not anything else) should be regarded as the *Intelligent Perceiver*; for the simple reason that the presence and absence of the Perception of objects is found to be in strict accordance with the presence and absence of the Sense-organs. Such being the case, what is the use of postulating a distinct Intelligent Being (in the shape of 'Soul')?"

† The answer to the above is that the premiss put forward being doubtful, the reasoning becomes fallacious. What has been put forward is the fact of the presence and absence of Perceptions being in accordance with the presence and absence of the Sense-organs, but it is open to doubt whether this fact is due to the

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fact of Recognition, demurs to the conclusion; the sense being that, Recognition does not necessarily prove the existence of something different from the Sense-organs, for even if such a Soul were there, it would not be omniscient, it could perceive only a few things, not all, and as such it would be limited in its scope in the same manner as the Sense-organs are. What advantage then can be gained by postulating a distinct entity in the shape of 'Soul,'—*Pariśuddhi.*

This is somewhat different from the explanation in the *Bhāṣya.*

* So that in the case in question when it is found that Perception appears while the Sense-organ exists, and does not appear while the organ does not exist,—it follows that the Perception belongs to the Sense-organ, *i. e.*, the Sense-organ is the *perceiver.—Tātparya.*

† The *Pariśuddhi* remarks that this answer is to the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument presented in the *Bhāṣya*; the answer to the argument in Sū. 2 is given in Sū. 3. The *Bhāṣyacandra* says that this is the Bhāṣyakāra's own answer to the Pūrvapaksa argument.

Sense-organs being the intelligent perceivers, or to their being mere instruments belonging to another Intelligent Perceiver, and thus being the causes of the said Perceptions; the said fact can certainly be accounted for also as being due to the Sense-organs being *causes* of Perceptions, even though only as *Instruments* belonging to an Intelligent perceiver.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the argument urged (in Sū. 2) —"because there is restriction as to objects"—the answer is—

Sūtra 3

It is because there is restriction as to objects that there must be a Soul ; hence this cannot be denied.†

If there were no 'restriction' in regard to the objects perceived by any single Sense-organ [and that alone were to perceive all objects], this would mean that that Sense-organ apprehending all objects is the omniscient and intelligent Perceiver ; and (under the circumstances) who could ever infer the existence of any intelligence apart from the said organ ? So that, it is because there is restriction as to objects apprehended by the several Sense-organs that we are led to infer the existence of an intelligent Agent, distinct from the Sense-organs, who is free from the said 'restriction as to objects', and (hence) omniscient, (i.e. capable of perceiving the objects perceptible by *all* Sense-organs). We now put forward instances representing the functioning of the Intelligent Agent, which irresistibly point to the said conclusion (that the Intelligent Agent is distinct from the

* All that the fact of the presence and absence of one thing being in accordance with the presence and absence of another thing, proves is that the latter is the *cause* of the former ; and it cannot prove any such conclusion as that the latter is the *intelligent agent* of the former, or that there can be no other intelligent agent.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† There is restriction as to objects :—one organ brings about the perception of only a few objects, not of all :—this shows that the organs must be *non-intelligent* ; this therefore renders it necessary to postulate the existence of the Soul as the intelligent agent, operating on the organs. Hence what has been urged by the Opponent in proof of the Organs being the intelligent agents, points to a conclusion entirely to the contrary.—*Tātparya and Bhāṣyacandra*.

Sense-organs).*—(*a*) The Intelligent Agent, on perceiving Colour (of a certain fruit for instance) infers the Odour and Taste which he has perceived in the past; or on perceiving its Odour, he infers its Colour and Taste; and so on in regard to other objects;—(*b*) then again, having (at one moment) seen the Colour, he smells (at another moment) the Odour; or having smelt the Odour, he sees the Colour; all which goes to show that the Perceiver recalls (and reviews) the perception of all objects, without any fixed order of sequence; and all this Perception subsists in (belongs to) one Intelligent Agent,† and not to anything else (in the shape of the Body or the Sense-organs &c.); and this is so not only in connection with perception through the senses, but the same Perceiver also recalls and recognises various such cognitions as *Perceptional*, *Inferential*, *Verbal* and *Doubtful*, bearing upon several objects; *e.g.*, (1) he hears the Scriptures, which bear upon all things,—and apprehends the meaning (of the Scriptures), which is not perceptible by the Auditory Organ (by which he hears the syllables pronounced in a certain order),—(2) he reviews and recognises the syllables as forming words and sentences,—(3) and he recalls the laws bearing upon the denotation of the words,—which shows that the single Perceiver cognises a number of several objects which are not capable of being apprehended by any single Sense-organ. Now this 'absence of restriction as to the objects apprehended', which points to a single Perceiver of all things, cannot be turned aside (to prove the intelligence of Sense-organs).§ Thus it is found that the assertion—'the Sense-organs being the intelligent Agents, what is the use of postulating a distinct intelligent Agent?'—is not right.

* The Viz., text reads प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्, which does not suit the context; the *Tātparya* and the *Bhaṣyacandra* both read, अभिज्ञानम्. The *Tātparya* construes the two clauses तत्रेदमभिज्ञानमप्रत्याख्येयम् and चेतनवृत्तमुदाह्रियते as one sentence, this is what we have followed in the translation. The *Bhaṣyacandra* takes the two separately; according to this, the translation would run thus 'What has been just said irresistibly points to the conclusion that the Soul is something quite distinct, *and* we now proceed to cite an instance of the functioning of the Intelligent Agent.'

† As is shown by such well-recognised notions as—"I, who had seen the Colour, now smell the Odour".—*Bhāsyacandra*.

§ The *Bhāsyacandra* reads व्यवस्था for अव्यवस्था and explains it as 'distinctive feature'; the passage in that case would mean that the aforesaid distinctive feature of the all-perceiving Agent cannot be attributed to the Sense-organs.

SECTION (2)

[Sūtras 4–6]

The Soul is distinct from the Body

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

*For the following reason also the Aggregate of Body &c , can not be the Soul ; the Soul is something different from these :—

Sūtra 4

[If the Body were the Soul, then] there would be no sin accruing from the burning (killing) of a living Body †

* The *Pariśuddi* introduces this section as follows .– The first *section* having established the conclusion that the Soul is something distinct from the Sense-organs, some people might urge the following argument.– "We admit that, being restricted as to their Objects, the Sense-organs cannot be regarded as *intelligent* ; but the Body could very well be regarded as the intelligent Agent , because there is no such restriction in regard to the Body ; as is vouched for by such notions as 'I, *who am fat and fair,* am, now in my old age, teaching what I had seen in my youth' [where *fatness, fairness, oldness* and *youth*, all belong to the *Body*], which shows that the Siddhānṭa argument put forward in Sū. (1) is applicable to the Body."

It is with a view to meet these people that the Author proceeds with this second *section.*

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* construes the Sūtra thus—(*a*) The term *Śarīradāhe* may be taken to mean *the burner of body, Śarīradāhakē* ; or as *Śarīradāhe sati tatkartari,* 'on the burning of the body, to the person doing the *burning*'.

The *Parisuddhi* remarks that 'burning' here stands for *destroying, killing* ; and 'sin' for all such qualities as would be capable of producing their results in the future , the sense of the argument being that if the Body were the Soul, then there could be no such things as *Merit* and *Demerit,* qualities which are believed to subsist in the Soul, only with a view to account for the experiences of our present life, which are believed to be the results of the *Merit* and *Demerit* accumulated by us during our previous existences ; if the Body were the Soul, it must perish at death ; hence it could have no such qualities attaching to it as would continue in future lives, when the t ime for the retribution of those qualities would come ; and thus the theory that the Body is the Soul would do away with all notions of *Dharma* and *Adharma.*

The *Tātparya* remarks that this argument can have no force against the thorough-going Materialist, who admits of no *Dharma* and *Adharma* , but it will be effective against the Bauddhas. who, while denying the Soul, do admit of *Dharma* and *Adharma.*

That the above is the sense of the arguments propounded in the Sūtra is clear from what follows in Sū. 5 *et. seq.* If Sū. 4 had stood alone, it

The term 'Body' here stands for the 'living creature,' the Aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Intellects and Sensations. When this 'Body' of a living creature is burnt by a person, there accrues to him the 'Sin' of killing a living creature; and it is this sin that is called (in the Sūtra) '*pātaka*', 'sin';—there could be no connection between such 'sin' and the Agent who did the act,* and what the 'Sin' would be connected with [*i.e.*, to whom its results would accrue] would not be the Agent who did the act. For (according to the Opponent) the Agent being nothing more than an Aggregate or Composite, a series of (momentary) Bodies, Sense-organs, Intellects and Sensations, the Composite or Aggregate that is destroyed (disappears) at one moment must be totally different from that which appears at the next; and inasmuch as you regard the 'series' as consisting of mere appearances and disappearances, you cannot get rid of the fact that (according to you) there is a difference (between the two Aggregates in the series); as the Aggregate of Body and the rest [which appears later] would be the substratum of difference [from that which has gone before],† for (according to you) this later Aggregate is held to be quite different (from the preceding Aggregates)§

would have been much simpler to explain it as—'If the Body were the Soul, then the burning of the dead body would involve a sin, but as a matter of fact it does not; hence the Body cannot be the Soul', or as—'the body having been burnt away after death, nothing in the shape of *Dharma* or *Adharma* could remain behind to lead to re-birth '

* As the Body, which is the only Agent, has according to the Opponent, ceased to exist the very moment that the act has been done; so that it does not exist at the time that the 'sin' manifests itself or its results. The results of sin accrue to a person after death, or at a time other than that at which the act has been done; according to the Opponent, the Body being the only Agent, and it having only a momentary existence, to whom could the sin or its results accrue? Hence the 'sin' cannot be regarded as subsisting in the Agent; this, says the *Bhāṣyacandra*, is what is meant by the phrase 'there could be no sin'.

† That which appears later being that to whom the Sin and its results would accrue, that which has gone before being that by which the act was done.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The *Bhaṣyacandra* reads अनन्यत्वाधिष्ठा etc., according to which the passage would mean—'Though such is your view, yet as a matter of fact, the Aggregate to whom the results accrue is actually recognised to be the substratum of *non-difference* from the preceding Aggregate.' But by the

Such being the case (according to your view), that creature consisting of the Aggregate of the Body etc. who does the *killing*, does not have any connection with the result of that killing, and what is connected with the result is not that by whom the killing was done.* So that, the two (the *doer* and the *experiencer of results*) being entirely different, it comes to this that one (the preceding 'Aggregate') who did the act becomes dissociated from what he did (and from its consequences), while one (the later Aggregate) who did not do the act becomes saddled with it (and its consequences). And if the said 'Creature' is one that is liable to birth and destruction [as it must be, being only an Aggregate of the Body etc.], the birth of such a 'creature' could not (according to the view of the Opponent) be due to his past actions ;† and this would mean that there can be no point in leading the life of a 'Religious Student' for the purposes of Release (from birth and rebirth).§

Thus then it is found that if the living creature were only an Aggregate of Body etc. there would be no sin accruing from the killing of a living body ; and this certainly is most undesirable ; from which it follows that the Soul must be something different from the Aggregate of Body etc.

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interposing of this remark, the connection between the presentation of the Opponent's views and the contingency urged in the Sūtra and pointed out in the next sentence of the Bhāsya—एवं सति &c.—becomes lost.

* This, says the *Vārtika*, is put forward, not as a proof of the Soul, but only as indicating the objectionable feature in the theory of those who deny the Soul.

† The only plausible explanation of the birth of man and the diversity of his conditions during life is that all this is due to the necessary consequence of his acts during previous lives. If the 'man' is only a 'bundle of body, organs etc.', this explanation would lose its value ; as this 'bundle' &c., is found to perish entirely at death ; so that one to whom the conditions of next birth would accrue would not be that same 'bundle' which did the acts leading up to those conditions.

§ According to the Buḍḍha, if one wishes to be released from rebirth he should lead the pure life of the Religious Student. But if the man is nothing more than the bundle of body &c., his existence would naturally come to an end with his death ; and this would be a total Release from Rebirth ; as the Body &c., born subsequently will, in no case, be the same as the preceding ones. Why then should one undergo the rigorous discipline of the Religious Student ?

Sūtra 5

[*The Opponent says*]—**"Even on the burning of that [aggregate of Body etc.,] which is accompanied by the Soul, there could be no sin ; as the Soul is something eternal."**

BHĀṢYA

"Even for him, according to whom what is burnt is the Body endowed with a Soul, no sin could accrue, from the act of burning, to the burner. 'Why?' Because the Soul (postulated by him) is eternal ; and certainly no one can ever kill what is eternal. If it could be killed, it would not be eternal. So that, while according to one theory (that there is no such thing as Soul) the *killing* (not being sinful) does not lead to anything,—according to the other (that there is such a thing as Soul, and it is eternal), *killing* is impossible"

Sūtra 6

[*The answer of the Siddhāntin to the Opponents' arguments in Sū. 5.*]—**Not so ; (A) because the 'killing' is of the receptacle of effects and of that which brings about those effects.—[(B) Or because the 'killing' is of the receptacle of effects, which is what brings about those effects].***

(A) What we say is, not that 'Killing' consists in destroying the eternal entity, but that it consists in the destroying of the

* The *Bhāṣya* has supplied two explanations of the Sūtra, the difference being due to the different ways of construing the compound कार्याश्रयकर्तृ. Under (A) it is treated as a Dvandva, which gives the meaning '*the receptacle of effects*'—*i.e.*, the Body—*and that which brings about the effects*—*i. e.*, the Sense-organs, while under (B) the compound is treated as *Karmadhāraya*,—the sense being—'the receptacle of effects, *which* is what brings about those effects.'—the Body.

The *Nyāyasūtravivarana* reads the Sūtra as कार्याश्रयकर्तृबाधात्—and explains it to mean that the killing of the body does not do away with the Unseen Force ; 'effect' in the Sūtra standing for the 'Unseen Force of Merit and Demerit',-the 'receptacle' आश्रय and 'bringer about' कर्तृ of that Force is the Soul ; and there is बाध—*i. e.*, *non-destruction* of that Soul. It adds that the Sūtra cannot mean that 'It is not right to say that there can be no sin even on the 'Killing of the Body' with a Soul, as there is Destruction of the Soul, which is the bringer about, कर्तृ, of the connection, आश्रय, of the Body, कार्य."

Viśvanātha accepts the second (B) explanation given in the *Bhāṣya*.

'*receptacle of effects*'—*i.e., Body*—*and of* '*that which brings* about those effects', in the shape of the apprehension of their respective objects—i.e., the *Sense-organs*,—both of these (Body and Sense-organs) belonging to a living entity which, by its very nature, is indestructible ; and this ' destroying ' takes the form of *striking* or *causing pain*, i.e., *disorganising*, by *bringing death* or by *tearing out of its bearings*.* ' Effect ' here stands for the *feeling of pleasure and pain* ; and of this the Body is the ' receptacle,' i.e , the abode, the substratum;—and the Sense-organs are ' those that bring about ' the apprehension of their objects ;—and it is the destroying of both these (as belonging to the Soul) that constitutes ' Killing '; and not that of the eternal Soul itself. Consequently what has been urged by the opponent in Sūtra 5—that " there could be no sin even on the burning of that which is accompanied by the Soul, as the Soul is something eternal "—is not right.

It is only the person holding the view that ' Killing ' consists in destroying the entity itself that is open to the charge that his theory involves the absurdity of an act being destroyed (ineffective) for him who did it, and falling upon him who did not do it (as urged in the *Bhāṣya* above).

In regard to the point at issue there are two alternative theories—viz (*a*) the ' Killing ' consists in the total destroying of the entity itself, or (*b*) that it consists in the destroying of the ' receptacle of effects and that which brings about the effects',—these two belonging to the entity which is itself indestructible ;—there can be no third alternative. Of these the view that there is destruction of the entity itself has been negatived ; what remains is the other view, which has been found to be true (in ordinary experience).

(B) [The Bhāsya puts forward a second explanation of the Sūtra] We can also construe the term ' *Kāryāśrayakartṛvadhāt* ' as follows—' *Kāryāśraya*', 'the receptacle of effects', is *the aggregate made up of the Body, the Sense-organs and Intellect* '—

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* 'Bringing death' refers to the Body ; and 'tearing out of its bearings' to the Sense-organ. '*Prabandhocchedah*' is explained by the *Bhāṣyacandra* as 'destroying its connections , *sambandhocchittih* ; and the *Tātparya* adds that one causes pain by striking the Body, as also by tearing the Eye out of its sockets.

because it is in this aggregate that the eternal Soul feels pleasure and pain ; it forms its *abode* ' receptacle', because it is only in the said Aggregate, and in nothing else, that the feeling appears ;—this same aggregate is also regarded as the '*Kartṛ*', the ' bringer about', of the feeling ; as it is by reason of, through, the said Aggregate,—and never without it—that the feeling comes about ; —and it is the striking or causing pain or disorganising of this Aggregate that constitutes ' Killing', and not the destroying of the eternal Soul. Hence what has been urged in Sūtra 5—that " there could be no sin even on the killing of the body accompanied by the Soul, because the Soul is eternal "—is not true.*

SECTION 3

Sūtras 7–14

[*Refutation of the View that the Visual Organ is one only.*]†

* The Aggregate of Body &c , is called the 'receptable' in the sense that it is as favourable to the appearing of the feeling as the very container of the feeling. It is called '*Kartṛ*' the bringer about, of the feeling, in the sense that it forms an agency in the bringing about of the feeling.—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

† There is much confusion in regard to this section. As a matter of fact, up to Sū. 27 we have the same *prakarana*, dealing with the Soul, and proving, by a number of reasonings, that the Soul cannot be the same as either the Body, or the Sense-organs, or the Mind, or a mere aggregate of all these. But Commentators have made sub-divisions of the *prakarana*, in view of the nature of the arguments put forward. Hence the *Nyāyasūcinibandha* makes one *prakarana* of Sūtras 7–14, wherein it is shown that the Visual Organ is not *one*, but *two*, and hence the Soul, which is *one*, cannot be this or any other organ. So also the *Tātparya* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*; though the latter is not very precise as to its *prakarana*-divisions, and deals with the whole subject of the Soul being distinct from the Body &c. as under a single *prakarana* ; but in its explanations it accepts the same stages as the *Nyoyasūcinibardha* and the *Tātparya.*

The footnote in the Viz. Bhāsya-text asserts that the *Vārtika* does not accept the *Bhāṣya* interpretation of this *prakarana ;* it says that the fact of the Soul being something different from the Sense-organs having been already established, there would be no point in introducing the same subject over again ; hence it offers another explanation—taking Sūtras 7 to 11 as embodying the view that *the Visual Organ is one only.*

The *Bhāṣya* proceeds on the basis of the assumption that the organs are two ; while the *Vārṭika* denies this at the very outset. It is clear that the *Bhāṣya* has been led to proceed on the said assumption, by reason of the ease with which it supports the argument in favour of a single Soul operating hrough several organs. According to this view, Sū. 7 embodies the argu-

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also the Soul must be regarded as something different from the Body etc. :—

ment that when we see a thing with one eye on the first occasion, and then subsequently with the other eye, we have the *recognition* of the thing as being the same as that seen on the previous occasion ; which shows that there has been a common *perceiver*, and this is Soul.—This is answered by the Opponent in Sū. 8 by the argument that the Eye is one and the same in the two sockets ; hence on both occasions perception being by the same Eye, it is only natural that there is *Recognition*.—This is answered in Sū. 9, which tries to show that the fact urged in Sū. 7 cannot be explained otherwise than on the basis of a single intelligent Soul.—Sū. 10 contains the Opponent's rejoinder.—This is finally disposed of in Sū. 11, where it is concluded that the Eyes are *two*, not one, hence the argument of *Recognition* remains unshaken.

The *Vārtika* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* take Sū. 7 as embodying only the argument based upon Recognition in general, and then object to its introduction on the ground that this matter has already been dealt with in the foregoing Adhikarana.

The *Vārtika* and the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha, take Sūtra 7-11 as put in for the purpose of demolishing the view that the existence of Soul is proved by the fact (urged in Sū. 7) that there is recognition by the right eye of what has been seen with the left eye ; and in course of the refutation of this view there comes in the subject of the Visual organ being one or two. Sūtra 7 is explained, by the *Bhāṣya*, as also by the *Vārtika*, as embodying the argument that the existence of Soul is proved by the Recognition urged in Sū. 7 ; but while the *Bhāṣya* and the *Tātparya* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*, accept it as Siddhānta, and so carry on the Prakarana to Sū. 15 [and this appears to be the rational interpretation of the Sūtras as they stand],—the *Vārtika*, holding to the view that the Visual organ is one only, could not accept this interpretation of Sū. 7-11. Hence it regards the argument propounded in Sū. 7 as put forward simply for being refuted. The *Vārtika* propounds this refutation from P. 362, L. 7 onwards (Bib. Ind. Edition). In course of this refutation, the unity of the Visual organ being put forward, the opponent asks (P. 363, L. 5) what explanation there is of the ordinary idea that there are *two eyes*.—In Sū. 8, the *Siddhāntin* explains this.—This explanation is objected to in Sū. 9.—The real answer to this objection is given by the *Vārtika* in P. 363, L 161 *et. seq.*—Sū. 10 is explained as the answer given by 'some people' to the objection urged in Sū. 9 ; and then Sū. 11 is explained as refuting this answer of 'some people' as also the original *Pūrvapakṣa*.

The weak points in this interpretation of Sūtras 7-11 by the *Vārtika* and the *Vṛitti* are as follow—(1) Nowhere else do we find the Sūtra starting a section with a gratuitous argument in support of the Siddhānta view,—simply for refuting it ; and (2) according to this explanation, the author of the Sūtra fails to answer the Opponent's argument in Sū. 9 ; and the only answer that he puts forward (in Sū. 10)—he himself refutes in Sū. 11.

Sūtra 7

Because there is recognition with the other Eye of what has been seen with the left Eye.*

BHĀṢYA

When one applies to, or connects with, the same objects, two Cognitions, which appear at different times (one appearing after the other),—there is what is called 'Recognition'; this 'recognition' appearing in the form 'I *see* now what I had cognised (seen) previously', 'this is that same object'; and there is such 'recognition' in a case where the former cognition was with the left eye and the subsequent one with the right eye,—the cognition being in the form 'that same thing which I saw on the previous occasion (with the left eye) I am now seeing (with the right eye)'. Now if the Sense-organ itself were the intelligent perceiver, no such 'recognition' would be possible, for what is seen by one cannot be recognised (or remembered) by another. There is no doubt however that there is such 'Recognition'. Hence it follows that the intelligent perceiver is something different from the Sense-organs.

Sūtra 8

[Says the Opponent]—"The above reasoning is not right; for the Organ (in reality) is one only, and the notion of duality arises from the one Organ being divided by the nasal bone".†

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—"As a matter of fact the Visual Organ is one only; it is divided by the nasal bone, and when the two ends (parts) of the organ, thus divided, are perceived, it gives rise

* The conclusion derived from this 'because &c.' is that there is a Soul who is the agent of the *seeing* and the *recognising*. But according to the *Nyāyasūtravivarana* the conclusion deduced is that the Visual Organ is one only. See preceding *note*.

† The *Tātparya* says—This Sūtra objects to the reasoning of Sū. 7, on the basis of the view that 'the Visual Organ is one only'.—The *Bhāṣyacandra* says—'What the Opponent means to urge in Sū. 8 is as follows—'What has been urged in Sū. 7 would be right if there were two distinct visual organs; but according to our view it is not so; for the visual organ is one only.'

to the notion that there are two organs ; just as it happens in the case of any long object (like the Bamboo, for instance).

Sūtra 9

[Answer]—The Organ cannot be regarded as one only ; as (we find that) when one (Eye) is destroyed, the other is not destroyed.

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, we find that even when one eye is destroyed, or taken out of its socket, the other eye remains intact, as is clearly indicated by the perception of things (with the remaining eye).* From this it is clear that it is not right to say that a single organ is divided (by the nasal bone).

Sūtra 10

[The Opponent's rejoinder.]—"The argument put forward has no force , as even on the destruction of a part the whole is still found (effective)."

BHĀṢYA

"The reasoning,—that 'because one eye is not destroyed on the destruction of the other eye (therefore the two eyes must be distinct)',—is not right ; because, as a matter of fact, we find that even when some branches of the tree are cut off, the tree itself is actually found standing. [Similarly, on the theory that the Visual Organ is one only, even when one part of it, in the shape of the one eye, is destroyed, the Organ itself will remain intact and effective]."

Sūtra 11

[Answer]—Inasmuch as the example cited is not true [or, inasmuch as the Opponent's view is contrary to perceived facts], the denial (in Sū. 10) cannot be right.

BHĀṢYA

[The *Bhāṣya* supplies two interpretations of the Sūtra]—(A) [The Opponent has urged, in Sū. 10, that the fact of the Visual Organ continuing to be operative even on the destruction of one

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* All Mss. read विषयग्रहणाल्लिङ्गम्, which has been adopted in the translation. The Vārtika reads विषयग्रहग लिङ्गम् , which means that the remaining Eye is the लिङ्ग the instrument, of the perception of things.

Eye may be regarded as analogous to the case of the whole tree continuing to remain even when one of its parts, a branch, has been cut off.]—As a matter of fact, however, it is not true that the Composite Product continues to exist even when there is disruption of its component particles; for if it did, then it would have to be regarded as eternal (which is absurd). [What really happens in the case of the *Tree*, cited in Sū. 10, is that] in a case where there are several *composite wholes* (making up a composite object), those wholes are destroyed whose component particles are destroyed, while those continue to exist among whose component particles there is no disruption.*

(B) Or, we may explain the term '*dṛṣṭāntavirodhaḥ*' of the Sūtra to mean *being contrary to (incompatible with) a perceived fact:* that is to say,—(a) in the case of the dead man's skull we find that there are two holes, separated from each other by the nasal bone, in the places where the eyes existed; and quite distinct from each other; this should not be so if there were a single eye simply bifurcated by the nasal bone; (b) *secondly*, as a matter of fact, as it is found that there is no certainty as to the destruction of one eye (necessarily leading, or not leading, to the destruction of the other), the two must be regarded as entirely distinct; and inasmuch as the two eyes have their own distinct obstruction and destruction (and the obstruction and destruction of one does not necessarily mean the obstruction and destruction of the other), it follows that they are distinct things;—(c) *thirdly*, when one eye is pressed with the finger there is a divarication or aberration in the contact of the perceived object with the rays of light emanating from the eyes, and (as a consequence) we perceive a diversity in the object; this could not be the case if there were only one Visual Organ; specially as on the cessation

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* Several composite wholes go to make up the Tree; when a branch is cut off, there is disruption of the component parts of this Tree; hence the Tree cannot but be regarded as destroyed; what remains behind is only a part of the Tree—one of the several composites that made up the Tree; it is recognised as the same Tree, and not only as its part, because of its similarity to the original tree.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Hence the case of the Tree does not meet the *Siddhānta* argument put orward in Sū. 9.

of the finger-pressure the object is again perceived as one only.* From all these well-known facts it follows that it is not right to regard the organ as one only, simply bifurcated (by the nasal bone).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA†

That the Intelligent Agent is something distinct from the Aggregate of the Body etc. is also inferred—

* The meaning of this passage, according to the *Bhāṣyacandra* is as follows—'When we close one eye and press the other with our finger, we see the object, the lamp, as *two*; and when the pressure is removed, we perceive the object as one only, or we have the recognition in the form 'what I saw as two is one only'.

But the case meant to be cited appears to have nothing to do with the closing of any eye. It refers to the well-known phenomenon that when we look upon a thing with both eyes open in the usual way, we perceive it as *one*, but when we press one eye with the finger, we perceive the thing as *two*; this is due to the fact that in normal vision the rays of light emanating from the eyes coalesce when they fall upon the perceived thing, and this provides a single image of the thing, which comes to be perceived as *one*; but when one eye is pressed with the finger, the rays of light from that eye become diverted from their natural course, and hence fail to coalesce with the rays proceeding from the other eye ; so that the light from the eyes not coalescing, there are two images of the thing, and it is perceived as *two*. All this cannot be explained except on the basis of the theory that the two eyes constitute two distinct Visual Organs.

† According to the *Bhāṣya*, *Vārtika*, *Tātparya* and *Bhāṣyacandra*, the Sūtra resumes now the subject-matter of proofs for regarding the Soul as something different from the Body &c. The *Tātparya* goes on to remark—'Having proved, on the strength of Recognition, the soundness of the notion of Soul as something distinct (and also having, by the way, refuted the theory that the said Recognition can be explained on the basis of the conception that there is only one Visual Organ operating through the two sockets), the Author now proceeds to put forward inferential reasonings in support of the same theory. It should be borne in mind that the Author has, in Sū. 7-11, put forward the phenomenon of recognition in support of his view, simply for the purpose of convincing the opponent ; in reality the existence of Soul is proved by ordinary cognitions through Inference &c.

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa*, which took Sū. 7-11 as putting forward the view that the Visual Organ is one only, takes Sūtras 8-15 also as dealing with the same subject ; and according to this the present Sū. (2) means that "what happens in the case of men who have lost one eye, is that his former Visual Organ, which operated through two physical outlets, is destroyed and another organ is produced, operating through a single opening."

Sūtra 12

from the excitation appearing in another Sense-organ (than the one that brought about the preceding perception).

BHĀṢYA

When a person has tasted a sour fruit and found that its taste is concomitant with a certain colour and smell,—if, at some future time he happens to perceive its colour or smell, by means of a sense-organ (of vision or odour,) there appears an 'excitation' in the *organ of Taste*, which is totally different (from the organ that has apprehended the colour or smell): that is to say, there is remembrance (through association) of the Taste of the fruit, which gives rise to a longing for that taste, which brings about the flow of the liquid (saliva) from the roots of the teeth This phenomenon would not be possible if the Sense-organs themselves were the Intelligent Agent; as an agent can never remember (or recall) what has been perceived by another.*

Sūtra 13

[Objection]—" The above reasoning is not right; Remembrance has for its object that which is remembered."

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—" Remembrance is a quality and proceeds from a certain cause;† and its object is *that which is remembered*; and the 'excitation of the other organ' (put forward in Sūtra 12) is due to the said *remembered thing*, and not to any such thing as the Soul."§

* The whole process of Inference involved here is thus explained by the *Tātparya*—

The man perceives the colour and smell,—he remembers the Taste which he has associated with such colour and smell—he then desires to experience the Taste thus remembered—this desire excites the organ of Taste,—this excitation appearing in the form of the flow of saliva; on seeing this excitation appearing in the mouth of a certain person, we infer from this that the man has been moved by a desire;—and, from this desire we infer that the man has had a remembrance (of the Taste). This remembrance would not be possible, unless there were a single Agent, perceiving things through the several sense-organs.

† This cause consists in the *remembered things*—adds the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ 'We do not admit of the Soul as that in which the Cognition or Remembrance subsists; for us the Soul is none other than *Cognition* itself'—such is the sense of the Opponent.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

Sūtra 14

[Answer]—Inasmuch as Remembrance is a quality of the Soul, the denial (of Soul) is not right.

BHĀṢYA

Inasmuch as the act of Remembering is found to be such as appears only as a quality subsisting in the Soul, the existence of the Soul cannot be denied. As a matter of fact, Remembrance is possible only as a quality subsisting in the Soul; and certainly one does not *remember* what has been perceived by another.* If then, Intelligence belonged to the Sense-organs,—inasmuch as the several apprehensions of things would be by diverse agents (in the shape of the Sense-organs), either there could be no *Recognition* at all, or even if Recognition were possible (even when Perception and Remembrance belonged to diverse agents), there could be no restriction as to objects (perceived through the Sense-organs);† [there is no such incongruity under the view that there is a single intelligent Agent for all cognitions and remembrance; for] the fact of the matter is that there is one intelligent agent (in whom the cognitions subsist), perceiving the several things, through the diverse instrumentality (of the several Sense-organs)§

Remembrance could be regarded as indicating the *Soul*, either as its *cause* or as its *object*; the Soul could not be regarded as the *cause*, as the cause of Remembrance is the impression left by its previous cognition; nor could the Soul be regarded as the *object*, as the object of Remembrance is the remembered thing. And further, since the 'excitation of the sense-organ' may be explained as due to the *remembered thing*, it can not prove the existence of the Soul.—*Tātparya*.

The *Nyāyasūtravivarana* explains the Sūtra to mean that all that Remembrance points to is the thing remembered, and not to the fact of its being due to the same sense-organ that had brought the original cognition.

* Any mere momentary 'Soul', or the mere object 'Jar', cannot bring about a remembrance in itself, for perception and remembrance cannot appear at the same moment of time.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† There could be no such restriction as that the Eye should apprehend *Colour only*, and not *Taste*; and yet such restriction is accepted by both parties—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*bhinnanimittah*' *as* meaning 'subsisting in several bodies (during the several lives on Earth)' But it appears simpler to take it as above—'through the diverse instrumentality of the several sense-organs', which the *Bhāṣyacandra* takes as implied in '*Anekārthadarśī*'.

—who *remembers* the things *perceived* on some past occasion ; so that the existence of Remembrance is possible only as a quality subsisting in the Soul, when perception and recognition both belong to the same Agent, who is capable of perceiving several things ; and it is not possible under the contrary theory (of there being no such single Agent). And the entire business of living beings, which is based upon Remembrance, indicates the existence of the Soul ; the 'excitation of another sense-organ' being cited only by way of illustration.

'Further [the assertion of the Opponent cannot be accepted], *because it does not take into account the real object of Remembrance.** As a matter of fact, the assertion in Sū. 13, that "Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing,"—has been made without due consideration of what forms the real object of Remembrance.† As a matter of fact, *Remembrance*, which appears at the time when the thing (remembered) is not actually apprehended, and which appears in the form—'I knew *that* thing', or 'I had cognized *that* thing', or '*that* thing had been cognised by me', or 'I had a cognition in regard to *that* thing',—has for its object, not merely the *thing* alone by itself, but the thing *as previously cognised* and *as along with the notion of the cogniser*; the above fourfold statement, which indicates the exact nature of the object of Remembrance, serves one and the same purpose ; all of them comprehend the *cogniser* ('I'), the previous *cognition* ('knew before') and the *thing* ('this') §

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* The Viz ed. prints this as Sū. 15. But there is no such Sūtra in the *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, nor in the Sū. Mss. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also does not treat it as Sūtra ; and the *Nyāyasūtravivarana calls it Bhāṣyakārīyam Sūtram.* It is only Viśvanātha who reads it as Sūtra.

† Having shown above that without Soul there can be no Remembrance the *Bhāṣya* now proceeds to refute the Opponent's assertion that "Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing, and not the Soul."—*Tātparya.*

§ Of the four statements, in the second—*jñatavānahamamumarthom*, the Cogniser is expressed by the verbal affix in '*Jñātavān ;*'—in the third '*ayamartho mayā jñātaḥ*' the thing cognised is expressed by the verbal affix in '*Jñātaḥ*' ;—in the fourth '*āsminnarthē mama jñānamabhūt*' the act of cognising is expressed by the verbal affix in '*jñānam ;*' and in the first, the *cogniser* is expressed by the conjugational affix in '*ajñāsiṣam.*' The Bhāṣya

Then again, as a matter of fact, the Remembrance (or Recognition) that appears in regard to a perceived thing comprehends three cognitions in connection with the same thing, and all these cognitions have the same cognising agent; they do not have several agents; nor are they without agents; they all have one and the same Agent;* [the Recognition of a thing is always in the form] 'What I see now I had seen before'; in this the term 'I had seen before' implies *seeing* (in the past), as also the *recalled conception of that seeing*; so that the statement 'I have seen this before' could not be made if the *seeing* referred to were not by that same person (who makes the statement); the statement 'I have seen this before' involves (as we have seen) two conceptions (the *seeing* and the recalled notion of it), and the statement 'what I see now' represents a third conception; thus the single act of Recognition, involving as it does three conceptions, cannot but belong to a single Agent; it could not belong to several Agents; not could it be entirely without an Agent.

Thus we find that when the Opponent makes the statement—'there is no Soul, because Remembrance has for its object the remembered thing', (Sū. 13)—he denies a well-known fact, and loses sight of the real object of Remembrance (as just explained). As we have seen above, the Recognition (expressed by the sentence 'I have seen this before') is not mere 'Remembrance'; nor has it for its object the 'remembered thing' only;† in fact it involves a recognition or

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uses the singular number in *etadvākyam*. in view of the fact that the agent in all is one and the same.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

All serve the same purpose of indicating the *cogniser*, the *cognition* and the *cognised*—*Tātparya*.

* The preceding passage having shown that the Pūrvapakṣa view is against verbal usage, the Author now shows that it is against a perceptible fact also. Here 'Remembrance' '*Smṛti*' stands for *Recognition*; the name being applied to this latter on the ground of its resemblance to Remembrance.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains this sentence to mean that 'the recognition is not mere Remembrance *without an object*, nor has it the remembered thing alone for its object'. But from what follows, it appears better to take the sentence as translated. *The Bhāṣyacandra* has itself pointed out that in the present context the term '*Smṛti*' 'Remembrance' generally stands for '*Recognition*'. "स्मर्तव्यमात्रविषयं वा" the reading of three Mss. and of the *Bhāṣyacandra*, gives better sense.

recalling of the direct *cognition* (the present *seeing*) as also of the *remembrance* (of the past *seeing*),—all this belonging to a single cogniser; that is to say, a single cogniser, being cognisant of all the factors (involved in the conception under consideration), recalls the several cognitions as belonging to (and subsisting in) himself; for instance, he it is who has such notions as—'I shall cognise such and such a thing' 'I am cognising the thing', 'I have cognised the thing'; and lastly, not having cognised for a long time, and having an intense desire for cognising it, he comes to have the notion 'I have discovered the real character of the thing' [So far in regard to the recognition of the cognition which has been shown to be pertaining to all three points of time]. Similarly, the same Agent also recognises or recalls the Remembrance, which also pertains to all three points of time and is accompanied by *the desire to remember*

Now if the Being (who is the Agent in all these several cognitions and recognitions) were a mere 'series of impressions' (as the Opponent holds),—inasmuch as every 'Impression' would (by its nature) disappear as soon as it has come into existence, there could not be a single 'Impression' which could do the apprehending of the Cognition and the Remembrance,—which apprehending has been shown to pertain to all three points of time; and without such comprehending (by a single Agent) there could be no Recognition (or Recalling) of Cognition or of Remembrance; and there would be no such conception as 'I' (*see*, *shall see* and *have seen*) or 'My' (*cognition is*, *was* and *shall be*), just in the same way as we have no such conceptions (as 'I' and 'Mine') with regard to the bodies of other persons.*

From the above reasons we conclude that there is a single Agent cognising all things and subsisting in all the bodies (with which a person is endowed during his numerous lives on Earth), who recalls, numerous cognitions and remembrances; and by reason of whose absence in the bodies of other persons, there is no recalling (of the cognitions and remembrances of other persons).

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* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*dehantaravat*' differently;—'It should not be forgotton that in the past and present bodies (of an individual) there runs the same Soul.' But it appears much simpler to take the phrase as in the translation.

SECTION (4)

Sūtras 15–16

The Soul is something different from the Mind.

Sūtra 15

[*Says the Opponent*]—" **The Conclusion of the Siddhāntin cannot be accepted ; as the reasons adduced in support of the notion of ' Soul ' are all applicable to the Mind.**

BHĀṢYA

" There can be no such thing as Soul distinct from the *Aggregate* of Body, Mind and the Sense-organs, (severally or collectively).*—Why so ?—*Because the reasons adduced in support of the notion of ' Soul ' are all applicable to the Mind.* Inasmuch as the reasons that have been put forward in Sūṭras 3-1-1, *et seq* , in proof of the existence of the Soul, are applicable to the Mind;—and as a matter of fact, the Mind is actually found capable of apprehending all things,† it follows that the Soul is nothing different from the Aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Mind and Sensation. "

Sūtra 16

[*Answer*] **Inasmuch as the instrument of cognition can belong only to the Cogniser, it is merely a difference in names.**

BHĀṢYA

[The Siddhāntin answers]—It is a well-known fact that the *Instruments of Cognition* belong to the *Cogniser*,—a fact which is vouched for by such expressions as ' he sees with the eye ', ' he smells with the nose ', ' he touches with the tactile organ '.—Similarly the Mind also is known to be only an ' Instrument ', by means of which the *Conceiver* (the Agent who does the *seeing* &c. with the Visual and other organs) does the *conceiving* of all things; and on that account this Instrument also operates naturally on all

* The reading देहादिसंघात gives better sense, though the two Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read simply संघात. 'Severally or collectively' has been added by way of explanation, by the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† 'Internal things' like Pleasure, Pain, &c., and 'external things,' like the Jar and the rest, are all found to be amenable to the cognitive action of the Mind ; without the action of Mind, no cognition of any kind is possible.

things; and it is *by means of this Mind* that the *Conceiver* does the *conceiving*.* Such being the case, it appears to us that while admitting the existence of the *Cogniser*, you do not bear the idea of his being named 'Soul', and you give him the name 'Mind',—and though admitting that there is an *instrument of Cognising*, you cannot bear its being named 'Mind'. So that it turns out to be a mere question of names,—there being no difference of opinion as to the thing, the *conceiving Soul* itself.† If, however, you deny what has been said above, that would mean the dropping out of all Sense-organs; that is to say, if you deny that to the Conceiver of all things there belongs an instrument which brings about the *conceiving* of all things,—and hold that there is no such instrument,—then a similar denial may be made in regard to the instruments of the cognition of *Colour* &c. also, and this would mean the total denial of all Sense-organs.§

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* None of the readings given in the Viz. text is satisfactory. The best reading is supplied by the two Puri Mss.—एवम्मन्तुः सर्वविषयमतिसाधनम्मन्तःकरणभूतं सर्वविषयं विद्यते येनायम्मन्यत इति.

The *Tātparya* says—The term '*mati*', 'conceiving', stands here for *remembrance* and *Inferential Cognition*; and even though the immediate cause of these consists in the impressions left by previous Perceptions, yet being *cognitions* like the cognition of Colour, they must be brought about by the instrumentality of an organ; and as such cognitions are found to appear also while the Visual and other organs are in operation, it follows that the organ by which those cognitions are brought about is different from those organs.

The *Pariśuddhi* adds—Even though the term '*mati*' is synonymous with '*jñāna*' and '*buddhi*'—all three standing for *Cognition*—yet what is meant by '*mati*' in the present context is *direct cognition*, such as is preceded by a *desire to cognise*, and such a cognition cannot but be brought about by the instrumentality of some operative substance in contact with the body [and this substance is the Mind, the organ of conception].

The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes '*mati*', 'conceiving', as standing for the cognising of Pleasure and Pain, in which the Mind is the only organ concerned.

† For अर्थे, the Bhāṣyacandra and the two Mss. read आत्मनि.

§ The *organ of vision* is postulated for the explaining of colour-cognition; the organ of smell for that of smell-cognition; and similarly the Mind is postulated for the explaining of the conception of Pleasure and Pain. All these 'organs' thus standing on the same footing, if you deny one you must deny all.

Sūtra 17

There is no reason in support of any definition.

BHĀṢYA

[Between the organs of Vision etc. on the one hand and the organ of Conceiving on the other] the Opponent makes a distinction; while he admits that for the *Cogniser* there are instruments or organs for the *cognising* of Colour etc., he denies that there is any instrument for the *conceiving* of all things. And there is no reason, or justification, for any such differentiation; there is no reason on the strength of which we could accept any such differentiation (between the two sets of organs). As a matter of fact, Pleasure etc. are objects (of Cognition) different from such objects as Colour and the rest; so that it follows that for their cognition there should be an organ different from the organs for the cognition of the latter; the fact that Smell is not cognised by means of the Visual Organ leads us to conclude that there is a distinct organ in the shape of the Olfactory Organ; the fact that Taste is not cognised by means of the Visual and Olfactory Organs leads us to conclude that there is a distinct organ in the shape of the Gestatory Organ; and so on with the other organs of Perception;—exactly in the same manner, the fact that Pleasure etc. are not cognised by means of the Visual and other organs, should lead us to conclude that there is a distinct organ (for the perceiving of Pleasure etc); and this organ is the one whose existence is indicated by the non-simultaneity of Cognitions (see Sū 1. 1. 16), that organ which serves as the instrument of the Cognition of Pleasure etc. is that one whose existence is proved by the fact that no two cognitions appear at the same point of time; that is to say, it is only by reason of the fact that at one time the said organ is in contact with only one Sense-organ, and not with another, that no two cognitions are found to appear at the same point of time. From all this it is clear that what has been asserted in the foregoing *Sūtra*—that 'the reasons adduced in support of the Soul are applicable to Mind'—is not true.

SECTION (5)

The Soul is eternal.

(Sūtras 18—26)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The question now arises]—The Soul, which has been proved to be something distinct from the Aggregate of the Body, &c.—is it eternal or non-eternal? "Why should there be a doubt on this point?" This doubt arises from the fact that both are seen; that is to say, things known to exist are found to be of both kinds,—some eternal and others non-eternal; so that it having been proved that the Soul exists, the doubt remains (as to its being eternal or non-eternal).

The answer to the above question is that those same arguments that have proved the Soul's existence also go to prove its previous existence (prior to its being endowed with the present body),—as is clear from the modifications undergone by this body (during all which the Soul's personality is recognised to be the same);*—and this Soul must exist also after the perishing of this body. "Why so?"

Sūtra 18

Because the new-born infant experiences joy, fear and sorrow,—which could follow only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before.

* '*Dehabhedāt*' has been explained by the *Tātparya* as follows — The continuity of the Soul's previous existence we deduce from the fact that during present life, while the body is seen to be changed, from childhood to youth and from youth to old age, the ensouling personality is *recognised* to be the same, so that the 'Recognition,' which has been found to supply the principal argument in support of the Soul's existence, is also found to supply the argument for its existence prior to its being endowed with the present body.

The *Bhāṣyacandra* offers two explanations-(1) by one it makes *prāgdehabhedāt* as one compound, meaning 'because the present body (in youth) is different from the one that preceded it (in childhood)'; and (2) by the second it separates '*prāk*' and takes it as qualifying '*avasthanam*'. The sense of the reasoning is the same in both cases; which is in keeping with the explanation supplied by the *Tātparya*. The second *dehābhedāt* refers to the *perishing of the body*.

The *Pariśuddhi* suggests also another explanation of *dehābhedāt*:—"The fact of recognition proves the existence of the Recognising Agent, *because the Body is something different* from that Agent.'

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, it is found that when an infant is born, he actually experiences joy, fear and sorrow, even though during his present life he has not perceived anything that could give rise to joy, fear or sorrow ; and that he actually experiences these is inferred from certain clear indicatives ;*—these experiences could proceed only from the continuity of remembrance, and not from any other source ;†—this 'continuity of remembrance' again could not but be due to previous repeated experience, and the 'previous experience' could be possible only during a previous life ;—so that from all this it follows that the Personality continues to exist even after the perishing of the body.§

Sūtra 19

[*Objection*]—"**What has been put forward is only a variation (of the transient Soul), resembling the variations of opening and closing undergone by the Lotus and other flowers.**"

BHĀSYA

[Says the Opponent]—" In the case of such transient things as the Lotus and the like, we find that they undergo such modifications as opening and closing; in the same manner the *transient* Soul may be said to undergo variations in the form of experiencing joy and sorrow, [which therefore cannot prove the eternality of the Soul] "

This contention is not right ; as there is no Reason. That is to say, it cannot be shown that—"for such and such a Reason the experiencing of joy and sorrow by the Soul is to be regarded only as a variation of it, like the variations of opening and closing undergone by the Lotus and other flowers ; "—in support of such

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* These 'indicatives' are in the form of 'smiling' and 'crying'. The inference is in the form—'the state of infancy belongs to a Soul experiencing joy, fear and sorrow,-because it is accompanied by smiles and cries.' —inferred from such indications as 'closing of the Eyes, throwing up of arms and legs, and crying'.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The infant's feeling of joy can only be accounted for as being due to his remembering the pleasant experiences of his previous life.

§ The facts adduced prove that the Soul in the infant's body is one that has had a previous life and body ; so that it is proved that after the perishing of that previous body, the Soul has continued to exist.

a conclusion there is no Reason based upon any kind of instance, analogous or otherwise.* So that, in the absence of a Reason, what has been urged can only be regarded as irrelevant and futile. Then again, the instance cited does not do away with what we have put forward as the cause of the Joy, &c.; that is to say, what has been pointed out is that in the case of every ordinary (grown-up) person it is found that in connection with objects already experienced in the past there are feelings of joy, &c., brought about by the continuity of remembrance;—and certainly this fact is not set aside by the mere citing of the case of the closing of the Lotus, &c., and [when this cannot be set aside or denied in the case of ordinary grown-up men] it cannot be denied in the case of the new-born infant also† Further, the 'opening and closing' of the Lotus consist only in certain 'conjunctions and disjunctions' of its petals, which are brought about by a certain action; § and Action must have a cause, as is clearly inferable from the fact that it is an *action* [similarly the action of the child's smiling, &c., must have a cause, and this cause can only be the remembering of past experiences]‡ Such

* Under Sūtras 1, 1, 34-35 it has been shown that a Reason that can prove a conclusion must be based upon well-known corroborative instances —these instances being either *per* similarity or *per* dissimilarity, and as a matter of fact, in support of the assertion put forward in this Sūtra, by the Opponent, there can be no Reason of either of these two kinds; and the mere citing of the example (of Lotus) cannot prove anything [An example is effective only as pointing to and corroborating a Reason or Premiss].—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

† This appears to be the simple meaning of this sentence. But according to the *Bhāṣyacandra* it means as follows —'Just as it cannot be denied that the action of closing, &c. of the Lotus is due to a certain cause, so also it cannot be denied that the infant's action of smiling is due to a certain cause.' This argument, however, is clearly put in the next sentence of the *Bhāṣya*.

§ The reading of the Viz text is unsatisfactory; the right reading is supplied by the two Puri Mss., which is also supported by the *Bhāṣyacandra* —क्रियाजाताश्च पर्णसंयोगविभागाः प्रबोधसम्मीलने ।

‡ This passage is a little obscure; all manuscripts, except Puri B, read क्रियाहेतुश्च क्रियानुमेयः as in the Viz. text; Puri Ms. B, reads क्रियाहेतुश्चजात्यानुमेयः which means—'that there is such cause in the shape of Action, (for the said conjunctions and disjunctions), is clearly inferred from the fact that these are actually brought about, [and nothing can be brought about except by the force of an action].'

being the case, what does the citing of the instance (of Lotus, &c.) serve to set aside? [Since it is found only to *support* the view of the *Siddhāntin*.]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

If it be held that what we mean is that the opening and closing of the Lotus are variations without any cause, and similarly the Soul's feeling of joy and sorrow also;—this

Sūtra 20

cannot* be right; because as a matter of fact, all variations of things constituted by the five rudimentary substances are due to such causes as cold, heat, and the rainy season.

BHĀṢYA

In the case of things made up of the combination† of the five rudimentary substances,—such as the Lotus etc.,—it is found that their variations appear when heat, etc., are present, and they do not appear when these are not present;§ and from this it follows that the said variations cannot be without cause (fortuitous). In the same manner, the variations of joy, sorrow etc., should follow only from a cause; they cannot appear without cause. And as a matter of fact, there can be no cause for these variations save *the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before.*

Nor will it be right to infer, on the basis of the instance cited (of Lotus etc), that there must be causes for the producing and destroying of the Soul.‡

* Puri Mss. A and B, and the *Bhāṣyacandra* make this न part of the preceding *Bhāṣya*; while Sūtra Ms. D, Puri Sūtra Ms. the *Nyāya-sūcīni-bandha* and *Viśvanātha* make it part of the Sūtra.

† '*Anugraha*' of the substances, consists in the *combining* together of their component particles—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ The Lotus opens when touched by the heat of the Sun's rays; it closes when touched by the cold of the Moon's rays; and the *Kuṭaja* plant flowers when the rainy season is on.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

‡ Such an inference cannot be right; as the eternality of the Soul (and hence the impossibility of its being produced or destroyed) is proved by the phenomenon of Remembrance, which cannot be explained except on the basis of the eternal continuity of Soul.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

From the above it is clear that Joy and Sorrow etc., cannot appear without a cause; and it is not possible to attribute these to any such other causes as Heat, Cold etc., (except the Continuity of Remembrance etc.) So that the view set up by the Opponent cannot be right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also the Soul should be regarded as eternal:—

Sūtra 21

[The Soul must be regarded as eternal] because of the desire for milk from the mother's breast, which is evinced (on birth) after death,* and which can only be due to repeated feeding (in the past).—

In the infant just born we perceive a desire for the mother's milk,—the presence of such desire being indicated by the child's activities (in the shape of the moving of its hands and mouth towards the mother's breasts). This desire could not arise except from repeated experience in the past. "For what reason (should this be accepted)?" In the case of all living persons we find that when they are afflicted by hunger, there appears in them desire for food, which desire arises from continuity of remembrance due to repeated experiences in the past; now in the case of the new-born infant, the appearance of such desire cannot but be explained as being due to repeated experiences in a previous body,—and from this it is inferred that the infant had a body previous to his present one, in which body it had gone through repeated experiences of feeding (which has given rise to its present desire for milk). From all this it follows that what happens is that the Soul, having (at death) departed from his previous body, has become endowed with a new body, and on

The *Bhāṣya* has added this in anticipation of the following argument—"You have proved that the variations of the Lotus, and also those of the Soul, proceed from a cause, and are not fortuitous; we accept that; but what do you say to this inference—'the Soul must be something produced and destroyed, because it undergoes variations,—like the Lotus'?"—This has been met by the *Bhāṣya* by pointing out that the citing of a mere example cannot prove anything at all, as already pointed out above.

* '*Pretya*'—after death; *i. e.*, in a person who, after having died, is just born again.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

being afflicted with hunger, remembers his repeated feedings in the past, and (accordingly) desires the milk from the breast. Hence it cannot be true that there is a different soul to each of these bodies; it must be the same Soul that continues to exist, even after the perishing of its former body.

Sūtra 22

[*Objection*]—" **The action of the child is only like the moving of the iron to the magnet.** "

BHĀṢYĀ

" In the case of the Iron it is found that it moves towards the Magnet, even without any repeated experience in the past; and similarly the desire (and consequent activity) of the child for the mother's milk may come about without any repeated experience in the past [So that the activity of the new-born child does not necessarily prove past experience]. "

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[In answer to the Opponent's argument in the preceding *Sūtra*, the *Siddhāntin* asks]—Is this 'moving up of the Iron' (that you have put forward) without any cause? Or is it due to a definite cause? *Without a cause*—

Sūtra 23

it cannot be, because there is no such action in any other thing (except Iron, and that too in the proximity of no other thing except Magnets).

BHĀSYA

If, in the case cited, the moving up of the Iron were without any cause (entirely fortuitous), then it would be possible for stone and other things also to move up to the Magnet, and there would be no ground for any such restriction (as that Iron alone, and no other substance, moves up to the Magnet).

If, on the other hand, the moving of the Iron be held to be due to a definite cause, then we ask—Who ever perceives any such cause? [All that is perceived is that the Iron moves up to the Magnet]. As a matter of fact, the sole indicative of the cause of an action is the action itself, and (consequently) any limitations in the Action indicates similar limitations in the cause. It is this that accounts for the absence of moving in the

case of other substances (than Iron).* [Hence from the limitation in the Effect,—that the moving appears only in Iron, and not in other substances,—we infer that this restriction must be due to some corresponding limitation in the cause of the Motion]. Now in the case of the child also the action (of moving the mouth &c) is found to be restricted (in the sense that such actions appear in the child only, and that also only when near its mother, and so forth); [all parties being agreed as to this action of the child being due to the desire for mother's milk], the only cause that can be indicated by the child's desire for the mother's milk consists in the 'continuity of remembrance due to repeated feeding in the past',—and the instance cited by the Opponent (that of the moving of the Iron to the Magnet) cannot point to any other cause.† And no effect can appear unless its cause is present. Further, the instance§ cited by the Opponent cannot set aside what is actually perceived (by all sentient beings) to be the cause of the said desire [*e.g.*, everyone perceives in his own case that when he sees sugar, his desire for it is due to his remembering its sweetness tasted by him in the past] From all this it is clear that the citing of the instance of the Iron moving to the Magnet is entirely futile.

[Another explanation of the expression *anyatra pravrittyabhāvāt*, in the Sūtra is suggested]—*The moving of the Iron also is found to appear in the proximity of no other thing*; that is, the Iron is never found to move up to *Stone* [nor does it move up to a magnet far removed from it];—now, to what is this restriction due? If it is due to the limitations of its cause, and

* What is the cause of the moving up of the Iron to the Magnet placed near it is its contact with the imperceptible rays of light emanating from the Magnet. If this were due to something in the nature of the Iron itself, then every bit of Iron in the world would be constantly moving towards the Magnet that lies buried under the Sea.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The Viz text with its wrong punctuation, is unintelligible. The passage should read thus—न च स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गमन्यदाहाराभ्यासकृतात्स्मरणानुबन्धान्निमित्तं दृष्टान्तेनोपपाद्यते; which is to be construed as follows—आहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्मरणानुबन्धात् अन्यत् स्तन्याभिलाषलिङ्गं (स्तन्याभिलाषो लिङ्गं यस्य तत्) निमित्तं दृष्टान्तेन (अयसो दृष्टान्तेन) न उपपाद्यते (उपपादयितुं शक्यते)।

§ The case of the opening and closing of the Lotus cited under Sū. 20—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

such limitations in the cause are indicated by the limitations in the action (due to that cause),—then, in the case of the Child also, the desire, appearing in regard to a restricted object (like the mother's milk, for instance), can be due only to some restrictions in connection with its cause; and whether this cause consists in 'the remembering of repeated experiences of the past', or in something else, is settled by our actual experience: in our actual experience we have found that in the case of living beings the desire for food proceeds from the remembrance of past experience.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also the Soul should be regarded as eternal. "Why?"

Sūtra 24

Because persons free from longings are never found to be born.*

BHĀṢYA

What is implied by the Sūtra is that *only persons beset with longings are born.*† As a mattar of fact, when a person is born, he is born as beset with longings; this 'longing' could be due only to the recalling to mind of things previously experienced; and this 'previous experience' of things in a preceding life could not be possible without a body, hence what happens is that the Soul, remembering the things experienced (and found pleasant) by him in his previous body, comes to 'long' for them; this is what forms the connecting link between his two lives; there

* Viśvanātha, suspecting this Sūtra to be a mere repetition of what has been said in Sū. 22, in connection with the child's desire for milk, offers the following explanation.—In the former Sūtra the child's desire was put forward as brought about by the remembering of the milk having been found, in the previous life, to be the means of a desired end; while what is put forward in the present Sūtra is the fact of the said desire being due to 'attachment', a condition that is applicable, not only to human beings, but to all kinds of animals.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* rightly remarks that this implication is due to the two negatives in the Sūtra—Persons *without attachments* are *not born*; which means that persons that *are born* are only those in whom attachment *is present*. But it becomes over-refined when it goes on to explain the simple expression '*arthāt āpadyate*' to mean '*arthāpattyā anumīyate*'.

are similar links between his previous life and his life preceding that, and between that and a life preceding that, and so on and on (to infinity);—which shows that the connection of the Soul with bodies has been without beginning; and without beginning has also been his connection with longings; and from this (beginningless series of attachments and consequent bodies) it follows that the Soul is eternal.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent asks]—"How do you know that the Longing of the new-born child arises from the recalling of previously experienced things, and not

Sūtra 25

"that it is produced in the same manner as substances and their qualities?"

BHĀṢYA

"In the case of ordinary substances that are capable of being produced, their qualities are found to be produced by certain causes (in the shape of fire-contact and the like),—in the same manner, in the case of the Soul, *which is capable of being produced*, its quality in the form of *Longing* may be produced by certain causes (in the shape of Time and Place &c.)."*

The assertion put forward (in the present Sūtra) is only a repetition of what has already been said before †

Sūtra 26

[*Answer*]—**It is not so; because Longing (and Aversion) are due to anticipation.**

BHĀSYA

The Soul's longing cannot be said to be produced in the same manner as Substances and their Qualities.—"Why?"—

* Viśvanātha explains this Sūtra somewhat differently: 'Just as an ordinary substance, like the Jar, is produced along with certain qualities; so is the Soul also born, as along with the quality of attachment'.

† The argument here urged is the same as that urged in Sūtra 22; there the argument was based upon the instance of the Iron and Magnet; and in the present Sūtra, it is based upon the example of such ordinary things as the Jar and the like.

What the Bhāsya means by this remark is that the answer to this argument is also the same as that offered to Sū. 22'.—*Tātparya*.

Because Attachment and Aversion are due to anticipation. As a matter of fact, in the case of living beings experiencing pleasures and pains from objects, Longing is found to arise from anticipation or conviction [that such and such an object is the source of pleasure, or of pain] ;—this 'anticipation' arises from the recalling to Mind of previously experienced objects ;—and from this fact it is inferred that in the case of the new-born child also, the Longing must arise from the recalling to Mind of the previously experienced object.* On the other hand, for †persons who hold the view that the Soul is produced (or brought into existence anew, at each birth), the appearance of Longing must be explained as proceeding from a cause other than the said 'anticipation' [as no such anticipation from past experience is possible under this theory] ;—just as the coming into existence of substances and their qualities [which is due to causes other than 'anticipation']. As a matter of fact, however, it is not yet proved that the Soul is actually *produced* ;§ nor do we find any other cause for 'Longing,' than the said 'anticipation'. From all this it follows that it is not right to say that—'the coming into existence of the Soul and its Longing is like the coming into existence of Substances and their Qualities."

Some people explain the appearance of 'Longing' as being due to a cause entirely different from 'anticipation',—such cause, according to them, being in the form of the 'Unseen Force' consisting of 'Merit—Demerit'. But even so (under this theory also) the Soul's connection with a previous body cannot be denied. For the said 'Unseen Force' (of 'Merit—Demerit') could have accrued to the Soul only during its connection with a previous body, not during its present life.‡ As a matter of fact, however,‖

* The child recalls to mind the fact that the mother's milk was a source of pleasure ; and hence his longing for it.

† In place of अत्मोत्पादाधिकरणात्तु, read आत्मोत्पादाधिकरणानान्तु, which is the reading of the two Puri Mss.; and also of the *Bhāṣyacandra*, which explains the word as अत्मोत्पादः अधिकरणं पक्षः येषाम् तेषां वादिनान्तु मते.

§ The Viz. text wrongly puts a stop after आत्मोत्पादः.

‡ As in the present life the new-born person has done no acts that could bring to him *Dharma* or *Adharma*.

‖ The author cites here a popular saying.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

it is well known that *Longing proceeds from complete absorption in the thing*; and this 'absorption' is no other than the *repeated experiencing of the object*, which leads to the conviction or anticipation (that such and such a thing is the source of pleasure). What particular kind of Longings will appear in a new-born Soul will depend upon the peculiarities of the particular kind of body into which it is born;* what determines the special kind of body in which the Soul is born is his past 'Karma' (good or bad acts of the past); and the personality comes to be known by the particular name (of an animal) by reason of the peculiar body with which it is equipped at the time †

From all this it is clear that it is not possible for the said 'Longing' to be due to any other cause except 'anticipation'.

Section (6)
The Exact Nature of the Body
Sūtras 27–29§
INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

It has been explained that the connection of the intelligent Soul with the Body is without beginning; this Body has its

* This has been added in view of the following objection —"If the Longings in the new-born child are the result of the remembrance of past experience, then this would mean that, even in a case where a Soul, that occupied a human body in its past life, happens to be born in an elephant's body, the desires of this elephant cub would be for such things as are sought after by human beings " The answer to this is that the character of the child's longings depends upon that of the body occupied by him at the time; and the longings in the elephant cub would be those in accordance with the experiences gone through by that Soul in some remote previous life in an elephant's body.—*Tātparya*.

† The new-born personality is known as 'man' or 'elephant', not because the Soul is *man* or *elephant*, but because the Soul happens to be equipped with a *human* or an *elephantine* body. This meaning, in the case of learned men, is *figurative*, while in the case of ignorant people, it is a misconception—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

The Vārtika reads तादर्थ्यात् ताच्छब्द्यं लभते which means that the Body comes to be known as the 'person' because it serves the purposes of the Soul.

§ The *Pariśuddhi* mentions Shrī-vatsa as raising the question why this section does not form part of the foregoing section,—inasmuch as this also explains the difference of the Soul from the Body. The answer given by the *Pariśuddhi* is that it is necessary to have the 'detailed examination'

source in the acts done by the Personality, and becomes the receptacle* of pleasure and pain. In regard to this Body, we proceed to examine whether, like the Olfactory and other organs, it is composed of a single substance, or of several substances. "Why should there be any doubt on this point?" The doubt arises from difference of opinion.† People have held the Earth and other material substances to be the components of the Body, in varying numbers;§ and the question naturally arises—What is the real truth? [The answer is supplied by the next *Sūtra*]

Sūtra 27

The Body must be regarded as composed of the Earth; because we find in it the distinctive quality (of Earth).‡

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of everything that has been 'mentioned;' and since the distinction of the Soul from the Body has been already explained in the previous section, it now behoves us to examine in detail the exact nature of the Body. The real motive for this procedure has been explained by the *Tātparya*, which points out that when one knows the exact nature of the Body and its appurtenances, he loses all regard for it, and hence acquires the necessary degree of dispassion, which is necessary for Release

* The Body is the 'receptacle' of pleasure and pain only in the sense that they serve the purpose of qualifying and differentiating it; it is the *Soul* that is the actual 'receptacle' of pleasure and pain, as a 'receptacle' of a thing, in the proper sense of the term, must be such as forms its substratum, that in which the thing subsists by inherence, (and not merely the *container*.)—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† Both Puri manuscripts have a '*ca*' here, and the *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks that this '*ca*', 'also', is meant to include the 'presence of diverse properties', which is one of the principal sources of doubt (*vide*—Sū. 1. 1. 23).

§ Some philosophers regard the Body as composed of a single material substance, others of two, others again, of three, others of four, and others of five substances.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

‡ The *Parishuddhi* reads '*tadiyaviśeṣagunopalabdheh*', which, not being found in any manuscript, we take as the paraphrase of the phrase '*gunāntaropalabdheḥ*.' This 'peculiar quality' of the earth is 'Odour'—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*, which is in keeping with the *Pariśuddhi*; it is only Odour that forms the 'peculiar quality' of Earth. But *Viśvanātha* would include all such qualities as *dark colour*, *solidity* and so forth.

The *Pariśuddhi* raises the question—In reality the Body is the receptacle of the activities of the Soul; and it is on the basis of this character that its examination should proceed; what bearing has the composition of the Body got on its examination? What does it matter whether the Body is composed

BHĀṢYA

The human body must be regarded as composed of Earth; —Why?—*because we find in it the distinctive quality of Earth.* The Earth is endowed with Odour, and so is also the Body;—and inasmuch as Water and the other material substances are *odourless*, if the Body were composed of them it would be without odour. But as a matter of fact, the Body could not form the receptable of the Soul's activities, if it were built up of the Earth only, without being mixed with Water, etc.; hence the Body should be regarded as being built up by the mixture of all the five material substances; the Sūtra does not deny the mutual contact or mixture (in the Body) of the five substances.*

Bodies composed of Water, Fire and Air are found in other regions,† and in these also the presence (by contact) of the several material substances is in accordance with the character of the experiences to be undergone by the personality ensouling a particular body. In the case of all such ordinary things as the Dish and the like, it is found without the least doubt, that they

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of Earth or of Water? The answer given is that when it becomes ascertained that the Body is composed entirely of material substances, it becomes comparatively easy to prove that intelligence cannot belong to it; from which it would follow that—(*a*) it is the receptacle of the activities of which the contact of the existing Soul is the non-constituent cause,—(*b*) that it is the substratum of the Sense-organs, the developments whereof are due to the developments of the Body under the influence of food and drink,—and (*c*) that it forms the receptacle of the experiences of the Soul related to the Body.

* The Siddhānta says that the Body is composed of, constituted by, the Earth only, the Earth alone forms its component cause; though the presence, by contact, of the other four substances also is necessary in its formation; but this does not make these four the *constituent cause* of the Body. The Jar has for its constituent cause, only the Clay; and yet the presence of water is necessary. The *Bhāṣyacandra* takes the term '*bhūtasamyoga*' as a '*karmadhāraya*' compound, meaning 'well-recognised presence', the meaning being—'the mere presence by contact of the other four, which (contact) is *duly recognised* (*bhuta*), cannot be denied'—the *Bhāṣyacandra* explaining '*niṣiddah*' as '*niṣeddhum śakyaḥ*'.

† The *aqueous* body is found in the regions of Varuna; the *fiery* body in the regions of the Sun, and the *aerial* body in the regions of Vāyu. *Ākāśa* does not form the component of any body; hence there is no *Ākāśic* or ethereal body,—according to the Nyāya.

are not built up without the contact of Water and other substances.*

Sūtra 28

"The Body is made up of Earth, Water and Fire. Because we find in it the distinctive qualities of these, [*i. e.*, Odour, Viscidity and Heat]." *A*

Sūtra 29

"It is made up of four substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air), because we find in it in-breathing and out-breathing (in addition to the aforesaid qualities of Earth, etc.)." *B*

Sūtra 30

"It is made up of five substances, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākās'a, because we find in it odour (of Earth), humidity (of Water), heat (of Fire), breathing (or circulation of the juices) (of Air) and cavities (of Ākās'a)."† *C*

BHĀṢYA

The reasons put forward in these Sūtras being inconclusive, the author of the Sūtra has taken no notice of them [*i. e.*, he has not taken the trouble to refute them].

Question.—"In what way are they inconclusive?"

Answer:—As a matter of fact, the presence of the qualities of material substances in any object may be due, either to the fact of those substances forming the constituents of that object, or to the fact that the mere presence by contact of these substances in any object is possible—(a) when those substances form the

* The *Bhāṣyacandra*, along with nearly all manuscripts, reads *niḥsaṁśayah* but *niḥsaṁśayā*, appears to be the right reading. The only way of construing the form '*niḥsaṁśayāḥ*' is to take it, as the *Bhāṣyacandra* does, along with '*bhūtasaṁyogah*' of the preceding sentence; otherwise (if we do not read *niḥsaṁśyayā*, and take it as qualifying '*niṣpattiḥ*'), the only form that could be admitted would be *niḥsaṁśayam*.

† All these three are *Sūtras*. They are found in the *Nyāyasūchinibandha*, and also in the Puri Sūtra manuscript. *Viśvanātha* and the *Bhāṣyacandra* both explain them as propounding the different opinions in regard to the composition of the human body. The edititor of the Viz. text has been misled by the fact that these opinions have not been refuted by the Sūtra. But this omission has been satisfactorily explained by the *Bhāṣya*, which says that the Author of the Sūtra has taken no notice of these views, because the reasons put forward by them are of doubtful validity.

constituents of that object, and also (b) when they do not form the constituents, and are only present in it by contact; which presence is not denied (by any party);—for example in the case of the Dish we find that Water, Air, Fire and Ākāśa are all present by contact [even though the dish is composed of Earth only, and not of these four]. [Thus it being found that the mere fact of the qualities of a certain material substance being found in the Body does not necessarily prove that the Body is actually composed of that substance,—the reasons put forward in the three Sūtras must be regarded as *inconclusive.*]

If the human body were composed of several substances, then, by reason of the peculiar character of its (multiple) constitution, it would be without odour, without taste, without colour and without touch.* As a matter of fact, however, the Body is not so (Without Odour etc.) Hence the conclusion is that *it should be regarded as composed of Earth, because we find in it the distinctive quality of Earth.*

Sūtra 31

Also because of the authority of the Revealed Scripture.

BHĀṢYA

In the *mantra*†—'May thy Eye go to the Sun etc.' (*Ṛgveda*, 10-16-3), we find the words—'May thy Body go to the Earth'; and what is referred to here is the absorption of the product (the Body) into its constituent element. Again, we find another *mantra* (recited in the course of the rites of consecration performed in connection with child-conception) beginning with the words—'I create thy Eye out of the Sun'—and going on to say—'I create thy Body out of the Earth' (*S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, 11-8-4-6); and what is referred to is only the production of the product (Body) out of its constituent element. In the case of the Dish and such other things, we find that one product is produced out of one kind of constituents; and from this we infer that it is not possible for any single product to be produced out of several heterogeneous constituents.

* This has been explained in detail by the *Vārtika*.

† This mantra is recited over the dead body, in course of its consecration by fire.

SECTION (7)

Sūtras 32–50

The Sense-organs and their Material Character.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In accordance with the order in which the 'Objects of Cognition' have been *mentioned*, it it now the turn of the *Sense-organs* to be *examined*; and in regard to the Sense-organs we are going to consider whether they are the modifications of Primordial Matter (as held by the Sānkhyas), or they are made up of elemental substances (Earth &c.)*

"Whence does this doubt arise?"

[We have the answer in the following Sūtra]—

Sūtra 32

This doubt arises from the fact that there is perception (with the Eye) when the Pupil is there, and there is perception also when there is no contact with the Pupil.

On one hand, it is found that there is perception of colour only when the Pupil, which is a physical organ made up of elemental substances, remains intact, and there is no perception when the Pupil is destroyed [which would indicate that the Visual-organ consists of the Pupil only, which is made up of elemental substances]; while on the other hand, it is also found that when an object is before the observer, there is perception of it without its coming into direct contact with the Pupil, and it is not necessary for it to come into any such contact with the Pupil; and certainly Sense-organs cannot operate effectively without getting at, coming into direct contact with, the object perceived; and in

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* It is interesting to note that while the *Bhāṣya* confines the discussion between the Sānkhya and the Naiyāyika, the *Tātparya* brings in here the controversy between the Naiyāyika and the *Bauddha* who holds that the organ is nothing apart from the outer physical body; i.e., the Visual-organ consists only of the Pupil, and not of a Luminous Substance underlying the Pupil, as the Naiyāika holds. The *Tātparya* also adds that according to the Sānkhya also, the Sense-organ is not exactly a 'modification of Primordial Matter' itself; but it is the direct product of '*Ahankāra*', 'Egoism', which is the product of Buddhi, which is the direct product of Primordial Matter. Even so, inasmuch as Primordial Matter is the root-cause of all manifested things, it is quite right to say that according to the Sānkhya, the Sense-organs are 'modifications of Primordial Matter'.

reality this latter fact (of an object being seen without coming into contact with the Pupil) can be explained only on the basis of the theory that the Organ is not made up of elemental substances and is all-pervading in its character [and it does not consist of the Pupil].* So that both characters being found to belong to the Organ, the aforesaid doubt arises.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[In refutation of the above-mentioned Bauddha-theory that the Visual Organ consists in the Pupil only, the *Sāṅkhya*] asserts as follows :—

" The Sense-organs are not made up of Elemental Substances ;—Why ?—

Sūtra 33

"Because there is perception of large and small things."

BHĀSYA

" The term ' large ' includes also the *larger* and the *largest* ; and what is meant is that as a matter of fact, all things of various degrees of magnitude are perceived , *e.g.*, the (*large*) Banyan tree, as also the (*larger*) mountain, and so forth ,—similarly the term ' small ' includes also the *smaller* and the *smallest*; and the meaning is that as a matter of fact things of various degrees of smallness are perceived ; such as the Banyan-seed and so forth. This fact of both kinds of things being perceived sets aside the possibility of the Sense-organs being made up of Elemental Substances ; as a matter of fact, that which is made up of Elemental Substances can pervade over (and operate upon) only such things as are of the same magnitude as itself ; while

* The organ can be all-pervading in character only if it be the product of *Ahankāra* which being all-pervading in its character, its products are also such, and hence unimpeded by anything, can come into contact with anything and everything ; so that even though the object is not in physical contact with the physical Eye-pupil, it would not matter , as the Visual-organ, being all-pervading in its character, would be in contact with it all the same , and hence render it perceptible. If, on the other hand, the Visual-organ were made up of Elemental Substances, it could not get at things behind any physical obstruction whatsoever, even in the shape of transparent things.—*Tātparya.*

that which is not so made up is all-pervading, and as such can operate upon all things (of all magnitudes)."*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the *Sāṅkhya* argument of Sū. 33 as follows]—From the mere fact of there being apprehension of large and small things it cannot be inferred that the Sense-organs are *not made up of elemental substances*, or that they are *all-pervading*.

Sūtra 34

The said apprehension (of large and small things) is due to the peculiarity of the contact between the light-rays (emanating from the Visual Organ) and the object (perceived).

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the 'apprehension of large and small things' is brought about by the peculiarity of contact between the light-rays emanating from the Visual Organ and the object perceived ;† just as there is by contact between the light-rays from the lamp and the object.

That there is such contact between the light-rays (from the Visual Organ) and the Object perceived is proved by the phenomenon of obstruction ; that is, when the rays of light emanating from the Eye are obstructed by such things as the wall and the like intervening between the Eye and the Object,

* The *Sāṅkhya* argument is thus stated by Viśvanātha .—The Physical Eye-ball cannot be the organ of vision ; for if it were, then it would mean that the organ is operative without getting at the Object ; which is open to objection. Then, it might be held that if the Eye-ball is not the organ, it is something else made up of Elemental Substances which is the organ ;—but this also would not be right ; as the organ of vision apprehends things of large as well as small magnitudes ; which would not be possible, if it were made up of Elemental Substances.

† The light-rays emanating from the Visual Organ which are devoid of any manifested colour, form the constituent parts of the organ, which according to the Naiyāyika, is made up of the Elemental substance of Light; the organ, consisting of the light-rays, issuing forth, comes into direct contact with the object ; and whether it is a large or a small object perceived depends upon the exact nature and extent and force of the light-rays emanating from the organ. The example cited is that of the Lamp, because the light from the lamp also, like that from the Visual Organ, is devoid of manifested colour.—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

they do not illumine (and render perceptible) that object; this being exactly what happens in the case of light emanating from a Lamp. [And this goes to prove that for the perception of objects, the direct contact of light from the Eye with the object is essential; for if this were not so, and if the organ were an all-pervading one, the perception would not be obstructed by an intervening object].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Siddhāntin having put forward the view that the fact of the Visual Organ consisting of light-rays can be inferred from the phenomenon of obstruction,—the Opponent urges the following objection :—

Sūtra 35

"Inasmuch as no such thing (as Visual light-rays) is ever perceived, what has been put forward cannot prove anything."

BHĀṢYA

"Inasmuch as by its very nature Light is endowed with colour and touch, the Light of the Visual Organ, if it existed, should be perceived,—just in the same manner as the Light of the Lamp is perceived,—according to the principle that 'the perception of a thing is due to its being possessed of large magnitude, being composed of several component particles, and being endowed with colour'.* [And since the Light from the Eye is never perceived, it follows that no such Light exists.]

Sūtra 36

[*Answer to the objection*]—**Mere non-Perception of that which can be deduced by inference is no proof of its non-existence.**

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* This principle is enunciated in the Vaiśesika-Sūtras, though the form of the Sūtra (4. 1 6) is somewhat different from what is quoted here. The Sūtra is worded as महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् रूपवत्त्वाच्च उपलब्धिः.

The *Tātparya* explains the sense of the Opponent's objection thus — "When a thing, which is capable of perception, is not perceived, the only right conclusion is that it does not exist, and it would not be right to assert its existenee on the ground of merely inferential reasons. If this were permitted, then it might be permissible to assert the existence of even such things as the horns of a man."

BHĀṢYA

The existence of the light-rays (of the Visual Organ) being deduced by Inference from the phenomenon of 'obstruction', which shuts off (makes impossible) the contact (of the object with the Visual organ,)—mere non-apprehension of them by Perception does not prove non-existence; just as in the case of the upper surface of the lunar disc and the lower strata of the Earth (both of which are deduced by Inference and not apprehended by Perception, and yet not regarded as non-existent).

Sūtra 37

There being no uniformity regarding the character (of perceptibility or *imperceptibility*) as *belonging to* Substances and Qualities, there can be no certainty in regard to any particular thing being actually perceived.*

BHĀSYA

The said character (of Perceptibility or Imperceptibility) is diverse, inasmuch as it belongs (sometimes) to the Substance and (sometimes) to the Quality; for instance, while the *Substance*, in the shape of the molecule of Water (hanging in the atmosphere) with its constituent particles actually in contact (with our organs of perception), is not perceived (though the Visual organ),—its *quality* of *coolness* is perceived, and it is from the continuous presence (in the atmosphere) of such aqueous molecules that the two (Winter) seasons of *Hēmanta* and *S'is'ira* derive their character;—similarly while the Substance in the shape of the molecule of light (hanging in the atmosphere), with its colour unmanifested, fails to be seen, along with its colour,—its warmth is actually perceived; and it is from the presence of this substance that the two seasons of Spring and Summer derive their character. [All this goes to prove that the mere non-perception of a thing is not a proof of its non-existence.]

* The Viz.-edition reads उपलब्धिनियमः so also the *Nyāyasūchinibandha*. But we find the reading उपलभ्यनियमः in the *Bhāṣyacandra*, in the Puri Sū. Ms., in Sūtra Ms. D; as also in the Puri Bhāsya Mss. A and B. The translation adopts this latter reading.

Sūtra 38

Where it does come about,—

Perception of Colour (and coloured Substance) is the result of the subsistence of several component substances, and of the presence of a particular character of Colour.*

BHĀṢYA

That is to say, it is so whenever Colour and the Substance in which it subsists are apprehended by Perception. The 'particular character of Colour'—by reason of whose presence colour (and coloured Substances) are perceived, and on account of whose absence, a Substance (as endowed with colour) is *not* perceived,—consists in what has been called its 'manifested character'.† It is for this reason (of perceptibility depending upon the *manifestation of colour*) that the Light-ray from the Eye, having its colour *unmanifested*, is not perceived with the Eye, [and certainly this non-perception does not prove that the ray is non-existent]. In connection with Light, we find that it possesses a diversity of character: *viz* (*a*) sometimes it has both Colour and Touch manifested, as in the Sun's rays (which are perceived by the Visual and Tactile organs), (*b*) in some cases it has its Colour manifested but Touch unmanifested; as in the rays of light from the Lamp (which are perceived with the Visual organ); (*c*) in some cases it has its touch manifested and colour unmanifested, as light in contact with (heated) Water and such other things (which are perceived by the Tactile Organ only); and (*d*) in some cases it has both Colour and Touch unmanifested and is, as such, *not perceptible*, (either by the Visual or by the Tactile Organ)—*e. g.*, the light-rays emanating from the Eye.

Sūtra 39

The formation of the Sense-organs, being due to Merit and Demerit, is subservient to §the purposes of man.

* This *Sūtra* is not found in Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, nor in the *Nyāyasūtravivarana*, nor in Sūtra Ms. D., nor in Puri Sūtra Ms. But the *Vārtika*, the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Bhāṣyacandra* treat it as *Sūtra*.

† That is, Colour and Coloured object are perceived only when the colour is manifested.

§ The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः, as 'brought about by man's purpose'. But from the *Bhāṣya* it is clear that it means 'subservient to man's purpose'.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Sense-organs are formed in accordance with the purposes of the sentient being served by them,—such 'purpose' consisting of the *perception of things* and the *experiencing of pleasure and pain*; so that the generation of the light-ray in the Eye is for the purpose of getting at (and operating upon) the object perceived;* and the fact that the Colour and Touch (of this Light in the Visual Organ) are not manifested is deduced from (and assumed on the basis of) certain well-known usages [such, *e.g.*, as the dictum that 'the Sense-organs are themselves beyond the senses', and so forth].† Similarly it is from usage (and experience) that we deduce the fact that, in regard to certain objects, there is hindrance (to the operation of the Visual organ), which indicates the presence of obstruction. In fact, as the Sense-organs, so also the manifold and diverse formation of all things, is 'due to Merit and Demerit (of Men being born into the World)', and is 'subservient to the purposes of Man'.

The term '*Karma*' (in the Sūtra) stands for 'Merit and Demerit'; which serves to bring about the experiences of the sentient Person.

The said 'Obstruction' can belong only to a material substance, because there is unfailing concomitance § That is to

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* From the general principles enumerated in the Sūtra, it follows that, because objects are perceived with the Eye, and the Eye-socket or Pupil is unable to get at the object,—and Sense-organs cannot apprehend things without getting at them,—we conclude that the formation of the Eye must be such that it is able to get at the object, and hence we come to the conclusion that the Eye is composed of Light, and it is the ray of light, that issuing from the Eye, falls upon the object that is seen with it.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains '*Vyavahāra*' as *Vyavahāraviśeṣaḥ, Vicitrajñānaśabdaprayogarūpādiḥ, Atīndriyamindriyamityādiḥ* There are certain well-known notions in connection with the Sense-organs, one of these being that the Sense-organs themselves cannot be perceived by the Senses; and in the case of the Eye, this would be true only if the Eye consisted of such Light as has its colour and touch unmanifested; if it consisted of the Pupil only, the Eye could not be *imperceptible*.

§ This sentence has been printed in the Viz.-edition as a Sūtra. But neither Sū. Ms. D., nor the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, nor the Puri Sū. Ms., nor Viśvanātha, nor the *Nyāyasūtravivarana*, nor the *Bhāṣyacandra* read any such Sūtra. We do not, therefore, treat it as a Sū.

say, the obstruction that we find as hindering the operation of the Sense-organ upon certain substances must be regarded as belonging to a material substance, for the simple reason that it never fails in its concomitance with material substances; for we have never found any *immaterial* substance (as *Ākās'a* and the like) appearing as an 'obstruction'. [It is true that *non-obstruction* is found in the case of certain *material* substances also, *e g.*, glass, rock-crystal and the like, which do not hinder the operation of the Visual organ; but] as for *non-obstruction*, this is not *unfailing in its concomitance*, either with *material* or with *immaterial* substances,—being found, as it is, along with both. [Hence non-obstruction cannot prove either the *material* or the *non-material* character of the Sense-organs.]

Some people argue as follows:—" It comes to this that, because there is *obstruction*, the Sense-organs must be *material*, and because there is *non-obstruction*, they must be *non-material*; 'non-obstruction' (of the Sense-organ) also we find when things, hidden behind the glass, or mass of white clouds, or rock-crystal, are clearly perceived " But this is not right, because there is *non-obstruction* also in the case of *material substances*; *e. g.* (*a*) there is illumination, by lamp-light, of things hidden behind glass, clouds and rock-crystal, which shows that there is *no obstruction* of *Lamp-light* (which is admittedly *material*); and (*b*) there is no *obstruction* of the heat of the cooking fire operating upon things placed in the vessel (placed upon the oven) [and the cooking fire is also admittedly *material*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

As regards the non-perception (of the Light-rays from the Eye), this may be due to special reasons [For example]—

Sūtra 40

Its non-perception is similar to the non-perception of the light of the stars at midday.

BHĀṢYA

The general principle is that there is perception of a thing when there is 'inherence of several component substances' and also 'a particular colour'; and yet in the case of the light of the stars, we find that even though the said conditions of perception are present, it still fails to be perceived at midday, because it

is suppressed by the (stronger) light of the Sun ;—exactly in the same manner, in the case of the Light of the Visual Organ, even though the conditions of perception—in the shape of the presence of 'several component substances' and of 'a particular colour'—are present, it fails to be perceived, for certain special reasons. What this special reason is has been explained above (in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū 38,), where it has been pointed out that there is no perceptional apprehension of the substance *which does not have its Colour and Touch manifested*. It is only when there is absolute non-perception, [*i.e* when the thing is not perceived at all, and its non-perception is not due to any special causes], that it can be rightly regarded as proving the non-existence of the thing [and inasmuch as such is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ, its merely accidental non-perception cannot justify the conclusion that it does not exist].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some one might here argue that—"On the same analogy we may say that there is Light in the piece of stone also, and it is not perceived at midday because it is suppressed by the Light of the Sun." And in answer to this we have the following Sūtra—

Sūtra 41

The said assertion cannot be accepted ; because there is non-perception (of the Light of Stones) also at night ;—

BHĀSYA

and also because there is no cognition of it by Inference either (which there *is* in the case of the Light of the Visual Organ). Thus then, there being absolute non-cognition (at all times, and by all means of Cognition) of the Light of the Stone-pieces, we conclude that no such light exists. Such however is not the case with the Light of the Visual Organ [which *is* apprehended by means of *Inference*].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The view propounded by us is supported by reason also.

Sūtra 42

The perception of things being brought about by the aid of external light, the non-perception (of the Visual Light) must be due to non-manifestation (of colour).

BHĀṢYA

It is only when the Visual Organ is aided by some external light that it becomes capable of apprehending things; and in the absence of such light, there is no apprehension with the Visual Organ. [So that it is on account of the absence of an external light falling upon it that the Visual Light is not perceived.] As a matter of fact, even when the aid of (external) light is present, and there is perception also of Cool Touch, the object in which that touch subsists, (i, e., the particles of Water hanging in the atmosphere) fails to be perceived with the Eye; for the simple reason that its Colour is not manifested; this shows that there is non-perception of an object endowed with Colour by reason of its Colour being not manifested.* For these reasons we conclude that what the *Pūrvapakṣin* has said in Sū 35—that "inasmuch as no such things (as the Visual Light-rav) is ever perceived, what has been put forward cannot prove any thing"—is not right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—"But why is *suppression* not put forward as the reason for the non-perception of the Visual Light?† [The answer is given in the following Sūṭra].

Sūtra 43

Because there can be suppression (of Colour) only when it is manifest also;

* In the case of the Water-particle hanging in the atmosphere, what happens is that its Colour not being manifested, it is not perceived with the Eye, and that this is so we infer from the fact that in the perception of Water we require the aid of external light; similarly, the Visual Light also requiring, for its perception, the aid of external light, it follows that the non-perception of this also must be due to the non-manifestation of its Colour. It is a generally recognised principle that a thing, which requires for its perception the aid of external light, fails to be perceived only when its Colour is not manifested; so that the non-perception of such a thing must be attributed to the *non-manifestation of its colour*, and not to its *suppression by stronger light*; as is found to be the case with the light of stars, which, not requiring the aid of any external light in its perception, has its non-perception at midday due to suppression by the light of the Sun.—*Vārtika and Tātparya*.

† This question emanates from those Logicians who hold that Visual Light has its Colour manifested, like any ordinary Light; and it is not perceived because it is suppressed by the stronger light of the atmosphere.

BHĀṢYA

—and *also when it is not dependent for its perception upon external light* ; this is the implication of the particle '*cha*', 'also'. As a matter of fact, there is suppression of only such Light as is manifested—*i. e.* duly evolved—and does not depend upon the aid of external light [as we find in the case of Stars] ; when, on the other hand, such conditions are absent, (*e. g.*, in the case of the Light in such things as the Visual Organ), there can be no suppression; which leads us to conclude that when a certain Light, which is not perceived (with the Eye) by reason of its Colour being not manifested, becomes perceived when some external light falls upon it,—such Light cannot be said to be 'suppressed'.

From the above it follows that the Visual Light does exist (and is endowed with a particular form and character).

Sūtra 44

Also because we actually perceive the Light in the eyes of night-walkers.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we actually see rays of light in the eyes of 'night-walkers'—*i. e.* the cat and other animals (of the feline species); and from this we infer the existence of light in the eyes of other living beings.

"But just as the genus (of the Cat) is different (from that of Man), so would their sense-organs also be of different characters [so that the mere fact of the Cat's Eye possessing rays of light cannot justify the inference of the existence of Light in the Eyes of Man]."

There is no justification for the assumption that there is such difference of character (between the Eye of the Cat and the Eye of the Man); specially in view of the fact that both are equally found to have their approach (upon visible objects) hindered by obstructions such as the wall and other things. [Which fact is what forms the main ground for the assumption that the Visual Organ consists of Light.]*

* The mere fact that while we see light-rays emanating from the Cat's Eye, and not those emanating from the Man's Eye, cannot justify the assumption that the two are not of the same kind of 'sense-organ'; in the case of the Sun and the Moon, though the former is felt to be hot and the latter cool, both are regarded as 'luminous'; hence mere difference in some detail of character does not prove diversity of 'genus'.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—" It is not right to regard *the Contact of the Sense-organ with the Object* as an instrument of Cognition. Why?

Sūtra 45

" Because (as a matter of fact) there is perception without (the Organ) getting at (the Object); as (we find that) there is perception of things behind glass, vapour and rock-crystal."

BHĀṢYA

" As a matter of fact, we find that when a flying piece of straw strikes against glass or vapour, it is actually seen with the Eye; and yet one thing can come into contact with another only when no third thing comes between them,—and whenever a third thing does come between two things, their contact is obstructed. Such being the case, if the contact of Light-rays (from the Eye) and the Object (the straw behind the glass) were the cause of its perception, then,—no contact being possible by reason of the obstruction (of the intervening glass),—there should be no perception at all. And yet we do perceive things hidden behind glass, vapour and rock-crystal;—all which goes to prove that the Sense-organs are operative without actually getting at (and coming into contact with) the object. From this it follows that they are non-material in their character, because all material things (such as the Arrow, the Axe and the like) have the character of being operative only by getting at their objects."

Sūtra 46

[*Answer to the above*]—**The above reasoning has no force against our doctrine, because there is no perception of things behind a wall.***

BHĀSYA

If the Sense-organs were operative without getting at their objects, then there would be nothing to prevent the perception of things hidden behind a wall.

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* In the Viz. text and in Puri A, the *Bhāṣya* has a '*na*' preceding he Sūtra. It is not in Puri B; nor is it supported by the *Bhāṣyacandra*. †And as the denial is already contained in the *Sūtra* itself, in the term '*apratiṣedhaḥ*', an additional '*na*' would be superfluous.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent retorts]—"But if the Sense-organs were operative only by getting at the objects, then there would be no perception of things behind glass or vapour or rock-crystal."

[The answer to this is as follows]—

Sūtra 47

Inasmuch as there is no real obstruction (by such things as the Glass etc.), Contact does take place* (in the cases cited).

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, neither Glass nor Vapour obstructs the passage of Light rays from the Eye; and not being obstructed, the rays do actually come into contact with the object.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

One who holds the view that "there can be no non-obstruction of what is purely material"†—is not right;—

Sūtra 48

Because (as a matter of fact) there is no obstruction of the Sun's rays,—*in connection with the object behind a piece* of rock-crystal,—and in connection with the object to be burnt,§

BHĀṢYA

The view that has been held cannot be accepted as right,—(*a*) because there is no obstruction of the Sun's rays,—(*b*) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object behind a piece of rock-crystal,—and (*c*) because there is no obstruction in regard to the object to be burnt,—the sentence in the Sūṭra is to be split up into three clauses by construing the term 'because there is no obstruction', '*avighātāt*', with each of the other three terms;

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* and Viśvanātha read उत्पत्तिः for उपपत्तिः.

† Puri Mss. A and B and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read यश्च न मन्यते &c. which may be construed to give the same sense thus.—'If one does not admit all this, and insists upon the view that there could be no absence of obstruction, if the Sense-organs were material in character'.

§ Such is the translation of the Sūtra as interpreted by the Bhāṣya, which (see below) analyses the Sūtra into three factors. The simple meaning of the Sūtra appears to be that 'there is no obstruction of the Sun's-rays even when the object burnt by it is behind a piece of rock-crystal'.

and the meaning assigned to the Sūtra is in accordance with this construction.

(*a*) The rays of the Sun are not hindered by the Jar and such things,—'as there is no obstruction' in this case; and the Water in the Jar becomes heated; such imbibing of the quality of warmth of one thing (Light) by another (*i. e.*, Water) is possible only when there is actual contact (between the two things); and the original coolness (of the Water) becomes suppressed by the warmth thus imbibed.

(*b*) When the object to be illumined is hidden behind rock-crystal, there is no obstruction to the lamp-rays falling upon it; and 'because there is no obstruction', the object is got at by the light, and becomes perceived.

(*c*) When the thing is placed in a frying pan over the fire it becomes burnt by the light of the fire; and here also 'because there is no obstruction' to the light-rays, the thing is got at by them, and because it is thus got at, it becomes burnt; and the heat (of the Light) is operative only by contact

The term '*avighātāt*', 'because there is no obstruction', may also be taken by itself (as propounding a fourth argument); "What would be the meaning of '*avighāta*', 'non-obstruction' (in this case)?" It would mean that there is no hindrance on any side to the progress of the substance (Light) by any such intervening substance as has its component particles not ruptured and transformed (by the Light passing through them); * *i. e.*, there is no hindrance to its operation; *i. e.*, there is no obstacle to its contact (with the object). For instance, we find that water placed in an earthen jar imbibes the coolness of the outer atmosphere [in which case the hot light-rays go out of the Water through the intervening jar, without dismembering and transform-

* The term '*vyūhyamāna*' is used here in a peculiar sense; it has been explained by the *Tātparya* as meaning 'dismemberment'; the sense being that when the thing in the frying pan is burnt by the heat of the fire in the oven, the heat passing through the pan does not tend to the dismemberment of the pan's component particles; *i.e.*, it does not so happen that the pan is broken up and another pan appears in its place. And this permeating of the rays of light and heat—without dismembering and transforming the intervening substance,—is what is meant by 'non-obstruction'.

ing the latter].* And there can be no perception of the *touch* (warmth or coolness) of a thing unless it is got at by the Sense-organ; and we also see (in the case of the Water in the Jar) that there is percolation, as also flowing out,† [which also shows that substances can pass through an intervening substance without dismembering or transforming it].

Thus then, it becomes established that in the case of things hidden behind glass or vapour or rock-crystal, perception duly comes about, 'because there is no obstruction' to the rays of Visual Light by the said glass, etc., and they get at the object by passing through the intervening glass, etc.

Sūtra 49

[*Objection*]—"**The view put forward is not right; because there is possibility of either of the two characters belonging to either of the two substances.**"

BHĀṢYA

"(*a*) Whether there is *non-obstruction* (of the Visual Light) by the Wall and such other things, just as there is by glass and vapour, etc., or (*b*) there is *obstruction* by glass and vapour, etc., just as there is by the wall;—inasmuch as both these alternative views are equally possible, it behoves you to show cause which, and why, is the right view"§

Sūtra 50

[*Answer*]—**Just as there is perception of Colour in the Mirror and in Water,—by reason of these two being, by their nature, bright and white,—similarly there is perception of Colour (also in the case of such intervening substances as Glass etc., which are, by their nature, transparent).**

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* This parenthetical explanation is according to the *Vārtika* and *Tātparya*.

† The *Vārtika* reads '*parispanda*' for '*praspanda*', and explains it as *lateral motion*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads '*praspanda*', and explains it as *percolating through the pores*; '*parisrava*' standing for actual *flowing out*.

§ The Puri Mss. read *Niyamena* for *Niyame*; the *Bhāṣyacandra* also notices this reading and explains it to mean that "it is absolutely necessary to state your reasons".

BHĀṢYA

The Mirror and Water are possessed of '*prasāda*'—*i. e.*, a particular colour (bright-white); which belongs to them by their very nature; as is shown by the fact of their always possessing it; and of this 'bright-white colour' also, it is the very nature that it reflects (and renders visible) the Colour (of things placed before it); and in the case of the Mirror, we find that when a man puts his face before it, the light-rays emanating from his eyes strike the Mirror and are turned back (reflected), and thereby they come into contact with the man's own face, whose colour and form thus become perceived; this perception being called 'the perception of the reflected image'; and it is brought about by the peculiar colour of the Mirror's surface; that it is so is proved by the fact that any such reflection fails to appear whenever there is a deterioration in the brightness of the Mirror's surface. [Though such is the case with the Mirror, yet] There is no such 'perception of the reflected image' in the case of the Wall and such other things [and the only explanation possible is that these latter things are not endowed with that particular property which would enable them to reflect the light-rays from the Eye]. In the same manner, even though there is *non-obstruction* of the Visual Light by such things as the Glass and Vapour, etc., yet there is *obstruction* by such things as the Wall and the like; and this is due to the very nature of the things concerned [which must be accepted as they are].

Sūtra 51

It is not right to question or deny things that are (rightly) perceived and inferred.*

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, every Instrument of Right Cognition apprehends things as they really exist; so that when certain things are cognised by means of Perception or Inference, it is not right for you, in course of your inquiry, to *question* the reality of these things;—nor is it right for you to *deny* their reality. It would, for instance, not be right to argue that 'Just

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* Puri Sū. Ms. reads '*paryanuyoga*' for '*pratiṣedha*; and Puri-Bhā. Ms. B. reads '*pratiyoga*'; it is clear from the *Bhāṣya* that *pratiṣedha* is the right reading.

as Colour is visible by the Eye, so should Odour also be visible', or that 'like Odour, Colour also should *not* be visible by the Eye'; or that 'like the cognition of Fire, the cognition of Water also should arise from that of Smoke'; or that 'like the cognition of Water, that of Fire also should *not* arise from that of Smoke'. And what is the reason for this? Simply this, that things are cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition just as they really exist, exactly as endowed with their real nature, and as possessed of their own real properties; so that Instruments of Right Cognition always apprehend things as they really exist. You have put forward the following *question* and *denial*:—(*a*) 'there *should be non-obstruction* (of Visual Light) by the Wall, etc.; just as there is by Glass and such things'; and (*b*) 'there should not be non-obstruction by Glass, etc., just as there is none by the Wall, etc.' But it is not right to do so; because the things that we have described (in connection with the obstruction or non-obstruction of Visual Light by certain objects) are such as are actually cognised by means of Perception and Inference; whether there is *obstruction* or *non-obstruction* (of a certain thing by another thing) can be determined only by our perception or non-perception, (*i. e.* it depends upon our perceiving or not perceiving such obstruction); so that in the case (in question) from the fact that there is no perception of things behind the Wall and such things, it is *inferred* that there *is* obstruction by these things; and from the fact that there *is* perception of things behind glass and vapour, etc., it is inferred that there is non-obstruction by these latter.

SECTION (8)

Sūtra 52–61

(*The Sense-organs one or many?*)

BHĀṢYA

[Now the question arises]—Is there only one Sense-organ? or several Sense-organs?* "Why should this doubt arise?" [The Sūtra answers]—

* The sequence of this section is thus explained by the *Pariśuddhi*—'In the foregoing section, it having been established that the Sense-organs are made up of material substances, and that they are operative by contact,—it has next to be proved that there are several Sense-organs; and the

Sūtra 52

The doubt arises—because by reason of Subsistence in several places, there should be multiplicity ; and yet a single composite actually subsists in several places.*

determination of this point is necessary as preliminary to what has gone before. For, if the Sense-organs are one only—and not many—then they cannot be made up of material substances ; and if they are not material in their character, they cannot be operative by contact. Because if there is only one Sense-organ, there would be no force in such reasonings as—'the Visual organ must consist of Light, because from among Colour and other things it renders perceptible only Colour', and so forth ; and under the circumstances it could not be proved that the Organ operates by contact ; as it is only when the organ is proved to be material in its character that it can be held to be operative by contact. The real purpose served by the present discussion is that when it has been proved that there are several Sense-organs, then alone can there be any force in such reasons for the existence of the Soul as—'one and the same object is apprehended by the organs of Vision and Touch' and like.

* The Sūtra presents a difficulty. The words as they stand mean—'We find several things occupying several places and also a single thing occupying several places'.—But the *Vārtika* and *Tātparya* are dissatisfied with this. The grounds for dissatisfaction are explained by the *Vārtika*, and amplified by the *Tātparya* .—If we take the words of the *Sūtra* as they stand, it would mean—'we have seen that when there is diversity of place there is multiplicity, as when several Jars occupy diverse places , and we also find a single thing occupying several places, as when a single composite resides in several of its components'. But such statement would be open to the following objections—in clause (*a*) 'diversity of place' स्थानान्यत्व denotes the quality of 'diversity' as subsisting in the *Place* , and in clause (*b*) the term नानास्थानत्व, 'the character of occupying several places', denotes a quality subsisting in something else, other than *Place*. But Doubt can never arise from *two qualities* subsisting in two distinct things. For these reasons, the reasoning of the Sūtra could be resolved into one or other (not both) of the following ; and neither would be right. For if the reasoning is put in the form—(*a*) 'Doubt arises because we have seen multiplicity *and* unity when there is *diversity of place*'—then inasmuch as this quality of diversity would belong to the *place*, it would not belong to any *one* thing , and hence it would not be common to both (*one* and *many*) ; specially as what the Sūtra has pointed out (in clause *b*) is only the fact of the *one thing* having the quality of occupying several places ; and it does not put forward the *diversity as belonging to the Place* ,—this latter has been put forward (in clause *a*) only in connection with *multiplicity*. If, on the other hand, the reasoning is put in the form—(*b*)—'Doubt arises because we have found Unity and Multiplicity when things occupy several places'—

As a matter of fact, we find that when different places are occupied, there are several substances; and yet the Composite

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then the difficulty is that, as a matter of fact, there is no substance which occupies several places, each substance occupying only one place; so that in this also the character would not be a common one; specially as what the Sūtra declares in clause (*b*) is the fact that *the character of occupying several places* indicates *unity* of the thing. As for the contingency when several Jars occupy several places this has been spoken of, in clause (*a*) as indicating *diversity of place*, and not *the character of occupying several places.*

[For these reasons], the *Bhāṣya*, ignoring the literal meaning of the words of the Sūtra, which would be apparently irrelevant, has explained the Sūtra according to its sense—says the *Pariśuddhi*. And this sense is as rendered in the translation. The whole point of the difference is that the 'occupying of several places' should be taken as belonging to the *Sense-organs* specifically, and not to things in general,—and that of *occupying of several places* indicating *multiplicity* as well as *singleness*.

The *Bhāṣyacandra* offers the following explanation —

स्थानानि अन्यानि यस्य तस्य तत्तथा तस्य भावः 'स्थानान्यत्वम्' अनेकस्थानस्थितैकत्वम् तेन नानात्वात् तज्ज्ञापितनानात्वात् [This explanation of the compound avoids the difficulty raised in the *Vārtika*]—'Because *multiplicity* of Sense-organs is indicated by the fact that it is found in several places'—and अवयविनः एकस्य नानास्थानत्वात् नानावयवाधारकत्वञ्च एकत्वम्; and yet inasmuch as a single composite resides in several of its components, it would seem that the Sense-organ is one only.'

The difficulty raised appears to be more verbal than real What the Sūtra means is simply this—'we find that when things occupy several places, they are many, [*e.g.*, when the Jar and the Cloth occupy different places]; and we also find a single thing occupying several places, *e.g.*, the Composite is single and yet it resides in several components, so that when we find the Sense-organs occupying different places, there arises a Doubt as to whether they are several (like the Jar and the Cloth), or one (like the composite)'.—as Viśvanātha puts it. And all that the *Vārtika* insists upon is the fact that the Sūtra should be construed as simply putting forward *the character of occupying several places—as belonging to the Sense-organs*—as the property common to 'one' and 'several', and hence giving rise to doubt as to the Sense-organs being *one* or *many*. And even when we take the Sūtra as referring to things in general, the implication is exactly this.

Vardhamāna, in the *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, puts the difficulty in a somewhat different manner —'As the words of the Sūtra stand, the first clause mentions *multiplicity due to diversity of place*, and it does not make any mention of *singleness* (the second factor of the Doubt); similarly, the second clause mentions *singleness during diversity of place*, and it does not make any mention of *multiplicity*, so that in either case, the Doubt remains unaccounted for.'

substance, though subsisting in several places, is one only. Hence *in regard to the sense-organs, which are found to occupy different places*, the said doubt arises.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[*Purvapakṣa*]—"The Sense-organ is *one*,—

Sūtra 53

"the Cutaneous (Tactile) only, because of non-absence."

BHĀṢYA

"The Cutaneous Organ is the only *one* organ",—says the Opponent. Why? "*Because of non-absence*; that is, there is no *substratum of sense-organ* which is not pervaded by the *Skin* (in which the skin is not present); so that in the absence of *Skin* there can be no perception of anything. Hence it follows that there is a single Sense-organ—the Cutaneous (Tactile) Organ—by which all sense-substrata are pervaded, and in whose presence alone the perception of things is possible."

[**Siddhānta*]—The above is not right; because there is no perception (by the Tactile Organ) of the objects of other Sense-organs.† The distinctive feature of the Cutaneous or Tactile Organ is that it is the instrument of the perception of Touch; and when by means of this Tactile Organ, the Touch (of a certain thing) is perceived, there is no perception of the objects of other Sense-organs, such for instance, as Colour etc.—by such persons as are blind (devoid of the Visual Organ, even though endowed with an efficient Tactile Organ). [According to the Pūrvapakṣa] there is no other Organ except that which apprehends Touch; so that (according to that theory) the blind man should perceive *Colour* etc., exactly as he perceives Touch;—as a matter of fact, however, Colour etc. are not perceived by the blind;—from which it follows that the Cutaneous Organ is not the only *one* Organ.

[The view that the Cutaneous Organ is the only sense-organ having been shown to be untenable, the *Pūrvapakṣin* next

* This is the Siddhānta put forward by the *Bhāṣya*; the Sūtrakāra propounds it in the next Sūtra.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* calls this '*Sūtra*'; The *Tātparya* regards it as Sūtra. It is interesting to note that the *Pariśuddhi* states and criticises the view that this is a *Sūtra*.

advances the view that the various Sense-organs are only parts of the one Cutaneous Organ]—"The perception of those things would be of the same kind as the perception of Smoke; that is, as a matter of fact, the touch of Smoke is perceived (felt) by means of that particular part of the Cutaneous Organ (skin) which is located in the Eye,—and not by means of any other part of skin; and similarly Colour, etc., also are perceived by particular parts of the skin; and it is on account of the destruction of such parts that the blind fail to perceive Colour, the deaf fail to perceive Sound, and so forth."*

Answer—What has been urged cannot be right; as it involves a self-contradiction. Having asserted that—"inasmuch as the Cutaneous Organ is not absent anywhere, there is only one Sense-organ,"—you now allege that "the perception of Colour etc., is obtained by means of particular parts of skin, just like the perception of Smoke;" if this latter allegation is true, then the instruments apprehending the several objects of perception (Colour, Touch etc.) must be regarded as *several*; for the simple reason that each of them apprehends a particular object of its own; as is proved by the fact that one particular object, (*e. g.* Colour) is perceived only when one particular instrument (the *Eye* or the *Skin in the Eye*) is present, and it is not perceived when the latter is destroyed Thus your former assertion (that there is a single Sense-organ apprehending all things) becomes contradicted by the latter.

The 'non-absence' that you have put forward (in Sū. 53), as the reason (for the conclusion that there is only one 'Sense-organ') is also open to doubt. As a matter of fact, the substrata of the Sense-organs are pervaded by (*i. e.* composed of) the Earth and such other substances also; for in the absence of these substances there is no perception of things. From this it follows that there is no single Sense-organ—the Cutaneous or any other—which can bring about the perception of all things.

* When the blind fail to perceive Colour, it is only because that particular part of skin which was in the Eye, and which was the means of colour-perception, has been destroyed.

Sūtra 54

[*Siddhānta*]—**It is not true [that there is only one Sense-organ]; because (several) things are not perceived simultaneously.**

BHĀSYA

[According to the view that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all things, what would happen would be that] the Soul would come into contact with the Mind, the Mind with the single Sense-organ, and the single sense-organ with all objects (Colour, Odour, Touch, Taste and Sound), so that (in every act of Perception), the contact of the Soul, the Mind, the Sense-organ and the several objects being present, there would be perception, at one and the same time, of all these objects. As a matter of fact, however, Colour and such other objects are never perceived at one and the same time. Hence it follows that it is not true that there is a single sense-organ operating on all objects of perception.

Further, by reason of the non-concomitance of the perceptions of things, it cannot be accepted that there is a single sense-organ apprehending all things, if there were concomitance of perceptions of several things, then no blindness etc., would be possible.*

Sūtra 55

The Cutaneous Organ cannot be the only sense-organ; as this would involve inner contradictions.†

* The difference between 'non-simultaneity of perceptions' urged before and the 'non-concomitance of perceptions', urged now is not quite clear. The distinction, according to the *Vārtika* and the *Pariśuddhi*, is that 'non-simultaneity' is more general, referring principally to simultaneity of Perceptions; the sense being that several perceptions cannot appear at the same time; while 'non-concomitance' refers mainly *to the objects perceived*, the sense being that the several perceptions do not always appear together; *i. e.*, it is not necessary that the perception of Odour must always be accompanied by the perception of Colour, if that were so, then at the time that the blind man perceives Odour, he could have the perception of Colour also; and he would not be blind at all.

The *Pariśuddhi* remarks that what the *Sūtra* really means to urge here is, not exactly the '*non-simultaneity of cognitions*', but only the impossibility of *several things* being perceived at one and the same time.

† The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains the term '*vipratiṣedha*' as '*vidhāya pratiṣedha*', 'denying after affirming'.—*i e.*, contradicting oneself.

This *Sūtra* is not found in Viśvanātha, the *Bhāṣyacandra* appears to treat it as *Bhāsya*, it is not found in Sūtra Ms. D, nor in the Puri Sūtra Ms. It is found in the *Nyāyasūcīmbandha*, and the *Vārtika* also treats it as *Sūtra*.

BHĀṢYA

The Cutaneous Organ cannot be regarded as the only Sense-organ; as such a view involves inner contradictions: That is, it would mean that by that Organ, Colour etc., are perceived without being in contact with it;—and if the organ is operative without contact (as it is *ex-hypothesi*, in the perception of Colour etc.), then it should be so in the perception of Touch also; or if Touch etc., are apprehended by the organ by contact only, then Colour etc., also should be apprehended by contact only.* It might be urged that—" the Cutaneous Organ operates half and half." But, in that case, since no obstruction would be possible, any and every object would be equally perceived. That is to say, if you mean that—" Touch etc., are apprehended by the Cutaneous Organ only when they are in contact with it, while Colours are apprehended by it without being in contact with it,"—then (our answer is that), under such a theory (where apprehension is possible *without contact*) there would be no obstruction (to the operation of the Organ), and there being no obstruction, there would be perception of all colours, the hidden as well as the unhidden, nor would there be any ground for the well-known phenomenon that there is perception of Colour near at hand, and no perception of Colour at a distance; that is to say, if the Cutaneous Organ apprehends Colour without being in contact with it, then there would be no reason for the phenomenon that, while Colour is not perceived from a distance, it is perceived when near at hand.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The plurality (of sense-organs) having been proved (indirectly) by the denial of *singleness*, the *Sūtra* proceeds to propound direct positive arguments in support of the same.†

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* The right reading प्राप्तानां ग्रहणम् is supplied by the Puri Mss. A. and B.

† This sentence has been construed in two ways, by the *Vārtika*:—(1) *Ekatvapratiṣedhāt anantaram*,—'after having negatived singleness'—*nānātvasiddhāu sthāpanāhetuh upādīyate*—'the Sūtra propounds arguments in support of plurality',—or (2) '*Ekatvapratiṣedhāt nānātvasiddhau*'—'the plurality of sense-organs having been proved (indirectly) by the denial of singleness, the Sūtra proceeds to propound direct arguments in support of the same.'

Sūtra 56

Because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*artha*' stands for *prayojana*, 'object' or 'purpose'; and as a matter of fact, this 'object' of the sense-organs is five-fold; that is, when Touch is apprehended by the Tactile Organ, that same organ does not apprehend Colour; hence we infer the existence of another, the Visual organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Colour; similarly when Colour and Touch are apprehended (by the Tactile and the Visual organs respectively), these two organs do not apprehend Odour; which leads us to infer a third, the Olfactory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Odour;—in the same manner, when the three (Touch, Colour and Odour) are apprehended (by the Tactile, the Visual and Olfactory organs respectively), these same organs do not apprehend Taste; hence we infer the existence of the fourth, the Gestatory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Taste;—lastly, when the four (Touch, Colour, Odour and Taste) are apprehended (by the Tactile, the Visual, the Olfactory, and the Gestatory organs respectively) those same organs do not apprehend Sound; hence we infer the fifth, Auditory Organ, which serves the 'purpose' of apprehending Sound. Thus, from the fact that the purpose of one sense-organ is not served by another, it follows that there are *five* Sense-organs.

Sūtra 57

[*Objection*]—"**What is asserted cannot be accepted; because the 'objects' are many (and not 'five')**".

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—"That there are '*five*' sense-organs cannot be regarded as rightly proved by the fact that *the objects of the sense-organs are fivefold*. Why?—*Because the said objects are many* The 'objects' of the Sense-organs are several; *e. g.*, there are three kinds of Touch—the *cool*, the *hot* and *the neither-cool-nor-hot*; there are endless colours—in the shape of white, green and the rest; there are three odours—agreeable, disagreeable and indifferent; there are several tastes—the bitter and the rest; Sound is diverse; appearing in the form of letters as also in that of mere indistinct sound. In view of these facts,

the man who would hold the sense-organs to be *five* on the ground of the objects of the Sense-organs being five-fold, should also have to admit that there are many (more than five) Sense-orgns, because the objects of the sense-organs are many."

Sūtra 58

[*Answer*]—Inasmuch as (the several kinds of Odour are) nothing more than 'odour,' there can be no denial of Odour or the rest (as constituting the 'five Sense-organs').

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, Odour (Colour, Test, Touch and Sound) have their exact extension precisely determined through their respective Universals ·—so that the perceptions of these can be rightly regarded as indicating the existence of distinct apprehending instruments, only when it is found that they (the perceptions) are such as are *not* brought about by the same (or similar) instruments.* Further, the argument that has been put forward (in Sū. 56) has for its subject the 'perceptible things' *as grouped under well-defined heads*, and not *individual things, severally*; while your denial (in Sū. 57) of the number 'five' as applied to 'perceptible things' refers to individual things regarded severally Consequently the denial cannot be regarded as right and proper.†

"But how do you know that Odour and the rest have their extension precisely determined through their respective Universals?"

Well, as a matter of fact, the three kinds of Touch—the cool, the warm and the neither-warm-nor-cool—are all grouped

* The reading न प्रयोजयन्ति is wrong; the right reading is प्रयोजयन्ति as found in the two Puri Mss. and in the *Bhāṣyacandra*, and also supported by the *Bhāṣya* below.

† All Odours are apprehended by the same organ; hence they are grouped under one head, and regarded as 'one', similarly with Colour, Taste, Touch and Sound. Hence these five groups justify the assumption of five 'Sense-organs'. The Opponent takes each Odour as a distinct unit, and for each such unit he would have one organ; and hence he does not agree to restrict the number of organs to five only. But when all Odours are actually found to be apprehended by the same organ, there is nothing to justify the assumption of several organs for the apprehending of Odour.

(and unified) under the single *Universal* of 'Touch'; so that when we perceive the *cool* Touch (by the Tactile Organ), the perception of the other two kinds of Touch—the *warm* and the *neither-warm-nor-cool*—cannot indicate, or justify the assumption of, other instruments (distinct from the said Tactile Organ); for the simple reason that all the several kinds of Touch are as a matter of fact perceptible by the same instrument; that is the other two kinds of Touch also are actually perceived by means of the same organ as the *cool* Touch. Similarly, all kinds of Odour are included under the single group 'Odour', all kinds of Colour under 'Colour', all kinds of Taste under 'Taste' and all kinds of Sound under 'Sound' As for the perceptions of Odour (Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound), on the other hand, each of these is found to be obtained by means of a different kind of instrument, and as such they indicate so many different organs. From all this it becomes established that 'because the objects of the Sense-organs are five-fold, there are five Sense-organs.'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

[Says the Opponent]—"If things can be grouped under a *Universal*, then it follows that all the Sense-organs—

Sūtra 59

"should be regarded as 'one', their (several) objects being no more than 'object'.

BHĀSYA

"That is to say, all objects being included under the single *Universal* of 'object' [the 'objects of the Sense-organs' are *one*, from which it follows that there is only one Sense-organ]"

Sūtra 60

[*Answer*]—**Not so; because of the fivefoldness—(*a*) of the signs (or indicatives) in the shape of Perceptions, (*b*) of the location, (*c*) of the process (operation), (*d*) of the shape (magnitude) and (*e*) of the constituents**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, objects are never found to have their extension determined through the Universal of 'Object'; and hence they cannot all be inferred as perceptible by any single organ, independently of other organs, in the case of Odour etc.,

on the other hand, we find that they do have their extension determined by their respective Universals 'Odour' and the rest; and as such they are inferred as perceptible—each by a distinct Sense-organ. Hence what is urged (in Su. 59) is entirely irrelevant.

This is what is described in detail in the Sutra:—

(A) *Because of the fivefoldness of the signs in the shape of Perceptions*; what indicate the existence of Sense-organs are our own perceptions, since the presence of Sense-organs is proved only by the perception that we have of certain things;—this has been already explained in the Bhāṣya on Sū 56, which speaks of the 'fivefoldness of the objects of the Sense-organs';—thus then, inasmuch as the 'indicatives of Sense-organs', in the shape of perceptions, are fivefold, the Sense-organs must be five

(B) The *location* also of the Sense-organs is *fivefold*: (1) The Tactile Organ, which is indicated by the perception of Touch, has its *location* throughout the body; (2) the Visual Organ, which, as issuing out of the body, is indicated by the perception of Colour, has its *location* in the pupil of the Eye; (3) the Olfactory organ has its *location* in the Nose; (4) the Gestatory organ has its *location* in the Tongue; (5) the Auditory Organ has its *location* in the cavity of the Ear,*—all this being proved by the fact that the five organs have their existence indicated by the perceptions of Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound.

(C) On account of the fivefoldness of the *processes* also there is diversity in the Sense-organs: *e. g.*, (in visual perception) the Visual Organ encased in the pupil issues outside and then gets at the objects possessed of Colour; the Organs of Touch (Taste and Odour) on the other hand are themselves got at by the objects, which latter reach the Organs by the movements of the

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks that, inasmuch as the Auditory organ consists of *Ākāśa* it is not right to locate it in the Ear-cavity. To avoid this difficulty, it offers other explanations of the compound '*karnachidrādhiṣṭhānam*'. (1) '*chidram*', 'cavity', stands for a particular form of contact; and '*karna*' stands for an object made up of earth-particles. and '*adhiṣṭhāna*' stands for auxiliary; hence the whole compound means 'that which has for its auxiliary an object made up of earth-particles'.—or (2) 'that which is the *adhisthāna*,—substratum,—of the contact of the Ear'.—Both these interpretations would apply to the *Ākāśa*.

body in which the Organs exist; while the contact of the Auditory Organ with the Sound (heard) is obtained by reason of this latter proceeding in a series.

(D) '*Ākṛti*, shape,' stands for the exact limit or extent of magnitude, and this is found to be fivefold. The Olfactory, the Gestatory and the Tactile Organs have their shape or magnitude restricted to their respective substrata (in the body ; the shape of the Olfactory organ is the same as that of the Nose, and so forth),—and are inferred (as distinct from the perception of their objects) ;—while the Visual organ, though located in the pupil, moves out of the socket and pervades over the object ;—while, lastly, the Auditory Organ is nothing other than Ākāśa itself, and like *Ākāśa*, is all-pervading,—being inferred only from the perception of Sound ; and yet this Organ manifests or renders audible only certain particular sounds,—being restricted in its scope by the substratum (body) in which it subsists, by reason of the force of the peculiar faculties (of Merit and Demerit) belonging to the person concerned.*

(E) By *Jāti*, 'Constituent', is meant 'source'; the 'sources' or 'constituents' of the Sense-organs are five, in the shape of the rudimentary substances, Earth (Air, Water, Light and Ākāśa). It follows therefore that, because the 'constituents' are five, the Sense-organs also must be five.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

(The *Sānkhya* asks)—" How do you know that the Sense-organs have their source in the *rudimentary substances*, and not in *Unmanifested Primordial Matter* ? "

[The answer is given in the following Sūtra] .

Sūtra 61

The Sense-organs are regarded as being of the same nature as the Rudimentary Substances, because there is perception (by their means) of the specific qualities of these substances.

* Though the Auditory organ is nothing more than the all-pervading Ākāśa, yet it cannot apprehend all Sounds in the world, because its scope is restricted by the disabilities of the body in which it subsists,—this connection of a particular organ with a particular object being determined by the merit and demerit of the man to whom it belongs.

BHĀṢYA

In the case of Air and the other rudimentary substances we find that there is a restriction as to the perception of particular qualities; e. g. Air serves to manifest Touch; Water serves to manifest Taste; Light serves to manifest Colour; as for Earth, one earthy thing (oil, *f. i.*,) serves to manifest the odour of another earthy thing (the *kuṅkuma*, *f. i.*,);—this restriction as to the perception of the specific qualities of rudimentary substances is found in the case of the Sense-organs also [*e. g.* the Olfactory Organ manifests *Odour* only, the Tactile Organ *Touch* only, and so forth]; hence from the fact that there is restriction as to the perception of the specific qualities of Rudimentary Substances, we conclude that the Sense-organs have their source in (are constituted by) those Substances, and not in Unmanifested Primordial Matter.*

SECTION (9)

(*Sūtra 62–73*)

Examinations of the 'Objects' of Sense-organs.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been mentioned† above (in Sū. 1-1-14) that Odour etc., are the qualities of Earth, and inasmuch as this assertion would be true if Earth etc., had each only one quality, as well as

* The *Tātparya* makes the following observation :—By the declaration that there are only five Sense-organs, it is implied, that the other five—Hands, Feet etc.—which also have been regarded as 'Sense-organs'—are not 'Sense-organs'; and the reason for this lies in the fact that they do not fulfill the conditions of the 'Sense-organ'; these conditions are—(1) that they should be connected with the Body, (2) they should be distinct from the defects of *saṃskāras* and (3) they should be the direct instruments of cognition; and these (specially the last) are not present in Hands, Feet, etc.

† What this refers to is not the mere 'mention', '*uddeśa*' of the Objects; it apparently refers to their 'definition', '*lakṣaṇa*'. The *Tātparya* says—'With a view to *examine* the nature of *objects*, the *Bhāṣyakāra* recalls the definition provided under Sū. 1-1-14'; the mere 'mention' of 'objects' has been made under 1-1-1. The *Pariśuddhi* adds that the purpose underlying the examination of the 'objects' is the proving of the main thesis that there are several sense-organs, as also the discarding of the objections against the definition of Earth etc.

if they had several qualities,* the author of the Sūtra adds the following Sūtras —

Sūtras 62 and 63

From among Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound,—*those ending with Touch* belong to Earth (Sū. 62); **and [from among those ending with Touch] excluding from the beginning, one by one, they belong respectively to Water, Light and Water; and to Ākās'a belongs the latter.** (Sū 63).†

BHĀSYA

'From among those ending with Touch'—this term, with its (former Nominative) case-ending changed (into the Genitive)—has to be construed along with Sū 63 §

To Ākāśa belongs the latter—i. e Sound,—so called *in reference to those ending with Touch*.‡ "Why then is the comparative suffix '*tarap*' used [when the reference is to the *four* qualities of Odour etc, while '*tarap*' is used when one thing is referred to *one* other thing]?" The word is an independent positive adjective (and not a comparative term ending with '*tarap*') and all that it signifies is 'that which comes after'; and in Sū. 1-1-14,—where all five are mentioned—'Sound' comes after

* Here the author propounds the doubt that forms the basis of the present enquiry As regards the assertion in Sū 1-1-14, it may mean, either—(1) that each one of Odour, Colour etc, belongs to each one of Earth, Light etc., or (2) that among Earth and the rest, some have one quality, some two; or (3) that all belong to all.—*Vārtika*. On this the *Pariśuddhi* remarks—The question is—Is the assertion in Sū 1-1-14 meant to be *restrictive* (of one quality to one substance)? or *alternative* (one possessing one quality, one several and so forth)? or *cumulative* (all possessing all)? Or the doubt may be in regard to Odour, Colour, etc.;—some qualities are common to all substances, some belong to only a few;—to which of these categories do Odour &c belong?

† These are two *Sūtras*—according to the *Vārtika* and also according to the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ This term is necessary in Sū. 63 and it can be brought only from the foregoing Sūtra, there however it has the Nominative ending. hence when construed with Sū. 63, its case-ending has to be changed. The meaning is that Earth has Odour, Taste, Colour and Touch, Water has Taste, Colour and Touch; Light has Colour and Touch; Air has only Touch.

‡ The term '*spārśaparyanth*' of the previous *Sūtra*', with the case-ending changed into the form '*Sparahaparyantēbhyoḥ*', being brought in from the preceding *Sūtra*.

'those ending with the Touch'. Or the word may be taken as a relative term,—the reference being to 'Touch' only; the meaning being 'among those ending with Touch, that which is last, *i. e.* Touch,—in reference to this, Sound is 'latter'.

Sūtra 64

[*The Pūrvapakṣin objects*]—"**The view expressed cannot be accepted; because all the qualities (attributed to the Substances) are not apprehended (by the Sense-organs constituted by them).**"

BHĀṢYA

[The Pūrvapakṣin, holding the view that each one of the substances, is possessed of only one quality, objects to the view put forward in the preceding *Sūtra*]—" The said distribution of qualities is not right.—Why?—Because as a matter of fact, all the qualities that have been attributed to the various substances (under the preceding Sūtra) are not apprehended by the Sense-organs composed by those substances. For example, by the Olfactory Organ, which is composed of Earth, all the four qualities ending with *Touch* are not apprehended; it is *Odour* alone that is apprehended by it. Similarly with the others also."

In what manner then are the Qualities to be distributed?—asks the *Siddhāntin.*

[The Pūrvapakṣin answers this question and propounds his theory in the next Sūtra.]

Sūtra 65

[*The Pūrvapakṣin says*]—"**Inasmuch as each of the qualities subsists, one by one, in each of the Substances, one after the other,—there is no apprehension of the others.**"*

BHĀṢYA

" As a matter of fact, from among Odour (Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound), each subsists, one by one, respectively in Earth, (Water, Light, Air, and Ākāśa). Hence 'there is no apprehension of the others'—*i. e.* (*a*) 'of the other three qualities,' (*b*) 'of the other two qualities' and (*c*) 'of the other quality', that is to say, (*a*) there is no apprehension, by the

* The right reading is एकैकश्येन as found in Sū. Ms. D, in Puri Sūtra. Mss. A and B; in *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, and also in the *Vārtika*.

Olfactory Organ of Taste, Colour and Touch,—(*b*) there is no apprehension, by the Gestatory Organ, of Colour and Touch,—(*c*) there is no apprehension, by the Visual Organ, of Touch."

Question—If such is the case, then, how is it that the Rudimentary Substances (Earth and the rest) are actually perceived as possessing *several* qualities?

Answer—"The perception of several qualities is due to admixture,* that is, that Taste and the other qualities are perceived in Earth is due to the Mixture (*i. e*, presence therein) of particles of Water and the other substances. Similarly with the others."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *Siddāntin* asks]—If such be the case, then there should be no restriction; inasmuch as there is no restriction in the association of the substances, there should be no such restriction as that 'Earth has *four* qualities', 'Water has *three* qualities', 'Light has *two* qualities' and 'Air has *one* quality.'

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers]—"Certainly restriction is possible."—How?

Sūtra 66

"Because the preceding is permeated by the succeeding."

BHĀSYA

"As a matter of fact, among Earth (Water, Light, Air and Ākāśa), that which precedes is permeated by what succeeds it; and on account of this (restricted) mixture or association, there is restriction (in regard to the qualities).†

"All this is to be learnt from the account (contained in the Purāṇas) of the creation of things; and it cannot be

† This is printed as Sūtra in the Viz. edition; but no such Sūtra is found anywhere; and from the *Bhāṣya* below (*e.g.*) it is clear that the *Pūrvapakṣa* consists of only three Sūtras.

* Earth is permeated by all the other four substances, hence all those qualities are found in it; Water is permeated by all but Earth, hence it is found to possess all qualities except *Odour*; and so with the rest.

This is the explanation of the *Tātparya*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains he Sūtra as—'Earth is permeated by Water etc., and Water by Earth etc.' But this is not in keeping with the *Bhāṣya*.

directly known now (by us; since the matter is beyond the reach of our mind)."*

Sūtra 67

(*Siddhānta*)—Not so; because the Earthy and the Aqueous Substances are both actually perceived [with distinct qualities of their own.]†

BHĀSYA

'*Not so*'—denies all that has been stated in the preceding three *Sutras*. And the reason for this denial is given in the next phrase—*because the Earthy Substance (Earth) and Aqueous Substance (Water) are both actually perceived*. [If the *Pūrvapaksa* theory were true, and each of the Substances had only one quality, then] according to the principle that 'Perception is due to large magnitude, to composition by several components and to Colour,' the *Luminous Substance* (Light) alone would be perceptible, and not either Earth or Water; since the two latter are devoid of Colour (according to the *Pūrvapaksa*, and the presence of Colour is a necessary condition of perceptibility).§ As a matter of fact, however, Earth and Water are as perceptible as Light Nor will it be right to attribute the presence of several

* Such is the explanation given by the *Tātparya*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains that all this peculiar creation in which the substances are associated together in this peculiar fashion is the result of God's peculiar powers; and hence it cannot be questioned; it must be accepted as true, as described in the Scriptures.

† The *Bhāṣya* has provided four explanations of the Sūtra, embodying the following four statements—(a) Earth and Water are actually perceived, (b) they are perceived with distinct tastes, colours and touches; (c) they are perceived with distinct qualities of their own; and (d) each of the Substances, Earth, Water etc. is perceived as mixed up with the rest. We have adopted (c) alone in the translations, as it is the widest, and as such practically includes the others.

§ Even according to the Opponent, Earth, Water and Light are held to be perceptible by the Eye; but according to the view that each substance has only one quality, Earth would have Odour only, and Water would have Taste only; so that both of these being devoid of Colour, would be invisible; and Light would be the only visible substance. Nor will it be right to assert that the visibility of Earth and Water is due to their association with Light. For such association, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, is present in Air and Ākāśa also; so that these two also should be perceptible by the Eye.—*Tātparya*.

qualities in a substance to its association with other substances; because if one holds that the perceptibility of Earth and Water is due to the presence therein of such Colour as belongs to another substance (Light) which is mixed with it,—then, for him, Air also should be equally perceptible; or you should find some explanation for the restriction (that while Earth and Water are perceptible, Air is not perceptible) [the condition of perceptibility, in the shape of mixture with Light, being equally present in all the three].

(*b*) Or, the clause '*because the Earthy and the Aqueous are perceived*' may mean 'because distinct tastes of Earth and Water are perceived; *i.e.*, as a matter of fact, the taste of Earth is of six kinds, while that of Water is only *sweet*, and this could not be, if the two were actually mixed up. Or, *because distinct Colours of Earth and Water are perceived*; while if the Colour of Earth and Water were due only to the Colour of the Light mixed up with them, then such Colour would serve only to illumine (render perceptible) other things, and it would itself not be illumined (and perceived); '* as a matter of fact however the Colours of Earth and Water are *actually perceived*, as being of several kinds and of only one kind respectively; *e.g.*, the Colour of Earthy things is of several kinds, green, red, yellow and so forth; while the Colour of Water is only white, and that also illuminative in its character:—such a phenomenon is never found in the case of Substances consisting only of the mixture of several substances, each endowed with only one quality.

The Sutra has mentioned 'Earth' and 'Water' only by way of illustration. The same is true of other things also which we proceed to show in detail.

The reason for our denying the Pūrvapakṣa is—*because of Earth and Light, distinct touches are perceived*; *i.e.*, the touch of Earth is *neither-hot-nor-cold*, while that of Light is actually perceived as *hot*; and no such phenomenon would be possible

* For the *Colour of Light is* only *White-light*, which, while itself not perceptible, renders other things perceptible. Hence if the Colour in Earth and Water were only the Colour of Light, it would not be itself perceived; while the Colour of Earth and Water are actually perceived; these Colours must belong to something other than Light.

if both (Earth and Fire) were mixed up with Air, which is *neither-hot-nor-cold*.

(*c*) Or, the phrase, 'because the Earthy and Aqueous substances are perceived,' may mean that *both these substances, Earth and Water, are actually perceived with distinct qualities of their own* ; *e. g.* Earthy things are perceived with four qualities, and Aqueous things are perceived with only three ; and from this we conclude that the *constituent Earth* (of the Earthy substance) is also endowed with those same (four) qualities ; because the finished product is indicative of the nature of its cause, which, by reason of its being the cause, is regarded as modifiable (into that product). Similarly, inasmuch as the Earthy and Luminous Substances are perceived as possessed of distinct qualities, we conclude that the constituents of these also must be possessed of these same distinct qualities.

(*d*) Or, [The *Sūtra* may be explained to mean that] a difference is actually perceived between Earthy and Aqueous substances, both of which are distinctly perceived; that is to say, it is actually perceived that Earthy Substances are mixed up with Water (Light and Air),—that Aqueous Substances are mixed up with other two substances (Light and Air),–and Luminous Substances are mixed up with Air ; and not a single substance is ever found to be possessed of only one quality.

As for the reasoning propounded in Sū. 66—"because the preceding is permeated by the succeeding [restriction of qualities becomes possible]"—it is no reasoning at all ; because we do not find in it any reason leading up to the conclusion,—on the strength whereof we could accept the Proposition. As for the assertion (made by the Opponent, in the *Bhāṣya*, on Sū. 66)—" that the preceding is permeated by the succeeding is to be learnt from the account, contained in the Purāṇas, of the creation of the things, and it cannot be directly known now "—is not right : because there would be no ground for the restriction [that Odour only should subsist in Earth, that it subsists in Earth only, and so forth].* Further,

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* explains the passage as translated. The *Tātparya* offers a somewhat different explanation :—"There is no evidence according to you, in support of the view that Odour subsists in Earth only ; for the

it is actually seen even now that 'the preceding substance is permeated by the succeeding;' *e. g*, Light (Fire) is permeated by Air [so that the assertion referred to is not true, being contrary to a fact of perception]. Then again, 'permeation' is only a kind of *contact*, and this is equal to both; so that there can be no explanation for the fact that, while Light becomes endowed with Touch by reason of its being permeated by Air, Air does not become endowed with Colour, though it is permeated by Light. Further, it is actually seen that the Touch of Air (which is neither-hot-nor-cold) is suppressed by the Touch of Light (which is hot), and becomes imperceptible (by reason of that suppression), and certainly a thing cannot be suppressed by itself [and this is what the said phenomenon would mean if the touch of Light were due to its permeation by Air; as in that case the said suppression would mean that the *Touch of Air* is suppressed by the *Touch of Air*]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Having thus repudiated a theory opposed to all reason the *Sūtra* next turns to answer the argument (put forward under Sū. 64)—that "the view cannot be accepted, because all the qualities (attributed to Substances) are not apprehended by the Sense-organs constituted by them":—

Sūtra 68

Inasmuch as from among the qualities [of the organs of Olfaction, Gestation, Vision, Touch and Audition] there is an excess (in each Organ) of each of the qualities [Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound], one by one, in the order in which they are mentioned,—each Organ is regarded as preponderating in that quality.*

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only arguments that you propound are against such a conception; hence the account of the creation of things, referred to you, must be taken as figurative, not literally true."

* We have translated the *Sūtra* according to the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. The *Vārtika* does not accept this view, on the ground that—"if the predominance of an Organ consisted of its apprehending a certain object, then all Organs would be equally predominant; for every Organ apprehends its object." But the *Vārtika* apparently misunderstands the expression *tattatpradhānam* of the *Bhāṣya*: it does not mean that each of the *Organs* respectively is predominant, as the *Vārtika* seems to take it—but that each

BHĀṢYA

Hence [because of the fact mentioned in the Sūtra] there can be no apprehension (by any sense-organ) of all qualities. Among the qualities of the Olfacrory and other Organs—*i. e.*, among Odour and the rest—there being an excess (in each Organ) of the preceding quality (over the succeeding qualities)—each organ is regarded as preponderating in that quality.

"What does this *predominance* mean?"

It means that the Organ is capable of apprehending that object.

"What is meant by the '*excess*' of a quality in an Organ?"

It means that that Organ has the capacity of manifesting (rendering cognisable) that quality.

[The meaning of the Sūtra thus is as follows]—Just as the external substances of Earth, Water and Light,—which are endowed respectively with four, three, and two qualities—are capable of manifesting, not all these qualities, but only Odour, Taste and Colour, respectively;—and this is on account of the fact that in these substances there is an excess of the qualities of Odour, Taste and Colour, respectively,—in the same manner the Organs of Olfaction, Gestation and Vision,—which are endowed respectively with four, three and two qualities,—are capable of apprehending, not all qualities, but only Odour, Taste and Colour respectively,—and this on account of the fact that

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of the Organs has that for its predominant quality, and this predominance is indicated by the Sense-organ manifesting that only; and this is not open to the objection urged in the *Vārtika*. Further, the *Vārtika* explanation has no point; if the Olfactory Organ is predominant, as endowed with the largest number of qualities (four),—what can that have to do with its apprehending *Odour only*, which is the point at issue? In fact, that it is endowed with four qualities should make it capable of apprehending all those qualities. The *Tātparya* has attempted to justify the *Vārtika's* interpretation

The *Bhāṣyacandra* follows the *Vārtika*; but Vishvanātha accepts the *Bhāṣya*. *Vardhamāna* also in the *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, offers the following explanation of the Sūtra—'Inasmuch as among the qualities of the Olfactory and other Sense-organs, there is an excess of the preceding over the succeeding qualities, each of the Organs is predominant through that quality, hence it cannot apprehend *all* qualities; it can apprehend only that quality (in its manifested form) whose presence imparts to it the said predominance."

in each of the Organs there is an excess of those qualities, Odour, Taste and Colour respectively.—Hence [inasmuch as the Organs are not possessed of the capacity of apprehending all qualities] there can be no apprehension, by the Olfactory and other Organs, of all qualities.

[On the other hand] If one holds that—"the Olfactory Organ apprehends Odour, *because it is endowed with Odour*, and so on with the Gestatory and other Organs"—then, it should be possible for each of the other Organs, of Olfaction and the rest, to apprehend all the qualities that it is endowed with* [which would not meet the Opponent's objection]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The question now arises—"To what is this restriction due —that only one organ is composed of the *Earth* ; and not all ? —that only a few are composed of Water and Light particles, and not all ?"† *Answer*—

Sūtra 69

The restriction (as to one organ being composed of Earth, and so forth) is due to preponderance (*i.e.* singularity).§

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* Under the theory noticed—according to which the fact that the Olfactory Organ apprehends Odour, *because it is possessed of Odour*, and not because there is an excess of Odour in it—the Organ should apprehend all the four qualities of Odour, Taste, Colour, and Touch, with which it is held to be endowed. So that the contingency of one Organ apprehending all qualities would remain possible.

† The question simply means that one organ (Olfactory) is held to be composed of Earth, the Gestatory Organ of Water, the Visual Organ of Light, and so forth : now to what is all this restriction due ? Agreeably to this, the *Tātparya* puts the question as—"Whence do you get at the restriction that it is the Olfactory Organ alone that apprehends Odour ?" The *Vārtika* and Vishvanātha put the question differently—"Why is not every substance composed of Earth regarded as the 'Olfactory Organ' ? The *Bhāṣyacandra* and the *Nyāyasūtravivarana* put the question in the simplest form—"What are the reasons for regarding the Olfactory Organ alone as composed of Earth, the Gestatory Organ alone as composed of Water and so forth ?" With the exception of the *Vārtika* and *Viśvanātha*, all are in agreement with the *Bhāṣya*.

§ The *Bhāṣya* has explained the expression '*bhūyastvāt*' of the Sūtra to mean *prakṛṣṭatvāt*, due to superiority or singularity. Would it not be simpler to take it as meaning simply *preponderance ?*—the argument being that 'the Olfactory Organ is regarded as of Earth, because Earth forms the

BHĀṢYA

[In the formation of a thing] there is a coming together (amalgamation) of such distinct substances as are capable of bringing about the requisite thing—this amalgamation being regulated by the destiny (merit-demerit) of men (to whom the thing is to belong); it is *this amalgamation of distinct substances* that constitutes the 'preponderance' [which means 'singularity'] —of the thing; the word 'preponderance' is found to be used in the sense of 'singularity' or 'excellence', e.g., an *excellent* thing is called 'preponderating'. For instance, such things as Poison, Medicinal Plant, Gem and so forth, which are produced under the influence of the destiny of Men, are capable of accomplishing distinct purposes; and all things do not accomplish all purposes. In the same manner, when the Olfactory and other organs are produced, they are capable of apprehending only certain distinct things,—and not all things.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question.—"Why is it that the Sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities?"*

[The answer is given by the following *Sūtra*]—

Sūtra 70

Because it is only as endowed with qualities that the Sense-organs are what they are.

BHĀṢYA

The Olfactory and other organs do not, as a matter of fact, apprehend their own qualities, Odour and the rest. If you ask —"Why is this so?"—our answer is that it is only as endowed with their respective qualities that the Olfactory and other Organs are regarded as 'Sense-organs'. That is to say, the

preponderating element in its constitution. In view of this we have translated the said expression as 'preponderance', which is its natural signification, and placed the *Bhāṣya* rendering as a parenthetical explanation.

* "If, for instance, the Olfactory Organ is, as the Siddhāntin holds, endowed with Odour, how is it that the Organ does not perceive this Odour present in itself?"

Viśvanātha introduces the Sūtra somewhat differently —'The Sūtra proceeds to prove that the Sense-organs are actually endowed with the qualities of Odour, etc.'

Olfactory Organ apprehends outside Odour, only when it is itself accompanied by Odour which serves the same purpose (of making perceptible the Odour, of other things) as the organ itself; so that it cannot apprehend its own Odour, for the simple reason that in this the necessary auxiliary (in the shape of its own Odour) would be wanting. Similarly with the other sense-organs.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

If it be held that—"The Odour of the Olfactory Organ would itself be the requisite auxiliary also",—then our answer is—

Sūtra 71

Because a thing cannot be apprehended by itself.

BHĀSYA

There can be no apprehension, by the Sense-organs, of their own qualities In fact, the assertion made is exactly like the statement—"Just as an external substance is apprehended by the Eye, so, by the Eye, that same Eye itself should be apprehended;" for in both cases (the apprehension of the Eye by itself, and of the organ's quality by itself), the causes of requisite apprehension are wanting [*i.e.*, The quality, forming an integral part of the Sense-organ, cannot be apprehended by the same organ; nothing can operate upon itself.]

Sūtra 72

[*Objection*]—"**What is asserted cannot be accepted; because the quality of Sound is actually perceived.**"

BHĀṢYA

"It is not true that the Sense-organs do not apprehend their own qualities; because Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, and yet it is its own quality [Sound being the quality of *Ākāsa*, and the Auditory Organ being nothing other than *Ākāśa*]."

Sūtra 73

Answer—**The said apprehension is due to the fact of the quality (Sound) and the substance (Ākās'a) being unlike other qualities and substances.**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, it is not as endowed with a particular Sound that Ākāśa becomes the (Auditory) Sense-organ possessed

of a quality ;* and Sound is not the manifester of Sound [so that the Auditory organ consisting of Ākāśa differs from the other organs consisting of Earth etc., because it is only as possessed of Odour that Earth constitutes the Olfactory organ, and so forth; while Ākāśa forms the Auditory organ by its very nature ;—and Sound also differs from Odour].

Further, that the Olfactory and other organs apprehend their own qualities is known neither by Perception, nor by Inference ; while as regards the Ākāśa of the Auditory organ, we do know, by Inference, that Sound *is* apprehended by it ; and Sound is the quality of Ākāśa. The Inference that leads to this Cognition is that which operates by elimination : [among the Substances that could be regarded as the Auditory organ, to which alone Sound could belong as a quality] the Soul is the *hearer*, and not the *instrument* (of hearing) [Hence the Soul can not be the Auditory organ] ;—if the Mind were the Auditory organ, then (Mind being imperishable) there would be no possibility of deafness ,—as regards Earth (Water, Light and Air), though they have the capacity of becoming (composing) the organs of Olfaction and the rest, they do not have the capacity of forming the Auditory organ;—*Ākāśa* thus is the only substance left ;—hence it is concluded that it is *Ākāśa* that forms the Auditory Organ.

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* That is, it is *not* by reason of its having Sound for its quality that the Auditory organ is an organ of perception ; by its very nature is the Auditory organ Ākāśa. The quality of Sound that belongs to Ākāśa of the Auditory organ could not be the same that is apprehended by it.

DISCOURSE III

DAILY LESSON II

SECTION 1

Transient Character of Buddhi—Cognition.

Sūtras 1-9

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The *Sense-organs* and *Objects* have been fully examined; now it is the turn of the Examination of *Buddhi*, Cognition.* And the first question that arises is—Is Cognition eternal or non-eternal?

"Why should there be this doubt?"

Sūtra 1

The Doubt arises by reason of the similarity (of Cognition) to Action and Ākās'a.

BHĀSYA

(*a*) The 'similarity' of Cognition to Action and Ākāśa consists in *intangibility*; (*b*) and further, in Apprehension we do not perceive any such definite character as either *liability to production and destruction*—which would mark it as *non-eternal*—or the contrary [*i.e.*, *non-liability to production and destruction*] which would mark it as *eternal*; hence [all necessary conditions of

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* The Agent (Soul), the Instrument (the Sense-organs) and the Objects of Apprehension or Cognition having been duly examined, it is now the turn of the examination of the nature of Cognition or Apprehension itself.—*Bhāṣyacandra.*

The things outside the Body having been examined, the Author next proceeds to examine those within the Body,—says the *Pariśuddhi*. On this Varḍhamāna makes the following observations —

When it is said that the things now going to be examined exist *in the Body*, it cannot mean that they subsist or inhere in it, as in this sense Cognition and Mind cannot be said to exist in the body; nor can it mean that they are in physical contact with it; as this would not be true of Cognition, and also because many external things also are in contact with the Body. What is meant is that the coming Lesson deals with such objects of Cognition as are distinguished by the character of being the cause of experiences in connection with the Body. Such examination is conducive to that Disgust for things which is a necessary step towards Final Release.

Doubt, described under Sū. 1-1-23, being present] the said Doubt arises.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[An objection is raised against the above question]—"The doubt put forward is groundless; it is a fact known to every living being that Cognition is transient, being just like Pleasure and such experiences; every man has such notions as—'I shall know', 'I know' and 'I have known'; and the connection with the three points of time (involved in these conceptions) would not be possible if Cognition were *not liable to production and destruction* [So that it is not true that we do not find in Cognition the *liability to production and destruction*];* hence, inasmuch as Cognition is related to all three points of time (being, as it is, liable to production, existence and destruction), it follows as an established conclusion that it is *non-eternal*. Further, in the *Nyāya-sūtra* itself it has been asserted as a well-substantiated fact—(*a*) that 'Cognition is *produced* by the contact of the Sense-organs, and the Object' (Sū. 1-1-16), and (*b*) that 'the non-simultaneous *production* of Cognitions indicates the existence of Mind' (Sū. 1.1.16) [wherein it is taken for granted that Cognitions are *produced*, from which it follows that Cognition is *not-eternal*]; so that no further doubt and discussion should be called for."

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* The three notions mentioned imply that there is *production* of Cognition (as involved in the notion 'I shall know', which means that the Cognition shall be produced), there is Continuity of Cognition (as expressed by 'I know' which means that Cognition is *present*), and there is *destruction* of Cognition (as expressed by 'I have known', which means that the Cognition has come to an end).—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

The *Tātparya* puts the question somewhat differently:—"If by 'Buddhi' in the present context, you mean the individual cognition of things, then the whole discussion becomes pointless, as no one holds such cognitions to be other than momentary. If, on the other hand, you mean by *Buddhi*, the *Mahat* of the *Sāṅkhya*, then, before discussing the character of such a thing, it behoves you to discuss its very existence; as the Naiyāyika does not admit of any such universal Cosmic Principle as the 'Mahat' of the Sānkhya.

Vardhamāna has some observations to make in regard to the exact words in which the subject-matter of the discussion should be stated. In the sentence—'Is Buddhi eternal or non-eternal,' the term '*buddhi*' like every other term, denotes the *Universal 'buddhitva'*; and as this latter is eternal, according to all parties, there is no occasion for doubt on this matter.

Our answer (in justification of the present enquiry) is that the present enquiry is for the purpose of refuting the unreasonable assertions based upon false speculation; the Sāṅkhyas, speculating, in the realms of philosophy, assert that—"Buddhi, the Internal Organ of Man, is eternal"; and they also put forward arguments in support of this assertion, as in the following *Sūtra*.*

Sūtra 2

"Because there is re-cognition of things."

BHĀṢYA

"What is this 're-cognition'? 'Re-cognition' is the name of that re-collective cognition which is involved in the conception that we have in regard to one and the same thing, in the form—"I now cognise the same thing that I had cognised before'. Such

Nor can the question be stated in the form—'Is the *word buddhi* one whose *denotation* is eternal, or is it one whose *denotation* is not eternal?' Because it is possible to give the name to a person, whereby the physical body of that person would form the denotation of the word 'buddhi', and certainly there could be no question of this denotation being eternal. Some people have stated the question in the form—"Is the denotation of the term *buddhi*, which is the substratum of the *Universal 'buddhitva'*, eternal or non-eternal?" The Author himself would favour the question in the form—'Is *cognition* co-substrate with I-*ness* or not?' According to the *Sānkhya*, the *Buddhi-tattva* is the substratum of Cognition, which is something different from the Ātman, and as such *not* co-substrate with *I-notion*.

* Whether Buddhi is eternal or non-eternal is not the main subject of our present enquiry, this has been introduced only as a preliminary issue, which serves to establish the conclusion that there is no such thing as the Cosmic Thinking Principle, the Mahat, which the Sānkhya posits as something distinct from the ephemeral Cognitions of things. The fact of the matter is that if *Buddhi* were something eternal, then it would certainly be something different from the momentarily appearing and disappearing cognitions,—if on the other hand, the grounds put forward in proof of the eternality of *Buddhi*, are found to be incapable of establishing it, then there would be no justification for postulating any Universal Thinking Principle apart from the Cognitions; and it becomes established that 'Buddhi' and 'Cognition' are synonymous terms, as declared by the *Naiyāyika* in Sū. 1-1-15. It is in this manner also that the present enquiry becomes connected with the definition of Buddhi set forth in the *Sūtra* (1-1-15). There would be no such relevancy in the enquiry if it pertained merely to the eternality or non-eternality of *Buddhi*.—*Tātparya*.

re-collective cognition can be possible only when Cognition is eternal; for if there were several divergent Cognitions, capable of being produced and destroyed, no 're-cognition' would be possible for a thing *cognised* by one cannot be *re-cognised* by another".*

Sūtra 3

[*The Sidhāntin's answer to the Sānkhya argument*].

Inasmuch as what has been put forward is itself still to be proved, it cannot be accepted as a valid reason.

BHĀṢYA

Just as the 'eternality' of *Buddhi* is 'still to be proved,' so is also the fact that 're-cognition belongs to *Buddhi*' 'still to be proved', *i.e.*, not proved [it cannot be admitted];—why so?—because what belongs to an intelligent being cannot be attributed to an instrument; as a matter of fact, *Buddhi*,—which is spoken of as *jñāna* (Cognition), '*darshana*' (Perception), '*upalabdhi*' (Apprehension), '*bodha*' (Understanding), '*pratyaya*' (Cognizance), and '*adhyavasāya*' (Ascertainment),—is a quality of, and belongs to, the conscious Person; and it is only the conscious Person that *re-cognises* what he has *cognised* before; so that it is to this conscious Person only that 'eternality' can be attributed, on the ground of 'recognition'.† If it be held that 'Consciousness' (or 'Intelligence') belongs to the instrument [and not to the Soul; so that Recognition also would belong to the Instrument],—then it becomes necessary to explain the exact nature of the *conscious* (intelligent) being; for unless you define the exact nature of the 'Conscious Being', you cannot posit a totally different§ Soul (a Personality or conscious Being totally different from

* And according to the Sānkhya, Buddhi is eternal, and yet capable of under-going modifications; by virtue of which it becomes connected with the several cognitions involved in Re-cognition. This would not be possible of the Soul, which is eternal, unmodifiable.—*Tātparya*.

† It is the Person that *recognises*, 'recognition' belongs to him; hence if 'recognition' proves *eternality*, this eternality can belong only to the Conscious Person, and not to Buddhi, which, as the Iternal Organ, is a mere *instrument*; for this simple reason this Buddhi does not appear in the *Recognition* at all.—*Tātparya*.

§ The *Naiyāyika* posits one kind of Conscious Being in the shape of the Soul; the Opponent now posits the 'Conscious Being' in the shape of the Instrument, the Internal Organ. Before this can be accepted, the Opponent should explain what he exactly means by the 'Conscious Being'.

what is generally regarded as the Conscious Being). That is to say, if it be held that Cognition (Consciousness) belongs to the Internal Organ in the shape of the Mind, we ask you—of this 'conscious being' of yours, what is the exact form, what the character, and what the exact nature? And what does this 'Conscious Being' do with the cognition subsisting in the *Buddhi*?

If it be held that—"it cognises, *cētayatē*,"—our answer is that this expression would in no way differ from '*jñāna*', 'cognition'; that is to say, the two expressions—'the man *cognises*' and 'Buddhi *knows*'—would both connote *cognition*, and nothing else;* as the words *cētayatē* ('cognises') '*jānītē*', (knows) '*budhyate*' (understands), '*paśyati*' (perceives), '*upalabhate*' (apprehends),—all mean one and the same thing. "But *Buddhi* is what *makes things known*." That is just so; the *Person knows* and the *Buddhi makes known* things; but (under this theory) it thus becomes established that Cognition belongs to the Person (as held by the Siddhāntin), and *not* to the Internal Organ, 'Buddhi' (as held by the Pūrvapakṣin).†

[It having been proved that Cognition belongs to the person and not to Buddhi, the Author proceeds to refute the view that the actions denoted by the terms 'cognition', 'apprehension', 'understanding', are different from one another, and as such should belong to different entities]—If it be held that each of the actions denoted by the terms (above-mentioned) belong to distinct individual persons,—then it behoves you to show cause for your denial (of the view that they belong to the one and the same person). That is to say, if the Opponent holds the view that—"one person does the *cognising*, another the *understanding*, a third the *apprehending*, and a fourth the *perceiving*",—then it comes to this that all these persons,—the *cogniser*, the *under-*

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* 'What is spoken of as *cognising*, i.e., the Person, is nothing different from what is spoken of as *knowing*, i.e., Buddhi; so that '*Buddhi*' and 'Person' become 'synonymous terms'. This is the explanation of the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† One is said to 'know', when he brings about cognition in himself while one is said to 'make known' things when it brings about cognition in others; so that these two being totally different, *cognition* cannot belong to *Buddhi*, which, *ex-hypothesi*, only *makes* things *known*.'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

stander, the *apprehender* and the *perceiver*—are so many distinct persons, and *the corresponding qualities* (*of Cognition and the rest*) *do not belong to one and the same person.* Such being your view, (we ask you)—what is your reason for this denial? If you put forward "the non-difference of denotation" as your reason,—then the same may be said for us also. That is, if what you mean is that—"inasmuch as the words *cognises*, *apprehends* etc denote the same thing, it cannot be right to attribute (and restrict) them all to one and the same Person [and there would be no sense in predicating so many synonymous terms in reference to the same Agent]",—then the same fact (of sameness of denotation) may be equally urged against you also: For in the two expressions, 'the person *cognises*, *cetayate*', and 'the Buddhi *knows*, *jānāti*', there is no difference in the denotation of the terms 'cognises' and 'knows'; so that both (Person and Buddhi) being equally Cognitive or Conscious Beings, [there being no reason for predicating one of the Person, and the other of the Buddhi] one of the two must be rejected [and Cognition should be attributed to one only].*

* This passage is somewhat obscure; the obscurity being enhanced by the reading of the text. Several manuscripts, as also the *Vārtika*, read '*arthasyābheda iti samānam, abhinnārthā* etc. etc.' The only meaning that can be deduced from this text is as translated above; we have adopted this in the body of the text, in deference to the *Vārtika*. Several other manuscripts, however, among them the two Puri Mss., and also the *Bhāṣyacandra*, read '*arthasya bheda iti* etc. etc.' Apparently this is the better reading; because the proposition that the 'several qualities do not belong to the same individual' can be supported by the fact that the qualities expressed by the terms are different; if it were the same single quality denoted by them all, then there would be nothing wrong in predicating all the terms of the same individual. The difficulty in this reading, however, is that, the repeated reference to the argument of the preceding clause is found, in all manuscripts, in the form '*abhinnārthah etc.*', which shows that the preceding clause must be *arthasyābhedaḥ*.' The *Bhāṣyacandra* has made an attempt to construe this passage according to its own reading, by which the translation should stand thus:—"There is a difference in the denotation of the terms *cognises* etc., which are not synonymous;—if this is what you mean, then we may make a similar assertion: the words in question *are* synonymous [this assertion being as reasonable as yours, that they are *not* synonymous]; and hence it is not possible to make any distinction (either as to the qualities denoted by the words, or to the entities to whom the qualities belong). If you admit this (well-established fact),

If (with a view to escape from the above difficulties) it be held that—"the name '*buddhi*' stands for the Mind, being explained as '*budhyate anayā*', *that by means of which things are cognised* [i. e. it is the *Instrument*, not the *Agent* of cognition]; and the Mind is certainly eternal",—then our answer is that that may be so* (the Mind may be eternal); but the eternality of the Mind is not proved by *the recognition of things* (which has been urged by the Opponent as the reason for the eternality of *Buddhi*);—specially because as a mattter of fact, we find *Recognition* appearing even when there is a diversity of *Instruments*, only if the Cognitive Agent happens to be the same [so that Recognition cannot imply or prove the sameness and continuity of the *Instrument*]; -for as asserted in Su. 3-1-7,—'there is *recognition*, with the right eye, of what has been seen with the left'—an assertion made in regard to the Eye, but equally true of the Lamp also; there being recognition, of a thing previously seen with the help of one lamp, with the help of another. From all this it follows that what has been put forward by the Opponent (i. e. 'the recognition of things') is a reason for the eternality of the *Cognitive Agent* (Soul): and not for that of the *Instrument*, Buḍdhi).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The view has been held (by the *Sāṅkhya*) that—"From out of the *eternal* '*Buddhi*', there go forth, in reference to the single object cognised, emanations, which constitute the 'Cognitions' of those objects,—and that the 'Emanation' is nothing different from the Source from which it proceeds".—This, however—

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then the same may be said (in connection with what we are going to point out): That is, in the two expressions, 'the Person cognises' and 'the Buddhi knows', there is no difference in the denotation of the two terms 'cognises' and 'knows'; so that both Buḍḍhi and Person being cognitive entities, one or the other must be rejected (not regarded as really cognitive) [there being no room for two cognitive entities in the same body]."

It will be found that both these explanations involve a certain amount of forced construction. In that which has been adopted in the body of the text, the explanation of the phrase '*vyavasthānupapattiḥ*' is not entirely satisfactory; while the *Bhāṣyacandra* in several places has been forced to give up the construction of the passage, which appears to be the most natural, and most in keeping with the style of the *Bhāṣya*.

* The Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read '*astyetadevam*'; which means 'Mind is eternal, we admit that'.

Sūtra 4

is not right ; because there is no simultaneous cognition of things.

BHĀṢYA

If the 'Emanation' and its source were non-different,—then, inasmuch as the Source (Buddhi) is, *ex hypothesi*, eternal, the Emanations also should be always present (eternal); which would mean that all the cognitions of things that we have are eternal ; and if this is so, then, the cognitions of things should be simultaneous [which is an absurdity].

Sūtra 5

[Otherwise] the cessation of the cognition* would mean the destruction (cessation of the existence) [of the Internal Organ, Buddhi].

BHĀṢYA

[If Cognitions were not eternal, even though the same as *Buddhi*, then], whenever the Cognition (Emanation from Buddhi) ceases to exist (as it must, being transient), the 'Source of Emanation' also should cease to exist and this would mean that the Internal Organ (Buddhi, which is the source from which the Emanations in the shape of Cognitions, proceed) is destroyed. On the contrary [i.e. if even on the cessation of the *Emanation*, its *source* continues to exist], the two should have to be regarded as different from each other.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Mind, which is of limited magnitude (not all-pervading), comes into contact with the several sense-organs,† one by one (and at distinct points of time) ; so that—

Sūtra 6

inasmuch as the process is gradual, the apprehension is not simultaneous,—

BHĀṢYA

that is, of the objects of sense-perception. Hence it follows that the 'Emanation' and its 'Source' are distinct from each

* Here, as in Sū. 7, '*pratyabhijñāna*' stands for *cognition in general.*

† *i. e.* with the Soul, and the Sense-organs—says the *Bhāṣyacandra.*

other; for if they were one and the same, there would be no appearance and disappearance of them (which would be incompatible with the afore-mentioned *gradual* process).*

Sūtra 7

The non-apprehension of one thing is due to (the Mind) being occupied with other things.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*apratyabhijñāna*' here stands for 'non-apprehension' (and not for *non-recognition*). The 'non-apprehension' of a certain object is explained on the assumption that (at that time) the Mind is occupied with some other object; and this (explanation) is possible only on the presumption that the Emanation is something different from its Source; for if the two were one and the same, there would be no force in any previous 'occupation with other objects'.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

†If the Mind were all-pervading, its gradual contact with the Sense-organs, one by one,

Sūtra 8

would not be possible; because there is no movement—

* The clear meaning of the *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* is as translated; the term '*indriyārthānām*' being syntactically construed with the '*grahanam*' of the Sūtra. The *Bhāṣyacandra* however offers a different construction: According to it, the words of the *Bhāṣya* have no syntactical connection with those of the Sūtra, and the first sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is to be construed as—*indriyarthānām nānātvam* (there is diversity in the Sense-organs and in the objects of perception), *vṛttivṛttimatośca nānātvam* (there is diversity between the substratum of the emanation and the emanations themselves—i.e. the contact and the resultant cognition).

† This anticipates the argument that the mere fact of the Mind's contact with the Sense-organs being gradual does not necessarily imply that the Mind is not all-pervading, and yet it would be possible to have contact with the Sense-organs, one by one. The sense of the refutation is that this is not possible:—the term '*Saṁyogah*' of the *Bhāṣya* being syntactically connected with the '*na*' of the Sūtra. The gradual contact of a thing with another thing pre-supposes *movement*—moving from one place to the other—on the part of the former; no such movement is possible for a thing which is all-pervading; *i.e.*, occupying all points in space, it cannot, and need not, move from one place to another. Hence if Mind were all-pervading, it could not have movement; and hence it could not have gradual contact with the Sense-organs.

BHĀṢYA

The Sense-organs (before becoming operative) have to be got at by the Internal Organ; and the *moving*, necessary for this *getting at* something, cannot be present (in the Mind, if it is all-pervading); so that gradual operation being impossible, there can be no explanation for the (well-known) fact of apprehension being *non-simultaneous* (as urged in Sū. 6). For the non-simultaneity of apprehensions having been found impossible, by reason of the absence of *movement* in the *all-pervading* Mind, there is no other reason from which it could be inferred (by which it could be accounted for). *In the case of the Organ of Vision, though the fact of near and remote things (*e. g.* Hand and Moon respectively) being seen at the same time leads one to conclude that the Organ has no movement, yet the fact that it *has* movement is inferred from the reason in the shape of the phenomenon of obstruction of vision by the interposition of something else, between the Eye and the Hand (which is near), and between the Eye and the Moon (which is remote). [There is however no such reason or ground available for the inferring of movement in the Mind, in which movement is found to be apparently impossible by reason of its all-pervading character, according to the Opponent].

All this dispute does not arise in regard to the *existence* of the Internal Organ (Mind); nor in regard to its *eternality*; for that there *is* such an Internal Organ as the Mind, and that it is eternal, are well-established facts.† "In regard to what, then, does the dispute arise?" it arises in regard to its all-pervading character; and this character is denied (by the *Siddhāntin*) on the ground that *there is no proof for it* [lit., it is not found to be cognised by any instrument of right cognition].

[The *Bhāṣya* proceeds to show a further reason for rejecting the view that the Emanations, Cognitions, and their Source, *Buddhi*, are identical]—The internal Organ is *one*, while the Emanations, in the shape of Cognitions, are *many*; e. g., *visual* cognition, *olfactory* cognition, cognition *of Colour*, cognition *of*

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* The Author cites an example *per contra*.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The Naiyāyika also admits the Mind to be atomic and hence eternal. It is only Buddhi, Cognition, that he holds to be transient.

Odour; all this would be impossible if the Emanations and their source were identical.

From all this we conclude that it is the (Conscious) Person that cognises, and not the Internal Organ.*

By this fact (that it is the Person that knows, and not the Internal Organ)† what has been said by the Sāṅkhya in regard to the Mind being 'occupied with other things' becomes refuted; because 'being occupied with other things' can only mean 'apprehending other things'; and this belongs to the Person, not to the Internal Organ;§ though we do admit of the Mind also being 'occupied', in the sense that in one case it is in contact with a Sense-organ, while in another it is not in such contact. [But this does not justify the view that the apprehending is done by Buḍdhi, and not by the Person.]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent, the *Sāṅkhya*, says)—"Even when the 'Emanation' is identical with its Soutce, it cannot be (reasonably) asserted that 'the Internal Organ is *one*, and its Emanations many'. Because]

Sūtra 9

"the notion of its being different (diverse) is analogous to the notion of difference (diversity) in regard to the rock-crystal."

BHĀṢYA

"In regard to the Emanation (which, as identical with the Internal Organ, is, in reality, *one* only), there is a notion of its

* For the *Siddhāntin*, who regards the Emanations as different from their source, it is quite possible and reasonable that things are cognised by the Soul, by the instrumentality of such instruments as the Internal Organ and the several Sense-organs—*Tātparya*.

† Or the fact that the Internal Organ is not all-pervading—according to the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ He alone can be 'pre-occupied' who apprehends things; and inasmuch as it is the Person, and not the Internal Organ, that apprehends, it is only the person that can be said to be 'occupied by other things'. This however does not mean that no kind of 'occupation' is possible for the Internal Organ; 'occupation' in the sense of being in contact with the Sense-organs, is quite possible for the Internal Organ; it is only 'occupation' in the sense of 'apprehending things' that cannot belong to it.

being many (diverse), by reason of its being associated, or in contact, with diverse objects ;—just in the same manner as, in regard to the rock-crystal, which is in contact with other (coloured) substances, there is the notion of its being different (from the pure *white* rock-crystal),—when the crystal is spoken of as being 'blue' or 'red' (as distinguished from the *white* crystal)."*

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the above view of the *Sānkhya*]—*We cannot accept the above, as there is no reason in support of it.*† What the Opponent means is that—" the notion of diversity in regard to Cognitions is only figurative, unreal, being like the notion of diversity in regard to the rock-crystal ; and it is not *real*, as is the notion of diversity in regard to Odour, Taste, etc." ,—but in support of this theory there is no reason adduced [what is stated in Sū. 9 being only an Example] ; and in the absence of valid reasons, it cannot be accepted as right. " But the absence of reasons is equal."§ Certainly not ; for as a matter of fact, *in the case of Cognitions it is actually found that they appear and dis-*

* The phrase '*viṣayāntaropadhānāt*' at the end of the paragraph is to be construed with '*nānātvābhimānah*' of the second line ; the construction being —तस्यां वृत्तौ नानात्वाभिमानो विषयान्तरोपधानात्, यथाद्रव्यान्तरोपहित........ नीलो लोहित इति ।

The sense of the Pūrvapaksa is thus explained by the *Tātparya* :—"It is true that Emanations *appear* as *many* ; but this appearance is a mistaken one ; for it is not possible for the Emanations, which are not different from the Internal Organ, to be *many* in reality. The fact of the matter is that, just as in the case of the Rock-crystal, which is one and of one uniform colour, notions of diversity appear by reason of its contact with several coloured things, and this notion of diversity is purely adventitious,—in the same manner when the pure white Internal Organ becomes associated, through the Sense-organs, with diverse things, it takes the form of the Cognitions or 'Emanations,' and hence *appears* as diverse and many."

† This is found as *Sūtra* in Puri Sū. Ms., in Sūtra Ms. D, also in *Nyāyasūtravivarana* ; the *Bhāṣyacandra* and Viśvanātha also treat it as Sūtra. But it is not found in the *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, and both the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* take it as part of the *Bhāṣya*. Vardhamāna says that some people call it 'Siddhānta-Sūtra', and adds that the *Tātparya* calls it '*Bhāṣyam*', because the '*bhāṣya*' is nothing more than an explanation and expansion of the 'Sūtra'.

§ " Just as we make the simple assertion,—that the notion of diversity is figurative—without adducing any reasons,—so do you also merely make the assertion that the notion of diversity is real, without adducing any reasons. So that both of us are open to the same charge."

appear one after the other [and not all together ;—and this is a clear reason in support of the proposition that they are really *many, not one*]. That is, it is found as a matter of fact that in connection with the Object of Perception, Cognitions appear and disappear, one after the other (at different points of time) ; and from this it follows that the notion of diversity in regard to Cognitions is real, just as it is in regard to Odour, etc.

SECTION (2)
(*Sūtras 10–17*)
Examination of the Theory that Things of the World are in Perpetual flux undergoing destruction every moment.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Under Sū 9, the *Sānkhya* has asserted that—"The notion of diversity in regard to the Emanation is analogous to the notion of diversity in regard to the rock-crystal",—being unable to admit this, the Nihilist [who holds that things of the world are in a perpetual flux, undergoing destruction every moment] argues as follows:*—

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* Having thus refuted the Sānkhya doctrine from the standpoint of the *Nyāya*, the Author, with a view to point out the defects in that doctrine pointed out by the Bauddha philosophers, proceeds first, to expound the doctrine of the Bauddhas.—*Tātparya.*

Though the main subject-matter of this section—the demolition of the Nihilistic philosophy,—is of use in all philosophical systems, yet in the present context, it has been introduced with a view to the proving of the Soul's existence ; it is only when the continued existence of things has been established that there can be any force in the arguments, based upon Recognition, that have been put forward under Sū. 3. 1. 1, *et seq* ; and it is only when the difference between qualities and things possessed of qualities has been established that we can prove the existence of the Soul, as the necessary substratum of such well-known qualities as Desire and the rest—*Pariśuddhi.*

Some people have held that this is only a part, and continuation, of the foregoing section ; and should not be treated as a separate section ; specially because the Bhāsya at the end of the present section concludes with the words—'Thus it is proved that Buddhi is not-eternal', from which it is clear that the Bhāsya takes the whole as one section dealing with the *non-eternality of Buddhi*. But the fact of the matter is that the subject-matter of the present section is totally different ; the Bhāsya conclusion is due to the fact that the subject of the present section has been introduced in connection with the *non-eternality of Buddhi*.—*Vardhamāna.*

Sūtra 10

[*The Nihilist says*]—"In the Rock-crystal also, there are produced fresh rock-crystals one after the other; since all individual things are momentary; hence what has been stated (in Sū. 9) is without reason."

BHĀṢYA

"The proposition (stated in Sū. 9) that—'In the case of the Rock-crystal, the notion of diversity is due to the diversity of its associates, the Rock-crystal remaining one and the same during the whole time"—is *without any reason* in its support;—'Why?'—*because in the Rock-crystal also there are produced fresh rock-crystals one after the other*; that is to say, in what is regarded as the Rock-crystal, several rock-crystals appear and several disappear (during the time);—'How is that?'—*Since all individual things are momentary*; the 'moment' is an extremely small point of time; and things whose existence lasts only for that time are called 'momentary'. 'How do you know that individual things are momentary?' We infer this from the fact that in the case of the Body and such things we find a continuous series of growth and decay; in the Body the essence of food taken, brought about by the process of digestion, *grows* into blood and the other constituents of the body; and this growth and consequent decay goes on continuously; and by 'growth' there is production or birth of the individual things, and by 'decay' there is destruction.* It is in this fashion that, by a process of modification of its constituent elements, there comes about, in the Body, in due course of time, a growth or development. And what is found in the case of one individual thing, (in the shape of the Body) should be understood to apply to every individual thing."†

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* We have adopted and translated the reading as in the Viz. text. In place of पक्तिनिर्वृत्तस्या etc. however, the two Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyacandra* read पक्तिवृत्तस्या etc. By this reading the passage should be translated thus 'In the case of the Body we find that there is *pakti*, ripening, which is a form of destruction; and there is continuous growth and decay of the food-essence, which becomes destroyed and then turns into blood etc.'.

† The Nihilistic position is thus summed up in the *Tātparya*—"All that exists must be momentary,—as the Body;—and the Rock-crystal also, being something that exists, must be momentary. In the case of the Body we find

Sūtra 11

[*The Naiyāyika's answer to the above Bauddha argument*]—

Inasmuch as there is no reason in support of the universal proposition,—we can admit of it only in accordance with our experience.

BHĀṢYA

It is not universally true that 'in all individual things there is a continuous series of growth and decay, just as there is in the Body';—why? *because there is no reason or proof in support of such a universal proposition*; that is, such a universal proposition is not supported either by Perception or by Inference. Hence *we can admit of it only in accordance with our experience*; that is, in cases where we actually perceive such continuous series of growth and decay, there, by reason of our actually seeing the appearance and disappearance of several individual entities, one after the other, we admit of such a series of growth and decay; e.g., in the case of the Body and such other things; where, on the other hand, we do not perceive any such series, there we deny it; e.g., in the case of such things as the stone and the like. In the case of the Rock-crystal, we do not perceive any such series of growth and decay. Hence it is not right to assert that "in the Rock-crystal, there are produced fresh rock-crystals, one after the other" (Sū. 10); for such an assertion (attributing growth and decay to all things on the ground of the Body being subject to growth and decay) would be similar to the attributing of the bitter taste to *all things* on the ground of the *Arka* (a poisonous plant) being bitter!

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some people hold that—"Every object consists of a series of entities, each entity being entirely destroyed and succeeded

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that it undergoes growth and decay, in course of time becoming fat and lean; from which we infer that it is undergoing minute changes every moment; and these changes constitute so many 'destructions'. Even though such growth and decay are not apparent in the case of the Rock-crystal and such things, yet we are justified in assuming that there must be such in these also, because they are *entities*, like the Body." So that the notion of diversity in the case of the Rock-crystal is not mistaken; there are really diverse crystals, appearing one after the other; though the crystal apparently remains the same.

by an entirely different entity, without any trace of the former, —and each of these entities has but a momentary existence ;"— • but this view

Sūtra 12

can not be accepted ; because the cause of production and of destruction (when present) are perceived.

BHĀṢYA

The augmentation of component particles is perceived to be the 'cause of production', in the case, for instance, of the *Ant-hill* and such other things ; and the *disruption of component particles* is perceived to be the 'cause of destruction', in the case, for instance, of the Jar and such other things. But when a philosopher holds that a thing is *destroyed*, without losing any of its component particles, or that a thing is *produced*, without having its component particles augmented,—there can *not* be perceived any cause, either of the 'total destruction' or of the 'production' of an entirely new thing.*

Sūtra 13

[The *Nihilist* says—]

" Just as in the case of the destruction of milk, and the production of curd, the cause is not perceived [and is yet admitted],—so would it be in the case of the substances in question."

BHĀṢYA

" [When milk is turned into curd] though we do not perceive the cause either of the destruction of the milk, or of the production of the curd, yet the existence of such cause is admitted ;— similarly in the case of the Rock-crystal, the existence of the cause of destruction, as also of the production, of several individual entities should be admitted."

Sūtra 14

[*The Siddhāntin* answers—]

Inasmuch as there is actual apprehension through indicatives, there is no non-perception (in the case of milk and curd).

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* The Vārtika explains the argument somewhat differently.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the cause of the destruction of Milk is actually apprehended,—being indicated by the destruction of the Milk; similarly the cause of the production of Curd is also apprehended,—being indicated by the production of the Curd; so that it is not true that there is "non-perception" (of the said causes).* Contrary to this is the case of such substances as the Rock-crystal and the like; for in the case of these, there is nothing to indicate the production of several individual entities (in the same object); which leads us to conclude that there is no such production (of several entities in a piece of Rock-crystal)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

To what the Bauddha Nihilist has urged in Sū 13, some one (the *Sānkhya*) has offered the following answer.—

Sūtra 15

"Of the milk there is no destruction (when it turns into curd); for what happens is either transformation or manifestation of new qualities."†

BHĀṢYA

"Of the milk there is *transformation*, not *destruction*,"—says one (the *Sānkhya*)—"and there is *transformation* when the substance remaining constant, its former character (*e g* that of

* That there is destruction of the Milk is inferred from the appearance of Curd in the milk particles, the inference being—'In the milk-particles there has been *destruction of Milk*, because there have appeared in them particles of a substance other than, not compatible with, Milk, and the *destruction of Milk being* thus cognised, inasmuch as the said *destruction* is an effect, it must have a *cause*; so that the *cause of destruction* is indicated by, has for its indicative, the *destruction*. The indicative of the *production of Curd* consists in the actual *perception of the Curd*; and when the *production* is thus cognised, inasmuch as it is an effect, it must have a cause; so that the 'cause of the production of Curd' is indicated by its *production*. And it is not true that "the cause of the destruction of Milk and that of production of Curd are not perceived" (as urged by the Opponent in Sū 13). —*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The translation of the *Sūtra* is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*. According to Viśvanātha it should run thus—'*What happens is only transformation, which consists in the manifestation of new qualities.*'

milk') is destroyed and a new character (*e.g.* that of 'curd') is produced."

Another philosopher (the Neo-Sāṅkhya) says that "there is manifestation of new qualities; *i.e.* the substance remaining constant, its former qualities disappear and new ones appear."*

Both these views appear as if they were one and the same.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The answer to both the views (put forward in Sū. 15) is as follows:—

Sūtra 16

[*Siddhānta*]—**When we perceive a new Substance being produced through a fresh reconstitution, we infer from this the cessation (destruction) of the previous substance.**

BHĀṢYA

When we see that a new Substance, in the shape of *Curd*, is produced through a fresh re-constitution or re-organisation of the component particles,—this 're-constitution' being in the form of *coagulation*,†—we infer from this that the previous subtance, Milk, has been 'destroyed' through the disruption of its component particles; just as when we see the new substance—Saucer—being produced out of a fresh re-arrangement of the component particles of the Clay-lump, it is inferred that the Clay-lump has been 'destroyed' through the disruption of its component particles. And the constitutional contiguity between Milk and Curd is similar to that between Clay and things made of Clay; [that is, the component particles of the Milk continue to subsist in the Curd, just as those of Clay do in the thing made of Clay]; if there were a complete destruction of the Milk (along with its component particles,—if it were completely burnt to ashes, for instance),—the production of the new substance (Curd) would

* The new qualities also are not *produced*, in the sense that they come into existence for the first time; for according to the Sānkhya, the qualities were there all along; but only in a latent form; and they only become *manifested*; and when they are regarded as having been destroyed, they only disappear from view, they are not lost.

† When the former constitution or arrangement of the component particles of the former substance—Milk—is upset, and a fresh arrangement —conducive to the new substance—is set in, we have what is called '*sammūrchanam*'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

never be possible,—there being no connection possible (between this production and any existing substance).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Even admitting (for the sake of argument) that there is destruction of Milk and production of Curd without any cause, we point out the following objections against the theory (of the Nihilist) :—

Sūtra 17

Inasmuch as in some cases the cause of destruction is perceived, while in some it is not perceived,—what is stated (as the premiss) is not universally true.*

BHĀṢYA

It is not universally true that—"there is destruction and production of individual rock-crystals, just as there is of Milk and Curd" ;—"Why ? "—Because there is no reason (in support of such a universal proposition) , that is, there is no ground for asserting that "the case of the individual entities in the Rock-crystal is analogous to that of Milk and Curd, where destruction and production are without cause,—and it is *not* analogous to that of the Jar, where there is destruction when the cause of destruction is present, so that there is no destruction and production of individual entities in the Rock-crystal simply because the causes of such destruction and production are not present."†

Further, the statement of the Example is baseless : If 'destruction and production' were ever actually perceived in the case of such things as the Rock-crystal and the like, then alone could there be any basis for the statement of the Example—"Just as in the case of the destruction of Milk and the production of Curd, the cause is not perceived" (Sū. 13) ;—as a matter of fact however 'destruction and production' are not

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* Viśvanātha reads the Sūtra simply as क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः. But everywhere else—in the *Nyāyasūtravivarana*, *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, the Sūtra-Ms. D. and in Puri Sū. Ms.—we find it as printed in the Viz. Text.

† The reading of the last part of this passage is confused ; by a comparison of the readings in several manuscripts, the right reading appears to be—कुम्भस्य विनाश उत्पत्तिकारणभावाच्चोत्पत्तिः एवंस्फटिकादिव्यक्तीनां विनाशोत्पत्तिकारणाभावाद्विनाशोत्पत्त्यभाव इति ।

perceived (in things like the Rock-crystal);—hence the statement of the Example is entirely baseless.*

Then again, when you admit the 'destruction and production' of the Rock-crystal, you tacitly admit also the cause of these [since, being effects, they must have a cause]; so that your denial (of the cause) is not right. That is to say, you cannot but admit the force of the Example (of the Jar) in the assertion—'the destruction and production of the Rock-crystal, etc., *like those of the Jar*, cannot be without cause'; for the simple reason that its force cannot be denied. On the other hand, the force of the Example cited by you—in the assertion "the destruction and production of the Rock-crystal, like those of Milk and and Curd, are without cause"—can be easily denied; for the simple reason that (in all cases) 'destruction and production' are actually found to proceed from causes; so that when we see 'destruction and production' in the case of Milk and Curd, we infer the presence of a cause; as the Effect is a sure indicative of the Cause.

From all that has gone before (in this section and the last) it follows that Buddhi or Apprehension is *not eternal*.

SECTION 3

Sūtras 18—41

Buddhi is a quality of the Soul.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

We now proceed to consider the question—From among the Soul, the Sense-organs, and the Objects of Cognition, of which one is *Buddhi* the quality?† Though this fact is well

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* A correct example is that which is found to be similar to the thing in question; in the present instance 'destruction and production of several entities in the Rock-crystal' is the thing in question, under dispute; so that the Example, to be correct, should be one that resembles the said 'destruction and production'; this resemblance could be known to us only if we had ever perceived such 'destruction and production in the Rock-crystal'. [Until we have perceived a thing, we cannot recognise its resemblance to anything.] As a matter of fact, however, no such 'production and destruction in the Rock-crystal' is ever perceived Hence the example cannot be a correct one.—*Tātparya*.

† It is only after the eternality of Buddhi has been refuted that there is any likelihood of its being a quality of the Soul. Hence it is the latter

known, yet it is introduced with a view to carry on further investigations on the subject. The doubt as regards Apprehension (being the quality of the Soul or of some other Substance) arises from the fact that it is found to arise from the contact (of several things, Soul, Mind, Sense-organ and Object), and people fail to detect any peculiarity in any one of these (by virtue of which the quality of Apprehension could be attributed to that one exclusively).

Sūtra 18

Apprehension (Buddhi's) cannot subsist in the Sense-organ, or in the Object,—since it continues to exist also when these two have been destroyed.

BHĀSYA

Apprehension or Cognition cannot be a quality of either the Sense-organ or the Object, because even when these have ceased to exit, Apprehension continues to exist. For instance, even after the object (seen) and the Sense-organ (the Eye) have been destroyed we have the Cognition in the form 'I have seen'. On the other hand, after the Cogniser (the Soul) has been destroyed, there can be no Cognition at all. As a matter of fact,

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subject that is introduced now. The purpose of this enquiry also consists in the proving of the Soul as an entity apart from the Body etc. Under Sū. 3. 1-1 *et. seq.* we have proved the existence of the Soul, on the strength of Apprehension through Recognition; and now we are going to establish it on the strength of Apprehension as its quality.—*Pariśuddhi.*

Vardhamāna adds the following.—The connection of the present Section with the immediately preceding section on the momentary character of things lies in this that if all things are momentary, there can be no such thing as the 'constituent' cause of things; so that there would be no possibility of Apprehension subsisting, as quality, in the Soul. Hence before taking up this latter question, we have had to dispose of the former theory .. .. ..Even though the fact of Apprehension being a quality of the Soul has already been put forward under Sū 3-1-14, yet there is this difference that under that *Sūtra* we have proved the existence of the Soul, as the substratum of Apprehension as a quality; while now we are going to prove the existence of Apprehension itself as a quality of the Soul. Some people think that the present section serves the purpose of adding fresh reasonings in support of the doctrine already established before, and thus strengthening the pupil's convictions. The *Tātparya*, for instance, remarks that the present section carries on further investigation into a matter already discussed before.

there are two kinds of Cognition : there is one kind of Cognition which proceeds from the contact of the Sense-organ and the Object (e.g. the ordinary perceptional cognitions), and which ceases upon the destruction of the Sense-organ and the Object; and there is the other kind of Cognition which proceeds from the Contact of the Mind and the Soul; and it is only natural that these latter should persist (even upon the destruction of the Sense-organ and the Object). To this latter class belongs the recollection in the form 'I have seen', which pertains to things seen before; and when the Cogniser has been destroyed, it is not possible for any previous perception to be recollected; for a thing that has been perceived by one cannot be recollected by another. Even if the existence of Soul be not admitted, and the Mind be regarded as the *Cogniser*,—it would not be possible to prove that either the Sense-organ or the Object is the *Cogniser*.

"Well then, Cognition may be a quality of the Mind."

[The answer to this is given in the next *Sūtra.*]

Sūtra 19

Apprehension cannot be the quality of the Mind, (*a*) whose existence is inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous—[or (*b*), because the apprehension of things is not simultaneous]—[(*c*) and also because the simultaneous cognition of things actually appearing in Mystics would be inexplicable if Cognition belonged to the Mind]*

BHĀSYA

(A) The fact that the Apprehension of things is not simultaneous is indicative of the existence of the Internal Organ (Mind) [as explained in Sū. 1-1-16]; and the Internal Organ (or Mind), having its existence inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous,—Apprehension or Cognition cannot be a quality of that Mind.

"Of what then is it a quality?"

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* Two explanations of the term युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेः are possible; both of which have been incorporated in the translation as (*a*) and (*b*). The *Bhāṣya* construes the च in the Sūtra as implying a further reason, which we put in as (*c*). The *Bhāṣya* notices only (*a*) and (*b*).

It is a quality of the Cognitive Agent, as it is he who is the controller.*

As a matter of fact, *controller* is the *cogniser*, and that which is controlled is the *instrument*. So that if the Mind has Apprehension for its quality, it would cease to be an *instrument*. And from the fact that the apprehension of Odour etc., belongs to that Cognitive Agent who is equipped with such instruments as the Olfactory Organ and the like, we infer the apprehension of pleasure etc., as also Re-collection, which belongs to that Cognitive Agent who is equipped with the instrument in the shape of the Internal Organ (Mind). Under the circumstances, if it be held that that of which Apprehension is a quality is the *Mind*,—to which we give the name 'Soul'—while that which is instrumental in bringing about pleasure etc., is the *Internal Organ*—to which we give the name 'Mind'; then there is a mere difference of nomenclature (between us); and the fact remains the same [that there are two distinct entities—one of which Apprehension is a quality and the other which is instrumental in bringing about pleasure etc.] according to both of us.

(B) The particle 'ca' in the *Sūtra* may be interpreted as implying the further reasoning that the Yogi's *simultaneous Cognition of things would be impossible*; that is to say, when the Yogi has attained the culminating point of his practices he becomes endowed with exceptional faculties of perception, and having created for himself several bodies endowed with distinct sets of organs, he apprehends several cognitions simultaneously in those bodies;—such a phenomenon could be possible if there were a single Cognising Agent permeating all those bodies; it could not be possible if the cognitions belonged to the Mind, for the simple reason that Mind is atomic (and as such could not be present in several bodies at one and the same time). If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) Mind be held to be

* Though the sentence ज्ञस्य वशित्वात् is generally regarded as *Sūtra*, it should be treated as *Bhāṣya*.—*Pariśuddhi*.

One who is independent, and operates by himself, is the *Cogniser*; while that which is operated upon, controlled by another, is the *instrument*; the intelligence necessary for the carrying on of activities and of operating the several instruments bearing upon it, belongs to the Agent.—*Tātparya*.

all-pervading (not *atomic*), even so this could not be accepted as a valid argument against Apprehension being a quality of the Soul. For if Mind were all-pervading, then, since it is the internal Organ (of Cognition), (and is all-pervading), it could be in contact with all the sense-organs at one and the same time, and thus bring about several Cognitions at one and the same time (even in the case of ordinary persons) (which is an impossibility).

Sūtra 20

[*Objection*]—"**What has been urged applies equally to the case of Apprehension being a Quality of the Soul.**"

BHĀṢYA

"The Soul, being all-pervading, would be in contact with all the Sense-organs at one and the same time; so that there would be a possibility of several Cognitions appearing simultaneously."

Sūtra 21

[*Answer*].—**The said (simultaneous) appearance of Cognitions is not possible; because the contact of the Mind with (all) the Sense-organs is not possible.**

BHĀṢYA

In the cognition of Odour, etc., the contact of the Sense-organs with the Mind is as much a necessary cause as the contact of the Sense-organs with the objects; and inasmuch as the Mind is atomic, it is not possible for its contact with all the Sense-organs to appear at one and the same time. And by reason of the non-simultaneity of this contact (of the Mind), it is not possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously, even though they are the qualities of the (all-pervading) Soul.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

If it be held that—"The Cognition of Odour etc., proceeds from the contact among Soul, Sense-organ and Object only, and the contact of Mind is not essential; [so that even though the contact of the Mind and the Sense-organ may be absent, that will not stand in the way of Cognitions appearing simultaneously; hence there is no force in the answer given in Sū. 21.]"—then our answer is—

Sūtra 22

This can not be right ; for no proof is adduced in support of such origin (of Cognitions, without contact of Mind).*

BHĀṢYA

When you make the assertion that—" The Cognition of Odour etc., proceeds from contact among Soul, Sense-organ and Object only",—you do not adduce any proof in support of such origin,—on the strength whereof we could accept it.†

Sūtra 23

[*Objection*]—"**Further, if Apprehension subsists (in the Soul), then it should have to be regarded as eternal ; since we do not perceive any cause for its destruction.**"

BHĀṢYA

" What is urged in this *Sūtra* is meant to be taken along with what has been said under Sū. 20 [This is the sense of the particle *ca.*]

"There are two kinds of causes whereby qualities are destroyed : (1) the destruction of the substance in which the quality subsists, and (2) the appearance of a contrary quality. Inasmuch as the Soul (which is the substance in which Apprehension subsists) is eternal, the former cause of destruction is not possible (in the destruction of Apprehension). Then, as for a quality contrary to Apprehension (whose appearance would put an end to the Apprehension), we do not find any such quality (appearing in the Soul). So that, if Apprehension is the quality of Soul, it must have to be regarded as eternal."

Sūtra 24

[*Answer*]—**Inasmnch as Apprehension is (universally) recognised as non-eternal, its destruction proceeds from another apprehension ; just like Sound.**

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* '*Kārana*' stands for '*pramāna*', proofs, says the *Bhāṣyacandra*, What the Opponent says in Sū. 21 is a mere assertion and since no proofs have been adduced in support thereof it cannot be accepted

† Viśvanātha takes this Sūtra also as coming from the *Pūrvapakṣin* and meaning as follows —"Inasmuch as the Siddhāntin cannot point out the cause of Cognition, Cognition cannot belong to the Soul. He cannot point to *Mind-Soul Contact* as the cause ; for if this were so, then Cognition should never cease ; the contact of the all-pervading Soul being always present."

BHĀṢYA

That Apprehension is transient is recognised by all living beings in their own experience ;—and as a matter of fact, (in the case of every Apprehension) we perceive a series of cognitions ; and we infer from these facts that (in this series) one Apprehension is 'contrary' to the other ;—just as in every Sound there is a series of Sounds, where one Sound is contrary to the other [and hence the cause of its destruction].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—"If Apprehension is a quality of the Soul, several Recollections should appear at one and the same time ; for innumerable impressions produced by cognitions —which are the causes of Recollections, subsist in the Soul simultaneously,—and the contact of the Mind with the Soul, which is a cause common to all Recollections, is also present ; so that there is no *non-simultaneity* in the causes of Recollections. [Hence it should be possible to have several Recollections at one and the same time.]"

In view of this objection, some Logicians (*Ekadeśins*), with a view to show that the contact (necessary for Recollections) is *not* simultaneous, offer the following explanation :—

Sūtra 25

"As a matter of fact, Recollection proceeds from the contact of the Mind with that part of the Soul which is permeated by (the impression of) the (corresponding) Cognition ; so that several Recollections cannot appear simultaneously".

BHĀṢYA

"The term '*Jñāna*' in the *Sutra* stands for *impression brought about by cognition*. What happens (in cases of Recollection) is that the Mind comes into contact only gradually, one after the other, with such parts of the Soul as are impressed (affected) by Cognition ; hence the Recollections also, that proceed from the said contact of the Mind with the Soul, appear only gradually, one after the other (and *not* simultaneously)."

Sūtra 26

This explanation is not right ; because the Mind lies within the Body.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, when the Mind of man comes into contact with the Soul born in a body,—and this contact appears along with such Karmic residue as has begun to bear fruit,—this is what is called the person's 'living'; so that until the person dies (and the Soul escapes from the limitations of the Body), it is not possible for the Mind,—which lies and functions within the Body,—to come into contact with such parts of the Soul as lie outside of the Body, and to be impressed by (previous) cognitions. [And as for those parts of the Soul that lie within the Body, with these the Mind is in contact at one and the same time, whereby the possibility of Cognition and Recollections appearing simultaneously remains.]

Sūtra 27

[*The Ekadeśin objects to Sū. 26*]—**"The reason put forward is not valid, because it is still to be proved."**

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, *living* consists in *fructifying Karmic residue* only; so that it is still to be proved that *the Mind lies within the Body*."

Sūtra 28

[*Answer*]—**The above objection is not right; because (in support of our contention) there is this proof that the recollecting person retains a body.**

BHĀṢYA

When a person is desirous of recollecting something, he concentrates his mind, and then, after some time, succeeds in recollecting that thing; and while he is recollecting it, he is found to be equipped with the Body [which shows that in the phenomenon of Recollecting, the Mind operates in the Body; otherwise, if the Mind operated outside the Body, there would be no contact of the Mind outside with the Soul as equipped with the Body; and in the absence of this contact, no Effort would be possible; and without such Effort the *retaining of the Body* would be impossible]. The Effort due to the contact of the Mind with the Soul is of two kinds—*retaining* and *impelling*; and when the Mind goes out of the Body, no *retaining* Effort (within the

Body) would be possible ; so that (in the absence of the *retaining* or sustaining Effort), the Body of the recollecting person would, through its inherent gravity, fall down.

Sūtra 29

[*Another Objection*]—"**What has been urged is not possible; as the Mind is quick in its movement.**"

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, the Mind is quick in moving; so that it is quite possible for it to go out of the Body and come into contact with such parts of the Soul as are outside the Body, and are impressed by Cognition ; and then it quickly returns within the Body, and gives rise to the Effort (necessary for the retaining of the Body). Thus it is quite possible for the Mind to carry on both the processes of *Contact* and of *Effort*). Or (inversely), it may be that the Mind goes out of the Body after having produced the Effort required for the retaining of the Body ; and thus it is quite possible that the Body should continue to be retained (until the Mind returns to it, which it does very quickly).

Sūtra 30

[*Answer*]—**What has been asserted is not possible; because there is no restriction as to the time of Recollection.**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, while one thing is remembered quickly, in another the process of recollection is delayed ; and when the process of recollection is delayed, the Mind is held concentrated, with a desire to remember the thing, and there appears a continuous series of ideas, and when among these there appears the idea of some such thing as happens to be the distinguishing feature of the thing to be remembered, it becomes the direct cause of the desired recollection. All this phenomenon could not be possible, (under the theory of the Opponent) ; as it would mean the going out of the Mind for a considerable length of time.

Then again, the contact of the Mind with the Soul cannot bring about Recollection, except when it is in contact with the Body ; because it is the Body that forms the receptacle of all experience. As a matter of fact, it is the Body of the Cognitive Person which forms the receptacle of experience ; so that when

the Mind goes out of the Body, its mere contact with the Soul cannot bring about either Cognition, or Pleasure etc.; if it did (i.e. if Cognition, Pleasure etc. were brought about independently of the Body) then there would be no use of the Body at all.

Sūtra 31

[A second Ekadeśin Logician offers the following remarks against the view of the former Ekadeśin propounded in Sū. 25.]—
"The particular kind of contact (of the Mind, with things outside the Body) is not possible; (*a*) either by the impelling of the Soul, or (*b*) by chance, or (*c*) by reason of intelligence."

BHĀṢYA

The contact of the Mind outside the body could be due—(*a*) either to the impelling of the Soul, or (*b*) to chance, or (*c*) to the intelligence of the Mind;—but as a matter of fact, none of these is possible. "Why?" (*a*) Because the thing has still got to be recollected, and because Recollection and Cognition are not possible through mere desire That is to say, if the said contact were due to the impelling or urging by the Soul, then it would mean that the Soul impells the Mind after having cogitated thus—'the Impression which is the cause of the Recollection of this particular thing subsists in this part of the Soul, let therefore the Mind come into contact with this part';—and this form of cogitation (where the idea of the thing is already present) on the part of the Soul would mean that the thing is *already recollected*, and is not one *that has got to be recollected*; and further, 'a part of the Soul' or the 'Impression' cannot be perceptible to the Soul, so that any apprehension of these by the cognition of the Soul itself is absolutely impossible [and yet both of these appear in the said cogitation]. (*b*) As a matter of fact, the person recollects a thing only after fixing his mind upon it for some time; and it (i. e., the contact necessary for Recollection) cannot be due to mere *Chance*. (*c*) Lastly, *intelligence* (to which the said contact might be due) does not belong to the Mind at all; as we have already shown that Consciousness does not belong to it.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The said particular kind of contact (which has been objected to under Sū. 31)—

Sūtra 32

is similar to that particular kind of contact which causes pain in the foot of the person whose Mind is preoccupied.

BHĀṢYA

When a person, having his Mind preoccupied with some attractive scene,* is hurt in the foot by a pebble or thorn, *a particular kind of contact* of the Mind with the Soul must be admitted; for we perceive that there is actual pain and feeling of pain in such cases; and what has been urged (in Sū. 31, against the particular kind of contact postulated by the previous *Ekadeśin* in the case of Recollection) would apply with equal force to the case cited. [And yet it cannot be denied that there is such contact actually present in the case.] Then as regards what the second *Ekadeśin* has said in regard to *contact* being due to 'chance' (in Sū. 31),—it is open to this additional objection that as a matter of fact, no action and no contact can ever be due to mere 'chance'. [So that this part of the argument is entirely baseless.]

"But in the case of the pain caused by the thorn, what causes the action (in the Mind) is the Unseen Karma (force of Destiny) which brings about all experience."

This also will be equally applicable to both cases. What you mean is that—"the Unseen Destiny, subsisting in the Person, which serves to bring about all his experiences, is what leads to the action of the Mind (and brings it into contact with the Soul), whereby there comes about pain and also the feeling of pain";—but exactly the same may be the case also with the particular kind of contact that brings about Recollection.

Thus then, what has been said by the second *Ekadeśin*, to the effect that "the particular kind of contact is not possible, either by the impelling of the Soul, or by chance, or by intelligence" (Sū. 32)—is no criticism at all (of what the first *Ekadeśin* has put forward under Sū. 25); the real criticism of that position is what has been said by us above to the effect

* Several Mss. read देशे, which should be construed with what follows, meaning—'having his foot hurt by a pebble or thorn in some place'. But दृश्ये gives better sense, as translated.

that 'this explanation is not right, *because the Mind lies within the Body*'. Sū. (26).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—"What now is the reason that Recollections are not simultaneous, even though their causes are present at one and the same time?"

Sūtra 33

[*Answer*]—**Recollections are not simultaneous, because such causes as Attention, Perception of the Sign and the rest are not all present at one and the same time.**

BHĀṢYA

Just as the *Contact of the Soul with the Mind* and *Impressions* are the 'cause of Recollection', so also are Attention and Perception of the Sign and such other things [detailed in Sū. 41]; and inasmuch as these latter do not appear at one and the same time, it is to this that the non-simultaneity of Recollections is due.*

[The Opponent argues]—"Just as in the case of Intuitional Perception, so also in the case of such Recollection as is independent of Attention and the other causes, there should be simultaneity. That is, there are at times certain Recollections which, being independent of Attention and the other causes, resemble Intuitional Perception; and in such Recollections there should be simultaneity, as there is no reason (why there should be no simultaneity)."†

[*Answer*]—As a matter of fact, in the case cited also, the several causes are present; and it is because these causes fail to be perceived that people have the idea that the Recollection resembles Intuitional Perception. What actually happens is that, when there appear in the Mind a number of ideas pertaining

* Mind-Soul Contact and Impressions are not the sole cause of Recollection. So that even though these two are present, yet, inasmuch as the other causes of Recollection—Attention, etc.—are not present, several Recollections do not appear simultaneously.

† When, for instance, without any rhyme or reason, a recollection rushes in upon the Mind, all on a sudden. *Prātibhavat, etc.*, is printed in some editions as Sūtra. But no such Sūtra appears either in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, or in any of the Sūtra Mss. or in Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*.

to several things, it is only some one of these several things that brings about Recollection in some man (and not in others); and this is so because he recollects that particular thing because he ponders more specially over that thing; and yet the Recollector is not cognisant of all the causes that go to bring about the Recollection; he does not review his entire memory-process by thinking that 'in this fashion has my Recollection come about'; and because he is not cognisant of the causes, he thinks that his Recollection resembles Intuitional Perception, and also that Recollection is not dependent upon *Attention* and such other causes.

Question.—"How is it in the case of Intuitional Perception?"*

Answer—The restriction or limitation is due to the peculiarities of the person's *Karma* (past deeds); just as there is in the case of experience. What the question means is—'Why does not Intuitional Perception appear simultaneously?"—and the meaning of the answer is that—just as the Man's past *Karma*, which brings about his experiences, does not bring about all his experiences at one and the same time,—similarly the peculiarity of man's past *Karma*, which is the cause of his Intuitional Perception, does not bring about several such perceptions at one and the same time.†

"What is said can not be right, because there is no reason."

This objection is not right, because an Instrument has power to bring about cognitions only one by one. That is to say, if, by your objection, you mean that—"When you say that the limitation is similar to that in the case of experiences, what you put forward is only an example,—you do not put forward any reason",—then our answer is that this objection has no force; because as a matter of fact, an Instrument can, by its very nature, bring about cognitions only one by one; and several cognitions are never produced, at one and the same time, either with regard to one or with regard to several objects;—and from this perceived fact of cognitions appearing one by one,

* This question has been propounded by the Author by way of introduction to the principal argument in support of his theory.—*Tātparya*.

† The *Tātparya* calls this answer '*ābilam*,' *unsatisfactory*. The real answer comes in the next passage.

we infer that the capacity of *Instruments* is such (that they can bring about cognitions only one by one): though there is no such restriction in regard to the *Agent*; because in the case of a person possessed of supernormal organs and powers, it is found that when (through his occult powers) he creates several bodies for himself, he does have several cognitions at one and the same time (in his several bodies).

The following is another objection that has been urged [against the view of the *Ekadeśin* that "Recollection cannot appear simultaneously, because it proceeds from the contact of the Mind with that part of the Soul which is permeated by the cognition" (Sū. 25)]:—"Even in the case of the person who has a single body (and who is not a Yogi capable of taking several bodies), it would be possible for several cognitions to subsist in a single part of the Soul at diverse times, and [since the impressions left by all these Cognitions would inhere in the same part of the Soul] it should be possible to have the recollection of several things at one and the same time. As a matter of fact, it often happens that when the Agent has his body located in a certain place, several cognitions do appear in one and the same part of the Soul, through the contact of the several Sense-organs with their respective objects;—so that when the Mind comes into contact with such a part of the Soul (bearing the impressions of several cognitions), it is only natural that there should appear, at one and the same time, the recollections of all the several things cognised before; specially because there can be no graduation or non-simultaneity in the case of the Mind's contact with a part of the Soul. Then again, the several 'parts of the Soul' not being so many distinct substances, the condition of 'subsisting in the same substance' would be fulfilled by all cognitions belonging to the several parts of any single Soul; and thus (simultaneity of cognitions being quite possible) the said Ekadeśin's explanation of the non-simultaneity of Recollections (propounded in Sū. 25) is not satisfactory."

[Our answer to the above objection is as follows.]—In the case of Sound-series it is found that only that individual Sound is heard which happens to be in contact with the receptacle

or substratum of the Auditory Organ (and not all the Sounds; even though they all inhere in the same substratum, *Ākāśa*; in the same manner Recollection is produced by the contact of the Mind with *each individual impression* (left by the corresponding Cognition; and not all the impressions left on the Soul); so that there can be no possibility of the several Recollections appearing at one and the same time.* Hence we conclude that the right answer to the Ekadeśin position (in Sū. 25) is what has been put forward before (in Sū 26); and it is not true (as has been argued above) that "since several cognitions subsist in a single part of the Soul, it should be possible to have several Recollections at one and the same time".

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some people hold the theory that—"*Jñāna*, Cognition, is a property of the Soul, but Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, and Pain are properties of the Internal Organ;"†—this theory is impugned in the next Sūtra.

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* Even though it is true that the impressions left by the several cognitions are present in the same part of the Soul,—yet, inasmuch as no Impression pervades over an entire part of the Soul, it is not possible for the Mind to be in contact with all the impressions at one and the same time, and hence no simultaneity of Recollections is possible; the Mind, in fact, can come into contact with only one impression at a time.

† We now proceed to consider the question whether or not Cognition belongs to the same substratum as Desire and the rest. This doubt arises by reason of different views being held by the *Sāṅkhya* and the Nihilist.—*Tātparya.*

That Cognition belongs to the same substratum as Desire etc. is a fact known by ordinary experience, and is also established by reasons. Hence so long as it is not proved that Desire etc. belong to the Soul, it cannot be regarded as established that Cognition belongs to it. Such is the connection of the present question with the main subject-matter of the section.—*Pariśuddhi.*

Viśvanātha puts it somewhat differently —"Desire belongs to the Mind; Desire again is produced by Cognition; hence the two should reside in the same substratum; therefore Cognition also should belong to the Mind, not to the Soul."

The 'theory' quoted in the Bhāṣya is thus explained by the *Tātparya*—'The intelligence of the Soul is one and immutable; in this are reflected the Internal Organ modified into the forms of the several objects of cognition; and it is by virtue of these reflections that the *one* Intelligence appears to be liable to production and destruction. Desire, Aversion etc. on the

Sūtra 34

Inasmuch as activity and cessation from activity are caused by Desire and Aversion of a Cognisant Being [Desire and Aversion must belong to this Cognisant Being].*

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, what happens is that the person *cognises* the fact of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another thing being a source of pain to him,—then he *desires* to obtain that which gives him pleasure and *desires* to get rid of what causes him pain,—and when he is imbued with the *desire to obtain* and puts forth an Effort to obtain what gives him pleasure, this *Effort* is what is called '*activity*'; and when imbued with the desire to get rid of a thing, he avoids what gives him pain, this is what constitutes '*cessation from activity*';—thus we find that *Cognising*, *Desiring*, *Effort*, *Aversion*, *Pleasure*, and *Pain*, all these belong to (subsist in) one and the same substratum; that is, *Cognising*, *Desiring* and *Acting* have one and the same Agent, and subsist in the same substratum. From all this it follows that Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, and Pain are properties of the cognisant, intelligent thing (the Soul),—and not of a non-intelligent thing (the Internal Organ). Such 'activity' and 'cessation from activity' as have been described we actually perceive in the case of our own Souls,—and from this we infer the same in regard to other Souls.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The philosopher who holds Intelligence to belong to Material Substances (*i.e.*, the Materialist) says—

Sūtra 35

" Inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion, these cannot

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other hand, are by their very nature, diverse and liable to be produced and destroyed. Hence while the Cognition belongs to the Soul, Desire etc. belong to the Internal Organ.

* Viśvanātha has supplied two constructions of the Sūtra.–(1) 'Activity and Cessation from Activity are due to Desire and Aversion, hence these latter are ज्ञस्य, must belong to a Cognisant Being'; and (2) 'Inasmuch as Activity and Cessation from Activity are caused by Desire and Aversion of a Cognisant Being, (these latter must belong to that cognisant being).'

be denied in regard to the Bodies composed of Earth and other material substances."

BHĀṢYA

"The presence of Desire and Aversion is indicated by Activity and Absence of Activity; hence it follows that Desire and Aversion must belong to that to which Activity and Cessation from Activity belong, and to that same should belong Cognition also;—so that, inasmuch as Activity and Absence of Activity are found in Bodies composed of Earth, Water, Fire and Air,—it is these Bodies that are endowed with Desire, Aversion, and Cognition; which shows that Intelligence belongs to these material bodies."

Sūtra 36

Since we find Activity and Absence of Activity in such things as the Axe and the like,—

BHĀṢYA

it follows that Intelligence need not belong to the material Body. That is, if the finding of Activity and Absence of Activity in a certain thing justifies the attributing of Desire, Aversion and Cognition to it,—then, inasmuch as such Activity and Absence of Activity are found also in such *Instruments* as the Axe and the like, Intelligence should be attributed to these also. Desire etc., are attributed to the Body,—and yet we find, in the case of the Axe etc., that Activity and Cessation from Activity are not concomitant with Desire etc.;—so that it cannot be right reasoning to argue that—"*because Activity and Absence of Activity are found in Bodies of Earth, Water, Fire and Air,*—therefore, Desire, Aversion and Cognition must belong to these."

[Says the *Materialist*]—"Well, in that case, we shall put another meaning to the words—'*tallingatvāt* etc., etc.,' (Sū. 35): The 'activity' of the material substances, Earth etc., in bodies,—transitory* (of insects) and durable (of animals and men),—consists of a particular kind of action, whose presence is indicated by the aggregation or re-arrangement of the component parti-

* We adopt the reading त्रसत्सु for तावत्. It is found in several Mss. and is supported by the *Tātparya* which says—'त्रसत्सु' अस्थिरेषु कृमिप्रभृतीनां शरीरेषु, 'स्थावरेषु' स्थिरेषु देवमनुष्यादीनां शरीरेषु.

cles of those bodies (by virtue of which the shape of the bodies undergoes changes, becoming fatter or leaner etc.]; 'Absence of Activity'—i.e., Inactivity—is found in such things as stone etc.; in which there is no such indication of activity;—and again, the presence of Desire and Aversion is indicated by 'Activity' and 'Absence of Activity';—so that, inasmuch as we find Activity and Absence of Activity in the Atoms of Earth etc., (as shown above), and as Desire and Aversion are concomitant with these (Activity and Absence of Activity), it follows that Cognition also belongs to those same Atoms;—and thus it becomes established that Intelligence belongs to material substances (and not to the Śoul)."

[Our *answer* to the above is as follows]—What has been put forward is not a valid reason, as it is not perceived in such things as the Jar and the like.* In the case of the Earth-molecules composing the Jar and such things also, we find 'activity' in the form of a particular action which is indicated by *aggregation* or *re-arrangement* (of parts);—and we find 'absence of activity' in such things as the Sound (in which case there is no aggregation) in which every form of action is absent;—and yet even though 'Activity and Absence of Activity' are found in the Earth-molecules and Sound, we do not find in them 'Desire and Aversion';—from this it is clear that mere presence of 'Activity and Absence of Activity' in anything cannot be a valid ground for attributing to it Desire and Aversion.

Sūtra 37

What differentiates the said Desire and Aversion (from the qualities of Material Substances, and marks them out as belonging to something other than Material Substances) is Universality and Absence of Universality.

BHĀṢYA

What distinguishes the qualities of *Desire* and *Aversion* and marks them out as belonging to something other than Material Substances is '*niyama*', '*restriction*', '*Universality*', *and* '*Aniyama*', *Absence of Restriction*', i.e *Absence of Universality.*

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* This is sometimes printed as Sūtra. But no such *Sūtra* is found either in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* or in Viśvanātha's Vṛtti, or in any manuscript of the Sūtra.

The 'activity and absence of activity', due to the 'Desire and Aversion of the cognisant being', are such as subsist, not in that Being, but in that on which he operates; so that the Activity and Absence of Activity should belong to only such Material Substances, Earth and the rest, as happen to be manipulated or operated upon by that Being,—and not to all Substances; so that there is in this case '*aniyama*', 'absence of universality'.

For one, on the other hand, who regards the Material Substances themselves as *cognisant* (and as such, endowed with Desire and Aversion), the 'activity and absence of activity' due to Desire and Aversion would subsist in those substances themselves; and hence there should be '*niyama*', 'universality'. For in the case of the other well-known qualities of material substances, it is found that the action due to a quality, as also absence of action due to the cessation or obstruction of that quality, occurs in all substances; so that, in the same manner, the action and absence of action due to Desire and Aversion (belonging to the Material Substances) should also occur in all Material Substances;—this however is never found to be the case;—from which it follows that while Activity and Absence of Activity subsist in the things operated upon or manipulated, Desire, Aversion and Effort belong to the *manipulator*.*

* The qualities that are recognised by both parties as belonging to Material Substances are found in all Material Substances, and continue to exist as long as those substances exist. For instance, the Odour of Earth is found in all that is of Earth, and lasts as long as the Earth lasts. The action of *falling* due to the quality of gravity will occur in all Material Substances, and it will cease to occur only when the quality is obstructed or counteracted. This is what is meant by '*niyama*, Universality, restriction'. If Desire etc. belonged to material substances, these also would have been co-existent and coeval with those substances; *i.e.*, they should have been found in all such substances; as a matter of fact, however, Desire and Aversion and Effort are not found to be so; *e.g.*, Desire etc. are never found in the Jar. This is what is meant by 'Absence of Universality', *Aniyama*. From this we conclude that Desire etc. cannot belong to Material Substances.

There is some confusion here in regard to the terms '*Niyama*' and '*Aniyam*'—The *Bhāṣya* has taken then in the sense of 'Universality' and 'Absence of Universality' respectively; the former belonging to the qualities of Material Substances, and the latter to the qualities of the cognisant Being. The *Vārtika* has taken the terms to mean 'restriction' and 'want of restriction', the former applying to the qualities of the Cogni-

Further, there can be no reason in support of the view that in each single body there are several cognisers; and yet according to the person who attributes Consciousness to Material Substances, inasmuch there are, in each single body, several Material Substances (Particles of Earth, Water etc.), every one of which is endowed with the qualities of Desire, Aversion and Efforts,—this would mean that in a single body there are several Cognisers.* If the Opponent says—"Yes, be it so",—we point out that there is no proof for such an assertion. In the case of several different bodies we infer the presence of so many different *Cognisers* from the fact that each of them is found to be possessed of distinct qualities of Cognition (Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure and Pain); in the same manner, if, in each single body, every particle of Material Substance were possessed of its own Cognition and other qualities, then alone could it follow as a necessary conclusion that these are so many distinct cognisers (in that single body). [But there is no such ground for Inference.]

Further, as a matter of fact, we find that in Material Substances there appear several such actions as are due to the quality of something else,—and this provides the ground for inferring the same thing in other cases also. That is, in the case of such substances as are used as Instruments,—*e.g* the axe and the like—and also in the case of such as form the con-

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sant Being, and the latter to those of Material Substances. This is the difference of opinion upon which Vardhamāna asserts that the term 'niyama' may mean either *universality* or *partiality*, according to the meaning that we attach to the term, and 'aniyama' is its contrary. The sense of the argument remains the same

* In answer to what has been said in para 1, in regard to the possibility of Desire etc. being found in all Earthly substances, the Opponent might put forward the case of wine, grains of barley as a rule are not endowed with the power of intoxicating men, but those grains that enter into the composition of wine do become endowed with that power,—similarly only those particles of Earth are endowed with Consciousness which enter into the composition of the body of man It is in answer to this that the *Bhāṣya* points out that even so every particle of the material substances composing the body should be imbued with Consciousness ; and as such form so many distinct cognisant beings in each body, just as each particle of wine is endowed with the power of intoxication.

stituent cause of objects—*e.g.* clay and the like,—we find that there appear actions that are due to the quality of others;—and this provides the ground for inferring the same thing in other cases also;—*i.e.* in the case of such things as the transitory and durable bodies (of Insects and Men respectively); so that we infer that the action of material substances composing these bodies,—which is indicated by the aggregation and modification of their component particles [which has been put forward by the Opponent in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 36],—is due to the quality of something different (from the material substances).* This quality (to which the said action is due) subsists in the same substratum as *Effort*, and appears in the form of '*Samskāra*', 'Faculty', and is called 'Merit-Demerit'; like the quality of *Effort*, it bears upon all things (related to the Man), and urges to activity all Material Substances, for the fulfilment of that man's purpose.

The theory that Consciousness belongs to Material Substances may also be regarded as set aside by all those arguments that have been shown to prove the existence of the Soul, as well as by those put forward in proof of the Eternality of the Soul; and what has been said (in Sū. 3-2-18)—in regard to 'Cognition not belonging to either the Sense-organs or objects or perception, because Cognition persists also when these are destroyed'—applies with equal force to the denying of Consciousness in the material substances of the Body †

Further, what the Opponent has urged (in Sū. 35)—to the effect that—"inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion, these cannot be denied in regard to the bodies composed of Earth

* It is not only the activity of the Body as a whole, but also the action of all its component particles that go on undergoing re-arrangement during life, that are all due to the quality (*Dharma etc.*) of the Soul ensouling the Body.

† Because even when the Objects and the Sense-organs are destroyed, Cognition remains,—it is inferred that Cognition cannot belong to them, similarly Consciousness cannot belong to the material substances in the body, because while these substances undergo changes and destruction during the life of the individual, the quality of Consciousness continues to persist all along —*Tātparya.*

and other substances"—is on the understanding that the terms '*ārambha*', Activity, and '*nivṛitti*', 'Absence of Activity' (used by us in Sū. 34) stand for mere *action* and *cessation of action*; as a matter of fact, these two terms—'Activity' and 'Absence of Activity'—stand (in Sū. 34) for action of a totally different kind;* and Action of this kind is never found in Earth and other substances. Hence what has been urged (in Sū. 35) to the effect that—"inasmuch as the said Activity and Absence of Activity are the sole indicatives of Desire and Aversion, these cannot be denied in regard to the bodies composed of Earth and other substances"—is not right.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, our denial of Consciousness applies equally to Material Substances, Sense-organs and Mind, but (in the following Sūtra) we speak of *Mind* only, singling it out by way of illustration [and our reason for selecting this lies in the fact that Mind is more like the Soul than Substances or Sense-organs].

Sūtra 38

(A) On account of reasons explained before,—(B) on account of these being under the control of something else,—and (C) on account of the contingency, that [if Consciousness belonged to the Mind, etc.] it would mean that the results accruing (to Man) are those of acts done by others (than himself).†

BHĀṢYA

(A) The first phrase ('on account of reasons explained above') includes all that has been said, beginning from the Sūtra

* What is meant by 'Activity and Absence of Activity' in Sū. 34, is not mere *Action* and *Cessation of Action*, but that particular form of action which is undertaken for the obtaining of the desirable and the getting rid of the undesirable thing, and certainly no such intelligent action is ever found in material substances. Without understanding this, you have put forward your argument in Sū. 35.—*Tātparya*.

† In place of (*c*) अकृताभ्यागमात् Viśvanātha reads स्वकृताभ्यागमात्, meaning—'on account of the fact that what accrues to man must be the results of his own acts.' The same reading is found in the Puri Sūtra Ms., and also in Sūtra Ms. D. The *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* read as in the Viz., text.

1-1-10, 'Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the indicatives of the Soul';—all this goes to show that Consciousness cannot belong to Material Substances, or Sense-organs, or Mind.

(B) *On account of their being under the control of something else*;—Material Substances, Sense-organs and Mind are 'under the control of something else', in the sense that it is only under the impulse of Effort (of the Soul) that they proceed to the actions of sustaining, propelling and aggregating;* while if these were themselves conscious or intelligent, they would be independent [and this would be incompatible with the arguments that have been propounded in support of the conclusion that the Body is under the control of something else].

(C) *On account of the contingency that, if Consciousness belonged to the Mind etc, it would mean that the results accruing to Man are those of acts not done by himself* † Under Sū 1-1-17 it has been pointed out that 'Activity consists in the operating of Mind, of Speech and of Body'—[and in the *Bhāsya* on Sū. 1-1-2, it is shown that *Activity*, conductive to Merit-Demerit, leads to Rebirth];—now if Consciousness belonged to the Mind, or the Sense-organs, or the Material Substances, [since the Conscious beings must be independent agents, it would be those that would

* The *Tātparya* explains that these three actions refer only to the Body and the Sense-organs; the arguments being formulated thus—(*a*) 'The Body and the Sense-organs are under the control of something else, in the actions of sustaining, propelling and aggregating, severally,—because they are material,—like the Jar, and (*b*) 'The Mind is under the control of something else, because it is an instrument,—like the Axe.' So that it is clear that all three act only under the influence of something else

The actions mentioned,—those of sustaining, etc,—appear to be such as belong to the Body only, it is the Body only that sustains or upholds things, that propells things, with the hand, f. i, and that goes on changing through the diverse aggregations of its component particles. The last however is applicable to the Sense-organs also. That is how the Tātparya has spoken of the three actions as referring *severally* to the Body and the Sense-organs.

† This argument is aimed against those persons who accept the authority of the Veda, and thereby regard the Man as one to whom the results of acts accrue, but still attribute Consciousness, not to Man, but to the Body, etc.

have to be regarded as the Agents of all Activity, as the *doers* of all acts ;—and yet all these are destroyed at death, and the only thing that remains after death is the Soul, which, being *ex hypothesi*, *non-intelligent*, has not been the *doer* of any deed ; —so that the results occurring in future births, from these acts, would fall upon the Soul, and not upon the Body, etc., and] it would mean that what is experienced by the Soul (on rebirth) is the result of acts done by others (the Body, etc.) On the other hand, if the Mind, etc. are held to be *non-intelligent* [and a being other than these, i.e., the Soul, be held to be the intelligent or Conscious entity, this latter, being independent, would be the Agent, the *doer* of all deeds], then all these would be the instruments under the control of the Conscious Agent, and hence it would be only right that the Person, the intelligent Agent, acting through those instruments (of the Mind etc), should undergo (on Re-birth) the results of acts done by himself

Sūtra 39

(A) By reason of 'Elimination' and also (B) because the reasons adduced before are firmly established

[or (B) because of reasons adduced before and (C) by reason of Reappearance.*]—

BHĀṢYA

The proposition under consideration is that 'Intelligence or Consciouness is the quality of the Soul'.

(A) *Pariśesa*, '*Elimination*'.—When in regard to a quality, some likely substrata being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of other substrata, we have the cognition of that likely substratum which remains undenied,—we have what is called 'Cognition by Elimination'.† In the present connection, for instance, we have the denial of 'Material Substances, Sense-organs and the Mind' (as likely substratum of Consciousness),—there is no other likely substance which might be suspected to be that substratum,—and the only substance that remains is the Soul,—so that the conclusion is that 'Consciousness is a quality of the Soul'.

* This is the second interpretation of the clause *Yathoktahetūpapatteśca*, by the *Bhāṣya* (see below).

† This passage also occurs in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1-1-5.

(B) *Also because the reasons adduced before are firmly established*;—i.e. because all the reasons that have been adduced as leading to the Conception of the Soul—beginning with Sū. 3-1-1 onwards—have not been answered by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. The reference to *the previously adduced reasons being established* is meant to indicate (and lend support to) the aforesaid 'reasoning by Elimination' [*i.e.* it is on account of those reasons that we are led to the notion that the Soul is the only substance to which Consciousness can belong]; and it also serves to redirect attention to the direct proofs in support of the proposition under consideration.

Or, we may take the phrase '*upapatteśca*' as putting forward an additional reason , [the meaning being as follows] :—'The Soul, which is eternal, having performed meritorious acts in one body, *reappears*, on the death of that body, in Heaven among divine beings ; while having performed sinful acts, it reappears, on death of the body, in the Hells ; this reappearance, which consists in the Soul taking to other bodies, can be possible only if the Soul is a lasting entity ; on the other hand, if all that existed was a mere 'series of sensations', and there were no persisting entity in the shape of the Soul, there being no substratum for the said 'reappearance', it would not be possible. Then again ' Samsāra ', ' series of births ', which consists of the connection of a single entity with several bodies, *is possible*,—and ' Deliverance ' or ' Final Release', also, which consists of freedom from the series of bodies, *is possible*—[only if there is a persisting entity in the shape of the *Soul*] , and if there be nothing apart from the 'series of sensations', since there would be nothing that could traverse the long path (of Births and Rebirths), there would be nothing that could be freed from the series of bodies ; so that in that case both 'Metempsychosis' and ' Final Release ' would be impossible. Further, if there were nothing but a ' series of sensations ', then each individual living being would consist of several diverse entities ; so that the entire phenomenon of his life would be disjointed (the act begun today and finished tomorrow being done by two distinct entities, it would *not be recognised* as the same on both days), undistinguishable [*i.e.*, not properly distinguished from what belongs to another

person : the entity finishing the act to-day being as different from that which began it on the previous day as any strange person] and confused [as no discrimination of personalities would be possible, the entire business of the world would be mixed up].* And another inevitable result of this would be that there could be no Recollection ; for what has been seen by one personality (which was present yesterday) cannot be recollected by another (that has taken its place today); for *Recollection* is only the re-cognition by the same cogniser of the previously-perceived thing,—it appearing in the form. 'I have known this object before'; and it is clear that in this the same cogniser re-cognises what he had cognised before , and this *re-cognition* is what is called 'Recollection'; and no such phenomenon could be possible if there were no other persistent entity save a 'series of Sensations'

Sūtra 40

Recollection (must belong) to the Soul ; for it is the Soul that is endowed with the character of the 'Cogniser '

BHĀṢYA

The term '*Upapadyate*' 'must belong' is to be supplied in the Sūtra ; the sense being that *Recollection must belong to the Soul*, and not to a mere Series of Sensations ;-the particle '*tu*' expressing *certitude* ('must'). "Why so ?" *Because it is the Soul that is endowed with the character of the cogniser* ; i.e. 'being cogniser' is the character, the peculiar characteristic, of the Soul. It is the Soul that is spoken of as 'shall know', 'knows' and 'has known', which shows that the Soul is related to cognitions appearing at all the three points of time ; and that the Soul has these cognitions pertaining to the three points of time is realised by each person in his own experience,—every person having such notions as 'I shall know', 'I know' and 'I have known'. Hence it follows that he who is endowed with the said peculiar

* The *Tātparya* explains the 'confusion' as being due to the fact that every entity, according to the Bauddha sensationalist, being a mere 'negation of contraries', all persons would be the same, and no distinction as between the 'Brāhmaṇa' and the 'Ksatriya' and so forth would be possible ; so that there would be no discrimination of their duties such as the 'Brāhmaṇa alone shall perform the Soma sacrifice', 'the Ksatriya alone shall perform the *Rājasūya*' and so forth.

feature, to him belongs Recollection, and not to a mere Series of Sensations, apart from the Soul.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been explained (under Sū. 33) that 'Recollections do not appear simultaneously, because the causes of Recollections do not appear at one and the same time';—and now the question arises—"From what causes does Recollection arise ?"

The answer is that—Recollection arises—

Sūtra 41

from such causes as—(*a*) attention, (*b*) association, (*c*) retentiveness, (*d*) indicative, (*e*) distinguishing feature, (*f*) likeness, (*g*) ownership, (*h*) supporter, (*i*) supported, (*j*) relationship, (*k*) sequence, (*l*) separation, (*m*) co-profession, (*n*) enmity, (*o*) superiority, (*p*) acquisition, (*q*) cover, (*r*) pleasure and pain, (*s*) desire and aversion, (*t*) fear, (*u*) need, (*v*) profession, (*w*) affection, (*x*) merit and (*y*) demerit.

BHĀṢYA

(*a*) *Attention*—the fixing of the Mind, with the desire to recollect something, and the pondering of the peculiarities of the thing desired to be recalled—is a cause of Recollection.—(*b*) *Association*—is either (1) the arranging of several things in a connected chain, things so connected bringing about the recollection of one another, either, in the order in which they have been arranged, or in some other order ; or (2) the fixing of things (in the plexuses of the Body) to be remembered with those already known,—such connecting being done with the help of the Science of Concentration (Yoga).—(*c*) *Retentiveness*—the Faculty produced by the repeated cognitions of like things ; and this quality of Faculty, belonging to the Soul, is called 'Retentiveness'; this also, like others, is a cause of Recollection.—(*d*) *Indicative*—this is of four kinds—(1) conjunct, (2) inherent, (3) co-inherent in one substratum , and (4) contradictory ; (1) *e.g.* smoke is the *conjunct* 'indicative' of Fire ; (2) the horn is the *inherent* 'indicative' of the Bull ; (3) the hand is the co-inherent 'indicative' of the feet ; and so also is Colour of Touch ; and (4) the non-material substance is the *contradictory* 'indicative' of the material substance.— (*e*) *Distinguishing feature*—as found in a living being—reminds us of the race or family to which that

being belongs,—in such forms as 'this belongs to the race of the Vidas', 'this belongs to the family of the Gargas', and so forth.—(*f*) *Likeness*—the likeness of *Dēvadatta* in the picture reminds us of Dēvadatta.— (*g*) *Ownership*—the master reminds us of the servant and the servant of the master.— (*h*) *Supporter*—one is reminded by the landlord of his tenants.— (*i*) *Supported*—the tenant reminds one of the landlord.— (*j*) *Relationship**—the pupil reminds one of the Teacher, and the Priest of the person at whose sacrificial performance he officiates.— (*k*) *Sequence*—as in the case of a number of acts to be done one after the other (the preceding reminds us of the succeeding).— (*l*) *Separation*—when one is separated from a person and feels the separation, he remembers him frequently,— (*m*) *Co-profession*—one cutter reminds us of another cutter.— (*n*) *Enmity*—of two rivals the sight of one reminds us of the other.— (*o*) *Superiority*—reminds us of that which has produced the superiority — (*p*) *Aquisition*—when one has either acquired a thing, or wishes to aquire it he is frequently reminded of it — (*q*) *Cover*—when the sword is remembered by its scabbard.— (*r*) *Pleasure and Pain*—remind us of what causes them.— (*s*) *Desire and Aversion*—remind one of what is liked and what is disliked.—(*t*) *Fear*—reminds one of the cause of fear— (*u*) *Need*—reminds one of what he needs, in the shape of food or clothing.— (*v*) *Profession*—the chariot-maker is recalled by the chariot.— (*w*) *Affection*—one frequently remembers the woman whom he loves.— (*x*) *Merit*—reminds one of his previous births ; and Merit also enables one to retain what he reads and hears — (*y*) *Demerit*—reminds one of the causes of pain suffered in the past.

These several causes of Recollection are never cognised at the same time; hence no simultaneous Recollections are possible.

The Sūtra is merely suggestive of what causes Recollection ; it is by no means exhaustive.†

End of Section 3

* Some sort of 'Relationship' is involved in all that is enumerated here. Hence 'Relationship' here stands for those other than the ones specially enumerated.—*Tātparya.*

† There are other causes also; e.g., Insanity tends to revive old memories—*Tātparya.*

Section (4)

Sūtras 42-45

Apprehension vanishes soon after appearance.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Buddhi, Apprehension, having been proved to be *non-eternal*, it would follow that it vanishes soon after appearance; and yet there are several *non-eternal* things* (e.g the Jar) which continue to exist for a time more or less remote (from the time at which they are produced);—hence there arises the doubt—Is Apprehension entirely evanescent (disappearing soon after appearance), like Sound?—or is it durable for some time longer, like the Jar?

We accept the view that it is totally evanescent.

"Why so?"

Sūtra 42

Because there is Apprehension of Movement, which is fleeting

BHĀṢYA

Because there is apprehension of Movement which is fleeting (not durable)—In the case of the arrow shot from the bow we perceive a series of movements till the arrow drops down; and since every cognition is restricted to a single object, it follows that, just as there is a series of (fleeting) movements (in the arrow), so must there be also a series of corresponding cognitions. In the case of the apprehension of (comparatively) durable things also, inasmuch as we find that the perception ceases when the thing is hidden from view, [it follows that in this case

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* The *Viz.* text as well as the Puri Mss. read *'nityānām'*; but the sense requires *'anityānām'*; the *Vārtika* has neither *nityānām* nor *anityānām*. The fact of *nitya*, eternal things, being such as continue to exist longer, can have no bearing upon *Buddhi*, after this has been proved to be *non-eternal*. The meaning clearly is—'it having been proved that Buddhi is non-eternal, this would naturally imply that it is fleeting, evanescent, disappearing soon after appearance; and several non-eternal things are found to have longer duration; hence the Doubt in regard to *Buddhi*, as to whether it is entirely evanescent or it has some duration'.

With the reading *'nityānām'* the only sense that can be deduced from the passage is as follows—'If Buddhi is non-eternal, it should be entirely evanescent, and if it is eternal, it should continue to exist; hence the doubt.'

also there is a series of several evanescent cognitions]; that is, when the Jar, which is durable, is perceived, we have a series of cognitions, until something comes between (the Jar and the Perceiver); it is for this reason that as soon as something happens to intervene, the perception of the Jar ceases. If Cognition were durable (not evanescent), then the perceptional cognition of the Jar should continue even when the Jar has been hidden from view [which however is not found to be the case, and hence it follows that there is a series of several evanescent cognitions].

The phenomenon of Recollection also does not* prove the durability of Cognitions; for what brings about Recollection is the *Impression* produced by the Cognition (and *not* the *Cognition* itself). Some people have argued that—"Cognition must be regarded as durable, because we find Recollection of things apprehended by the Cognition,—and no such Recollection would be possible if its cause, in the shape of the corresponding Cognition, were non-eternal" But the fact put forward is no proof (of the proposition set forth). "Why?" Because what brings about the Recollection is, not the Cognition, but, the Impression produced by the Cognition; and this Impression is a quality entirely different from the Cognition.

"What is said cannot be accepted; because no reason has been adduced in its support."

[The *reason* is this]—If Cognition were something durable, then the perception itself would continue for a long time, and there would be no room for *Recollection* at all That is, so long as the original Perception would continue to exist, the object cognised would remain 'perceptible', and while the Perception itself is there, no 'Recollection' is possible.

* The Puri Mss read *smṛtiśca liṅgam*, 'Re-collection does prove'; in that case *buddhyavasthāne* should read as '*buddhyavyavastāne*'. But the reading of the *Viz.* text gives better sense. Things seen now are remembered after several days; this might be regarded as indicating that the cognition of the thing has continued to exist during all these days. But the fact is that the cognition is *not* the immediate cause of Re-collection, which is directly produced by the Impression left by the Cognition.

Sūtra 43

[*Objection*] —"**If Cognition were evanescent, the perception of things would be always indistinct; just like the indistinct perception of Colour during lightning-flash**".

BHĀṢYA

"If Cognition is evanescent, then the perception of all cognisable things should be indistinct; just as during lightning-flash, the light of the flash being evanescent, the perception of colour is indistinct As a matter of fact, however, the perception of things is quite distinct. Hence the view (that 'Cognitions are evanescent') cannot be right."

Sūtra 44

[*Answer*]—**The very reason put forward implies the admission of what is sought to be denied.**

BHĀṢYA

What is sought to be denied (by the Opponent) is that 'Cognition is evanescent'; and this is exactly what is admitted when he asserts (in Sū 43) that "the cognition should be indistinct like the indistinct cognition of Colour during lightning-flash" For if cognition is *indistinct*, it follows that it is also *evanescent*.

As a matter of fact, the diversity in the character (distinct or indistinct) of Cognitions is due to the diverse nature of their causes, and not to any diversity in the cognitions themselves.* That is, the fact that Cognition is at one time distinct and at another indistinct, is due to the diverse nature of the causes of Cognitions; so that where the cause of the Cognition is evanescent, the Cognition is *indistinct*, while where the cause is lasting, the Cognition is *distinct*; and the said distinctness or indistinctness is not due to the non-evanescence and evanescence respectively of Cognitions. "Why? Because 'Cognition' is the apprehension of a thing; be it distinct or indistinct, it is what is called 'Cognition'. What happens is that, when the special features of a thing are not perceived,—and only its general features are perceived,—then the Cognition is *distinct*, [so far as the cognition

* This has been generally printed as Sūtra. But neither the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, nor Viśvanātha, nor any Sūtra-Ms. reads any such *Sūtra*.

of these general features is concerned] ;† and if a further Cognition of something else (in the shape of the special features) does not appear, this is due to the absence of the necessary causes; when again the thing is perceived, as along with its general features, and also as along with its special features,—then the Cognition is clearly distinct [so far as both features are concerned]; —and where the special features being unperceived, the general features alone are perceived, the cognition is clearly *indistinct*—[but only so far as the special features are concerned]. In the present context, *the presence of special features* is clearly 'something else' (*viṣayāntara*) in comparison with *the presence of general features*; and if there is no cognition of the 'some-thing else', [and there is consequent *indintinctness*], this is due to the absence of the causes of that cognition,—and not to the evanescent character of the Cognition (as the Opponent seems to think).

In fact a cognition that is quite in keeping with the character of its *object* is always *distinct*; so that each Cognition pertaining to its own particular object, even the cognition of generalities, should be regarded as *distinct*, so far as its own particular *object* is concerned; and similarly the cognition of peculiarities should be regarded as *distinct*, so far as its own object is concerned; for the simple reason that each cognition pertains to its own particular object. So that when the Opponent brings forward (against us) the contigency of cognitions being *indistinct*,—what is that object of which the cognition would have to be *indistinct*, on account of the *evanescence of cognitions*?

As a matter of fact, there being several features in the object perceived, there arises a diversity in the cognitions (of that object); and it is to the presence or absence of such diversity that distinctness or indistinctness is due That is, every object has two kinds of features, general and special, and in regard to each of these there are diverse cognitions, if both these kinds

† It appears better to read this passage as सामान्यग्रहणमात्रमव्यक्तग्रहणम् —the meaning being that 'when general features are perceived and not the special features, the cognition is '*indistinct*'. But in deference to the *Vārtika* —and in view of the reading in all Mss., and in view of that follows below —we have admitted the reading of the Viz. text, and translated it in accordance with the explanation of the *Vārtika*.

of features are present (and perceived) in an object, then the Cognition is *distinct*, so far as that object is concerned ; if however only the general features are perceived, the Cognition is *indistinct*. It is in this manner that we can explain the appearance of *distinct and indistinct* cognitions.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact also, mere *evanescence*, either of the *cognition* or of the *cognised object*, does not necessarily make the Apprehension indistinct [as the Pūrvapakṣin asserts in Sū. 43].* What has been urged is ;—

Sūtra 45

not true , the said perception would be like the distinct perception of the continuous series of lamp-flames.

BHĀṢYA

Even if Cognition is evanescent, the perception of things must be regarded as *distinct*—why ?—because it is *like the perception of the continuous series of lamp-flames* ; i.e., when the flames of a lamp appear in a continuous series, every one of the perceptions thereof is evanescent ; as also is every one of the individual flames perceived ; and inasmuch as every perception pertains to its own individual object, there exist as many *perceptions* as there are *flames* ; and yet in this case we find that the perception of each of these flames is quite distinct.

End of Section (4)

SECTION (5)

Sūtras 46–55

Consciousness is not a quality of the Body.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Consciousness or Sentience would appear to be a quality of the Body, as it is found to be present when the Body is present, and absent when the Body is absent ; but—

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* In Sū. 44, the author has met the Pūrvapaksa by a sort of silencer, pointing out to him that his own statement admits what he seeks to demolish. Now, in the following Sūtra, he states his real argument against the Opponent's contention.

Sūtra 46

as a matter of fact, in Substances we perceive their own qualities as also the qualites of others · so that the matter is open to doubt.

BHĀṢYA

The mere fact of Consciousness being present when the Body is present leaves the matter doubtful; for in water we perceive Fluidity, which is its own quality, as also *warmth*, which is the quality of another substance (Fire). Hence when we perceive Consciousness in the Body, there arises a doubt as to whether the Consciousness perceived is the quality of the Body itself, or it is the quality of some other substance.

Sūtra 47

[*Siddhānta*]

Consciousness is not a quality of the Body. "Why?"

Because Colour and other qualities continue to exist as long as the Body exists.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Body is never found to be without colour and such other qualities; without *Consciousness*, on the other hand, it is actually found (when it is dead, for instance); in the same manner as Water is found without warmth. Hence the conclusion is that Consciousness is not a quality of the Body [just as warmth is not a quality of water].*

"It may be like Embellishment (or Momentum)."

That cannot be; as there is no cessation of any cause (of Consciousness) In the case of Embellishment, it is found that when it ceases to exist in an object, (the Body, e.g.) this object is not quite the same as what it was when the Embellishment was present; for as a matter of fact, Embellishment ceases to appear in an object only when the object has become deprived of those

* The reason is formulated in the form of a Hypothetical Reasoning, by Viśvanātha.—'If Consciousness were a quality of the Body, it would, like Colour etc., exist as long as the Body exists.' The *Pariśuddhi* formulates it in the form of a regular Inference: 'Consciousness, etc., are not the quality of the Body,—because, like Sound, they do not exist as long as their substratum.' Colour, in this case, being treated as an Instance *per contra*.

factors (such as Propulsion and the like) that were conducive to the appearance of the Embellishment ;—in the case in question on the other hand, when Consciousness ceases to appear in the Body, the Body is exactly what it was when Consciousness appeared in it [and there is no deprival of any factors, the only cause of Consciouness, according to the Opponent, consisting in the Body itself, which is still intact] Hence (the case of Consciousness not being analogous to that of Embellishment) it is not right to urge, in answer to our argument, that "the absence of Consciousness in the Body is like the absence of Embellishment".

If (in order to escape from the said difficulty) it be held that the cause of Consciousness in the Body is something else (and not the Body itself), then this cause could subsist either in the Body itself, or in some other Substance, or in both (the Body as well as another Substance) And none of these views can be maintained , because there would be no reason for any restriction (such as the following) (*a*) The cause of Consciousness subsisting in the Body itself, there would be no reason for any such restriction as that Consciousness should appear therein at certain times, and not at others ,—(*b*) the cause of Consciousness being in some other substance, there can be no reason for the restriction that while Consciousness appears in the Body, it does not appear in pieces of stone and such other things ,*—(*c*) if the cause of Consciousness subsists in both (Body and the other substance), there can be no reason for the restriction that Consciousness appears in the Body, and not in other substances that belong to the same category as that Body

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Some people might argue thus:—"In the case of the object possessed of the quality of dark colour (e g the unbaked Jar), we find that there is cessation of that Colour (while the object continues to exist), and in the same manner there may be cessation of the quality of Consciousness (while the Body, of which it is a quality, continues to exist)"

Sūtra 48

This however is not right, because (in the case of the object cited) there is appearance of another Colour due to baking.

* Puri Ms. B rightly reads a *na* after '*loṣṭādiṣvityatra*.'

BHĀṢYA

In the case of the object cited (*i.e.* the jar) there is not a total disappearance of all Colour; all that happens is that the *dark* Colour having disappeared, another Colour, *red*, is produced by baking;—in the case of the Body, on the other hand, there is, at death, a total disappearance of Consciousness (and nothing appears in its place).*

Sūtra 49

Further,

Inasmuch as qualities produced by heat are found to be due to the presence of counter-active forces, the criticism based upon the analogy of these cannot be right.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, qualities are found to be produced by heat in only such substances in which there are present forces counter-active (destructive) of the previous quality; that this is so is shown by the fact that the qualities produced by heat are incompatible with the previous qualities. In the Body, on the other hand, we do not find present any force counteractive of the quality of Consciousness,—by reason of the presence whereof there could appear any new quality incompatible with the (previous) quality of *Consciousness*; and it is only from the appearance of such new quality that the counter-action (destruction) of Consciousness (and hence the impossibility of its continuing as long as the Body lasts) could be inferred. Thus there being nothing to counteract the quality of Consciousness, it should continue in the Body as long as the Body lasts (if it is a quality of the Body). As a matter of fact, however, it does not so continue to exist. Hence the conclusion is that Consciousness is not a quality of the Body.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also Consciousness cannot be a quality of the Body:—

* Viśvanātha takes this *Sūtra* as coming from the Opponent; the meaning being—"The Siddhānta view is not right; as we find new colours produced (and old ones destroyed) by heat, while yet the substance remains the same."

Sūtra 50

Because it pervades over the entire Body.*

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, like the Body, all its component parts also are pervaded by the appearance of Consciousness ; and there is not a single part of the Body where Consciousness does not appear ; under the circumstances, if Consciousness belonged to the Body, this would mean that, like the Body, all its component parts are Conscious, and hence in each single person there would be several conscious entities ! So that, just as the restriction in regard to Pleasure, Pain and Cognition [that the Pleasure appearing in Devadatta's body is felt by him alone, and not by Yajñadatta and so forth] is indicative of the fact that there are several conscious beings—one to each individual body,—so would it also be in regard to the single body [every component part of which being endowed with Consciousness, it would follow that there is restriction as to the Pleasure, etc., of each such part ; so that the Pleasure appearing in one part of the Body would be felt by that part alone, and not by any other part of that same Body]. As a matter of fact, however, no such thing actually happens. Hence we conclude that Consciousness is not a quality of the Body.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[*Objection*] "It has been said that 'there is no part of the body where Consciousness does not appear' ; but—

Sūtra 51

" This is not right ;† as it is not found in such parts of the body as hairs and nails.

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* According to the *Pariśuddhi*, this Sūtra contains the following argument —'Consciousness cannot be a specific quality of the Body—because it is a quality that pervades over the whole of its substratum,—like Sound.' It goes on to remark,—'This meaning of the Sūtra was so clear and patent that the *Bhāṣyakāra* did not think it necessary to mention it, and he put down only that interpretation of it whereby it became connected with, and introductory to, the following *Sūtras*.'

† The *na*, appearing in the *Viz.* text as part of the *Bhāṣya*, should form part of *the Sūtra* ; such being the reading of all *Sūtra-texts*.

BHĀṢYA

"In hairs and in nails we do not feel any Consciousness appearing; so that it is not right to say that *it pervades over the entire body.*"

Sūtra 52

[*Answer*]—Inasmuch as the Body extends only so far as the skin, there is no possibility of Consciousness appearing in such things as Hairs and Nails.

BHĀSYA

'Body' has been defined as 'the substratum of Sense-organs'; so that the Body, which is the receptacle of life, mind, pleasure, pain and cognition, can be regarded as extending only up to the skin; hence it is natural that no Consciousness would appear in the Hairs and Nails The presence of such things as Nails and Hairs in the Body is due to the action of certain things [and they do not form constituent parts of the Body].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

For the following reason also Consciousness cannot be a quality of the Body:—

Sūtra 53

Because it differs in character from the qualities of the Body.

BHĀṢYA

Qualities belonging to the Body are of two kinds—(1) Imperceptible, *e.g.*, Gravity, and (2) Perceptible by the senses, *e.g.*, Colour, *etc* Consciousness is a quality of a totally different kind from the said qualities: It cannot be regarded as *imperceptible*, because it is capable of being sensed (perceived) by itself; nor can it be regarded as *perceptible by the senses*, because it is cognisable by the Mind * From this it follows that Consciousness is the quality of a substance totally different from the Body.

* The correct order appears in the *Vārtika*. The right reading would appear to be नाप्रत्यक्षा मनोविषयत्वात् नेन्द्रियग्राह्या स्वसंवेद्यत्वात् and the right translation should be—'It cannot be regarded as ***imperceptible***, as it is *perceived* by the Mind (which is an organ); nor can it be regarded as *perceptible* (i. e. perceived through an organ), as it is *cognised by itself.*'

Sūtra 54

[*Objection*]—“ **What is urged is not right ; as there is difference in character among Colour and other qualities (belonging to the Body)”.**

BHĀṢYA

“ Just as, even though differing in character from one another, Colour and the other qualities do not cease to be qualities of the Body, in the same manner, Consciousness also, though differing in character from Colour and the other qualities, need not cease to be a quality of the Body.”

Sūtra 55

[*Answer*]—**Inasmuch as Colour and the other qualities (of the Body) are perceptible by the Senses, there is no incongruity in these (belonging to the Boy).**

BHĀSYA

‘ *Also because they are not perceptible* ’—(this should be added to the *Sūtra*) ; [the meaning of the Sūtra being] Colour etc. though differing among themselves, yet do not go beyond the limits of the two kinds (mentioned under Sū. 53) ; and Consciousness also, differing from Colour etc., should fall within the limits of these two kinds, if it wère really a quality of the Body ;—as a matter of fact, however, Consciousness is found (as shown under Sū 53) to lie beyond the limits of the said two kinds :—hence it follows that Consciousness cannot be a quality of the Body.

Though the fact of Consciousness not belonging to the Body has already been established by what has been said above (in Section 3) in regard to Cognition not belonging to Material Substances, or Sense-organs, or Mind,—yet it has been dealt with over again (in the present Section), for the purpose of stating additional arguments (such as pertain to the Body specifically) ; specially because the more is truth investigated the more fully established it becomes.

End of Section 5

SECTION (6)

[*Sūtras 56–59*].

Treating of the Mind.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The character of Apprehension having been examined, it is now the turn of Mind to be examined ; and the question arising —Is there only one Mind in each body, or several ? *—[the answer is—

Sūtra 56

The Mind must be one only : since there is non-simultaneity of Cognitions.

There are two kinds of 'non-simultaneity of cognitions'—(1) the non-simultaneity of several cognitions produced through the same Sense-organ, and (2) the non-simultaneity of cognitions of several things produced through several Sense-organs. Of these two the former is not what is spoken of as indicating the singleness of the Mind,—this 'non-simultaneity' being due to the fact that one Instrument (such as Sense-organs are) can, by its very nature, accomplish only one thing at a time :—it is the latter 'non-simultaneity' of the cognitions of several things through several Sense-organs that is regarded as indicating the singleness of Mind. "How does that non-simultaneity indicate the singleness of Mind ?" If there were several Minds, it would be possible for several Sense-organs to be in contact with several Minds simultaneously ; whereby there should be several cognitions appearing (through these contacts) at one and the same time ,—but this never happens ;—hence the conclusion is that, inasmuch as cognitions of things appear only one after another—and never simultaneously—there is a single Mind (in one body).

* It has been explained in Sū. 1-1-16 that 'the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is the indicative of Mind ;' this would not be true, if there were several Minds in a body, or if the Mind were of large dimension The present enquiry is undertaken for the purpose of finding out some means of concentrating the Mind ; attempts at concentration could be fruitful only if there were only one Mind ; if there were several Minds, there need be no attempt at concentration ; and no abstraction of the Mind or Meditation would be possible.

Sūtra 57

[*Objection*]—"**What has been asserted is not right; for as a matter of fact, we do perceive several actions (cognitions) actually appearing simultaneously.**"

BHĀṢYA

"[When the pupil perceives his Teacher going in the forest] he has the following notions,—'This Teacher reads—walks—holds the water-pot—looks at the path—hears the sounds proceeding from the forest—becomes frightened—keeps on the lookout for signs of serpents or tigers—remembers the place of destination* ';—he does not notice any order of sequence among these cognitions, so that all these may be regarded as appearing simultaneously;—and hence it follows that there are several Minds."

Sūtra 58

[*Answer*]—**The said perception is like the perception of the fire-circle; and is due to the rapidity of motion.**

BHĀṢYA

In the case of the whirling fire-brand, even though there is sequence among the several perceptions of the fire, yet it is not perceived, by reason of the extreme rapidity of motion; and the sequence not being perceived, there arises the idea of the continuity (of fire in revolution), which gives rise to the notion that there is a single *circle of fire*,—similarly in the case of cognitions also, Sequence, even though present, fails to be perceived by reason of the rapidity of the cognitions or actions; and the Sequence failing to be perceived, there arises the notion that the actions (or cognitions) appear simultaneously.

"But is the notion of the simultaneity of cognitions due to the non-perception of sequence in them? Or, is the perception of simultaneity due to the actual existence of simultaneity?—You do not show any cause for accepting the one or the other view in preference to the other; [so that the matter must be open to doubt]."

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* The *Tātparya* adopts the reading संस्त्यायनम् and explains it as स्त्यापनम्. The right reading appears to be that found in the Puri Ms. B. स्थानीयम्.

We have already explained that cognitions of several things, due to the action of the sense-organs, appear one after the other; and this cannot be denied, being directly perceptible by each man for himself. Further, whenever we think of a number of things seen or heard before, our ideas of them always appear one after the other, and never simultaneously; and from this also we can infer (that the cognitions in the case cited in Sū 57 are not simultaneous).

In the case of the cognitions of syllables, words and sentences, and those of their meanings, sequence fails to be perceived by reason of rapidity. "How so?" [As a matter of fact the phenomenon involves the following process]—When the several syllables composing a sentence are pronounced, there appears one auditory perception in connection with each one of those syllables,—then the hearer recognises one or several syllables as forming a *word*,—having recognised the word, he ponders over it,—by this pondering he recalls the meaning of that word,—ponders over a number of words as constituting one *sentence*,—having cognised the meanings of the words as syntactically connected, he recognises the meaning of the sentence —Even though there are so many cognitions involved (in the process of our comprehension of the meaning of a sentence), yet by reason of the rapidity with which they appear, their sequence fails to be perceived This example explains the ordinary notion of *simultaneity* that people have in regard to Cognitions.

[While the above facts cannot be gainsaid by either party],—in support of the contrary view—that Cognitions do actually appear simultaneously, there is no instance which is free from doubt (and admitted by both parties), on the strength of which it could be inferred that there are several Minds in a body.

Sūtra 59

For reasons already mentioned, the Mind must be atomic

BHĀṢYA

That Mind is *atomic*, and that it is *one*—both these properties of the Mind follow from the *non-simultaneity of Cognitions*. If

the Mind were something *large*, then it would be possible for it to be in contact with several sense-organs at one and the same time ; and this should give rise to several Cognitions *simultaneously*.

End of Section 6

SECTION (7)

Sūtras 60-72

The Body is formed under the Influence of the Unseen Force (of Destiny)

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

*The Mind, along with the Sense-organs, is found to operate only within the Body, never outside the Body , of the cognising person also, all experiencing of objects, consisting of apprehension etc , is found to occur only in the Body; so also his acquiring of the desired and abandoning of the undesired thing,—and all other operations carried on by man With regard to the Body, there is a diversity of opinion, which gives rise to the

* Since the Mind operates only in the Body, it is only right that the exact nature of the Body should be examined after the character of the Mind has been discussed,—says the *Vārtika*. An examination of the Mind requires an examination of its receptacle, Body, also—the *Tātparya* adds.

The use of the present enquiry consists in the determining of the relation of a particular Soul with a particular Body, and the birth and Final Release of that Soul, as also what is called 'Death'. If we can prove that the connection of the Soul with the Body is due to the past deeds of that Soul, all these phenomena become explained , thus alone is use found for the laws relating to the duties of the several castes and conditions of man. Thus it is that all that has gone before in the Nyāyasūtra becomes justified—*Pariśuddhi*

Man's experiences occur in the Body ; the Mind, like all Sense-organs, functions in the Body , and these facts can be explained only on the basis of Man's body being due to his past deeds Hence the necessity of the present enquiry It would seem that the proper occasion for this investigation was the Section that dealt with the Body itself. But it comes in more naturally in connection with the Mind, which is the principal instrument of all man's pleasure, pain etc . .Some people think that the Body of the child is due to the *Karman*, not of the child itself, but of the Father. But this is not right , because the Body of man must be the product of the acts of that person who regards that Body as himself, and acts for the experiences obtained through and in that Body.—*Vardhamāna*.

following doubt :—Is the formation of the man's Body due to his '*Karman*', or, is it the product of the material substances, independently of any '*Karman*'? We hear several opinions expressed on this point. The truth on this point is as follows : -

Sūtra 60

The formation of the Body is due to the persistence of the effect of previous acts.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*pūrvakrtam*', 'previous', stands for those deeds, or actions in the shape of the 'Activity of Speech, Thought and Bodily activity', that were done (by the person) in his previous body ;—the 'effect' of the said 'acts' consists of *Merit and Demerit* produced by them ,—the '*anubandha*', 'persistence', of that 'effect', means the continuing of it as subsisting in the Soul ; —and the formation of the Body is out of the material substances *as operated upon by the said 'persistence of Merit* and *Demerit*', and not out of the material substances by themselves That particular Body belongs to a Soul subsisting in which the Soul regards it as 'I', attached to which and desiring experiences in which that Soul obtains the various kinds of objects and acquires (brings about) Merit and Demerit ; and when this Body falls off (on death), another is brought into existence by the force of the 'Faculty' in the shape of the said 'Merit and Demerit' along with (and operating upon) the material substances ; when this second body has come into existence, there go on again actions for the fulfilment of the man's purposes, just as in the previous body ; and the man's activities go on as in the previous body. All this phenomenon is possible only on the basis of the assumption that the production of the Body is out of the material substances as operated upon by the Soul's acts. In the case of such objects as the chariot and the like, we find that being intended for the accomplishment of man's purpose, they are brought into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by man's quality in the shape of *Effort* ; and on the analogy of this we can infer that the Body, being meant to accomplish the man's purposes, comes into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by some qualities belonging to the man (such for instance as his Merit and Demerit).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

On this point the Atheist argues as follows :—

Sūtra 61

" The formation of the Body out of material substances is exactly like the production of material bodies out of material substances."

BHĀṢYA

" From out of material substances themselves—independently of 'Karman'—are produced material bodies, in the shape of Sands, Pebbles, Stones, Orpiment and Soot ; and they are taken up (by men) on account of their being capable of accomplishing the purposes of man. In the same manner the Body, being produced, out of material substances independently of man's 'Karman', would be taken up by him, on account of its being conducive to his purposes."

Sūtra 62

This cannot be accepted : because what is urged is still to be proved.

BHĀṢYA

Just as it is *still to be proved* that 'the formation of the Body is independent of Karman', so is it *still to be proved* that 'the production of Sands, Pebbles, Stones, Orpiment, Soot and such things is independent of Karman' ; so that being itself still to be proved, the said premiss cannot serve as a valid reason.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

What has been urged (in Sū. 61) in regard to the 'production of material bodies out of material substances',—any analogy between this and the case in question—

Sūtra 63

there is none ; because Parents are the cause of formation (of the Body).

BHĀṢYA

What has been urged by the Atheist bears no analogy to the case in question. "Why ? " Because the 'material bodies' mentioned (Sands etc.,) are produced without seeds ; while the Body is always produced from seeds. The term 'parents' stands for *the ovule and semen*, which constitute the 'seeds' (of the Body) ;

and what bring about the birth of the Body out of the material substances in the mother's womb are—(1) that 'Karman' of the personality himself, which is conducive to the experiences to be gone through by him in the mother's womb, and (2) the 'Karman' of the Parents which is conducive to the experiences resulting from the birth of the child. Thus it is established that there is connection with 'seeds' (in the shape of Semen and Ovule).

Sūtra 64

And so also is the food.

BHĀSYA

'*The cause of the formation of the Body*'—this has to be added, being the principal clause (of the sentence of which Sūtras 63 and 64 are component parts).

'Food' is what is eaten and drunk ; and the juices, brought about by the digestion of the food, entering into the seed embedded in the mother's womb, undergo development along with that seed · and in that seed there is as much development as suffices for the accretion of the necessary aggregate,—the accretion thus formed goes on to develop into such aggregates as (1) the cell, (2) the mass, (3) the fœtus, (4) the embryo,* (5) the arteries, (6) and head, and (7) the feet etc ,—and ultimately into what comes to be the substratum of the sense-organs ;—when the fœtus has been formed, the juices of the food are absorbed by it through the umbilical cord, and it continues to grow till it becomes fit for being born. No such development is found to occur in the case of food lying in the dish (and not eaten by a person) : From all this it follows that the development of the Body of the child is dependent upon the *karman* (Destiny of the Parents)

Sūtra 65

Specially because, even when physical connection is present, there is no certainty (in the appearance of the result).

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, every connection of the Parents does not bring about conception ; and the only explanation of this is

* From (1) to (4) are the names of the several shapes of the developing fœtus—says the *Tātparya*.

that there is no conception when the necessary influence of *Karman* (Destiny) is absent ; and when this influence is present conception does take place. This is the only explanation possible of the said uncertainty of conception. If the material substances were independent (of any such influence as Destiny), there should be certainty of conception ; for under that hypothesis, there would be no element wanting in the causes necessary for the formation of the Body.

Further,

Sūtra 66

Just as Karman (Destiny) is the cause of the formation of the Body, so is it also of the connection of the Body (with a particular Soul).*

BHĀṢYA

It is, as a matter of fact, impossible for the Body to be formed out of the Earth and other material substances, independently of Destiny,—as the Body consists of an aggregation, brought about by means of an arrangement or disposition, most difficult to encompass, of such (heterogeneous) components as—(1) the arteries through which the bodily humours and life-breath flow, (2) the humours of the body culminating in the semen, (3) the Tendon, Skin, Bones, Veins, Muscle, Embryo and Fœtus, (4) head, arms and belly, (5) the thighs, (6) the wind, Bile and Phlegm permeating the Body, and (7) the mouth, throat, chest, stomach, intestines and bowels ,—consequently we conclude that its formation is due to Destiny In the same manner if among the causes (bringing about the body) there is nothing that is related to any particular Soul, the Earth and other material substances that would constitute the body would be

* This *Sūtra* anticipates the objection that, when a body is born, it comes into contact with all Souls—since all are equally omnipresent,—so that a body should belong to all Souls equally. The answer is that, though in a general way all Souls are in contact with the Body, yet the special connection of the body with one individual Soul is due to the Destiny of that Soul , which Destiny determines the exact body fit for the experiences in store for that Soul

Would it not be simpler to take the *Sūtra* to mean that 'the connection of *Parents* also is due to the Destiny of the Soul to be born of these parents' ? This would be more in keeping with the context.

equally related to all the Souls–among whom there would be nothing to distinguish one from the other,–and there being nothing in the Earth etc., themselves that would connect them with any one Soul, and not with the rest, the Body formed out of these would be the common substratum for the pleasure, pain and cognition of all the Souls,—as a matter of fact, however, each Body is found to be connected with only one particular Soul; and the only explanation of this restriction is that *Karman* (Destiny) is a cause that brings about the formation of the Body; so that the Karmic residuum of each Soul being restricted to itself, it produces a Body fit for being the substratum of the experiences of that particular Soul in which the residuum subsists, and connects that body with that Soul. Thus it is found that just as *Destiny is the cause of the formation of the Body, so is it also of the connection of that Body with a particular Soul*. What we mean by 'connection' is the relation that each Body bears to an individual Soul.

Sūtra 67

By what has been said in the preceding Sūtra the absence of universality has been explained [*i.e.*, shown to be impossible, inexplicable under the Pūrva-prakṣa].*

BHĀṢYA

What is called '*aniyama*', 'absence of universality', has been explained—by what has been said in the preceding Sūtra,—'just as Destiny is the cause of the formation of the Body so is it also of the connection of that Body with a particular Soul',—as impossible and inexplicable under the theory that the formation of the Body is *not* due to Destiny.†

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* All the commentaries explain this Sūtra as aimed against the following Sānkhya-doctrine.—"The formation of the Body is not due to Destiny; it is due to the functioning of Primordial Matter; this Primordial Matter, through its own inherent activity, independently of Merit, Demerit etc., evolves the several products."

The Sūtra has been rendered according to the explanation provided by the Commentators. Would it not be simpler to render it as follows—'What has been said disposes of the objection that there could be no restriction as to which Soul should have which Body.'

† The *Tātparya* has adopted the reading योऽयमकर्मनिमित्तसर्गे मते अनियम......कर्मैत्यनेन प्रत्युक्त: which has been construed as—योऽयमनियम

Q. "What does *Niyama*, 'Universality', mean here ?"

A. What is called 'Universality' here is the idea that *the body of one Soul is the same as that of all Souls* ; so that what is meant by '*aniyama*', 'absence of Universality', is *diversity, distinction, peculiarity*,—*i.e.*, the idea that *the body of one Soul is different from that of another*.*

As a matter of fact, we actually find such diversity or distinction in the birth of bodies as (*a*) one is born in a high family, another in a low family, (*b*) one is praiseworthy and another blameworthy, (*c*) one is full of diseases while another is free from diseases, (*d*) one is full-bodied while another is maimed, (*e*) one is full of suffering while another is full of happiness, (*f*) one is endowed with excellent characteristics of man while another is quite the contrary, (*g*) one is endowed with good properties while another possesses bad properties, (*h*) one has efficient and another weak sense-organs. [These are the cruder differences ordinarily perceptible.] There are several subtler differences, which are innumerable. All this diversity in the birth of Bodies can be due only to the Destiny attaching to each individual Soul (which determines the character of the Body into which that Soul is going to be born). On the other hand, if there were no such diverse Destinies attaching to individual Souls, (as influencing the birth of the Body), then—there being no difference among the Souls themselves, and the Earth and other material substances (as constituting Primordial Matter) being the same in all cases, and there being nothing in these substances to lead to any restriction,—it would come to this that all bodies belong to all Souls. As a matter of fact, however, the life of Souls is not found to be so (that is, such as all bodies belong to all Souls).

इत्युच्यते अयं अकर्मनिमित्तसर्गे मते......प्रत्युक्तः The *Tātparya* explains the purport as follows—'the absence of Universality—*i.e.*, the fact that no single Body can be common to all Souls—that has been described in the preceding Sūtra—*has been explained*—*i.e.*, shown to be impossible under the theory that the formation of the Body is brought about by material substances independently of any such influence as that of Destiny.'

* '*Niyama*' stands for *Universality*, the idea of all Souls having a common body ; '*Aniyama*' means *non-universality*, the idea that one Soul has one body and another a totally different one—*Tātparya*.

Hence the conclusion is that the formation of the Body cannot but be due to the influence of Destiny.

Further, the separation (freedom) of the Soul from the Body is also rendered possible by the possibility of the exhaustion of *Karman* (Destiny).* That is to say, when the formation of the Body is due to Destiny, it becomes possible for the Soul to become separated (freed) from that body —"How ?"—*Through the possibility of the exhaustion of Destiny.* It is possible for Destiny to be exhausted in the following manner . —Right Knowledge having destroyed Illusion, the person becomes free from all attachment,—he commits no further deeds, by body, speech, or mind, which could lead to his re-birth , so that there is no further accumulation of Destiny ; and all past accumulation becomes exhausted by his passing through the experiences resulting therefrom , thus (in the absence of Destiny) there being nothing to bring about a further Body, when the present Body falls off, no further Body is formed, and hence there is no further bondage (for that Soul). If the formation of the Body were *not* due to Destiny,—as of the material substance (Primordial Matter) itself there can be no destruction,—there would be no possibility of the Soul ever becoming freed from the Body.

Sūtra 68

† If it be asserted that—"the formation of the Body is due to 'adṛṣṭa' [(a) 'non-perception', or (b) unseen quality]"

* This appears as *Sūtra* in the *Viz* text But no such Sūtra is found in the *Nyāyasūcī nibandha,* nor in Sūtra Mss. C and D, nor in Viśvanātha's Vṛtti.

† The *Viz* text, as also the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha,* includes this clause also under the Sūtra But neither Viśvanātha nor any Sūtra Ms reads the Sūtra so , according to these the form of the Sūtra is simply *'punastatprasango' pavarge'* But from the *Bhāṣya* below it is clear that the text of the Sūtra is as translated

The *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* explain this objection as proceeding from the *Sānkhya* (A). The *Bhāṣya* latter on, P. 191, L 10, offers another explanation, whereby the objection is represented as coming from the Jaina (B).

The *Tātparya* has explained the term 'Adrsṭa' of the Sūtra,—which the Bhāsva savs, is synonymous here with *'adarśana',* non-perception,—to mean the non-perception of such objects of enjoyment as Sound and the like, as also the non-perception of the distinction between Soul and Matter.

—then [our answer is that] in that case, even after final release there would be likelihood of a Body being produced.

BHĀṢYA

[A] "It is *adars'ana*, 'non-perception', that is spoken of as *adṛṣṭa*, (in the *Sūtra*). As a matter of fact, the formation of the Body is brought about by 'non-perception'. That is, as long as the Body has not been formed, the perceiver, being without a receptable (abode), *cannot perceive* things; the things to be *perceived* by him being of two kinds—(*a*) the *object* (Sound, Taste, Odour etc.) and the *diversity* or *difference* between the *Unmanifested* (Primordial Matter) and the *Soul*;—and it is (in view of this 'non-perception', and) for this purpose (of accomplishing the *perception* of these two kinds of things) that the Body is brought into existence. Hence when the said *perception* (of both kinds of things) has been accomplished, the material substances have done all they had to do (in connection with that perceiving Soul) and consequently do not produce any other Body for him; and in this manner the 'separation from Body' becomes possible."

If you hold the above view, then our answer is that—*in that case, even after Final Release, there would be likelihood of a further Body being born.* That is, there would be likelihood of another Body being produced for that Soul. According to you, there is one 'non-perception'—*i.e.*, impossibility of perception—while the Body has not been formed; and there is 'impossibility of perception' after the Body has ceased to exist,—which also is another 'non-perception';—and between these two 'non-perceptions' there is no difference; so that, even after Final Release, inasmuch as 'non-perception' [which, according to you, is the sole cause of the production of the Body] would be there, there would be every likelihood of another Body being produced.

"But the fact of *the purpose of the Body-production having been accomplished* forms the point of difference (between the two 'non-perceptions')."*

This cannot be right; because, as a matter of fact, we find production or accomplishment as well as non-accomplishment.

* This is sometimes printed as Sūtra. But no such Sūtra is found anywhere.

That is, if what you mean to urge is that—"When perception (of ordinary things, and of the difference between Soul and Matter) has been accomplished, the material substances have their purpose fulfilled, and as such, do not go to form another Body; and this forms the point of difference [wherein one kind of 'non-perception', that due to the cessation of the Body upon Final Release, differs from the other kind of 'non-perception', that due to the non-existence of the Body, before it has been produced],"—then, our answer is that this cannot be right; because we find production on accomplishment as well as on non-accomplishment; that is, as a matter of fact, we find that Bodies are produced again and again (for the non-released Soul), even though the material substances have their purpose fulfilled by the Soul's *perception* of the things of the world, and inasmuch as the Bodies produced again and again do not (always) bring about the *perception* of difference between Soul and Matter (which is the only purpose left to be accomplished for the Soul by these subsequent bodies), the production of all these bodies must be regarded as purposeless.

From all this it is clear that, under the theory that the creation of things is not due to Destiny, the formation of the Body *cannot* be regarded as being for the purposes of 'Perception', while under the theory that the said creation is due to Destiny, the formation of the Body can be rightly regarded as being for the purposes of 'Perception'; as (under this latter theory) 'Perception' consists in *experience*, wh s the result of deeds done (i.e. Destiny)

[B] The clause '*tadadṛstakāritam*' may be taken as representing the theory of other philosophers :—" *Adṛṣta* is the name of a particular quality of Atoms, which brings about action or movement (vibration); it is when urged by this quality that the Atoms combine and bring about the Body; whereupon this Body is entered by the Mind, which also is urged to it by its own quality of '*Adṛṣṭa*'; and when the Body has become entered by the Mind then the Perceiver begins to have his perceptions."

The answer to this theory also is that—'*there is likelihood of another Body being produced*'—since the Mind is not destroyed; that is, even after Final Release, there would be likelihood of a further Body being produced, as '*Adṛṣṭa*', the quality of Atoms, is indestructible (and hence persists even after Release).

Sūtra 69

There should be no severance of connection,—this being due to the action of Mind.*

BHĀṢYA

[Another objection against the Jaina view, referred to in the latter part of the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 68]

If the Mind enters (into the Body) by virtue of '*adṛṣṭa*', the Unseen Quality of the Mind, there should be no severance of connection (between the Mind and the Body) For under this view,† to what could the moving out of the Mind from the Body be due? Under our theory the said moving out (of the Mind from the Body, at death) is due to the fact that one set of Karmic Residuum (to which the dead Body owed its existence) having been exhausted, another set of Karmic residuum (to which the next Body would be due) sets up its fruition § "The moving out of the Mind would be due to the unseen quality (*Adṛṣṭa*); that same unseen quality which has been the cause of *entrance* (of the Mind into the Body) will also be the cause of its *exit*." This cannot be right; for one and the same thing cannot be the cause of both *life* (which is what the *entrance* of Mind means) and *death* (which is what is meant by the Mind's *exit*); according to your view the same Unseen Quality would be the cause of both life and death; and this is absurd.

Sūtra 70

Inasmuch as Death would not be possible, the Body should have to be regarded as ever-lasting.

BHĀṢYA

When, on the experiencing of the fruits (of all deeds) there is exhaustion of Karmic residuum and the Body falls off, it is called 'death'; and under the influence of another Karmic residuum there is 'rebirth'. Now, if the formation of the Body

* This Sūtra is not found in the Puri Sūtra Ms., it is found everywhere else.

† तत्र is better than तच्च.

§ तादिहं दृष्टान्तस्य......दृष्टान्ते—These words, found in some editions, have no connection with the present context. They are not found in the Puri Mss., nor in any other manuscript save one.

were due to the material substances themselves, independently of Destiny, what would that be the exhaustion whereof could lead to the fall of the Body, which is called 'death'? And there being no death, we understand that *the Body should have to be regarded as ever-lasting.* For if Death were due to mere chance, (and not to a specific cause relating specifically to the individual), then there could be no difference in the manner of death (in several persons).*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Opponent,—with a view to criticise what has been urged against him, to the effect that 'there would be likelihood of another Body being produced' (Sū. 68),—argues as follows ;—

Sūtra 71

"It would be like the eternality of the dark colour of the Atom."†

BHĀṢYA

"Just as the dark colour of the Atom (of Clay) is eternal, and yet when it is obstructed (set aside) by fire-contact (in baking), it does not appear again,—in the same manner the Body, though formed by the Unseen Quality (of the Atoms), would not appear again, after Final Release."

Sūtra 72

That cannot be ; as this would involve (A) the admission of what is not supported (by reasoning or fact)§ [(B) or, the accruing of what is not earned.]

BHĀṢYA

(A) The instance cited (in Sū. 71) cannot be right ;—"Why?"—*Because this would involve the admission of what is not supported.* The term 'supported' stands for *not compatible with*

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* Some persons die in the womb, some as soon as they are born, and so forth. If death were not the effect of a specific cause, it should be either *eternal*, like *Ākāśa*, or an absolute *non-entity*, like the sky-lotus.—*Tātparya*.

† This *Sūtra*, though not found in Sūtra Ms. C, is found everywhere else.

§ The *Tātparya* construes the Sūtra thus —*Pramāṇena aviṣayīkṛtam 'akṛtam'—pratyuta pratyakṣāgamaviruddham—tasya 'abhyāgamaḥ' abhyupagamah tatprasaṅgāt.* This is the interpetation that has been adopted in the translation ; as also a second interpretation (B), put forward in the *Bhāṣya*.

any right Cognition; the '*abhyāgama*' of that means its acceptance, avowal; the meaning thus is that he who believes what has been said (in Sū. 71) would be avowing what is incompatible with all right notion. Hence the instance cited cannot be right; since what is asserted is neither perceptible, nor cognisable by inference. Thus what the *Sūtra* (72) urges is the fact that what has been cited by the Opponent is something *still to be proved*.

(B) Or, the Sūtra may be explained to mean that—*That cannot be, as this would involve the accruing of what is not earned.* A person who, on the basis of the example of the Dark Colour of the Atom, seeks to support the view that the formation of the Body is not due to Destiny, draws upon himself the incongruity of *the accruing of the unearned.* That is, the theory would involve the contingency that pleasure and pain accrues to the man without his having done the acts leading up to that pleasure and pain. If, in answer to this, you say "yes, be it so";—then our answer is that this would be contrary (*a*) to Perception, (*b*) to Inference and (*c*) to Scripture.

(*a*) To perception it would be contrary in the following manner:—That the Pleasure and Pain experienced by each individual Soul is distinct is a fact perceptible to all persons. "What is the distinction?" The distinctions are such as *strong and weak*, *belated and quick*, *diverse and uniform*, and so forth. (Under the Opponent's theory) there can be no speciality in the causes bringing pleasure and pain to each individual Soul separately; and unless there is some speciality in the cause there can be none in the effect. If, on the other hand, the advent of pleasure and pain is due to Destiny,—inasmuch as it is possible (*a*) for the acts of diverse personalities to be strong or weak etc., (*b*) for their Karmic residuum to be correspondingly more or less potent, and (*c*) for their acts to be of diverse or uniform character,—it is only right that there should be a corresponding distinction in the Pleasure and Pain resulting from those acts. And since no such distinction *in the cause* would be possible on the theory of the Opponent, there should be no distinction in the resultant Pleasure and Pain:—and this would be incompatible with (contrary to) a fact known by Perception.

(*b*) The Opponent's theory would be contrary to Inference in the following manner:—The distribution of Pleasure and Pain among persons is found to follow from the distribution of their qualities; e.g. when an intelligent person, having recognised a certain pleasure as brought about by a certain means, *desires* that pleasure, he makes an *effort* to obtain that means, and thereby obtains that pleasure; and he does not obtain it otherwise [i.e if he does not put forth the said effort];—similarly, when a person, having recognised a certain pain as brought about by a certain means, *desires* to aovid that Pain, he makes an *effort* to avoid that means, and thereby avoids that pain; and not otherwise. Now in the case in question, we find that there are certain pleasures and pains that accrue to a person without any effort on his part [such for instance as the sufferings due to a mis-shaped body]: and on the strength of the well-known facts just mentioned, we *infer* that the distribution of these pleasures and pains also must be due to some other quality of the intelligent being (if not his direct *effort*) [and this other quality is *Merit-Demerit* constituting the person's Destiny]. This inference would be contradicted if the accruing of pleasure and pain were held to be not due to Destiny. The said 'other quality' (Merit-Demerit), being imperceptible, is called '*adṛṣta*' (Unseen Force, Destiny), and since the time of its fruition is not definitely fixed, it is regarded as *indefinite*;* while Apprehension and the other qualities of the Soul are perceptible and evanescent.

(*c*) The Opponent's theory would be contrary to Scripture in the following manner:—There are several Scriptures written by sages, containing the instructions imparted by those sages, in regard to the performance and avoidance of actions; and the effect of such instruction we find in the shape of activities of men consisting of performance in due accordance with their respective castes and conditions of life, as also in the shape of cessation from activity, consisting of avoidance of action. Both

* We have translated the reading *avyavasthitam*; though to keep up the contrast with the 'evanescence' of Buddhi, spoken of in the next sentence, '*vyavasthitam*', 'permanent', 'lasting', would appear to be the better reading.

these kinds of action, good and evil, would be impossible, under the philosophy of the *Pūrvapakṣin*; so that this philosophy is contrary to the view (in consonance with Scriptures) that the accruing of pleasure and pain to persons is due to Destiny.

Thus the conclusion is that the doctrine—that "the formation of the Body is not due to Destiny, and the accruing of Pleasure and Pain is not due to Destiny"—is clearly wrong and is maintained only by the worst sinners.

Thus ends the *Bhāṣya* on *Adhyāya III*.

DISCOURSE IV

DAILY LESSON I

SECTION (1)

Sūtras 1—2

General Examination of Activity and Defect.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After *Mind* it is the turn of *Activity* to be examined.* All that has been said in course of the Examination of the *Body* as the receptacle of Merit and Demerit may be regarded as constituting the Examination of *Activity* ;—this is what is asserted in the following *Sūtra*.

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* The Third Discourse has dealt with the first six of the twelve 'objects of cognition' mentioned in Sū. 1-1-9, these six—Soul, Body, Sense-organs, Things perceived, Apprehension and Mind—being the *causes* of the remaining six—Activity, Defect, Re-birth, Fruition, Pain and Release; these are the *effects* of the former six. [This is what constitutes the connection between Discourses III and IV.] In the First Daily Lesson we have the examination of the six 'objects'; and in the Second we have the Examination of the Highest Cognition, the Right Knowledge, (that leads directly to Release).—*Pariśuddhi*.

Vardhamāna adds—Another connection between the end of Adhyāya III and the beginning of Adhyāya IV, consists in the fact that among the Objects mentioned in Sū. 1-1-9, it is 'Activity' whose *mention* follows that of 'Mind'; hence it is only natural that the 'examination' also of *Activity* should follow that of *Mind*.

Vardhamāna raises a further question—According to the rule laid down by the *Bhāṣya*, the 'examination' of a subject must be preceded by its 'mention' and 'definition'; and as 'Right Knowledge' has nowhere been *mentioned*, there can be no justification for its *examination* in the second Daily Lesson of Adh. IV. The answer is that 'Right-Cognition' has been actually mentioned in Sū. 1-1-1, where it is *mentioned* as leading to the Highest Good of Man; and further, to justify an 'examination', it is not necessary to directly *mention* a subject; for we find the *Sūtras* examining several subjects that are connected only remotely with the subjects *mentioned*. Another question that arises is—since Right Knowledge is the precursor of Release, it should have been dealt with beforehand. The answer to this is that a full account of Right Knowledge demands a previous account of the *objects* of that knowledge; it is for this reason that Right Knowledge has been dealt with *after* all other subjects have been dealt with.

Sūtra 1

As Activity has been defined—*so has it been examined.**

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It might be urged that after 'Activity', there should follow the Examination of 'Defects'; hence the *Sūtra* adds—

Sūtra 2

So also have the Defects—

BHĀṢYA

been examined. (A) Inasmuch as they subsist in the same substratum as *Apprehension*, Defects are regarded as the qualities of the Soul;—(B) inasmuch as they are the source of Activity and as they have the power of bringing about re-birth, they are regarded as the cause of '*Samsāra*', 'Birth-Rebirths';—and since this (series of births and re-births) is beginningless, Defects are regarded as operating† in a continuous series § *Wrong Knowledge* ceases when Right Knowledge is attained; and on the cessation of *Wrong Knowledge*, the whole series of *Affections and Aversions* drop off; whereupon follows *Final Release*;—and from this it is clear that Defects (i.e., Wrong Knowledge, Affec-

* Activity has been defined under Sū. 1-1-17 as the 'Operation of Speech, of Mind and of Body'; and this may be regarded as its 'examination' also.

These words—'*so has it been examined*'—are, according to the *Bhāṣya*, to be supplied to complete the Sūtra. Viśvanātha has taken exception to this —"It is not right to supply these words to the Sūtra; for if this is done then the word '*tathā*', 'so', required as the necessary correlation to '*yathā*', 'as', of the Sūtra (1), having already been thus supplied, there would be no syntactical connection between Sūtras (1) and (2). Hence the right way to construe is to take both Sūtras together, the meaning being—'just as Activity is as has been defined, so is Defect also as it has been defined'".

This construction is perhaps better; but there is no point in the criticism of the Bhāṣya-interpretation, for there is nothing wrong in construing the single '*yathā*' of Sū (1) with two '*tathās*'—one supplied by the *Bhāṣya* and the other occurring in Sū. (2).

† The right reading '*pravartante*' is supplied by Puri Ms. B.

§ Defects are due to the contemplation of desirable and undesirable things; hence like Apprehension they must be qualities of the Soul; being qualities of the Soul they must proceed on lines similar to Activity, which is the product of the Soul's quality, Effort. Hence the examination of 'Defects' becomes included in that of 'Activity.'—*Tātparya.*

tion etc.) are liable to Appearance and Disappearance ;—all this in connection with Defects has already been explained (under *Sūtras* 1-1-2 and 3-1-25).

End of Section (1)

SECTION (2)*

Sūtras 3-9

Defects divided into three Groups.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question :—It has been said in Sū. 1-1-18 that 'Defects have inciting (causing activity) as their distinguishing feature' ; now the feelings of Pride, Jealousy, Envy, Suspicion, Selfishness and the like are all characterised by the said distinguishing feature ; under the circumstances, why are not these enumerated by name ?

The answer to this is supplied by the following *Sūtra*:

Sūtra 3

There are three Groups of Defects ;—[all being included under] Desire, Hatred and Illusion, which are distinct from one another.

BHĀṢYA

Of Defects there are three groups, three types ; (I) The *Desire-type*—under which are included Love (for the other sex), Selfishness, Longing for acquiring, in a lawful manner, what belongs to another, Hankering (for Rebirth) and Greed (desire for obtaining, in an unlawful manner, what belongs to another) ;—(II) *The Hatred-type*—under which are included Anger, Jealousy, Envy, Malice, and Resentment ;—(III) *The Illusion-type*—under which are included Error, Suspicion, Pride, and Negligence. Thus,

* Vardhamāna remarks—Sūtra 2 having dealt with Defects, it would appear reasonable to regard Sūtra 3 *et seq* as continuing the same section. So that the proper arrangement would be to put Sū. (1) alone under Section I, dealing with 'Activity', and Sūtras 2 to 9 under Section II dealing with Defects. But to this arrangement there would be the objection that only one Sūtra, the first, would form a 'Section' which is not right ; as a 'Section' must consist of several *Sūtras*. Hence the best explanation is that under Section I we have the treatment of 'Defects' only in a general way, and that too, as a side-issue, as something connected with Activity ; while under Section II we have the detailed treatment of 'Defects'.

since all defects are included under one or the other of these three groups, they are not described individually.

Objection—" Since all have the same distinguishing feature (of *causing activity*), it is not right to divide them under three groups. "

Answer :—The division into three groups is certainly right, since ' Desire ', ' Hatred ' and ' Illusion ' *are distinct from one another* [though all are *causes of activity*, yet each has a distinctive character of its own] ; e.g., ' Desire ' is characterised by *attachment*, ' Hatred ' is characterised by *aversion* (intolerance), and ' Illusion ' is characterised by *wrong notion* ; this fact is realised by every man in his own experience : every conscious person knows when Love appears, when he has the feeling that ' the quality of Love has appeared in my Soul ' ; he also recognises the absence of Love, when he has the feeling ' the quality of Love is not present in my Soul ' : and similarly with the other two. As for the feelings of Pride and the rest, these are all found to be included under one or other of these three groups : and hence they have not been mentioned separately.

Sūtra 4

[*Objection*]—"**What is asserted is not right ; because all three have one and the same thing for their antithesis.**"

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

"Desire and the rest cannot be regarded as distinct from one another ;—Why ?—*Because they have one and the same thing for their antithesis* ; all three have one and the same thing for their antithesis—viz.: that which is known under the names '*tattvajñānam*', 'knowledge of truth', '*samyanmatih*', 'right knowledge', '*āryaprajñā*', 'truthful cognition', '*sambodhaḥ*', 'right apprehension.' "

Sūtra 5

[*Answer*]—**The reason put forward is not valid, as there is no invariable concomitance.**

BHĀṢYA

The Dark Colour and several such properties of Clay have the same antithesis in the form of 'fire-contact', and there are other qualities of it, which, being brought about by baking, have one and the same source ;—

Sūtra 6

of these, Illusion is the worser evil; each of these three being distinct;—as for one who is not under Illusion the others do not appear.

BHĀṢYA

Illusion is an evil; it is spoken of as the 'worser evil', by taking the three two at a time.* "Why is Illusion the 'worser evil'?" *Because for one who is not under illusion the others do not appear*,—i.e. unless one is affected by Illusion, Desire and Hatred do not appear; and when a man has become influenced by Illusion, one or the other (of the other two) appear in accordance with the man's notions;† when the man's impressions in regard to a thing are attractive (such as create attachment), they produce in him *Desire* (for that thing); while when his notions are repulsive (such as create aversion), they produce *Hatred*. Both these notions are nothing other than 'Illusion', which consists of *wrong notion*. Thus it is that Desire and Hatred have their source in Illusion. When Illusion is destroyed by Right Knowledge, both Desire and Hatred cease to appear; this is what accounts for their having one and the same thing for their antithesis. It is with a view to these facts that it has been explained under Sū. 1. 1. 2. that, *after True Knowledge 'there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect, and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to the Highest Good'*.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Objection:—" If what is said in Sū. 6 is true, then there arises the following difficulty :—

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* Because the term '*pāpīyān*' is in the comparative degree, it follows that what is meant is that, as between Illusion and Desire, and Illusion and Hatred, Illusion is the 'worser evil'.

† What is spoken of '*Saṅkalpa*', 'Notions' is the remembrance, under Illusion, of a certain thing as bringing pleasure, and that of another thing, as bringing pain—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 7

"Inasmuch as (between Illusion and the other two) there is the relation of cause and effect, it follows that 'Illusion' is *something different from the* 'Defects' ".

BHĀṢYA

" The effect is always different from the cause: hence if Illusion is the cause of the Defects (Desire and Hatred), it cannot itself be a "Defect'. "

Sūtra 8

[*Answer*]—**That is not so ; as Illusion is included under the definition of 'Defects'.**

BHĀṢYA

Defects having been defined as *those that have 'causing activity' for their distinguishing feature*—Illusion becomes included, by this definition, under 'Defect'.

Sūtra 9

Further, since it is quite possible for things belonging to the same class to bear among themselves the relation of cause and effect, the objection (in Sū. 7) has no force.

BHĀṢYA

Among substances, as well as qualities, belonging to the same class, it is found that they bear to one another various kinds of causal relation.

End of Section (2)

SECTION (3)

Sūtra 10–31

Examination of 'Rebirth'

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After 'Defects' comes 'Rebirth'.* In regard to this the following objection is raised :—"There can be no such thing as

*** The doubt in regard to 'Rebirth' is as to its belonging to the Soul, or to Apprehension, or to the Body—says the *Tātparya*. To this form of Doubt, the objection is raised in Varḍhamāna's *'Prakāśa'* that, it having been already determined under Sū. 1-1-19 that Rebirth is of the Soul, there can be no room for such a doubt. The answer given is that from the definition provided under Sū. 1-1-19, 'Rebirth' appears to consist in death and birth ; hence the further question naturally arises—'How can death and birth**

Rebirth, as the Soul is eternal : and no eternal thing is ever found to be born or to die : so that the Soul being eternal, there is no possibility of *Birth and Death* : and yet it is only these two that constitute 'Rebirth' ?"*

On this point we have the following statement of the established conclusion :—

Sūtra 10

Rebirth is possible only becauee the Soul is eternal.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, it is the *eternal* Soul that 'departs' (*praiti*),—i.e. abandons the former body, dies,—and having '*departed*' (*pretya*), i.e., having abandoned the former body, 'comes' (*bhavati*)—i.e. is born, takes up another body ; and it is these two (*departing—coming*) that have been spoken of as 'Rebirth', '*Pretya-bhāva*', under the Sūtra—'Rebirth consists in being born again' (Sū 1–1–19), so that what is meant (by Rebirth 'belonging to the Soul') is that *it abandons the previous body and takes up another* , and this is possible only when the Soul is eternal. On the other hand, he, for whom 'Rebirth' consists of the 'birth of one entity and destruction of another entity', would be faced with the absurdity that one entity would be deprived of the fruits of his deeds, while another would be saddled with the fruits of acts not done by him † And further, under

belong to the *Soul*, which, being eternal, cannot die or be born ?' And the most fitting occasion for dealing with this question is that when the 'examination' of 'Rebirth' is taken up. Vardhamāna also suggests another answer as offered by 'others' —The *Pūrvapakṣin* imposes upon the *Naiyāyika* the view that 'Rebirth' consists of 'destruction and production', and then raises the doubt and the objection against the view that 'Rebirth' belongs to the Soul, and instead of urging the objection in this form, the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in the *Bhāṣya*) starts off with the Naiyāyika view that Rebirth is something belonging to the Soul, and then goes on to say that such Rebirth is not possible ; as it is not possible for any such thing to belong to the Soul.

* Thus 'Rebirth,' is impossible under the theory of the *Naiyāyika*, though it is quite compatible with the theory of the Bauḍḍha, according to whom all these are evanescent, undergoing destruction every moment.

† The entity that does the act is destroyed immediately afterwards ; the entity that is subsequently born, at the time when the fruit of the said act appears, is a totally different being ; so that while the latter is saddled

the theory that there are causes bringing about destruction (of the Being in the body), the teachings of the sages would be entirely useless [as the Being to whom the teachings are imparted cannot live long enough to profit by them].*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Question—"In what manner does the *production* of things come about?"†

Sūtra 11

[*Answer*]—The (production) of perceptible† things is from perceptible§ things; as is clearly proved by Perception.

The question being—"in what manner, and from what sort of material cause is the perceptible thing, such as the Body, produced?"—the answer is that, '*from perceptible things*', known as 'material substances'—i.e. from Earth and the other material substances, in their extremely subtle eternal forms—is produced the '*perceptible thing*', *i.e*, the ordinarily known Substances (Earth etc. in their gross form), which appear in the form of the Body, the Sense-organs, the Objects and their appurtenances.

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with the fruit of the acts not done by him, the former becomes deprived of the fruit of those acts done by himself. Under the view that the eternal Soul is re-born, it is the same Soul that does the act and experiences its effects.

* According to the Naiyāyika, on the other hand, the real Being, Soul, being everlasting, persists from life to life; and its birth and death consist respectively, in its becoming connected, and disconnected, with a Body, a set of Sense-organs, Intellect and Sensation.

† It is not easy to perceive the connection of this question with 'Rebirth', the subject-matter of the Section The 'production' questioned about now, is the coming into existence of material objects, and the only connection possible would be that, the *Bhāṣya* having declared that 'Rebirth' does not consist of 'destruction and production', it becomes necessary to determine the exact nature of 'production', and then to show that it is not possible for the non-material substance Soul; and hence in the term '*pretyabhāva*', 'Rebirth', '*bhāva*', 'birth' cannot mean 'production'.

Viśvanātha takes it as introduced for the purpose of bringing forward the various theories in regard to the 'production' of the Body.

§ The term '*vyakta*' stands, according to the *Vārtika*, for that which is endowed with the conditions of perceptibility, i.e. anything endowed with such perceptible qualities as Colour and the rest. Hence the word '*vyaktāt*' takes in the Atoms also, which are endowed with the qualities of Colour etc.

The term '*vyakta*', 'perceptible', stands for what is cognisable by means of the Sense-organs; and by reason of similarity to this 'perceptible' thing, its cause also is called '*vyakṭa*', 'perceptible'.

" What is the similarity ? "

The similarity (between the perceptible thing and its cause) consists in the presence of Colour and other qualities. Hence the meaning of the Sūtra is that—'out of the eternal substances, Earth etc., which are endowed with the qualities of Colour etc., are produced the Body and such other things, which are endowed with the qualities of Colour etc.'

[That this is so] *is clearly proved by Perception.* We actually see that out of such substances as Clay and the like which are endowed with the qualities of Colour and the rest, are produced objects of the same kind (*i.e.*, possessed of the qualities of Colour etc.);—and from this fact (perceived in connection with visible Objects) we infer the same in connection with invisible things also; that is, in the case of the Clay etc., we find that the presence of Colour and other qualities is common to the material cause as well as its product; and from this we deduce the same in regard to the causal nature of the eternal super-sensuous things (Atoms) also.

Sūtra 12

[*Objection*]—"**What is asserted is not true ; as the Jar is not produced out of the Jar.**"

BHĀṢYA

"This also is a perceptible fact that the 'perceptible' Jar is never found to be produced out of the 'perceptible' Jar; hence, as we do not see the 'perceptible' thing being produced out of the 'perceptible' thing, it follows that the cause (of the production) of the 'perceptible' (Body etc.) is not a 'perceptible' thing."

Sūtra 13

[*Answer*]—**Inasmuch as the Jar is actually produced out of a 'perceptible' substance, the objection has no force.**

BHĀṢYA

We do not say that everything is the cause of everything; what we do say is that whatever 'perceptible' thing is produced, it is produced out of a similar (*i.e., perceptible*) thing; and the

substance Clay, which is called 'potsherd', out of which the Jar is produced, is 'perceptible'. One who would deny such a patent fact could never be argued with by any person.

The truth of the matter is as we have described.

End of Section (3)

SECTION (4)

Sūtra 14—18

Examination of the Theory that the Things of the World are produced out of the Void.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

We now proceed to show up the views of philosophers (of several schools)—*

Sūtra 14

"Entities are produced out of Negation; as no object comes into existence without having destroyed (its cause)."

BHĀṢYA

" One theory is that the *entity* is produced out of *negation* ;—Why ?—Because things are produced only after having destroyed (something) ; e.g. the sprout is produced only after the seed has been destroyed ; and not till the seed is destroyed. If the '*destruction* of the seed' were not the cause of the sprout, then it would be possible for the sprout to come into existence even without destroying the seed."†

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The answer to the above is given in the following Sūtra :—

* The *Pariśuddhi* calls Sections 4–11 '*Aupodghātika*', 'Introductory', or (more correctly) 'Supplementary', to the Section putting forward the theory that 'perceptible things are produced out of perceptible things'.

It is interesting to note that the purely theistic doctrine of God having created the world has been put by Gautama among these 'views' held apparently by other people. It is in view of this that the *Vārtika* has remarked that the Author of the Sūtra has put forward these various views of doctrines here ;—'some of these are set forth for being criticised, and others are put up as accepted'. The *Tātparya*, the *Pariśuddhi* and the *Prakāśa* however do not admit this view. (See below, Note on Sec. 5.)

† Whenever an object is produced, its production is always preceded by the destruction of its material cause. Hence every object has for its cause this *Destruction*, and Destruction is a form of *negation*.

Sūtra 15

The reasoning put forward is unsound ; as it involves self-contradiction.

BHĀṢYA

The premiss—'because there is no production without destruction'—is unsound ; as it involves self-contradiction. That which *destroys* (the cause) cannot be said to come into existence *after that destruction* ; since it must have been already in existence [in order to be able to destroy the cause ; that which is itself non-existent cannot destroy anything] ;—and that which comes into existence (*after destruction* of the cause) was not in existence before, and being non-existent, it could not destroy the cause [consequently the assertion that 'the thing comes into existence after destroying the cause' is self-contradictory].

Sūtra 16

[*Not comprehending the purport of the Siddhāntin's argument, in Sū 15 the Nihilist says*]—

" **What has been urged is not right ; for, as a matter of fact, words denoting the case-relations are applied to past as well as future things.**"

BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—" As a matter of fact words denoting the case-relations are used in regard to past as well as future things , e.g ' the son shall be born ', [where the *future* son is in the *Nominative case*],—'he rejoices at the son to be born', [where the *future* son is in the *Accusative Case*],—'he appoints the name of the son to be born ' [where the *future* son is in the Genitive case].—'the Jar existed' [where the *past* Jar is in the Nominative *case*],—'he is sorry for the broken Jar' [where the *past* Jar is in the Accusative case],—' these postherds are of the broken Jar ' [where the *past* Jar is in the Genitive case].—Sons, not being born, are a source of anxiety, to the old Father,* [where the future son is in the Nominative case] ;—we find several instances of such secondary (figurative) usage. ' What is the primary basis of this secondary usage ?' Immediate sequence is the primary basis : and on this basis of 'immediate sequence', what the ex-

* The *Vārtika* reads स्थविर which gives better sense.

pression 'comes into existence after having destroyed' means is that 'when *going to come into existence*, the sprout destroys the seed'; and the Nominative character (of the Sprout, not yet born) is purely secondary (or figurative)."

Sūtra 17

[*Answer*]—[Even so] the view put forth cannot be accepted; because as a matter of fact there is no production out of things destroyed.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Sprout is *not* produced out of the *destroyed* seed. Hence it is not true that "Entities are produced out of negation" (as alleged in Sū. 14).*

Sūtra 18

In so far as 'Sequence' is mentioned,—this we do not deny.

BHĀṢYA

The fact that the 'coming into existence' (of the sprout) is preceded by the 'destruction' (of the seed) constitutes their 'sequence'; and in so far as this 'sequence' has been put forward (by the Opponent) as the reason (probans) for the proposition that "Entities are produced out of negation";—this 'sequence' we do not deny; all that we mean is that, when the composition of the particles becomes disturbed, the previous combination ceases and another combination takes its place; and it is out of this latter combination,—and not out of *negation*—that the next substance is produced. What happens is that the component particles of the Seed have aroused within them a certain vibration by reason of some (unknown) cause,—whereupon they abandon their previous combination and take upon another; and it is from this latter combination that the sprout is produced; in fact

* If the 'destruction of the seed' were the cause of the birth of the sprout,—then, how is it that we find no sprout appearing when the seed is broken up into pieces by the hammer, and the disruptured component pieces do not form another composite? And how is it that the sprout appears only when the disruption of the seed is followed by a fresh composite formed out of its disjointed component pieces? These facts clearly show that the birth of the sprout does not arise out of the 'destruction' of the seed —*Tātparya*.

we actually see that the 'particles of the seed' and their 'composition' constitute the causes of the production of the Sprout; and unless the previous combination has been *destroyed*, it is not possible for another combination to come into existence;—this is all that constitutes the 'sequence' between 'Destruction' and 'coming into existence';—but this cannot prove that "Entities are produced out of Negation" (as alleged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*). And inasmuch as, for the production of the sprout there is no other cause except the component particles of the seed, it is only right that the seed should be admitted as the cause of the Sprout.*

End of Section 4

SECTION (5)

Sūtras 19–21

Examination of the Theory that God is the Cause of the Universe.†

* Because, says the *Tātparya*, unless the seed is there, the component particles of the seed cannot be there.

† In regard to this *Section* there is a difference among Commentators. According to the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and Viśvanātha, it is meant to propound the Naiyāyika *Siddhānta* that the Universe has been created by God; and in accordance with this view, Sū. 19 puts forward the final *Siddhānta*. Sū. 20 puts forward an objection against the *Siddhānta* and Sū. 21 answers that objection from the stand-point of the *Siddhānta*. It is this interpretation that we have adopted in the translation.

In view, perhaps, of the fact that such an interpretation of the Section is inconsistent with the introductory assertion of the previous *Bhāṣya*—'we now proceed to show up the views of philosophers',—the *Tātparya*, followed by the *Pariśuddhi* and *Prakāśa*, has taken it as representing the criticism of the Vedānta doctrine that "God is the *constituent* cause of the Universe." By this interpretation Sū 19 represents the Vedānta view, Sū. 20 shows the untenability of that view, and Sū. 21 puts forward the final *Nyāya-Siddhānta* that God is the *creator*, the *operative* cause, *not* the *constituent cause*, of the Universe.

There is also a wider issue involved in this Section. The Commentators are agreed that the Siddhānta view here put forward is that God is the Creator of the Universe. Now the question arises—How is it that this cardinal doctrine of the system has been inserted by Gautama as a side-issue? He has put it forward only among "certain philosophical doctrines", and not as *the true doctrine*. Nor is it easy to reconcile the doctrine of God being the *Creator* with the view that there is no such thing as 'beginning of

Another philosopher says—

Sūtra 19

God is the cause; because we find fruitlessness in the actions of Men.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we find that Man, desiring a certain thing, does not always obtain the fruit of his desire; hence it is inferred that Man's acquisition of the fruits of his actions is dependent upon some other person; and that Person upon whom it is dependent is *God*; hence it follows that God is the Cause (of the World).*

Sūtra 20

[*Objection**]—"**It is not so; because as a matter of fact, no fruit appears without man's action.**"

Creation'—as is often found re-iterated by the *Vārtika* (e.g. on P. 445 and P. 466, Bib. Ind. Ed.); *if there is no beginning, God may be the **Controller**, the **Ruler***; He cannot be the *Creator*. From the *Bhāṣya* also (under Sū. 21) it seems that *God is held to be only* the *Seer, Knower, Omniscient, All-powerful.*

* According to the *Tātparya* this Sūtra presents the Vedānta view that God is the *constituent cause* of the world; the *Pariśuddhi* remarks that though the *Sūtra* has used the general term 'cause', yet it is clear from the context that the constituent 'cause' is meant. *Vardhamāna*—'From this *Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra* it is clear that the purpose of the Section is to refute the Vedānta-theory.' In support of this view is also the fact that the preceding section also has dealt with the question of the *constituent cause* of the world.

The Vedānta doctrine is thus stated by the *Tātparya*—"The phenomenal world may not have come out of the Void; it can certainly be produced out of Brahman, which becomes modified into the several names and forms [i.e. *objects* and their *qualities*, says Vardhamāna], exactly in the same manner as the clay is modified into the Jar etc.; or (according to other Vedantins) Brahman, through the limitations cast by the beginningless Nescience, appears in the form of the several phenomenal substances, just as the face appears in several forms, through the limitations of the substances in which it becomes reflected. It is this *Brahman* that is meant by the term 'Īśvara', in the *Sūtra*; this term connoting the powers of reflection and action, both of which are present in Brahman alone; and not in *Negation*, or in *Primordial Matter*, or in *Atoms*. Man himself does not possess these powers. But if Man were the ordainer of the World, and had the necessary properties of omniscience and omnipotence, then he could never undertake an action that would turn out to be futile, fruitless. And *inasmuch as we do find the actions of Men turning out fruitless, we conclude that God,*—i.e. *Brahman—is the Cause of the World*. Sū. (19)"

BHĀṢYA

[*Objection*] :—" If the appearancc of fruits (of actions) were dependent upon God (entirely), then such fruits could be accomplished even without the desire (and action) of man."

Sūtra 21

[*Answer*]—Inasmnch as it is influenced by Him, there is no force in the reason (put forward).†

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* According to the *Bhāsya* this Sūtra is an objection urged by the Pūrvapaksin, against the Nyāya doctrine stated in Sū. 19. According to the *Tātparya*, it is an objection urged by the *Siddhāntin Naiyāyika*, against the Vedānta doctrine stated in Sū. 19. In pursuance of this interpretation, the *Tātparya* introduces this Sū. 20 as follows —It puts forth arguments against the Vedānta theory of things evolving or modifying out of Brahman, and concludes with the assertion that it is not right to hold that Brahman evolves or modifies into the endless phenomenal substances, and as such is the *constituent cause* of things ; though it may be that Brahman or God is the *operative cause* of things ,—and then it goes on to say that in connection with the view that God is the *operative cause* of things, it might be held that in creating the world, God is not influenced by any other force ;—and it is with a view to guard against this view that we have Sū. 20, which shows that *God is influenced by the actions of men.*

It may be noted that the roundabout manner in which the *Tātparya* has got to fit in the Sūtra to its own interpretation shows that it is, perhaps, not what the *Sūtras* really mean ; that is, the *Sūtras* have no bearing upon the Vedānta theory at all.

† The *Tātparya*, in pursuance of its own interpretation, remarks :— 'Having rejected the two theories—(1) that the World is evolved out of Brahman, and (2) that God, independent of all other forces, is the Creator of the world,—the author of the *Sūtra* now puts forward his own final *Siddhānta*.'

According to the *Bhāṣya*, this Sūtra is only the Naiyāyika's answer to the objection urged in Sū. 20 ; the sense being that—'inasmuch as Man's efforts are influenced by God, what has been urged in Sū. 20, against the view that God is the *operative cause* of the world, is not a valid reason.'

The *Nyāya-Siddhānta* is thus expounded by the *Tātparya* —The World has the Atoms for its *constituent cause* ; and its *operative cause* is God as influenced by Men's acts ; and these acts also have God for their *operative cause* , nor is there any incongruity in this ; since even though the carpenter is helped and influenced by the axe, yet the axe also is made by him The reason put forward in Sū. 20 has no force against the view that the world is the work of God as helped by Men's acts, though it is an effective argument against the view that in creating the world, God does not require the help of anything outside Himself.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, God helps the effort of Man; *i. e.*, when Man is trying to obtain a particular fruit, it is God that accomplishes that fruit for him; when God does not accomplish it, Man's action becomes fruitless;—hence since things are thus influenced by God, what has been urged to the effect that—"because as a matter of fact no fruit appears without man's action"—is no reason at all.

[The question now arises—What is *God*? The *Bhāṣya* proceeds to answer this question]—God is a distinct Soul endowed with certain qualities; as a Being of the same kind as 'Soul'. He cannot be put under any other category; hence God is defined as a particular Soul endowed with such qualities as—(1) absence of demerit, wrong knowledge and negligence, and (2) presence of merit, knowledge and intuitiveness; and to Him also belongs, the eight-fold 'Power'—consisting of 'minuteness' and the rest—as the result of His Merit and Knowledge;—His 'Merit' follows the bent of his Volition;—He controls the operation of the accumulated Merit-Demerit subsisting in each individual Soul, as also that of the Earth and other material substances; and He is Omnipotent in regard to His creation, not however, failing to be influenced by the results of acts done by the beings He creates.

He has obtained* all the results of His deeds; [and continues to act for the sake of His created beings, because] just as the father acts for His children, so does God also act father-like for His creatures. There is no other category except the category of 'Soul' to which God could belong; for (as in the case of Soul so) in the case of God, no other property, save *Buddhi*, Consciousness, can be pointed out as being indicative of His existence.† From scriptures also we

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* Puri Ms. B. reads आप्तकर्मफल instead of आप्तकल्प, which latter is the reading adopted by the *Tātparya* and in our text; this latter also explains आप्तकल्प as अवाप्तसकलकाम; so that the sense remains the same under both readings.

† Though God differs from other Souls in the point of His Cognition etc. being eternal, while those of others are evanescent, yet He must be classed under the same category; since, like other Souls, He also is indicated by Buddhi etc.

learn that God is the 'Seer, the Cogniser and omniscient'. If God were not discernible by the presence of Consciousness and such other indicatives of the 'Soul', then, as He is beyond the reach of ordinary Perception, Inference and Words, how could His existence be described and proved by anyone?

Lastly, if God acted irrespectively of the effects of acts done by the beings created by Him, then, this view would become open to all those objections that have been urged against the view that "the creation is not due to the acts of Souls". [*Vide*, end of I Daily Lesson, Adhyāya III].

End of Section (5)

SECTION (6)

(Sūtras 22–24)

Examination of the View that the World is the result of Chance.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Another philosopher asserts as follows :—

Sūtra 22

"The production of entities must be without an *operative cause*; as we see such things as the sharpness of the thorn and the like."

BHĀṢYA

" The Body and such other entities must be regarded as produced without an *operative cause*; *since we see such things as the sharpness of the thorn and the like*; such things as the sharpness of the thorn, the variegated colour of the minerals found in mountainous regions, the smoothness of stones and so forth are found to be produced without any *operative cause*, and yet each of them has a constituent cause;* the same must be the case with the production of the Body etc., also."

* चोपादान of the *Viz.* text gives no sense; the right reading is चोपादानवच्च, which is countenanced by the *Vārtika*, and is found in the Puri Ms. B.

It is clear that what the *Pūrvapakṣin* denies in the present Sūtra is the Nyāya-theory of God being the *operative* cause of the world; the Sūtra distinctly mentions the '*nimitta*', and the *Bhāṣya* makes it still clearer by

Sūtra 23

[The Ekadeśin's answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa.*]

Since the non-cause is (spoken of as) the 'cause', the said production of entities is not 'without cause'.

BHĀṢYA

[Some Naiyāyikas have offered this as an answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view expressed in Sū 22]. It is alleged (in Sū. 22) that '*bhāvotpatti*', the 'production of entities', is '*animittataḥ*'; [and since this latter term ends in an affix which has the sense of the Ablative, it can only mean that the 'production' proceeds from '*animitta*', 'non-cause']; and that from which a thing proceeds is its 'cause'; so that since (from what is said in Sū 22 it is clear that) the '*animitta*', 'non-cause', is the 'cause' of the 'production of entities', it follows that the said 'production' is not 'without cause' (as is alleged by the Pūrvapakṣin).

Sūtra 24

'Nimitta' (Cause) and 'Animitta' ('Non-cause') being two distinct things, the answer (offered in Sū. 23) is no answer at all.

BHĀṢYA

'*Nimitta*', *Cause*, is one thing, and its negation (*animitta*) ('Non-cause') is another; and the *negation* cannot be the same as the *negatived*; e. g. when it is said that 'the vessel is *without water*', this *denial of water* is not the same as *water*. [So that

saying that the things mentioned—the sharpness of the thorn etc.—*have a constituent cause*, and yet they have no operative cause. Thus explained, the present section becomes connected naturally with the foregoing section dealing with God as the *operative* cause of the world. In their anxiety to connect this section with what they consider the principal subject of the *Adhyāya*—the constituent cause of the world—the commentators have needlessly confused the issues involved. E.g, the *Pariśuddhi* says—"The *Pūrvapakṣin* proceeds to criticise the *Siddhānta* position (put forward under Sū. 4-1-11) that perceptible things are produced out of perceptible causes; and for demolishing this view he begins with the demolition of the *operative* cause—", and Vardhamāna adds that in reality the Pūrvapakṣin's standpoint is to deny all kinds of cause of the world. Viśvanātha also says—"If things are due to mere *chance*, then Atoms cannot be the constituent cause, nor God the *operative* cause, of the World [hence the *Pūrvapakṣin* insists upon the *Chance*-theory, and the *Siddhāntin* controverts it]."

there is no point in saying, as the *Ekades'in* has said in Sū. 23, that the '*animitta*', 'non-cause', is the '*nimitta*', 'cause', of production.]

[The real answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* put forward in Sū. 22 is that] the view therein put forward in no way differs from the view that 'the origination of the Body etc. is not due to the actions of men'; and being identical with this view, it must be taken as refuted by the refutation of that view, (under Sūtras 3. 2. 60–72).

End of Section (6)

SECTION (7)

(Sūtras 25–28)

Examination of the view that All Things are evanescent.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Other philosophers have held the following view:—

Sūtra 25

"All things must be evanescent; because they are liable to be produced and destroyed."*

"What is the meaning of being 'evanescent'? That which exists only for some time is called 'evanescent'. That which is

* The causes, out of which the things of the world are produced,—do they consist of all evanescent things, or of all eternal things; or of some eternal and some evanescent things? This is what is going to be considered now. If the first two alternatives are true, then there can be no 'Rebirth', such as the *Naiyāyika* postulates. Hence it becomes necessary to refute them; and the present Section proceeds to refute the first of the three alternatives. The position controverted here is not the same as that in which all things are held to be momentary; because the Pūrvapaksin here admits some sort of continuity of existence of things and as such differs from the thorough-going *Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin* Nihilist—*Pariśuddhi*.

Vardhamāna, in view of what he has said in connection with the preceding Section, says—Though what has been proved in the foregoing Section is that the things of the world have an *operative* cause, yet what the present Section takes up is the question of eternality or evanescence of all three kinds of cause, because in a general way what has been said in proof of the *operative* cause is applicable to the *constituent* and *non-constituent* causes also The precise Doubt or question to be dealt with in the present Section is—whether or not *cognisability* is invariably concomitant with *evanescence*.

Viśvanātha says—If all things are evanescent, the Soul also should be evanescent; hence it becomes necessary to controvert that view.

liable to be produced is *non-existent* while it is not produced, and that which is *liable to be destroyed* is *non-existent* when it has been destroyed ;* and what this means is that all material things—such as the Body etc.—and all non-material things—Cognition and the rest—both kinds of things are found to be *liable to production and destruction* ; from which it follows that they are all evanescent."

Sūtra 26

[The Ekadeśin's answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—**What is asserted cannot be true ; as the 'evanescence' itself is eternal.**

BHĀṢYA

If the *evanescence* of all things is everlasting (eternal), then, by reason of the *eternality* of that 'evanescence', it cannot be true that '*all* things are evanescent';—if, on the other hand, the said 'evanescence' is not ever-lasting, then while the 'evanescence' would be non-existent, all things would be *eternal* !

Sūtra 27

[The *Siddhāntin's* objection to the Ekadeśin's argument in Sū. 26.]

As a matter of fact, the 'evanescence' is not eternal : it is like the destruction of fire after having destroyed the thing burnt by it.

BHĀṢYA

The said 'evanescence' is not eternal. "How so ?" Just as Fire, after having destroyed the thing burnt by it becomes itself destroyed (extinguished), similarly the 'evanescence of all things', after having destroyed all things, becomes itself destroyed. [So that there need be no incongruity in regarding the 'evanescence' as 'non-eternal'.]

* The *Viz* edition reads चाविनष्टं ; the *Vārtika* (Bib. Ind. edition) and the *Tātparya* read च विनष्टं ; we have adopted the latter, as being more in keeping with the sense of the sentence as a whole. With the former reading the sentence would mean—'that which is liable to be destroyed is never not destroyed.' Though this will give some sort of sense, yet it would not be in keeping with the rest of the passage. The *Tātparya* construes the *Bhāṣya* to mean—'things are non-existent after destruction ; hence liability to production and destruction proves that *things exist only for some time*, that is, *they are evanescent*.'

Sūtra 28

[The Final *Siddhānta.*]

The Eternal cannot be rightly denied; because the determination (as to a certain thing being eternal or evanescent) must be in accordance with what is actually perceived.

BHĀṢYA

The theory propounded (in Sū. 25) totally denies all 'eternality'; but the total denial of 'eternality' is not right.—Why?—*Because the determination must be in accordance with what is actually perceived.* That is, when a certain thing is rightly found to be 'liable to be produced and destroyed', it should be regarded as *evanescent*,—and when a thing is found to be *not* so liable, it must be the reverse; and as a matter of fact, the said *liability to be produced and destroyed* is not perceived by any means of right knowledge, in such things as the elemental substances in their subtle forms, Ākāśa, Time, Space, Soul and Mind,—and some qualities of these,—Community, Individuality and Inherence;—hence the conclusion is that all these are eternal.

End of Section (7)

SECTION (8)

(*Sūtras 29–33*)

Examination of the Theory that All Things are Eternal.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Here is another sweeping assertion:—

Sūtra 29

[*Pūrvapakṣa*].—"**All things must be eternal, because the five elemental substances are eternal.**"

BHĀṢYA

"All this, everything in the world, is an elemental substance; and elemental substances are eternal; the total destruction of any elemental substance being impossible (according to the Naiyāyika himself) [everything must be eternal]." *

* If all things are eternal, there can be no Re-birth, as Re-birth presupposes the destruction of the Body. Hence it is necessary to controvert this view.

Sūtra 30

What has been asserted cannot be right; as we actually perceive the cause of production and of destruction.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we actually perceive the cause of the production (of things), as well as the cause of (their) destruction; and this would be incompatible with the view that all things are eternal.*

Sūtra 31

[*Objection*]—"**Inasmuch as all things possess the characteristics of elemental substances, the denial (in Su. 30) is not right.**"

BHĀṢYA

"The thing, of which you think you perceive the causes of production and destruction, is not found to be anything totally different from, and devoid of the characteristics of, Elemental Substances; and inasmuch as everything possesses the characteristics of Elemental Substances, it must be an Elemental Substance; so that the denial (in Sū. 30) is not right."†

Sūtra 32

[*Answer*]—**What has been urged can not be right; because as a matter of fact, the cause and production are actually perceived.**

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact (in the case of every ordinary thing, such as the Bull, the Jar and the like), the *cause* is actually perceived; as also the *production* of the thing possessing qualities analogous to the qualities of the cause; and neither of these can be possible in regard to an 'eternal' thing; nor is it possible to

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* Things composed of elemental substances are not the same as the elemental substances themselves; the Bull and the Jar for instance are not the same as the subtle Atoms; for if they were so, they would be as imperceptible as the Atoms are. And since we actually perceive the cause of production and destruction of such things as the Bull and the Jar, these cannot be eternal, even though the elemental substances may be so—

† Elemental substances are eternal;—the Bull and the Jar are not anything different from Elemental substances;—hence eternality cannot be denied of the Bull and the Jar.

deny that there is such perception of the 'cause' and the 'production' (of the thing); nor again is it possible for a perception to be entirely devoid of a real objective basis; so that on the strength of this perception it is inferred that the product is *produced* (brought into existence) as possessing qualities analogous to those of its cause; and it is that product which forms the real objective basis for the said perception. This (the fact of products having qualities similar to those of their cause) accounts for the fact that "all things possess the characteristics of Elemental Substances" (that has been urged by the Opponent in Sū. 31).*

Further, as a matter of fact, we find that the effort of the cognitive agent is put forth only when he is urged by a desire for the cause of the production (of what he wishes to obtain) and the destruction (of what he wishes to get rid of). [So that Man's effort also presupposes the *production* and *destruction* of things].

Thirdly, every composite substance is known to have that character; *i.e*, it is a well-known fact that every composite substance has the character of being liable to production and destruction.

Fourthly, what has been urged by the Opponent is not applicable to Sound, Motion, Cognition and such things; as a matter of fact, the two reasons put forward—(*a*) "because the five Elemental Substances are eternal" (Sū. 29) and (*b*) "because everything is possessed of the characteristics of Elemental Substances" (Sū. 31)—are not applicable to such things as Sound, Motion, Cognition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort, [as not one of these is either an Elemental Substance, or possessed of the characteristics of elemental substances]; hence the reason is '*anekānta*' i.e., inconclusive, because non-pervasive, too narrow).

[Says the Opponent]—"Like the cognition of things in a dream, the said perception (of the cause and of production) is wrong."

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* The fact of the Bull and the Jar having the characteristics of Elemental Substances is due to their being the *products* of those substances, and *not* to their being the same as those substances. Hence the said fact cannot prove the eternality of the Bull and the Jar.

The same may be said of the perception of Elemental Substances also. What you mean is that—" The perception of the production and the cause of things is of the same character as the cognition of things in a dream "; but if that be so, then the same might be said also in regard to the perception of Elemental Substances; and the perception of Earth etc. also would have to be regarded as similar to the cognition of things in a dream [so that there would be no justification for regarding even the Elemental Substances as *eternal*].

[The Opponent says]—" If there are no such things as the Earth etc., then the practical usages of men would come to an end. "

The same would apply to the other case also; if there were no real objective basis for the perception of the production and the cause of things, then also all practical usages of men would come to an end.

Further, to argue that " the said perception (of production etc.) is as unreal as the cognition of things during dreams", is not a right argument at all [i.e., it cannot prove any such conclusion as the Opponent desires to prove, *viz.*, ordinary things like the Bull and the Jar are exactly like the Atoms of Elemental Substances];—(*a*) because Eternal Substances (Atoms) are beyond the reach of the senses (which the ordinary things of the world are *not*), and (*b*) because they are *not* objects *of production* and *destruction* (which the ordinary things of the world *are*).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

" What really happens," says another philosopher, " is that the Original Substance remaining constant, one property of it ceases and another property is produced;—and this is what forms the object (meaning) of the 'destruction' and 'production' of the thing; in fact when a thing is said to be 'produced', it is something that has been already in existence (in the form of the original substance (even before that 'production'); and similarly when a thing is said to be 'destroyed' it continues to exist (in the form of the Substance) even after that destruction [for all that has happened is that one *property* has disappeared

and another has appeared]; and in this manner all things are eternal." *

[This doctrine is refuted in the following *Sūtra.*]

Sūtra 33

This cannot be accepted; for (under this theory) there would be no possibility of differentiation.—

BHĀṢYA

There would be no possibility of any such differentiation as 'this is *birth*, and *that is cessation*'; as under the theory put forward what is born and what has ceased to exist are both *extant*. (A) [In regard to properties also] there could be no differentiation (as to Time), such as 'this property is born and that property has ceased', as both are equally *extant*;—(B) nor would there be any differentiation as to time,—such as 'at this time there are birth and cessation, and not at that time', for *at all times* things would be equally *extant*; (C) nor could there be any differentiation as to *relationship*, such as 'there are birth and cessation of this property, and not of that', for both properties would be equally *extant*; (D) nor again, could there be any such differentiation in regard to *Time*, as 'this, not yet come, is in the future, and that is past'; for under the theory all things are always *extant*, which means that they are always 'present' [and as such can never be spoken of as 'future' or 'past'].

None of these objections lie against the view (held by the *Naiyāyika*) that 'birth' (production) consists in the coming into existence (gaining its own nature) of what has not been in existence, and cessation (destruction) consists in the ceasing to exist

* The *Tātparya* calls this doctrine '*Svāyambhuvānāmmatam*'; does it mean the '*Śaiva*' system? The doctrine is thus summed up in the *Tātparya*—"The modification undergone by Substances is of three kinds. (1) modification of properties, (2) modification of condition, and (3) modification of age. *E.g.* (1) the original subtance *Gold* in lump becomes modified into the ear-ring, and here we have the modification of the property (shape) of the gold; (2) when the ear-ring is broken up and made into the bracelet, we have the modification of *condition*, *i.e.*, the ear-ring has renounced its *present* and reverted to the *past* condition, and the bracelet has removed its *future* and reverted to the *present* condition; and (3) in the beginning the bracelet is new, young, and in time it becomes *old*; so that here we have the modification of *age*. [The original gold remains constant all the time]."

(losing its own nature) of what has been in existence. For these reasons we conclude that it is not right to assert, as has been asserted by the Opponent (End of Bhāṣya on Sū. 33), that—"a thing exists before it is born, and it exists also after it has been destroyed."

End of Section (8)

SECTION (9)

[*Sūtras 34–36*]

The Refutation of the View that all is Diversity, there is no Unity.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

The following is another sweeping assertion (of the (Bauddhas).—

Sūtra 34

"All must be regarded as diverse; because the symbols (names) of things refer to diverse entities."*

BHĀSYA

"All must be regarded as diverse, there is no *single entity*.—Why?—*Bhāvalakṣanapṛthaktvāt*—says the Sūtra, the '*lakṣana*'

* It has been established up to this point that all things are aggregates of—'the Quality and the Qualified', 'the negative and the positive', 'the intelligent and the non-intelligent', 'the eternal and the non-eternal';—and it becomes necessary to refute the theory that there is no such thing as the 'aggregate whole'. This theory has been held in several forms—(1) the theory that there is no *unity* (refuted in Sū. 34–36), (2) 'all is mere Void' (Sū. 37–40), (3) 'there is *only one* thing', or 'there are *only two* things', and so forth, (Sū. 41–43) All these have to be refuted, because—(1) if there is no *unity*, no one thing, then of what could there be an *aggregate*? (2) If nothing exists, and all is Void, then there can be no *aggregate*; and (3) similarly there can be no 'aggregate' under the theory of absolute Monism.—*Pariśuddhi.*

The doctrine put forward under this Sūtra (34) is thus explained in the *Tātparya*.—"All things must be diverse, distinct; because there is no such thing as 'substance', apart from colour etc., and colour etc., are distinct from one another; nor is there any such thing as 'composite' apart from the components, and these latter are distinct from one another." Such is the view of the *Sautrāntikas* and the *Vaibhaṣikas*.

Viśvanātha states the doctrine thus—"Such things as the Jar and the like must be regarded as distinct, even from themselves, because the odour, taste, etc., of these things, as also their component parts, are distinct from one another; and the 'Jar' is nothing apart from these latter."

or 'symbol' of the '*bhāva*', 'entity', is that which distinguishes it, i e. its name; and the names refer to diverse entities, as a matter of fact, all 'names of things' denote combinations; e.g., the name 'Jar' is applied to the combination of 'odour, taste, colour and touch', (the qualities of the Jar), and also to the combination of the 'bottom, sides and neck' (the parts of the Jar) [and these are diverse, distinct from one another; and the Jar is nothing apart from these qualities and component parts]. The 'Jar' has been mentioned only by way of illustration [the same holds good in regard to the *names* of all things.]"

Sūtra 35

What is alleged cannot be accepted; because (as a matter of fact) several (kinds of) things go to make a single entity.

BHĀṢYA

The compound '*anekalaksaṇaiḥ*' should be treated as one that has the middle word eliminated, and as standing for '*anekavidhalakṣanaih*', 'several *kinds* of things'. As a matter of fact, it is the single entity (the composite substance, Jar) that comes into existence as related to Odour and other qualities, and to the Bottom and other components; in fact, the *Substance* is something different from *its Qualities*, and the *Composite* is something different from the Components; both these facts have been already explained by us (under Sū 2-2-33 *et. seq.*).

Further,—

Sūtra 36

The denial cannot be right, as the symbols (of things) are restricted in their application.

BHĀṢYA

The denial—that "there is no single entity"—cannot be right,—why?—for the very simple reason that 'the symbols of things are restricted in their application'; as a matter of fact, the 'symbol' of entities,—i.e. the word that forms their name, is restricted in its application to single entities; as is clear from such expressions as 'I am touching that *Jar* which I saw before', 'I am seeing that which I touched before'. Then again, as a matter of fact, we never perceive any mere 'group of atoms' as such, and these 'groups of atoms' (as composing the

Jar) being imperceptible (by reason of their extreme minuteness), that which is actually perceived must be a single entity (composed of those atoms).

(A) It has been subsequently urged by the Opponent that—" there can be no single entity, because all things are mere groups (of several things) " ;—but if there is no *single* thing, there can be no *group* of things What the Opponent means is that—"there is no *single* entity as the names of things apply only to groups " ;—but the fact is that if there is no *single* thing, there can be no ' group ' ; as the ' group ' is nothing more than the conglomeration of several *single* things ; so that the allegation—" There is no single entity etc."—involving a self-contradiction, is most incongruous. That is, that (single entity) of which the denial has been alleged, (by the Opponent, on the basis of the premiss), " because the names of things are applied to groups",—becomes admitted by the Opponent when he asserts that " the names of things are applied to groups" , for the 'group' is only a collection of several *single* entities. (B) Further, in making the allegation—" because the names of things are applied to groups of things"—you admit the 'group', and then in the proposition, " there is no single entity " you deny each component of that ' group ' [for each such component can only be a *single entity*] [and when each component is denied, the *group* also becomes denied *ipso facto*]. Thus then, the Opponent's allegation being beset with a twofold ' self-contradiction ' (A & B), it must be rejected as a frivolous assertion.

End of Section (9)

SECTION (10)

[*Sūtras 37-40*]

The Refutation of the Theory that All is Mere Void.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The following is another sweeping assertion :—

Sūtra 37

" All things must be non-entities, because all things are known to be mere negations of one another. "

BHĀṢYA

All things must be regarded as non-entities;—why?—*because all things are known to be mere negations of one another.* As a matter of fact, the Bull is 'non-existent in the form of 'Horse', and the Bull is only 'not-horse'; similarly the Horse is 'non-existent' in the form the 'Bull', and the Horse in only 'not-bull'; thus we find that the names of things ('Bull', 'Horse' etc.) are concomitant (co-substrate) with the notion of 'non-existence' as also with *negation*; from which it follows that all things are *non-existent* or non-entities."*

[The *Bhāsya* offers its own answer to the Nihilistic doctrine put forward in the *Sūtra*]—The assertion put forward cannot be right; because there is contradiction between (A) the two terms of the Proposition and (B) between the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans.

(A) The term 'all' signifies *several things without exception*, while the term 'non-entity' signifies the *negation of existence*, of these two the former is something possessed of a definite character, while the latter is totally devoid of any character; now

* This Nihilism is thus expounded in the *Tātparya*:—"All things—Pramāna and the rest—are actually found to be cognised as 'non-existent' and also spoken of in negative terms, hence it follows that the names of those things are concomitant with these (the notion of non-existence and negation), hence Pramāna and the rest must be regarded as non-existent, as nonentities, just like the Cloth that has either not come into existence or has been destroyed Further are these things—Pramāna etc —eternal, or evanescent? If they are eternal, they must be non-entities, being without any capacity or power, as we have already explained how no sequence being possible among things that are eternal, no eternal things can ever bring about a product. If, on the other hand, the things are evanescent, then, since they would be liable to destruction, they would be *non-existent* at the first as at the second moment Further, if things are *existent*, they should not be liable to destruction, and as such they could not be destroyed at any point of time, for the blue Colour, being brought about by its cause, can never be turned into yellow by even thousands of painters. In fact evanescent things cannot but be regarded as liable to destruction. From all this we conclude that all things are mere *Void, Blank*, and it is only through assumed *existence* that they appear as *existing*. The reasoning may be formulated thus:—"All names of things apply to non-existent things,—because they are concomitant with notions of *non-existence* and *negation*,—like the unproduced and the destroyed Cloth."

how can that which is spoken of as possessed of definite character, i.e, ' all ', be a mere ' non-entity ', which is devoid of any character ? Certainly the ' non-entity ', which is totally devoid of any character, cannot be predicated either as ' several ' or as ' without exception ' [which are the two factors in the denotation of the term ' all '].

" But it is just all this that is non-entity ; what *you* (Logician) call the ' all ' is what is really only non-entity."

Even so the ' contradiction ' does not cease , for the conception of ' several things ' and ' without exception ' cannot possibly arise in regard to what is mere non-entity ,* and yet it is just this conception that is expressed by the term ' all ' ; hence it follows that this ' all ' cannot be a *non-entity*.

(B) There is contradiction also between the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans ; the Proposition is in the form ' all things are non-entities ', and it denies the existence (of all things) , and the statement of the Probans is ' because all things are known to be mere negations of one another ',—which admits that there is ' mutual negation ' among ' things ', and then on the basis thereof—the fact of there being mutual negation having been established,—it is asserted that ' all things are non-entities' ,—now if ' all things are non-entities ', then it is not possible for ' things ' to be the ' negation of one another ' ; and if ' things ' are ' negations of one another, ' then ' all things ' cannot be ' non-entities '.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The following is the answer (to Nihilism) offered by the *Sūtra*—

Sūtra 38

What has been alleged is not right, because things are, by virtue of their very nature, real entities.

BHĀṢYA

(*A*) All things cannot be non-entities.—Why ?—Because by virtue of their very nature things are real entities (really existing). The proposition laid down is that *by their very nature*

* The right reading is अभाँव प्रत्येयेन (as in the Puri Ms.). Construe thus. अनेकमशेषश्चेति प्रत्ययेन अभावे न भवितु शक्यम् ।

things exist. "What is the *nature* of things?" 'Existence', 'being an entity', and so forth constitute the nature or character common to Substances, Qualities and Actions;—'having action' and so forth are the 'character' peculiar to Substances;—the qualities ending with Touch belong to Earth;—so on and so forth there are endless characters peculiar to the several things of the world;— in *Universal*, in *Individuality* and in *Inherence* also we find specific characters. All this distinction among things which is recognised in actual experience, would not be possible [if all things were mere non-entities], as a non-entity is without any character,—and yet such distinction among things does exist;—from which it follows that all things are not mere non-entities.

(*B*) [Another interpretation of the Sūtra]—Or, the words of the Sūtra may be taken to mean that—*what has been asserted cannot be right*; *because each thing is recognised as having a distinct individuality of its own*; that is to say, when the word 'Bull' is used, what is apprehended is a particular substance qualified by (belonging to) a particular community, and not a mere non-entity. If all things were non-entities, the Bull would have been recognised as a 'non-entity', and the word 'Bull' would have denoted a *non-entity* "But how do you know that the word 'Bull' does not signify a non-entity?" * We know it from the fact that whenever the word 'Bull' is used, it brings about the notion of a particular substance, and not that of a non-entity. For these reasons what has been asserted by the Opponent cannot be right.

(*C*) Or, the words of the *Sūtra* '*na svabhāvasiddheḥ etc*' may be explained to mean as follows:—When you assert (Bhā. on Sū. 37) that "the Bull is non-existent *in the form of the Horse*", why do not you say that "the Bull is non-existent *in the form of the bull*"?† That you do not say so indicates that *in the form of the Bull* the Bull *is existent*; that is what is meant by the expression '*Svabhāvasiddhi*', 'existence in its own form'. [If you really mean that things are non-existent], why cannot you say that the

* The right reading is कस्माच्च गोशब्देन चाभाव उच्यते, as found in Puri Ms. B.

† असन् गौर्गवात्मनेति कस्माच्चोच्यते is the better reading, as found in Puri Ms. B.

Horse is not-Horse, or that the Bull is not-Bull? Since you do not say so, it follows that *in its own form*, the substance *exists*.

*As a matter of fact, whenever there is denial of non-difference—'difference' consisting, in this case, of the absence of conjunction and such other relations, and 'non-difference' consisting of identity,—even really existing things come to be spoken of as co-substrate (concomitant) with the notion of 'non-existence', as we find in the case of the expression 'the jujube fruit *is not* in the cup';†—so that in the case in question, in the expressions 'the Bull is non-existent in the form of the Horse', 'the Bull is not-Horse', what is denied is the non-difference between the Bull and the Horse,—the meaning being that, 'there is no identity between the Bull and the Horse'; and this identity being denied, there comes about the co-substrateness or concomitance of the notion of 'non-existence' with the thing, 'Bull'; hence the expression 'the *Bull is non-existent*, in the form of the Horse'; just as in the sentence 'the jujube fruit *is not* in the cup', the conjunction of the fruit with the cup being denied, we have the co-substrateness of the notion of 'non-existence' with the fruit which is a real entity. [All this shows that 'concomitance with the notion of *non-existence*,' upon which the Opponent bases his arguments, in Bhāsya, on Sū. 37, is not incompatible with *real entities*.]

Sūtra 39

[*Objection*]—**"There is no such thing as the character (or individuality) of things; as what is so regarded has only a relative existence"**§

BHĀṢYA

"'*Relative*' is that which is due to the *relativity* of things: *e.g.*, a thing is spoken of as 'long' in relation to what is 'short',

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* This, according to the *Vārtika*, explains how we have the negation expressed in the statement, 'the Bull is not-horse'.

† This is an obscure passage; the obscurity being due to wrong readings. From what follows in the next sentence it is clear that the passage should read as follows–अन्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधे–असंयोगादिसम्बन्धो व्यतिरेकोऽत्राव्यतिरेकोऽभेदाख्यसम्बन्ध:—भावेन असत्प्रत्ययस्यसामानाधिकरण्यम् । यथा न सन्ति कुण्डे बदराणीति ।

§ Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣana reads in this Sūtra a reference to the *Mādhyamikā-Sūtra*.

and 'short' in relation to what is 'long'; and neither of the two has an absolute existence of its own—Why so?—Because such is the force of relativity. Hence we conclude that there is no such thing as the *character or individuality* of things.'"

Sūtra 40

[*Answer*]—**What is put forward cannot be right, as it involves a self-contradiction.**

BHĀṢYA

If a thing is 'long' only relatively to the 'short', then the 'short' should be *non-relative*, for to what would the 'short' be relative? (Similarly) if a thing is 'short' only relatively to the 'long', then the 'long' should be *non-relative*, for to what would the 'long' be relative? And if the two depended upon each other, then the negation of one would imply the negation of the other, so that there would be negation of both. Hence it is not right to assert that the character of the 'short' is to be determined only relatively to the 'long'.†

Further, if there is no such thing as the 'character' (or individuality) of things, [and all is merely relative], why do we not have the relative notions of 'length' and 'shortness' in regard to two equal Atoms, or to any two objects of equal size? For, taken relatively or non-relatively, the two things remain the same, the two things taken relatively remain precisely the same two things, even when not taken relatively, the presence or absence of relativity does not alter the things themselves [so that under the *Pūrvapakṣa* theory, there can be no reason why the notions of 'length' and 'shortness' should not arise in regard to the two Atoms]; but if the character of things were purely relative, then the presence of *relativity* (of one thing or the other) would surely make a difference in the nature of things "What then is the effect of *relativity* on things?" What *relativity* does

* All things are relative: the *blue* is blue in relation to, in comparison with, the *yellow*; the *father* is so in relation to the *son*, and so forth, with all things.—*Tātparya*.

† The whole of this passage is read better in Puri Ms B. यदि ह्रस्वापेक्षाकृतं दीर्घं ह्रस्वमनापेक्षिकम् किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य............दीर्घमनापेक्षिकम्। किमिदानीमपेक्ष्य दीर्घमिति गृह्यते। एवमितरेतराश्रययोरेकाभावेऽन्यतराभावादुभयाभावइति दीर्घापेक्षाव्यवस्थाऽनुपपन्ना।

is that when we perceive two things, it becomes possible for us to perceive the preponderance of one over the other ;* that is, when one sees two things and notices a preponderance in one of them, he regards it as 'long', and that which he finds deficient, he regards as 'short'; this is what is done by relativity.

End of Section (10)

SECTION (11)

[*Sūtras 41–43*]

Examination of certain sweeping assertions in regard to the exact number of things

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The following are the sweeping assertions in regard to the exact number of things —(1) " All things are *one*, all being equally existent" ; (II) "All things are *two*, being divided into *eternal* and *non-eternal*" ; (III) " All things are *three*, *cogniser*, *cognition* and *cognised* " , (IV) " All things are *four*, *cogniser*, *means of cognition*, *cognised* and *cognition*" ; and so on there are other assertions on the same lines. It is the examination of these views that proceeds now †

* E. g. When we perceive the bamboo relatively to the sugar-cane, this relativity leads us to the judgment that the former is 'longer' than the latter, or that the latter is 'shorter' than the former.

† These views are criticised, because they limit all things within one particular number —According to (I) there is only one thing, according to (II) there are two things, and so forth

The *Pariśuddhi* remarks—The question arises—Why should those views be criticised which are not incompatible with the Nyāya view of things being the conglomeration or composite of several component particles ? But the fact of the matter is that those theories limit things within one definite number only e.g , 'There are only two things', and *two* only,—then, inasmuch as those two would be everlasting, there would be no explanation of the fact that they bring about their effects only *occasionally*; under this theory the appearance of effects should be unceasing. Similarly with the other views.

The *Tātparya* offers the following explanations of the two views mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* :—

(1) The entire phenomenon of the world is nothing apart from the *Light* of Consciousness ; everything is an emanation from this Light. There is no difference among cognitions, nor between the cognised object and its cognition ; as everything is a manifestation of Consciousness, which is

Sūtra 41

Any absolute limitation of the number (of things) cannot be established, either in the event of the means (of proving it) being available, or in that of its being not available.

BHĀṢYA

If the *means* of proving the desired conclusion is (available, and) something different from the conclusion *to be proved*, then no limitation of number can be proved; as the said Means will always, *ex-hypothesi*, be something outside that limited number (which, being included in the 'conclusion to be proved') could not include the *means* of proving (that same conclusion). If, on the other hand, there is no difference between the Means and the Conclusion to be proved by it, then also the limitation of number cannot be proved, as there is, *ex-hypothesi*, no real *means* of proving, and in the absence of such means nothing can be proved.

Sūtra 42

[*Objection*]- **"What has been urged is not true, as the means (of proving) is only a part (of what is to be proved)".**

BHĀṢYA

" It is not true that the limitation of number cannot be proved;—why?—because the means is a part (of what is proved by it), it is only a part of the subject-matter of the Proposition which is the Means of proving that Proposition; so that the Means need not be anything different. Similarly with the views that *there are only two things*, and so forth ".

Sūtra 43

[*Answer*]—**The reason put forward is no reason at all; as (according to the Pūrvapakṣa) things can have no 'parts'.**

Cognition. (II) 'Eternal' and 'non-eternal', being contradictory terms, must include all things, there can be nothing that is not either 'eternal' or 'non-eternal'.

The "other assertions" referred to in the *Bhāṣya* are—(1) that of the *Sānkhya*, that Soul and Primordial Matter are the only two entities; (2) that of the Bauddha, that the only entities are the five *skandhas* of Form, Name, Impression, Sensation and Cognition; and (3) that of the *Pāśupata*, that the only entities are the *Paśu* (living beings), their bondage, the removal of this bondage, and the Lord.

BHĀṢYA

The reason put forward (in Sū. 42) is "as the means of proving is only a part of what is to be proved"; but this is not a valid reason;—why?—because the Opponent has laid down the sweeping assertion that "all things are *one* only", without any exception at all; and then (in the reason put forward) he speaks of a certain thing (the Means of Proving) as being 'one' (part of the subject of the proposition); but there is nothing (apart from that 'one') which, in the Proposition, takes in, *all things*, that could be the 'part' and the necessary 'means of proving'.* Similarly with the other views limiting the number of things to 'two' etc.

If all these sweeping assertions in regard to the limitation of the number of things proceed on the basis of the denial of the indefinite number of diversities among things due to their distinctive properties, they militate against well-known facts ascertained from Perception, Inference and Verbal Cognition; and as such they have to be rejected as wrong doctrines If, on the other hand, they proceed on the basis of the admission of the said diversities, then they renounce their absolutism; as the inclusion of things (under any one head) is due to the presence of common properties, and the exclusion (or diversity) of things is due only to the presence of distinct properties [so that the admission of the diversity of things involves the admission of an indefinite number of diversities, and the renouncing of all limitation of the number]

All the above sweeping assertions (from Sū. 14 to Sū. 43) have been examined with a view to get at the discernment of True Knowledge.

End of Section (11)

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* If there were such a thing as the *part* of what is to be proved, then this would mean that there is no absolute limitation of the number of things to *one* only. When it is stated that "all things are one", nothing is left out; so that there is nothing that is not included in the Proposition which could be the proof of that proposition.

SECTION (12)

[*Sūtras 44–54*]

On Fruition—the Tenth object of Cognition

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After *Rebirth*, comes *Fruition* ; and with regard to this—

Sūtra 44

there arises a doubt since the fulfilment of the result (of acts) is found to appear immediately as well as after some time.

BHĀṢYA

When a man cooks rice or milks the cow, the results, in the shape of the Rice and the Milk respectively, appear immediately ; whereas when he ploughs the field and sows the seeds, the result in the shape of the Harvest, accrues to him after some time ,—now the *Agnihotra* is an act, the performance whereof is laid down in the text 'One desiring heaven should perform the *Agnihotra*' , and in regard to the fruition of this act, there arises a doubt (as to whether or not any results follow it, and if they do, when they follow, and so forth).*

Sūtra 45

[*Siddhānta*]—**The fruition is not immediate , because it is such as can be experienced only at a later time** †

* Says the *Pariśuddhi*—It is not possible that there should be any such doubt regarding *Fruition* in general, as to whether it appears immediately after the act, or after the lapse of some time , for so far as the acts of cooking, etc., are concerned, it is already ascertained that their fruition is immediate ; and in regard to the acts of *Agnihotra*, etc , also, it is already known that their fruition comes only after the lapse of some time. But what gives rise to the doubt is the very fact of the *Agnihotra*, etc , being *actions*, involving the effort of an intelligent agent , and inasmuch as it is found that the activities of intelligent beings are of both kinds—some having their fruition immediately and others after the lapse of time, there is nothing to show for certain to which of the two classes the action of Agnihotra belongs.

† This *Sūtra* is not found in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha* , and the Tātparya calls it 'Bhāṣya'. Visvanātha treats it as 'Sūtra', and it is found in the Puri 'Sūtra' Ms as also in Sūtra Mss. C. and D.

The *Siddhānta* embodied in the Sūtra is in answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* that it is not necessary to assume any invisible superphysical results for *Agnihotra*, etc , since we find them bringing about the immediate result in the shape of Fame, etc.—*Viśvanātha.*

BHĀSYA

'Heaven' is the result mentioned in the scriptures; and the attainment of Heaven accrues only to another body, which comes after the present body has been destroyed; and in the case of actions done with a view to the acquiring of landed property also, we find that the result does not appear immediately after the actions have been done.*

Sūtra 46

[*Objection.*]—" **The fruition cannot appear at another time; as the cause thereof will have ceased to exist** "

BHĀSYA

" The actual action (the sacrificial performance) having ceased to exist, the result of that action could not come about, in the absence of its cause (in the shape of the action); for, as a matter of fact, no effect is ever found to be produced out of a cause that has ceased to exist."

Sūtra 47

[*Answer.*]—**Prior to the actual fulfilment of the fruition there would be something (in the shape of an inter-mediary), just as there is in the case of the fruit of trees.**

BHĀṢYA

The man who desires fruits renders such services to the tree as pouring water at its roots, and so forth, and it is only after the actual act of watering has ceased to exist that the earth particles (under the tree's roots) become lumped together by the particles of water, and becoming heated with the heat underground, they produce a juicy substance; this juicy substance, as modified by the heat, comes into contact with the tree and, in a peculiarly modified form enters into it and produces the leaf etc., and the fruit,—in this manner the action of *watering* is fruitful, and yet the result does not quite follow from a cause that has entirely ceased to exist. In the same manner actions produce (in the Soul) a faculty in the shape of *Dharma-Adharma*, Merit-Demerit; and this faculty, after being produced, comes to be helped

* Puri Ms. B. reads प्रामादिकानाम् which would mean that—'in the case of the actions done by men still in the meshes of ignorance'. But in view of what follows later on in the *Bhāṣya*, the reading of the Viz. text is better.

by other causes and thus brings about the results at a later time. This is what we have already explained under Sū. 3-2-60, where it has been shown that 'the body comes into existence on account of the continuity of the results of previous deeds'.

Pūrvapakṣa

Says the Opponent—

Sūtra 48

"Prior to its fulfilment, the accomplished fruition (result) cannot be either (A) non-existent, (B) or existent, (C) or existent-non-existent; because 'existent' and 'non-existent' are contradictory."*

BHĀṢYA

(*a*) "A thing that is liable to be accomplished (produced) could not be *non-existent*, before its production, because of the restriction in regard to the material cause of things; that is, as a matter of fact, for the bringing about of a certain product (the Jar, e.g.) it is only the particular material (Clay) that is brought in; and it is not that any and every material is brought in for the making of all things; there could not be this limitation or restriction (in the form that one product is produced out of only one material substance, and not from all substances), if the product were absolutely *non-existent* (before its production)".†

(*b*) "Nor could the thing be *existent* (prior to its production); because if the thing already exists, before it is brought about, there could not (need not) be a further 'production' of that same thing."

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* The question going to be discussed now is whether the Fruition or Result of Acts is something that, prior to its being brought about, was—(1) already existent, or (2) non-existent, or (3) both existent and non-existent, or (4) neither existent nor non-existent. The Pūrvapaksa propounded in the Sūtra is that no one of these alternatives is possible, hence there can be no such thing as the 'fruition' of actions.—*Tātparya*.

The fourth of these alternatives is found in the *Vārtika*, not in the *Sūtra* or in the *Bhāṣya*. In this *Sūtra* also Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyābhūsana finds a reference to the *Mādhyamikā-Sūtras*.

† The very fact that it is only out of Clay that the Jar is produced, clearly shows that the Jar already exists in the Clay. *Cf. Sānkhyakārikā*, 9—'*Upādānagrahanāt*.'

(c) "Nor could the thing be both *existent and non-existent*; *because* ' *existent* ' *and* '*non-existent*' *are contradictory*: the term ' existent ' *affirms* a thing, while the term ' non-existent ' *denies* it ; and it is this mutually contradictory character that is spoken of as ' dissimilarity ' (in the Sūtra) ; and because of this fact their being contradictories, no co-existence of them is possible."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The truth of the matter is that prior to being produced, the thing to be produced was *non-existent*.—"How so ?"—

Sūtra 49

Because we perceive the production as well as destruction (of things).*

BHĀṢYA

It has been alleged (in the Bhāsya on Sū 48) by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"Prior to its production, the Product is not non-existent, because of the restriction in regard to the material cause of things" ;—[the answer to that is as follows]—

Sūtra 50

That the product is non-existent is clearly proved by that very conception.

BHĀṢYA

The conception (of restriction in regard to the material cause, which the Opponent has cited) is in the form 'this thing, and not all things, is capable of producing this effect ' ; and this conception clearly proves that prior to being produced, every effect is known as capable of being produced by a particular cause ; and that this conception is correct is shown by the fact that the production of the effect is actually in accordance with that conception ; and in fact it is only on the basis of this conception that we can explain the restriction in regard to the cause of things. If, on the other hand, the product is already existent, prior to being produced, then there can be no such thing as its ' *production* ' [so that there could be no conception

* If a thing is existent, even prior to being produced, it means that it is eternal ; and if it is eternal, there can be production or destruction of it.

at all in regard to its being produced out of only a particular material cause].*

Sūtra 51

[*Objection*]—"**The receptacles being different [in the case of the fruition of acts], it is not right to argue that it is like the fruition of trees.**"—

BHĀSYA

" [In the case of the fruition of trees] it is found that the services rendered, in the shape of the watering of the roots and so forth, as well as the *fruition*, both are in the tree itself,—both have the same tree for their receptacle ; [in the case of the fruition of actions] on the other hand, the action occurs in the present body, while the fruition appears in the next body; so that there being a difference in the receptacles, what has been urged (in Sū 47) does not prove anything at all (in regard to the sacrificial acts being the cause of fruition in the shape of Heaven, etc)".

Sūtra 52

[*Answer.*]—**Inasmuch as Happiness subsists in the Soul, the objection has no force at all.**

BHĀSYA

Happiness, being perceptible to the Soul, subsists in the Soul ; *action* also,—in the form known as '*Dharma*', 'Merit'—subsists in the Soul,—as *Dharma* is a quality of the Soul ; thus then, there is no possibility of *receptacles being different* †

Sūtra 53

[*Objection*]—"**What has been just said is not true as [the obtaining of] Son, Wife, Cattle, Clothing, Gold, Food and such things is mentioned as the fruit (of acts).**"

* The very conception that a thing is produced only out of a certain cause proves that before being produced that thing must be non-existent. The weaver takes up the yarns with the idea—'the Cloth *shall be produced* out of this' and not that 'the Cloth *is* here already '; for in the latter case, why should he put forth any effort to bring into existence the Cloth *which already exists* ?

† 'Heaven', which is the result of sacrificial acts, is only a form of *Happiness* ; and Happiness subsists in the Soul, not in the Body ; and Soul remains the same through the several lives.

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, what is mentioned as the 'fruit' is the obtaining of such things as the son etc., and *not* 'Happiness'; we have such assertions as—'one who desires landed property should perform *this* sacrifice', 'one who desires a son should perform *that* sacrifice', and so forth. So that the assertion (under Sū. 52) that 'Happiness is the fruit of actions' is not true.

Sūtra 54

[*Answer.*]—**Inasmuch as the real fruition follows from connection with the things mentioned, it is only indirectly (figuratively) that these latter are spoken of as the 'fruit'.**

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact the real fruition, in the shape of Happiness, results from connection with the son, wife etc., and it is for this reason that these latter are regarded, or spoken of, only indirectly, as 'fruit', just as food is (indirectly) spoken of as 'Life', in such statements as 'Food is life itself'

End of Section (12)

SECTION (13)

[*Sūtras 55-58*]

Examination of the nature of Pain

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After 'Fruition' (in Sū 1-1-9) is *mentioned* 'Pain'; and this has been *defined* (in Sū. 1-1-21) as 'that which is connected with annoyance is *Pain*'. But now the question is raised—"Does the Siddhāntin mean to totally deny such a thing as 'Pleasure', which is felt by every personality? or does he mean something else?"*

* *Question*—"What is it that has to be *examined* in the present section? No one denies that there is such a thing as Pain, nor is there any doubt as to its being a thing to be got rid of, it might be useful to examine whether it is eternal or not; but it has already been established, in course of our refutation of the doctrine that all things are eternal, what causes pain is also well known to be such things as the serpent, the thorn and so forth; Activity has been fully examined, as also its Effects, in the form of Birth etc.; and how the cessation of the cause leads to the cessation of its effects has been shown under Sū. 1-1-2. What then has remained uninvestigated, for the sake of which the present section has been taken up?"

Our answer is that the meaning of the *Siddhāntin* is something different. "Why so?" It is not possible to totally deny Pleasure, to whose existence testimony is borne by all men. The teaching (of the *Siddhānta*) that Pleasure should be looked upon as 'Pain' is meant for the removal of all pain for the person who has become disgusted with the sufferings caused by the experiences undergone during a series of births and deaths and is anxious to get rid of all similar experiences.* "But by what method (is this advice effective)?" The bodies of all living beings, all the regions where people are born, all rebirth (all conditions of life), every one of these is beset with 'annoyance', being inseparable from Pain, and it is in view of this fact that the sages have tendered the advice contained in the Sūtra 'Pain is that which is connected with annoyance' (Sū. 1-1-21); and the meaning of this is that all the aforesaid things should be looked upon as 'Pain' † Reasons for this view are put forward in the following *Sūtra*.

Answer—Pain has been defined as that which is connected with annoyance, by 'annoyance' here is meant the *feeling of annoyance*, and this according to the Siddhānta, includes, not only Pain and its causes, but *Pleasure* also If this is duly realised, then there is no room for the question put by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, but he has put the question in view of the primary meaning of the term 'annoyance', which is restricted to *Pain only*. —*Pariśuddhi*

The sense of the *Pūrvapaksa* has been thus expounded in the *Tātparya*:- "We admit that *Pain is that which is connected with annoyance*, but that which is experienced by every personality as *Pleasure*, that certainly could not be regarded as *Pain*, as this would be contrary to experience. As regards the Body and the Sense-organs etc —if they are to be regarded as Pain because they are the Source of Pain, they may be regarded as 'Pleasure' also, as being the source of Pleasure. In fact the timidity involved in the idea of regarding everything as pain is likely to strike at the root of all worldly usage. As a matter of fact, when a man eats meat, he removes all the bones and hence does not suffer the pain that might be due to the bones; similarly a wise man will enjoy Pleasuse only, taking care to avoid all that may be likely to bring pain." It is in view of all this that the *Pūrvapakṣin* has put the question.

* The *Tātparya* explains the expression '*utpattisthānāni*' as *the regions for the acquiring of things which bring pleasure and pain.*

† If it were possible to obtain pleasure *unmixed with pain*, no intelligent person would ever seek to get rid of it · as a matter of fact, however, no such unalloyed pleasure is ever met with; hence what the *Siddhānta* means 'is not the total denial of all Pleasure, but that all Pleasure should be looked upon as Pain.'—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 55

The Birth of the Body etc., is only Pain ; because it is •beset with Annoyances.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*janma*' (in the *Sūtra*) stands for *that which is produced i.e.*, the Body, the Sense-organs and so forth; and the '*utpatti*' of '*janma*' is the coming into existence of the Body etc., in their various forms. The 'several annoyances' are—the *least*, the *medium*, and the *greatest*; the *greatest* 'annoyance' is of those in hell; the *medium* is that of the lower animals; and the *least* is that of human beings; of the divine beings, as of those who have got rid of all attachment, it is *still less* When a person perceives that every condition of life is beset with annoyance, he becomes confirmed in his idea that Pleasure and its causes, in the shape of the Body, the sense-organs and cognitions are all to be regarded as 'Pain'; and when he has come to look upon all these as 'pain', he loses all attachment to all things of the world; and after he has harboured this dis-attachment, all his longings for worldly things come to an end; and his longings having come to an end, he becomes freed from all suffering, just as when one understands that by the contact of poison, milk becomes poison, he no longer seeks to obtain milk, and not obtaining it, does not suffer the pangs of death.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

The teaching that all things should be looked upon as 'Pain' is not meant to be a denial of Pleasure ;—Why ?

Sūtra 56

It is not so ; Because Pleasure also is accomplished during intervals.*

BHĀṢYA

By the teaching that all things should be looked upon as 'Pain', it is not meant that there is no such thing as 'Pleasure' at all ;—Why ? *Because Pleasure also is accomplished during intervals* ; that is, as a matter of fact, in the intervals of 'annoy-

* सुखस्याप्यन्तराल is the reading of the *Nyāyasūcinibandha*, of the Sūtra-Mss. C. and D. as also in Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*.

ances', Pleasure is actually accomplished and experienced by all living beings ; and hence it cannot be denied entirely.

Further,—

Sūtra 57

There is no denial [of Pleasure] ; because [all that is meant is that] inasmuch as the Man experiencing pleasure is oppressed with the frailty of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him

BHĀṢYA

The 'non-denial' (in the Sūtra) is meant to be that of *Pleasure*—by the teaching that it should be looked upon as 'Pain', that such is the meaning of the *Sūtra* is clear from the context. '*Longing*'—is wish, the eager desire for acquiring a thing ; and the 'frailty of this longing' is as follows :—when the man experiences pleasure from a certain thing, he desires that thing, —and sometimes the desire is not fulfilled, or if fulfilled, it is fulfilled only in part, or is fulfilled in such form as is beset with obstacles ,—and from this 'frailty of longing' there arise various kinds of mental suffering ; so that *the man experiencing pleasure, being oppressed with the frailty of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him* ;—and it is because there is no cessation of annoyance that it has been taught that Pleasure should be looked upon as 'Pain'. It is for this reason that Birth is 'pain', and not because there is no pleasure at all This is the idea that has been expressed in the following verses —

(1) 'For the man who desires a desirable thing, as soon as that desire is fulfilled, another desire quickly besets him.'

(2) 'Even though a man obtains the entire sea-girt Earth, along with all cows and horses, that seeker after wealth does not become satisfied with that wealth ; what pleasure, then, can there be for one who desires wealth ?'

Sūtra 58

Also because there are several kinds of Pain which people wrongly regard as pleasure ;—

BHĀṢYA

'*we have the instruction that Pleasure should be regarded as Pain*' [these words complete the sentence of the *Sūtra*].

The ordinary man, addicted to pleasure, regards Pleasure as the highest end of man, and feels that there is nothing better than Pleasure ; and hence when Pleasure has been attained, he feels happy and contended, feeling that all he had to attain had been attained ; and under the influence of illusion, he becomes attached to the Pleasure, as also to the things that bring about its accomplishment ; becoming so attached, he makes an attempt to obtain the pleasure ; and while he is trying for it, there come down upon him several kinds of Pain, in the form of birth, old age, disease, death, the contact of disagreeable things, separation from agreeable things, the non-fulfilment of desires and so forth ; and yet all these several kinds of Pain he regards as 'Pleasure'. In fact Pain is a necessary factor in Pleasure ; without suffering some pain no pleasure can be obtained, hence as leading to Pleasure, this Pain is regarded by the man as Pleasure ; and such a man, having his mind obsessed by this notion of 'Pleasure', never escapes from metempsychosis, which consists of a running series of births and deaths. And it is as an antidote of this notion of Pleasure that we have the teaching that all this should be looked upon as 'Pain'.

Birth has been called 'pain', because of its being beset with 'pain', and not because there is no such thing as Pleasure

Objection :—" If that is so, then why is it not said simply (in Sū. 55) that 'Birth is Pain' ? When this simple expression might have been used, the fact of the Sūtra having used the expression 'Birth is *only* pain' shows that the idea meant to be conveyed is that *there is no pleasure at all*."

Answer :—What the emphatic term '*eva*', 'only', implies is that what is laid down is conducive to the cessation of Birth. "How [does the particle serve the purpose of indicating the cessation of Birth] ?" What it means is that Birth is pain, not by its own nature, but by reason of its being beset with Pain ; and so with Pleasure also [which is 'Pain' because it is intermingled with Pain, and not because there is no such thing as *Pleasure*]. This is what is meant by the words of the *Sūtra* (55),—and not that in Birth there is *only Pain* (and *no Pleasure* at all).

End of Section (13)

SECTION (14)

[*Sūtras 59–68*]

Examination of the Nature of Final Release

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After 'Pain', 'Release' [has been *mentioned* and *defined*]. This Release is thus denied (by the Opponent)—

Sūtra 59

Pūrvapakṣa

"Since there is concatenation (*a*) of Debts, (*b*) of Aberrations and (*c*) of Activity,—there can be no Release"—

BHĀṢYA

" (*a*) *On account of the concatenation of debts there can be no Release.* The 'debts' are thus described (in the *S'atapatha Brāhmana*, 1-7-2-1)—'When the Brāhmaṇa is born, he is born with three debts: from the debt owing to the Risis he becomes freed by leading the life of the Religious Student; from the debt owing to Divine Beings he is freed by the performance of sacrifices; and from the debt owing to the Fathers he is freed by begetting children';—the 'concatenation of these debts consists in the connection (presence) of acts connected with the debts'; that it is necessary throughout one's life to perform these acts (towards the clearing of the debts) is thus mentioned (in the Veda)—'The sacrifices known as the *Agnihotra* and the *Dars'apūrnamāsa* should go on till old age or death,—it is only by either old age or death that one becomes freed from the necessity of performing the said sacrifices'.—So that the concatenation of these debts persisting (till the man's old age or death), there is no time left for the performance of acts conducive to Release; hence it follows that there can be no Release."

" (*b*) *On account of the concatenation of Aberrations, there can be no Release.* The man dies beset with aberrations [viz., Ignorance, Egoism, Affection, Hatred and Yearning for Life], and he is born beset with aberrations; and he is never found to be absolutely free from the concatenation of these aberrations [from which it follows that he can never be free from Births and Deaths; *i.e.*, there can be no Release]."

" (c) *On account of the concatenation of Activity, there can be no Release.* From birth till death, man is never found to be absolutely free from the 'Operating of Speech, Mind and Body'. From this it follows that the assertion made (in Sū. 1-1-2) to the effect that—'there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to Release',—is not true."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Siddhānta

Our answer to the above is as follows :—(A) Our answer to the argument, that " since there is concatenation of Debts etc., etc. ",—is that the term ' Debt ' (in the texts quoted) stands for *what is like debt.*

Sūtra 60

Inasmuch as the word cannot be taken in its primary signification, the statement must be taken as a description by means of a word used in its secondary (figurative) signification , specially as it is only thus that the sense of condemnation and commendation is obtained.

BHĀṢYA

The word '*ṛnaih*', (in the passage quoted from the *S'atapatha Brāhmana*) is not used in its primary sense of *debt*; the word 'debt' can be used in its primary sense only in a case where one gives to another something that has to be repaid and another receives such a thing ; and this condition is not present in the case spoken of in the passage quoted ; hence it follows that—*inasmuch as the word 'debts' cannot be taken in its primary signification, the statement must be taken as a description by means of a word used in its secondary (figurative) signification* ; the sense being that what are described are '*like debts*'. Such figurative descriptions are very common ; e.g., when the 'young student ' is described as 'Fire '; just as the word 'Fire' elsewhere used in one (the primary) sense is applied to the young student in another (figurative) sense,—so in the case in question, the word ' debt ', elsewhere found used in the primary sense, is used in the passage quoted in a different

sense. " But why should there be a description by means of a word in the figurative sense ? " *Because it is only thus that the sense of condemnation and commendation is obtained* ;—the meaning of the passage being that " if a person fails to perform the acts referred to, he is *condemned* in the same manner as the debtor, not repaying his debts ; and if he does perform the acts, he is *commended* in the same manner as the debtor, repaying his debts; this is what is meant by the figurative description of the acts *as 'debts'*.

The word '*jāyamānaḥ*', 'when he is born', is also used figuratively ; as otherwise (if the word were taken in its literal sense), the man would not be entitled to the performance of the acts mentioned ; what the phrase, 'when the Brāhmana is born' means is 'when the Brāhmaṇa enters the state of the Householder',—this is what is meant by the man 'being born' ; (that such must be the sense is clear from the fact that) it is only when the Brāhmana enters the state of the Householder that he becomes entitled to the performance of the act mentioned ; on merely being *born from his mother's womb* (which is the primary meaning of 'being born') the Brāhmana is not entitled to the performance of those acts ; as a matter of fact, when the child is just born from his mother's womb he is not in a position to perform any acts ; for only such persons are entitled to the performance of an act as (*a*) are *desirous* of acquiring the results following from that act and (*b*) are *capable* of performing it. (*a*) That to be entitled to the performance of an act it is necessary to have the desire for results calculated to follow from that act, is shown by the fact that the injunctions of the acts always speak of the presence of such desire ; e.g., in the injunction '*one desiring heaven* should offer the *Agnihotra* libations' ; and (*b*) that to be so entitled one must be *capable* of performing the act is shown by the fact that it is only a person who is capable of doing an act that can do it ; since it is only a capable man that can do an act it follows that it is only a capable man that is entitled to the performance of that act ; as a matter of fact, it is only the *capable* man, and none other, who actually undertakes the performance of an act. If the word 'born' were taken in its primary sense (of *coming out* of the mother's womb), then both these conditions

would be absent in the child just born; at the time that the child is just born out of the mother's womb, there is not present in it either the desire for the results following from any act, or the capability to perform it. An assertion made in the Veda in no way differs from an assertion made in common parlance,—both being the work (utterance) of intelligent persons; and in common parlance no one, even the most foolish, would ever address, to the newborn child, such injunctions as 'Study the Veda', 'Perform sacrifices', 'Lead the life of the Religious Student', and so forth; how then could a wise Sage, who says only what is true and faultless, and who is prompted to teach pupils, ever address such injunctions (to the new-born child)? No dancer ever dances before blind men; no singer sings to deaf persons. Then again, it is only the person who comprehends what is taught that can be the recipient of the teaching; *i.e.*, he alone who comprehends what is taught, can have the teaching addressed to him; and certainly this condition is not present in the new-born infant. Further, the Brāhmana-passage itself (quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) speaks of acts that clearly indicate the state of the House-holder; as a matter of fact, the action that the passage speaks of is such as requires the presence of the *wife*, and as such is clearly indicative of the state of the Householder. From all this it follows that, what is meant by the term 'born' is *one who has entered the state of the Householder*.

Further, the assertion (in the text quoted) in regard to old age and death (being the limit of the performance of the *Agnihotra etc*) can be explained on the basis of the assumption that the acts continue to be performed till the ceasing of the man's desire. That is, till the man's desire for the results (accruing from the act) does not cease—does not come to end—he should continue to perform the act;—it is in this sense that the assertion in regard to 'old age and death' would be applicable to the man. Further, what the passage—'by old age is the man freed etc.'—means is that 'when the man reaches the last quarter of his life, he enters the state of the Renunciate and thus becomes freed from the obligation of performing the sacrificial act'; the term 'old age' standing for the last quarter of man's life, when he enters the state of the Renunciate; it is in connection with

the last quarter of man's life that Renunciation has been enjoined. If the term 'old age' meant absolutely *decrepit senility*, then the assertion—'by old age is man freed etc.', would have no sense at all;* it could not be taken to mean that 'when the man is disabled (by decrepitude), he becomes freed from the obligation etc.;' as for the man who is himself unable to perform a sacrificial act, the Veda permits external aid; e.g., (a) 'or the pupil might offer the libations, his services having been secured by the teaching of the Veda', (*b*) 'or the milk-offerer might offer the libations, his services having been secured by presents of wealth.' Such being the case, the passage can either be taken as 'descriptive' of what has been enjoined in another text, or some other meaning (that of direct injunction of the acts for the new-born infant) may be arbitrarily assigned to it And there can be no doubt that the most reasonable course is to take it as containing a 'description' of what has been enjoined elsewhere,† the most natural meaning of the passage being that 'when the Householder undertakes the performance of the sacrificial acts, he is as much under compulsion as a debtor' Then again, what form the direct objective of man's effort are the means of accomplishing the desired result, and not the result itself; and when the said means have been duly accomplished they lead to the accomplishment of the Result; so that what has been enjoined previously (in some other passage) is the *coming into existence* of the means leading to the Result; and the same is also spoken of subsequently (in passages occurring later than the passage in question); so that it must be the person connected with the said means that is referred to by the term '*jāyamāna*', 'being born' §

* Because when the man has reached the state of senility, or has died, he actually becomes freed from all obligations.

† The passage itself does not contain a single injunctive word. Even so there might have been some justification for regarding it as an injunction if we had found no other Vedic text containing the necessary injunction of the Agnihotra etc. As a matter of fact, however, there are hundreds of such texts. There can, therefore, be no justification for assuming the passage in question to be injunctive.—*Tātparya*.

§ This anticipates the following argument of the Opponent—"The new-born infant may not have the capacity of *discerning the result*, and of knowing and attempting to obtain, the means leading to that result. But it certainly has the capacity of bringing upon itself the results of acts. if the

"But," says the Opponent, "there being no direct injunction (of Renunciation)—[the passage in question cannot be regarded as referring to the state of the Renunciate]."

This, however, is not right; as there is no direct injunction of the negation of it either [so that the fact cannot be urged one way or the other].

"The Brāhmana-text directly enjoins the state of the Householder; if there were other states also [such as that of the Renunciate], the Brāhmaṇa would have directly enjoined these also; so that, inasmuch as there is no direct injunction of these other states, we conclude that there is no other state."

There is no force in this, we reply; as of the negation of such other states also there is no direct injunction; we find no such direct injunction of the negation of other states as—'there are no other states, that of the Householder being the only one state'; hence, inasmuch as we do not meet with any direct injunction of the negation (of the state of the Renunciate), the argument put forward can have no force at all. Then again, the direct injunction (of the state of the Householder) in the passage in question is based upon the fact that it is that particular state that forms the subject-matter of the context; just as we find in the case of the various sciences. In the case of the sciences it is found that the fact that each science directly lays down certain things only is due to those things alone being connected with its own subject-matter,—and not to there being no other things at all; similarly the fact that the passage lays down things connected with the state of the Householder only is due to this state forming its subject-matter, and *not* to there being no other states.

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child does an act, however unconsciously of its being the means of a particular result, the *merit* or *demerit* accruing from that act will certainly accrue to the soul of the infant. So that there can be nothing incongruous in the acts being enjoined for the new-born child."

The sense of the reply is thus explained in the *Tātparya*:—The direct objective of man's effort cannot be the *Result*; what the man tries to obtain, in the first instance, is the means that leads to that *Result*; and certainly the new-born child can have no idea of what is the means leading to a Result. Hence no injunction could have any effect upon it. For this reason the only right course is to take the word 'born' in the figurative sense, as explained above.

Then again, we find *verses* and *prose-texts* speaking of Final Release ; as a matter of fact, we find several Ṛk verses and Brāhmaṇa-texts speaking of Final Release (along with the means of attaining it, and the four states, specially that of the Renunciate, fall under these). As instances of verses, we have the following:—(*a*) 'The sages, blessed with children and desiring wealth, fell into death (and rebirth) by performing actions ; other sages, who were endowed with wisdom, transcending beyond actions, attained immortality' ;—(*b*) 'Neither by action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth,—but by renunciation, only—did they attain immortality ; that immortality which shines beyond Heaven, hidden in the cave (beyond ordinary cognitions, which the renunciates alone enter)' (*Taittirīya Āranyaka* 10–10–3) ,—(*c*) 'I know that Great Person, effulgent like the Sun, lying beyond Illusion ; by knowing Him alone does man transcend death, there is no other path for going beyond' (*Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* 31–18) ; and as prose-texts we have the following .—(*a*) 'There are three stages of Dharma—Sacrifices, Study, and Charity ; the first of these constitutes Austerity ; the second as the Religious Student residing in the house of the Teacher ; and the third is the same person putting himself under severe penance while residing in the Teacher's house , all these lead man to pure regions : it is only one who is firm in Brahman (i.e the Renunciate) who reaches immortality' (*Chāndogya Upanisad*, 2–22–1) ;—(*b*) 'It is with a view to attain this region that Renunciates take to renunciation' (*Brhadāranyaka Upanisad*, 4–4–22) ; (*c*) 'They say that man is made up of desires ; as he desires so does he put forth efforts, and as he puts forth efforts, so does he act ; and as he acts so does he become, '—having in this way described the process of metempsychosis determined by the performance of acts, the texts go on to lay down the real teaching thus—'When the man with desires becomes free from desires, he becomes without desires, beyond desires, having all his desires fulfilled, his desires centred in the Self,—then his life-breaths do not go out, they become absorbed here and now, being Brahman, he attains Brahman itself.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniśad*, 4-4-5 and 6)

Thus then we find that the assertion that—"Since there is concatenation of debts, there can be no Release"—is not right.

There is yet another text—'The four paths leading to the Divine Beings' (*Taittirīyasaṁhitā* 5-7-23)—which speaks of the four states; and hence also it is not right to say that there is only one state (that of the Householder) laid down in the Veda [and that the state of the Renunciate is nowhere enjoined).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the passage speaking of 'the *Agnihotra* and the *Dars'apūrnamāsa* sacrifice continuing till old age and death' must refer to the man that desires the results (following from those acts). "Why?"

Sūtra 61

Inasmuch as there is transportation (of the Fires) into the Soul, the Denial (of Release) cannot be right.

BHĀSYA

It is laid down in the Veda that—'Having offered the *Prājāpatya* sacrifice, having offered the libation of all his belongings, and having transported the Fires into his Soul, the Brāhmaṇa should go out as a Renunciate';—and from this we learn that the 'transportation of the Fires' (which means the end of the *Agnihotra*) is only for the man who has risen above all desires for children, wealth and fame, and when his desire for the results (of the *Agnihotra*) also have entirely ceased. To this same end we have the following Brāhmana-passage (*Brhadārānyaka* 4-5):—'Yājñavalkya, when going to undertake another austerity, said to Maitreyī as follows: Oh, dear one, I am going to wander away from this place, I shall therefore make up an understanding between you and Kātyāyanī; you have already had your instructions, *O Maitreyi*! Immortality extends only so far;—having said this Yājñavalkya went away as a renunciate.'

Sūtra 62

Inasmuch as the 'collecting of sacrificial vessels' could not be possible in their case, the Results mentioned cannot pertain to others (than Householders).

BHĀṢYA

If the performance of the acts till 'old age and death' were taken as referring to *all men* (Householders as well as Renunciates), then the after-death rites ending with the 'collecting of the

sacrificial vessels ' would also have to be performed for *all men* ; and in that case there would be no point in the describing of the 'rising above desires', which we meet with in such passages as the following—' The ancient Brāhmaṇas, great teachers and learned, do not desire offspring, their idea being—what shall we do with offspring, we for whom the Self is the whole world ?—it is these Brāhmaṇas that, having risen above desire for sons, desire for wealth and desire for fame, live upon alms.' (*Bṛhadāranyaka—Upaniṣad*, 3-5-1). Because for one who has 'risen above desires (including also the desire for results accruing from the *Agnihotra etc.*) there can be no possibility of those rites that end with the 'collecting of sacrificial vessels'. Specially because Results do not supply sufficient motive to all men to the same extent.

Further, since we find *four stages* of life laid down in the *Itihāsas*, the *Purānas* and the *Dharmashāstra* scriptures, it is not right to hold (as the Pūrvspaksin does) that there is only one stage (that of the Householder). It will not be right to regard the said scriptures as having no authority ; for the authoritative character of these is vouched for by authoritative texts ; as a matter of fact, the authoritative character of *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas* is vouched for by *Brāhmana-texts*, which are entirely authoritative ; *e.g.*, ' The *Atharvāngirasas* declared the *Itihāsas* and *Purānas* ; and these Itihāsas and Purānas constitute the fifth of the Vedas.' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 3-4-2). For these reasons it is not right to say that the said *Itihāsas* and *Puraṇas* are not authoritative. As regards the *Dharmasāstra* scriptures, if these had no authority, there would be an end to all business among living beings, which would put the whole world into confusion. Secondly, inasmuch as the ' seers' and 'speakers' are the same, there is no reason why these scriptures should not be authoritative ; as a matter of fact, the ' seers ' and ' speakers ' of the *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and *Dharmasāstra* scriptures are the same as those of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmana* texts (of the Veda). Thirdly, inasmuch as there is a restriction in regard to their subject-matter (the said scriptures must be authoritative) ; as a matter of fact, the authority of each scripture bears upon its own special subject-matter ; and the subject-matter of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts is different from that of the *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and the

Dharmaśāstra scriptures ; *e.g.*, 'sacrificial performance' forms the subject-matter of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmana* texts, the 'doings of men' that of *Itihāsas* and *Purānas*, and the 'regulation of men's business' that of the *Dharmaśāstra* scriptures. So that since no single one of these regulates all the said subjects, every one of them must be regarded as authoritative in regard to its own special subject ; just as every one of the sense-organs is an authoritative means of the cognition of its own special object of perception.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the second argument propounded by the *Pūrvapaksin* (in Sū. 59) viz : "since there is no cessation of concatenation of the aberrations (there can be no Release),"—our answer is as follows :—

Sūtra 63

Release is possible ; inasmuch as (we find that) there are no aberrations in the case of the man in deep sleep, who dreams no dreams.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, we find that when a man is in deep sleep and dreams no dreams, there is an end (for the time being) of all connection with attachment, as also of all connection with pleasure and pain. Exactly in the same way there could be an end of all these at Release also. In fact people who have realised the real nature of Brahman actually describe the condition of the 'released' Soul as similar to that of *deep sleep.**

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

As regards the third argument—viz., "because there is concatenation of Activity,"—our answer is as follows :—

Sūtra 64

For the man whose aberrations have been destroyed, Activity does not lead to recrudescence.

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* The only difference being that while during deep sleep, the tendency of aberrations is present—[by virtue of which the man becomes beset with them on waking]—at Release there is no such tendency left; [so that there is no chance of the *Released* man being re-beset with aberrations.]—*Tātparya*.

BHĀṢYA

When Love, Hatred and Ignorance (which are the aberrations) have been destroyed, *Activity does not lead to recrudescence*; —'Recrudescence' stands for re-birth at the end of the previous birth; and since this rebirth is always brought about by Desire,* —when all Desire has been destroyed, there is no further birth after the previous one has come to an end; and this is what is meant by 'non-recrudescence'; and this is *Release*.

"But this would mean that actions are fruitless."

Certainly not; for our doctrine does not deny the experiencing of the fruition of one's acts. All that we say is that the previous birth having come to an end, there is no further birth, and we do not say that there is no experiencing of the fruits of one's acts; this comes about in the last birth (preceding Release) [so that there is no fruition left to be experienced]

Sūtra 65

[*Objection*.]—"**What has been just alleged is not possible as the concatenation of aberrations is innate (in man).**"

BHĀṢYA

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"Cessation of the concatenation of aberrations is not possible,—why?—*because the concatenation of aberrations is innate in man*, as a matter of fact, the concatenation of aberrations is without beginning, and what is beginningless can never be destroyed"

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

To the above objection some people (Ekadeśi—Logicians) make the following reply:

Sūtra 66

(A) 'Just as there is evanescence of the negation of things prior to their coming into existence,—so there can be evanescence of innate things also.'

BHĀṢYA

'The negation or absence of things, prior to their coming into existence, has had no beginning; and yet it is set aside by

* The reading तच्चादृष्टकारितं does not fit in with तस्याम्. In the *Vārtika* we find the expression तच्च तृष्णाकारितम्; so that we prefer to read the *Bhāṣya* also as तच्च तृष्णाकारितम्; and to take तस्यां as referring to तृष्णा.

the *existence* of the things when they are produced :—and in the same manner the *concatenation of the aberrations* also, though without beginning, may be liable to be set aside.'

Sūtra 67

(B) 'Or it may be like the evanescence of the dark colour of the Atom.'

BHĀṢYA

Others again offer the following answer to the objection (urged in Sū. 65) :—

'The dark colour of the Atom (of Earth) is beginningless, and yet it is destroyed by contact with fire ; similarly the concatenation of aberrations [though beginningless, could be destroyed] '.

BHĀṢYA

(A) As a matter of fact, 'eternality' and 'evanescence' are properties of existent things ; so they can be predicated directly of positive entities only ; to negative entities they can be attributed only indirectly (or figuratively). [So that it is not right to cite the case of the *negation of things*, as the *Ekadeśin* has done in Sū. 65]. (B) Then, as regards the 'dark colour of the Atom' (cited by the second *Ekadeśin* in Sū. 66), there is nothing to prove that it is *without beginning*,* and hence it is not right to put that forward as an instance. Nor is there anything to prove that a thing *not liable to production* is *evanescent*.

The real answer to the argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin* (put forward in Sū. 65) is as follows :—

Sūtra 68

What has been alleged by the Opponent cannot be right ; also because (a) desire and the rest have their source in misapprehension.†

* On the other hand, we have the following argument to prove that the dark colour of the Atom is *not without beginning* :—'The dark colour of the Atom is a *product*, because it is a Colour of the Earth, just like its red colour.'—*Tātparya*.

† On the exact meaning of the term '*saṅkalpa*' in the present context, the *Tātparya* says :—Though it is the *wish for a cognised thing* that is generally called '*saṅkalpa*', yet here we have to take it as referring to the *cognition* that is the precursor of the *wish* ; hence it should be taken here as standing for *wrong cognition, misapprehension*.

BHĀṢYA

The particle '*ca*', 'also', has a cumulative force, including the following two reasons also—(*b*) *because Desire and the rest are due to action*, and (*c*) *because Desire and the rest are due to one another*.

(*a*) As a matter of fact, Desire, Hatred and Illusion proceed from such wrong cognitions (respectively) as the actual *delighters*, *annoyers* and *deluders* of men. (*b*) Action also is what brings about the bodies of living beings, and gives rise to Desire, Hatred and Illusion, within well-defined limits; that it is so we gather from the fact that there is a limitation in regard to these; *e. g* a certain animal-body is found to abound in Desire, while another abounds in Illusion. (*c*) Lastly, the appearance of Desire etc. is due to one another; that is, it is the man under illusion who desires things; it is the man under illusion who is moved by hatred; the man under the influence of desire falls into illusion; and the man under the influence of hatred falls into illusion.

All misapprehensions cease to appear as soon as True Knowledge appears; and inasmuch as on the cessation of the cause, the effect cannot appear, there is absolute non-appearance of Desire etc. (on the disappearance of Misapprehensions, which are the source of Desire etc.).

Further, the assertion that "the concatenation of aberrations is beginningless" has no point at all. As *all things* related to the Soul,—*e. g.*, the Body, the Sense-organs etc. etc.—are such as proceed in a beginningless series, and there is not a single individual of this series that is produced without another individual having gone before it; with the sole exception of *True Knowledge* (which is produced *once* and *once* only for a Soul); but our doctrine (that Desire etc. are destroyed) does not imply the assumption that 'things not liable to be produced are liable to destruction' [as the *individual* Desire etc. whose destruction we postulate are not *without beginning*; the beginninglessness of the *series* does not simply the *beginninglessness* of each individual constituting the series; *e. g.*, *one series of Bodies* for each Soul is beginningless, yet each individual Body has a beginning]. As soon as *misapprehensions* have been dispelled by *True Knowledge*, 'Action' also, which is what brings about the Body of each living body, ceases to be a productive of Desire etc., though it continues to bring about (for some time) the experiencing of pleasure and pain.

End of Section (14)

DISCOURSE IV

DAILY LESSON II

SECTION (1)

[*Sūtras 1-3*]

Dealing with the Appearance of True Knowledge

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

**Question*—"Now, Sir, does *True Knowledge* appear in connection with each one of the several things that there are? Or only in connection with some of them?—What difference does that make?—Well, as a matter of fact, it would not be possible for it to appear in connection with each of the things; for the simple reason that the number of things to be known is endless. Nor again could the True Knowledge be held to appear only in connection with some of the things; for in connection with

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* The *Tātparya* introduces this Daily Lesson thus: *Doubt, Instruments of* and *Objects of Cognition* have been only examined;—*Motive* and the rest also have been examined by implication under *Sūtra* 2-1-7. So that all the sixteen categories have been examined. It has been declared in *Sū.* 1-1-1 that the 'true knowledge' of these categories is the means of attaining the highest good; it has also been explained that it is the 'true knowledge' or *cognition of objects* that leads directly to the attainment of the highest good; that of the others helps only indirectly. What we proceed to examine now is whether from among the Soul and the other objects of cognition, it is the true knowledge of only a few, or that of all, that brings about the highest good.

On this the *Pariśuddhi*—In the *first* Daily Lesson of this Adhyāya, six *objects of cognition* have been examined; and we now proceed to examine 'True Knowledge', which pertains to them. The questions for determination are—(*a*) What is True Knowledge? (*b*) To what things does it pertain? (*c*) How is it maintained? (*d*) How does it improve? First of all we proceed to consider—to what does True Knowledge pertain and how does it appear?

The *Nyāyanibandhāprakāśa* raises the objection, (i) that it is not right to proceed with the *examination* of 'True Knowledge' before having defined it; and (ii) that there is no sameness of subject-matter between the two Daily Lessons, and hence there is no reason why they should form part of the same *Adhyāya*. The answers provided by it are as follows:—(i) The definition of 'True Knowledge' has been provided, by implication, in *Sūtra* 1-1-2; and (ii) the real subject of the *Adhyāya* is the Examination of 'objects of cognition' in the form of 'Effects'; and 'True Knowledge' also is an *effect*.

those few things with reference to which True Knowledge would not appear, the man's Illusion would not cease; so that there would still be a residue of Illusion left behind; nor could the Illusion in regard to one thing be removed by True Knowledge in regard to another thing."

Answer:—'Illusion' consists in *wrong notion, misapprehension*,—not in mere *absence of True Knowledge*; and what is to be sought after is the *True Knowledge* of that thing the wrong notion of which becomes the active seed of metempsychosis.*

Question :—" What is that *wrong notion* [which leads to metempsychosis] ?"

Answer :—The notion of what is *not-Soul* as 'Soul',—appearing in such forms as 'I am'; this is the *notion of 'I'* (Egoism, *Ahankāra*) 'Illusion';† When one looks upon the not-Soul as 'I am', this is the conception that is called the notion of 'I' (Egoism, *Ahankāra*)

Question :—"What are those things in regard to which people have the notion of 'I' ?"

Answer .—They are—the Body, the Sense-organs, the Mind, Feelings and Cognitions.

Question :—"In what way does the *notion of 'I'* in regard to these become the seed of metempsychosis ?"

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* It is the Soul and such things connected with the Soul, which, when wrongly known, lead to birth and death, hence it is the wrong notion of these things that has to be got rid of, as it is the True Knowledge of these that leads to the cessation of metempsychosis. The different views are— (1) True Knowledge consists of realisation of Brahman, says the Vedāntin; (2) according to the Sānkhya it consists in discrimination between Matter and Spirit; (3) the Nyāya view is that it consists in the recognising of the Soul as eternal, as distinguished from the non-eternal things, Body, Sense-organs etc. etc.

† The *Tātparya*, after having criticised the other views, sums up the Nyāya view thus :—It is because the notion of 'I' consists in regarding as *Soul*, the Body etc. which are *not-Soul*, that people have such hopes as 'may I not cease to be, may I continue to live'. Such ideas come to only such men as regard the Body etc. as their 'Soul', and never to one who knows the real character of the Soul, as different from Body etc. This latter man looks upon his Body as the snake does upon its cast-off slough; and so does not feel attached to it, and does not fear separation from it.

Answer :—When a man looks upon the Body etc. as 'this is I', he regards their destruction as *his own* destruction ; so that he becomes imbued with a longing for the non-destruction of those, and thus becomes equipped with them over and over again and he thus becoming equipped with them, all his efforts tend to bring for him births and deaths ; so that not being freed from these, he is never *released*. On the other hand, the man who looks upon Pain, Receptacle of Pain (Body), and Pleasure intermingled with Pain,—on all these things as 'Pain',—he is the man who knows the real nature of 'Pain'; and when this 'Pain' has been duly recognised (in its true nature), it is not embraced by the man (as something desirable), and so comes to be dropped ; just like poisoned food. This man comes to look upon 'Defects' and 'Action' also as sources of pain ; and until the Defects have been removed, there is no possibility of cessation of the continuity of Pains ; hence the man renounces the 'defects' ; and when the 'defects' have been renounced, Activity does not lead to 'Rebirth',—as has already being explained (under Sū. 4-1-64).

Thus the man comes to the conclusion that 'Rebirth', 'Fruition', and 'Pain' are *things to be known*, and that 'Action' and 'Defects' are *things to be abandoned*, 'Final Release' is a *thing to be attained*, and True Knowledge is the *means of attaining it*. Thus when the man attends to, repeatedly looks upon and ponders over, the 'objects of cognition' as grouped under the aforesaid four categories, [(1) things mistaken as 'Soul,' *viz.* Body *etc* ; (2) things to be known, *viz.* 'Rebirth' etc. ; (3) things to be renounced, viz. Defects and Action , and (4) things to be attained, *viz.* 'Release']—there comes to him right perception,—*i.e.* the cognition of things in their real character, *i.e. True Knowledge.*

It is with a view to the above that we have the following *Sūtra* :

Sūtra 1

From the True Knowledge of the 'Cause of Defects' follows the cessation of the notion of 'I'.—

BHĀṢYA

The 'objects of cognition' beginning from 'Body' and ending with 'Pain' [*i.e.* Body Sense-organs, Objects of Perception, Appre-

hension, Mind, Activity, Defects, Rebirth, Fruition and Pain] are called the 'Cause of Defects', because these are what form the subjects of *wrong notions* ;—hence when the 'True Knowledge' of these comes about, it sets aside the notion of 'I' in regard to them ; for the True Knowledge of the said things (which are not the *Soul*, which alone can be rightly spoken of as 'I') is incompatible with the notion of 'I' in regard to those same things. Thus when True Knowledge has been attained, '*there is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion,—the cessation of that which follows bringing about the annihilation of that which precedes it ; and this ultimately leads to Final Release*'. (Sū. 1-1-2.)

Thus we find that this brief statement of the main doctrine of philosophy is only a re-assertion (of what has been stated already under Sū. 1-1-2), and it is not meant to put forward any new doctrine.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The order in which this True Knowledge is to be attained is as follows.*

Sūtra 2

Colour and other objects, when they form the subjects of wrong notion, become the cause of Defects.†

BHĀṢYA

Such objects of Sense-perception as form the objects of desire are spoken of here as ' Colour and other objects '; when these are wrongly conceived, they set going Attachment, Hatred and Illusion. Hence it is these objects that the man should seek to know (and understand in their true character) first of all. When the man knows the true character of these, his wrong notions in

* Puri Ms. B. reads प्रसंख्यानानुपूर्वी, which gives better sense.

'It has been declared that one should set aside the notion of 'I' in regard to the Body etc. which are not-Soul. Now the Sūtra proceeds to describe with which of these latter the process should begin ; and since the process is much easier in regard to external objects, the Sūtra begins with these. '*Prasaṅkhyāna*' means true knowledge resulting from contemplation.' —*Tātparya.*

† '*Saṅkalpa* is explained by the *Tātparya* as meaning 'wrong notion'. Viśvanātha specifies it further as the notion that 'these are good and desirable things'.

regard to Colour etc., disappear. When these have disappeared, then he should seek to know the things related to the Soul, such as the Body and the rest. When the knowledge of these has been attained, the notion of 'I' in regard to things related to the Soul ceases forthwith. Thus, the man, acting with his mind wholly unattached, either to external objects or to objects related to the Soul, comes to be called ' released '.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The author next proceeds to instruct us as to the propriety of our ignoring certain aspects of things and pondering over certain others ; and the next Sūtra has got nothing to do with either the proving or the disproving of things (as some people have supposed).

" What is this instruction ? "

Sūtra 3

Regard for the object as a whole becomes the cause of Defects.

BHĀṢYA

The regard or admiration for the object as a whole brings about Defects. For instance (in connection with sexual love), for the Male, the conceiving of the Female as such, becomes a source of bondage, and for the Female the conceiving of the Male as such becomes a source of bondage.* And there are two aspects in which the object (Male or Female) can be conceived of :—(1) the aspect of organs, and (2) the figurative or poetical aspect.

The 'aspect of organs' pertains to the teeth and the lips, the eyes and the nose, one by one ; and the ' figurative aspect ' pertains to the teeth or the lips, being ' so and so beautiful'. All this three-fold aspect intensifies Desire and its attendant Defects all which have to be avoided. The avoidance of the said object of love is to be done by conceiving of it in the terms of its limbs, —e.g., by conceiving of the Female as only made up of hairs, bristles, flesh, blood, bone, tendons, arteries, phlegm, bile, ordure and so forth. This is what is called the ' disagreeable aspect ' (of the thing). When one ponders over this aspect of the thing, his desire and attachment for it cease.

* In translating 'pariṣkāra' as 'bondage' we have followed the Vārtika which says—*pariṣkāro bandhanam.*

Thus then we find that there being two aspects (agreeable and disagreeable) of each object, there is one aspect (the agreeable) which should be ignored, while the other (the disagreeable) should be pondered over. This is what is taught here. Just as in the case of the poisoned food, while the food-aspect is meant to be acquired, the poison-aspect is to be avoided.*

End of Section (1)

SECTION (2)

Sūtras 4–17

Dealing with Components and Composites

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Now the Idealist, with a view to deny the Object, proceeds to deal with (and demolish) the 'Composite'.†

Sūtra 4

"Apprehension and Non-apprehension being two-fold, there arises doubt."

BHĀṢYA

"Since there is apprehension of existent as well as non-existent things, Apprehension is of two kinds; and since there is non-apprehension of existent as well as non-existent things, non-apprehension also is of two kinds.§ So that if we apprehend

* The *Pariśuddhi* remarks:—As a matter of fact, for one who seeks after Release, all things of the World, in all their aspects, are equally to be avoided, and are equally evil,—yet the author speaks of the two 'aspects' in regard to the ordinary Man of the World, who becomes desirous of Release only after having gone through a life of enjoyment.

† Says the *Tātparya*—The Idealist proceeds to deal with the Composite for the purpose of demolishing it. The conceptions spoken of under the preceding Sūtra are possible only when there is an object composed of several component parts. But since there is no such object, how can there be any such conceptions? It is with this view that the Idealist Pūrvapakṣa proceeds to demolish the *Composite*; and this we shall follow with the denial of the Atom. So that the Composite and the Component Atom being both demolished, Idea would be the only thing left.

On this the *Pariśuddhi*—Some people have tried to get rid of the entire fabric of Instruction expounded under the preceding Sūtra, by denying the *Composite*, in the absence whereof none of the 'conceptions' described above are possible.

§ There is apprehension of the existent thing when we see water in the tank; there is also apprehension of the non-existent thing when we perceive

the Composite, there is doubt, since Apprehension is of both kinds;—on the other hand, if we do not apprehend the Composite, then also there is doubt, since non-apprehension also is of both kinds. Thus then, whether the Composite is apprehended, or not apprehended,—in either case it does not become free from doubt."

Sūtra 5

There can be no doubt (in regard to the Composite), as its existence has been established by reasons already explained before.

BHĀṢYA

No doubt is possible (in regard to the Composite);—why? because the reasons already explained before (under Sū. 2-1-33 *et seq.*) have not been refuted; so that it remains established that there is such a thing as the *Composite* arising out of, and distinct from, the *Components*.

Sūtra 6

[*Objection*]—"**In that case, (we might as well say that), since the existence (of any such thing as the Composite) is impossible, there can be no doubt (as to whether it exists or not).**"*

BHĀṢYA

"No doubt is possible. That is, there certainly *is* no such thing as the Composite. This is further explained (in the next Sūtra)."

Sūtra 7

[*Objection continued*]—"**Inasmuch as the components cannot reside either in the whole or in a part (of the Composite), it follows that there is no Composite.**"†

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water in the mirage. There is non-apprehension of the existent thing when we do not perceive long-buried treasure, and there is non-apprehension of the non-existent thing when we do not perceive the absent Jar. So that whether we apprehend the Composite whole or not, there is doubt as to its existence or non-existence.—*Tātparya.*

* This Sūtra is not found in the Puri Sū. Ms. The *Nyāyasūcīmbardha* has omitted तर्हि.

† Sūtras 7 and 8 are not in Viśvanātha, nor in any Sū Ms. They are found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and Viśvanātha also says that they have been regarded as Sūtra. From the Bhāṣya—'*tad vibhajatē*' also it would appear that they are '*Sūtra*'.

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, each single *component* cannot reside in the entire *Composite*; (1) because both are not of the same dimension, and (2) because, in that case, there would be no connection between the *Composite* and the other *components*. Nor can the *component* reside in only a part of the *Composite*; for the simple reason that the *Composite* has no 'parts' apart from the *Components*."

"If (in order to escape from this difficulty) it be held that it is the *Composite* that subsists in the *Components* (and not the *Components* in the *Composite*),—[then our answer is as given in the following *Sūtra*]."

Sūtra 8

[*Objection continued*]—"**Inasmuch as it is not possible (for the Composite) to reside in them,—there can be no Composite.**"

BHĀṢYA

"(*a*) The *entire* Composite cannot reside in each one of the Components,—because they are of different sizes; and further, because in this manner the (Composite) object would consist of a single component substance [and as such it would have to be regarded as eternal, which is absurd]. (*b*) Nor can the Composite subsist *in parts* in all the components; as it has no other parts (except those same components)."

"From all this it follows that it is not right to entertain any doubts (as to whether the Composite exists or not),—the conclusion doubtless is that there does not exist any such thing as the *Composite*."

Sūtra 9

[*Objection continued*]—"**And since the Composite cannot reside apart from the Components (there can be no such thing as the Composite).**"*

* Viśvanātha notices three interpretations of this Sūtra :—(1) As in the *Bhāṣya*. (2) The Composite could not subsist apart from the Components; as in that case it would be non-existent:—(3) For reasons given in the preceding Sūtra, the Composite could have no existence even apart from the Components, hence it does not exist at all.

BHĀṢYA

* "*There can be no such thing as the 'Composite'*—These words have to be brought in from the preceding *Sūtra*. The Composite cannot reside apart from the Components,—(1) because it is not so perceived, and (2) because in that case it would be eternal. For these reasons it follows that there is no such thing as the Composite."

Sūtra 10

[*Objection continued*]—"**Lastly, the Composite cannot be the same as the Components.**"†

BHĀṢYA

" The Composite cannot be regarded as a mere quality of the Components ;—why ?—because, as shown above, there can be no connection of the said quality with the *qualified* Components ; and apart from the *qualified* Components, the quality is never perceived ; this last argument being the same as that urged before (in the preceding *Sūtra*)."

Sūtra 11

[*Answer*—From the standpoint of the *Siddhānta*]-**Inasmuch as there is no diversity in what is one only, terms connoting diversity cannot be applied to it ; so that there is no room for the question put by the Pūrvapakṣin.**§

BHĀṢYA

There is no room for the question—" Does the Composite reside in the Components in its entirety, or only in parts ?"—[as

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*The correct reading of the *Bhāṣya* on this *Sūtra* is found in Puri Ms. B अवयव्यभाव इति वर्तते । न चायम्पृथगवयवेभ्यो वर्तते, अग्रहणात् नित्यत्व-प्रसङ्गाच्च । तस्मान्नास्त्यवयवीति ।

† This Sūtra is directed against those persons who have held the following view .—"The Composite is only a quality of the Components, and it is neither absolutely different from them, not absolutely non-different ; it is *both* different and non-different from them."

§ The *Vārtika* remarks that there are two parts of the *Pūrvapakṣa* :— (1) Do the Components subsist in the Composite ? and (2) If the Composite subsists in the Components, does it do so in its entirety or in parts ? The (1) is ignored by the *Sūtrakāra* for the simple reason that no Logician acknowledges the subsistence of the Component (cause) in the Composite (Effect).

Hence it is only the (2) that is answered by the *Siddhāntin* in this *Sūtra*.

put by the Pūrvapakṣin under Sū. 7 *et. seq.*].—Why ?—Because *inasmuch as there is no diversity in what is one only, terms connoting diversity cannot be applied to it.* As a matter of fact, the term '*kṛtsna*', 'entire', connotes *all members of a group consisting of several individuals*, and the term '*ekadeśa*,' 'a part', connotes a few individuals out of several; so that both these terms, 'entire' and 'in part' are connotative of *diversity*; and as such they cannot be applied to the *Composite* which, being a single entity, is devoid of diversity.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Further, the Pūrvapakśin has argued that—"The Composite cannot reside in parts in the Components, because it has no other 'parts' (apart from the Components)" ;—but this is not right reasoning.

Sūtra 12

Even if there were other parts (of the Composite), * it could not subsist (in the Components); hence the reasoning is not right.

[In support of the proposition that the Composite cannot subsist in the Components, or in its parts] the Opponent has propounded the reason "because the Composite has no other parts"; but † even if 'parts' of the Composite were actually other than its Component, the meaning (of the Composite subsisting *in part* in the Components) would be that one part or Component subsists in another part or Component,—and not that the Composite subsists in them. If the Composite be accepted as being something different (from the Components), then,—even though it had 'parts' other than its Components, it would not mean the subsisting of the Composite; and hence it would not mean that it is *in parts* that the Composite subsists in the Components ;—so that there can be no force in the reasoning—" be-

* The Viz. text reads अवयवान्तराभावे ; as also Viśvanātha, Puri Bhā. Ms., Puri Sū. Ms. and Sū. Ms. C. But Sū. Ms. D, the *Nyāyasūcinbandha* and the *Tātparya* read अवयवान्तराभावे. Mss. of the *Vārtika* contain both. In view, however, of the explanation given in the *Bhāṣya*, अवयवान्तरभावे should be accepted as the right reading.

† अवयवान्तरभूतस्य does not give good sense. Puri Ms. B. reads अवयवान्तरभूत : which gives better sense.

cause it has no parts apart from the Components (the Composite subsists in parts in the Components)."

Question :—" What is the meaning then of the *subsisting* (of the Composite in the Components) ? "

Answer :—What it means is that there is *co-existence* (juxtaposition), consisting in the relation of container and contained, between the one (Composite) and the many (Components).

" What is the meaning of the *relation of container and contained* ? "

It means that when between two things it is found that one can have no existence apart from the other, the latter is called the ' container ' ; and as a matter of fact, the Product can have no existence apart from its constituent cause ; but this is not the case with the constituents (which may exist apart from the product). [So that what is meant by the Composite subsisting in the Components is that it cannot exist apart from these latter.]

" But how can this be so in the case of eternal things (which have no cause) ? "

In their case we infer it from what we perceive in the case of non-eternal things. What you mean to ask is—" how can there be the relation of container and contained in the case of eternal things ? "—and our answer is that when we perceive in the case of non-eternal things—substances and qualities—the relation of container and contained, we infer from this that similar relation exists in the case of eternal things also.

From all that has gone before (under Sūtras 4-12) it follows that what has been prohibited (under Sū. 3)—for the benefit of the person seeking after the highest good—is the *having of regard for objects as a whole* ; and it does not mean that there is no such thing as the *Composite* ; just as in regard to Colour etc., what has been prohibited is the *wrong notion* of them ; and the existence of Colour etc., themselves has not been denied.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Under Sū. 2-1-34 the *Siddhāntin* has put forward, in proof of the existence of the Composite, the argument that—'if there were no Composite, there would be non-apprehension of all things ' ; and even though he has been answered by this, the *Pūrvapakṣin* re-asserts his contention [having been reminded of the previous arguments by the reference to them in Sū. 4-2-5] :—

Sūtra 13

" The perception of things would be possible ; just like the perception of the mass of hairs by the person of dim vision."

BHĀṢYA

" As a matter of fact, we find that the man whose vision is dimmed does not perceive each single hair ; and yet he does perceive the mass of hair ; similarly though each single Atom may not be perceived, yet it would be quite possible to perceive a mass of atoms. Thus the perception that we have of things (and which the Siddhāntin has put forward as inexplicable except by the assuming of the *Composite* as apart from the component atoms) really pertains to the *masses of Atoms* (and not to any such thing as the Composite)."

Sūtra 14

The efficiency (distinctness) and dulness (indistinctness) of the perception is due to the efficiency and dulness of the sense-organs ; but these never go beyond the range of their respective objectives ; and they cannot operate upon what is not their objectives.

BHĀṢYA

This efficiency and dulness of the Sense-organs are in reference only to their respective objectives ; and it is from this that there follows the distinctness and indistinctness of the perceptions. That is, however efficient the Visual Organ may become, it can never apprehend *odour*, which is not the special object of visual perception ; and however dull it may become, it cannot fail to apprehend its own object. Now (turning to the case cited by the Opponent) there may be some person who, having his vision dimmed, does not perceive the hair singly ; while he does perceive the *mass* of hair ; and yet both (the single hair and the mass of hair) are perceived by the person whose vision is not dimmed. [But in all cases the man's eyes apprehend the Hair, either singly or in mass, which is an object perceptible through that organ]. Atoms, on the other hand, are beyond the reach of the sense-organs ; they never become objects of perception through the organs ; they are never apprehended by any sense-organ ;—under the circumstances, if the *Mass of Atoms* were perceived, (through sense-organs) it would mean that

the organs have operated upon something which is not their object at all; for (according to the Opponent) there is no other object except Atoms (and Atoms are absolutely imperceptible). So that what the Opponent asserts (in Sū. 13) comes to mean that when the Atoms, being massed, become perceived, they renounce their imperceptibility,—and when, being disjoined, they fail to be perceived, they cease to be objects of perception through by the sense-organs. All this would be entirely absurd, except on the supposition that a new object is produced (when the Atoms become massed). From all this it follows that what forms the object of perception is an object distinct (from the component Atoms),

It might be urged that "what forms the object of perception is merely the mass (of the Atoms themselves)". But this would not be right; for 'Mass' is only of the nature of *conjunction. combination*; and the *conjunction* of things that are themselves imperceptible can never be perceived; hence the explanation propounded would be highly improper. As a matter of fact, the 'Mass' is only *the conjunction or combination of several things*; and when we perceive a conjunction—as that 'this thing is in conjunction with that thing',—it is only the conjunction of things that are themselves perceptible, and never that of things beyond the reach of sense-organs;—hence the explanation put forward cannot be right. Further, in the case of things perceptible through the sense-organs, if they fail to be perceived, there is always found some thing, in the shape of an obstruction, that serves to prevent the perception [and we do not find any such thing as should prevent our perceiving of the Atoms, if they were perceptible]. It follows from all this that the non-perception of single Atoms cannot be due to the inefficiency of the sense-organs; just as the non-apprehension of Odour etc., through the Eye cannot be due to the inefficiency of that organ.

Sūtra 15

The difficulties in connection with Composites and Components would continue till the total negation of all things.

BHĀṢYA

The Opponent has pointed out difficulties in the way in which the Composite may subsist in its Components, and has, on that ground, denied the existence of the Composite. But the

components (the pieces that go to make up the Jar, *e.g.*) also have their own component parts ; and the said difficulties would be applicable to the way in which the Component may subsist in its own component parts ; so that, these difficulties should either lead us to deny the existence of all things, or they would lead us on and on to the mere Atom, which has no component parts ;—and either of these contingencies would mean that there does not exist anything that could be the object of perception, (the Atoms being imperceptible) ;—and in the absence of all objects of perception, there could be no Perception ;—and yet the denial of the subsistence of the Composite in its Components is supposed to be based upon facts of ordinary perception. Thus, when this denial (of the subsistence of the Composite etc,) ultimately leads to the denial of its very basis (in the form of Perception), it must be regarded as striking at its own very root. [Hence the fact urged by the Siddhāntin under Sū. 2-1-34, remains, that if there is no Composite there can be no Perception at all.]

Sūtra 16

But as a matter of fact,—

The total denial of all things cannot be right ; for the Atom remains.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, however, the (Opponent's) denial of things based upon the difficulties in connection with the subsistence of components and their parts, would cease at the Atom ; it cannot lead to the total denial of all things. Because the Atom has no component parts ; and difficulties based upon the dividing of things into their component parts must end at the thing than which there is nothing smaller. For instance, when we proceed to divide a clod of earth, into parts, we get at smaller and smaller particles ; and this division must come to an end at that piece than which there could be no smaller piece, and which is (on that account) the smallest piece possible ; and it is that very thing than which there is nothing smaller which we call 'Atom'.*

* It is only for the sake of argument that the two contingencies have been put forward in the preceding Sūtra. It is now shown that the denial of the Composite can lead only to the postulating of the Atom ; and as this is imperceptible, the Pūrvapakṣa view would do away with all Perception, as urged by the *Siddhāntin*, under Sū. 2-1-34.

Sūtra 17

Or [the Atom may be defined as] that which is beyond the Diad.

BHĀṢYA

As according to the Pūrvapakṣa (*a*) there would be no end to the division of things into their component particles, and (*b*) all things would come to consist of equally innumerable component substances,—there could be no such thing as the *Diad*.*

End of Section (2)

SECTION (3)

(*Sūtras 18–25*)

Regarding the Atom being without parts.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The Nihilist, holding the view that "all things are non-existent", urges the following argument† :—

Sūtra 18

[*Objection*.]—"**There can be no such thing (as the indivisible Atom), as it is surely permeated by Ākās'a.**"

BHĀṢYA

"*There can be no such thing* as the impartite eternal Atom; —Why?—*Because it is surely permeated by Ākāśa*; both inside and outside the Atom must be surrounded by Ākāśa, *permeated*

* The term '*truṭi*', literally, 'dismemberment', has come to mean the Diad. The point is that unless some end is postulated in the process of division, all things would consist of equally innumerable particles; which would mean that the mountain is of the same size as the grain of sand.

† The theory of the whole world emanating from the Void has been disposed of under Sūtras 4-1-14 to 17. The hypothesis taken up now is that all is mere *Void*. And in course of the refutation of this hypothesis, the Author proceeds to show that there do exist certain things that are devoid of parts; this subject being a natural sequence to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing section that there is such a thing as the *Composite*, composed of Component parts.

Viśvanātha introduces the section with the following remarks:—The present section is introduced with a view to establish the existence of the *impartite* Atom, in answer to the view that the world being a *Void* there can be no such thing as the Atom, on which the whole argument of the Siddhānta in the foregoing section is based.

by it ; and being so permeated, it must be made up of parts ; and being made up of parts, it must be non-eternal."*

Sūtra 19

"Or else, Ākās'a would be not all-pervading."

BHĀṢYA

" If it is not admitted (that the Atom is permeated by *Ākāśa*), then it would mean that there is no *Ākāśa* inside the Atom ; so that *Ākāśa* would cease to be *all-pervading*."

Sūtra 20

[*Answer*]—**Inasmuch as the terms ' inside ' and 'outside ' are denotative of other constituent causes of the Product,—they cannot apply to the case of the Atom, which is not a ' product '.**

BHĀṢYA

When one uses the term ' inside ' (in regard to an object), it stands for that constituent (part) of it which is hidden (from view) by other constituents ; and the term ' outside ' is applied to that constituent (part) which hides the others ; and which itself is not hidden (from view). And [since both these terms are applied to parts or *constituent causes*], these can apply only to such objects as are *products* ; they can never apply to the Atom, because it is not a *product* ; the Atom not being a *product*, the terms ' inside ' and ' outside ' cannot apply to it ; and the object to which these terms are really applicable is only a *product* (*composed*) *of the Atom*, and not the Atom itself ; because the Atom is the name of that than which there is nothing smaller.

Sūtra 21

It is by reason of the pervasion of Sound and of Conjunctions, that Ākās'a is regarded to be all-pervading.†

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* The real point of this objection, as the *Tātparya* points out, is that if the Atom is made up of parts, its existence will be open to the same difficulties as those that have been shown to beset any ordinary Composite ; so that the inevitable conclusion could only be that the Atom is as non-existent as an ordinary thing,—and that *nothing is existent, all is Void.*

† The *Tātparya* expounds the compound in both ways—(1) Pervasion of Sound and of Conjunctions, and (2) Pervasion of the Conjunctions of Sounds'. The *Bhāṣya* has adopted the former.

The Vārtika reads the *Sūtra* as सर्वसंयोगे etc.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, Sounds, that are produced anywhere, are found to pervade in *Ākāśa*, and subsist in it ;—similarly the conjunctions that take place,—with Minds, with Atoms, and with their products,—are also found to pervade in *Ākāśa* ; not a single corporeal object is ever found to be disjoined from *Ākāśa*. From these two facts it follows that Ākāśa cannot but be *all-pervading*.

Sūtra 22

'Absence of Transfigurations', 'Unobstructiveness' and 'All-pervasiveness' are the properties of Ākās'a.*

BHĀṢYA

There is no *transfiguration* (or displacement) caused in *Ākāśa* by things moving in it or striking against it ; as there is in Water by the piece of wood passing through it ;—and what is the reason for this ? ;—the reason for this lies in the fact that *Ākāśa* is not made up of parts. Secondly, *Ākāśa* offers no obstruction to things moving in it or striking against it ; that is, it does not counteract that quality of the thing which causes its motion ;—and why is this so ?—It is because *Ākāśa* is not tangible. It is only under contrary conditions,—*i.e.*, in the case, of such objects as are made up of parts and are tangible,—that we find obstruction ; and certainly you cannot attribute it to a substance where these conditions are not present.

Further, the character of 'product' must be denied to the Atom, because it would mean that the component parts of the Atom are smaller than the Atom ; if the Atom were made up of parts, these parts should be smaller than the Atom ;—why ?—because it is always found that there is a difference of size between the Cause and its Product ; it is for this reason that the parts of the Atom would have to be smaller than the Atom ; as the Atom that is made up of component parts must be a

* This *Sūtra* anticipates the following objection :—If Ākāśa is really all-pervading, as asserted under the foregoing *Sūtra*, then it should offer obstruction to things moving in it, and it should undergo changes in its shape by such objects ; as we find in the case of water ; as no such phenomena are found to take place, Ākāśa cannot be all-pervading.

The sense of the reply is that this reasoning would be all right, if Ākāśa also, like Water, were made up of parts, and tangible.

Product.* It is for this reason that we deny the fact of the Atom being a Product.

Lastly, the *non-eternality* of products is due to the dismemberment of its constituent cause, and not to '*permeation by Akāśa*' (as held by the Opponent, in Sū. 4-2-18) : *e.g.*, when the clod of earth is destroyed, it is so by reason of the dismemberment of its component parts, and not by the entering into it of *Ākāśa*.

Sūtra 23

[The *Nihilist*]—"**But the Atom must be made np of component parts ; because it is only corporeal objects that have shape.**"

BHĀṢYA

"As a matter of fact, shape belongs to only such things as are limited and tangible,—such shapes as triangular, rectangular, square, and globular ; and this 'shape' is only a particular arrangement of component parts ;—Atoms also are endowed with the globular *shape* ; hence these must be made up of component parts."†

Sūtra 24

"**Also because they are capable of conjunction [Atoms must be made up of component parts].**"

BHĀṢYA

"When an Atom comes between two other Atoms and becomes conjoined to them, it brings about separation between them ; and from this separation it is inferred that the intervening Atom is conjoined, in its forepart, with the Atom lying behind it, and, in its aft-parts, with the Atom appearing in front of it ; and these fore and aft-parts are the 'component parts' of the Atom Similarly when the Atom becomes conjoined in all its parts, it must be regarded as having component parts all over "

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *Bhāṣya* answers the arguments of the Nihilist, as follows]—

* The right reading for ऽणुकार्यतत् is ऽणुःकार्यतत्.

† The *Vārtika* and Viśvanātha construe the Sūtra as propounding two reasons —'The Atom must be made up of components,—(*a*) because it is corporeal, and (*b*) because it has shape.'

(A) As regards the argument—"*The Atom must be made up of component parts, because it is only corporeal objects that have shape*" (Sū. 23),—this has been answered by us already. "What is the answer that has been given?" The answer given was—(*a*) that there can be nothing smaller than that at which the process of division comes to an end (under Sū. 4-2-16);—and (*b*) that the Atom cannot be regarded as a product, as, if it were so, then the parts of the Atom would be smaller still (under Sū. 4-2-22). (B) As regards the argument—"*also because they are capable of conjunction*" (Sū. 24),—which means that "the Atom can bring about separation only if it is tangible, and conjunction not pervading over the whole of its substratum, it must be divisible into parts",—this also we have answered by pointing out that it is true that the Atom is tangible, but the separation caused by the intervening Atom is due to its being an obstacle in the way of the coming together of the two Atoms,—and not to its being made up of component parts. "But the Atom being tangible and causing separation, inasmuch as the conjunction of the Atom does not pervade over the whole of its substratum, the Atom must be divisible into parts, and it would appear as if it were made up of component parts." This also we have answered by pointing out (above)—(*a*) that the process of division must end at a thing than which there is nothing smaller, and (*b*) that the Atom cannot be regarded as a product, as that would mean that its parts are still smaller.

As regards the arguments—"(*a*) *Because it is only corporeal objects that have shape* (Sū. 24), and (*b*) *because Atoms are capable of conjunction* (Sū. 24), Atoms must be regarded as being made up of component parts",—these arguments

Sūtra 25

Cannot set aside (the fact of Atoms being impartite), because they lead to an infinite regress, and infinite regress cannot be right.

BHĀṢYA

The arguments put forward mean that everything that is corporeal, and everything that is conjunct,—all these are made up of parts; and as such these arguments lead to *an infinite regress*; and infinite regress cannot be right; if *infinite regress* were right, then alone could the said arguments have any force.

Consequently these cannot set aside the fact of Atoms being impartite.

Further, as a matter of fact, it is possible for the division of an object to completely destroy that object; hence it is not possible to carry on the process of division till the disappearance of the object.

If there were an *infinite regress* (such as is involved in the Opponent's arguments), it would mean that in every object there are endless component substances; so that (*a*) there should be no conception either of diverse dimensions, or of gravity,—and (*b*) after the dismemberment of the component parts of the Atom, the Composite and the Component would have to be regarded as of equal dimension.

End ˙ ection (3)

SECTION (4)
(*Sūtras 26–37*)
Refutation of the Denial of the External World

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The Bauddha Idealist says]—"You take your stand upon Cognitions, and then go on to assert that the objects of these Cognitions exist; but all these Cognitions are wrong notions. If these were right notions, then alone could the proper examination of Cognitions enable us to form an idea of and comprehend the real character of their objects *

Sūtra 26

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"**As a matter of fact, however, when we come to analyse things by our reason, we fail to apprehend their real character; and this non-apprehension must be like the non-apprehension of the 'cloth' after the yarns have been abstracted.**"†

* The foregoing two sections have proved that all ordinary things are made up of component parts, and that the Atom is not so made up;—we are now led on to discuss the question as to whether or not external objects exist. It is only when external things exist that there can be any occasion for considering whether or not they are composites.

† Cf. *Bauddhakārikā*—बुद्धया विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।
अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निस्स्वभावाश्च कीर्तिता: ॥

Satish Ch. Vidyābhūsaṇa finds in this Sūtra an echo of the *Mādhyamika-sūtras*.

BHĀṢYA

" When we come to analyse each yarn in the Cloth,—as 'this is a yarn', 'this is another yarn', and so forth,—we fail to perceive in it anything else besides the yarns, which could be the real object of the notion of 'Cloth'; and since we do not perceive things as they are ordinarily conceived of, it follows that no such things (as the Cloth) exist ; so that the *Cloth* being non-existent, if there is a notion of 'Cloth' it must be a wrong notion ; similarly with all things."*

Sūtra 27

[*Siddhānta*]—**The reason propounded is invalid ; as it involves self-contradiction.**

BHĀṢYA

If an 'analysis' of things by reason is possible, then it is not true that the real nature of things is *not* apprehended ; *if*, on the other hand, the real nature of things is not apprehended, then there can be no analysis or scrutiny of things by reason. So that to allege, that " there is analysis of things by reason—and the real nature of things is not apprehended", involves a contradiction in terms. We have explained all this under Sū. 4-2-15, where it has been pointed out that—' the difficulties in connection with Composites and Components would continue till the total negation of things.'†

Sūtra 28

The non-apprehension (of the whole) apart (from its parts) is due to the fact that it subsists in these.

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, the Product subsists, is contained, in its Causes ; it is for this reason that it is not apprehended apart from these latter ; there is separate apprehension only when the contrary happens to be the case ; that is, two things are separately apprehended only when one is not contained in the other.

* There is no Cloth apart from the yarns ; there is no yarn apart from its parts ; and so on, up to Atoms ; of Atoms also we cannot perceive the real character. Hence from Atom upwards, no Object exists.

† When the real nature of a thing is not comprehended, how can there be analysis of it by reason ? [As regards the analysis of things put forward by the Opponent under the preceding Sūtra] the process of analysing must end at a certain point ; if it did not, then the Diad would become immeasurable, etc. etc. etc as pointed out before.—*Tātparya*.

Then again, the analysis of things by reason does lead to the distinct apprehension of things,—as is found in the case of Atoms which are imperceptible ; that is, that which is perceived by the senses, when it comes to be analysed, is surely recognised as different (from the *imperceptible* Atoms).*

Sūtra 29

In reality, things are cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition.†

BHĀṢYA

When things are analysed by reason, what sort of apprehension of the real nature of things we have, and how we have it,—and also what sort of apprehension we do not have, and how we do not have it,—all this is known through what we can cognise by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition. In fact, the very 'analysis of things by reason' consists of what is cognised by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition ; as it is only such cognitions that pervade through all scriptures and all actions, as also all activities of living beings It is only when one comes to examine things by his reason that he comes to determine that a certain thing exists and another thing does not exist. And such an examination or analysis does not warrant the conclusion that nothing exists§.

Sūtra 30

By reason of the possibility and impossibility of proofs [*the Pūrvapaksa allegation becomes untenable*]

BHĀSYA

Under the circumstances, the allegation " nothing exists " in untenable—Why ?—*By reason of the possibility and impossibility*

* In the case of ordinarily perceptible composites and components—where both are perceptible, *e.g.* the cloth and the yarns,—it may be difficult to apprehend the composite as distinct from its parts. But when it comes to the composite thing whose components are atoms, the distinct apprehension becomes quite easy ; the composite being perceptible while the component is not perceptible.—*Tātparya.*

† This Sūtra is meant to show that even in the case of ordinary things, where the composite and its components are both perceptible, we do have the distinct apprehension of things in their real character.—*Tātparya.*

§ The *Tātparya* construes this last sentence with the following Sūtra. It appears better to construe it with the foregoing *Bhāṣya*. The connection of the next *Sūtra* follows from its very construction.

of proofs. That is, if proof is available in support of the allegation that "nothing exists", then the allegation becomes self-condemned :—If, on the other hand, no proof is available in support of the allegation, how can it be established? If it can be established without proofs, then why cannot the assertion "all things exist" be regarded as established?

Sūtras 31–32

[*The Idealist objects to what has been said in Sū. 30.*]—

"The notion of reality in regard to the 'Instruments of Right Cognition' and 'objects cognised' (by means thereof) is similar to the notion of the reality of dreams and the objects dreamt of ; (Sū. 31)—or, it may be likened to the notions of reality in regard to Magical phenomena, imaginary cities in the Air, and the Mirage."

BHĀṢYA

"In Dreams, no objects are existent, and yet we have the notion of reality in regard to them ; similarly neither 'Instruments of Cognition' nor 'Objects of Cognition' are really existent, yet we have the notion of reality in regard to 'Instruments of Cognition' and 'objects cognised' by means thereof. [And it is not so in Dreams only, in the waking condition also, we have several such notions of reality in regard to things not really existent ; *e g*., magical phenomena etc., etc.]"

Sūtra 33

[*Answer*]—**Since there is no reason (in support of it), the Proposition (of the Opponent) cannot be regarded as established.**

BHĀSYA

As a matter of fact, there is no reason in support of the view that "the notion of 'Instruments' and 'Objects' of Cognition are like the notion of reality in regard to things dreamt of, and it is not like the cognition of things during the waking state" ;—and since there is no such reason, the Proposition cannot be regarded as established. In fact, there is no reason to show that what are cognised during dreams are non-existent things.—"Inasmuch as things dreamt of are not perceived when the man wakes up, (they must be regarded as *non-existent*)."—[According to this reasoning of yours] inasmuch as we do appre-

hend the things cognised during the waking state, the existence of these cannot be denied ; if, from the fact of our not apprehending, on waking, the things cognised in dreams, you infer that these things are not existent,—then it follows that the things that we do apprehend when awake, are *existent*, because they *are* apprehended ; so that the reason you put forward in proof of the unreality of things dreamt of) is found to have the power of proving a conclusion contrary to your tenets. It is only when the existence of things can be inferred from their apprehension, that you can infer their non-existence from their non-apprehension.* And if under both circumstances (of dream as well as of waking) things were equally non-existent, then non-apprehension could have no power at all (of proving anything) ; when, for example, there is non-perception of Colour when the lamp is absent, what justifies our attributing the non-perception of Colour to the absence of the Lamp is the fact that the Colour is existent,† (and would have been perceived if the lamp were there).

Further, you have to show cause for the diversity that is found in dream-cognitions ; *e g*, one dream is beset with dread, another with joy, and yet another is devoid of both ; while at times one does not dream of anything at all. According to the theory under which the dream-cognitions are due to real causes, the said diversity can be explained as being due to the diversity in those causes. §

Sūtra 34

Like Remembrance and Desire, the cognition of objects in dreams also—

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* The right reading is उपलम्भात् सद्भावेसति अनुपलम्भादभाव: सिध्यति as found in Puri B., and countenanced by the *Vārtika*.

† We can attribute the non-perception of colour to the absence of the lamp, only if we know that colour is existent, and would have been perceived if the lamp were there. If all things were always—during dreams as well as during the waking state—non-existent, then their non-perception could not prove anything at all, as in that case we could have no such notion as that 'if it existed, it would have been perceived'.

§ This explanation cannot be available for the Idealist, for whom there is no real object at all.

BHĀṢYA

has for its object something that has been previously apprehended [this has to be added to complete the Sūtra]. Just as Remembrance and Desire have for their objects previously apprehended things, and are incapable of lending support to the denial of the reality of such things,—so in dreams also the cognition of things has for its object things that have been previously apprehended ; hence these also do not justify the notion that no such things exist. Thus in reality the Dream-cognition is always one that has its object previously perceived in the waking state ; and when the sleeping man who has seen a dream wakes up, he recognises the dream-cognitions as his own, the idea in his mind being 'this is what I saw in my dream'. And it is only in relation to (and in comparison with) the said waking cognition that we come to the conclusion that the Dream-cognition is unreal. That is to say, when on waking one recognises the Dream-cognition—as 'this is what I saw in my dream'—it is the recognition that leads him to the conclusion—'my cognition of things in the dream is unreal'. If there be no difference between the two, the proof becomes meaningless ; that is, he for whom there is no difference (on the point of reality) between the waking and the dream-cognition, for him the proof or reason,—that 'the notion of Instruments and Objects of Cognition is *like the notions o things in a dream*' (Sū. 31)—can have no meaning ; for he has denied the very basis of such an allegation ; the idea of a thing as what it is not (*i. e.* a wrong notion) is always based upon a real original (counterpart) ; *e.g.*, the conception of the pillar, which is not man, as 'man' is always based upon a real original ; *i.e.* until the original, the real *man*, has been perceived, one can have no conception of 'man' in regard to what is *not man*. Similarly the conception of things in a dream,—such as 'I have seen an elephant', 'I have seen a mountain',—can only rest on the basis of some real counterpart (the cognition of real elephants and mountains).*

Such being the case,—

* Unless one has had a previous cognition of the real object, he can have no wrong conceptions in regard to it.

Sūtra 35

The destruction of Wrong Apprehension follows from True Knowledge ; just as there is destruction of the conception of things during a dream, on waking.

BHĀṢYA

When one has the conception of 'man' in regard to the Pillar, this is 'wrong apprehension',—being the apprehension of the thing as what it is not: whereas when, in regard to the Pillar one has the conception of 'pillar', this is 'True Knowledge';—and what is set aside by 'True Knowledge' is the wrong *Apprehension*, not the *Object*,—the generic character of 'object' being common to the Man and the Pillar.* Just as when the man wakes up, the cognition that he has set aside the *conception* of things that he had during the dream,—and not the 'object' in general Similarly in the case of magical phenomena, imaginary cities and mirage, we have the cognition of things as what they are not ; and these wrong apprehensions also are set aside, in the manner described above, by 'True Knowledge', which does not set aside the fact of the cognitions having some sort of an *objective counterpart*. As a matter of fact, in the case of magic etc., also, the Wrong Apprehension has always got some basis in reality ; for what happens in what is called 'magic' is that the man equipped with the necessary appliances, takes up a real substance similar to that whose illusion he intends to produce, and in regard to this real substance, he brings about the wrong apprehension in another person ;—in the case of the 'Imaginary City', what happens is that either Snow or some such real substance actually comes to assume the shape of a city, and hence, from a distance, people come to conceive of it as 'City'; that this is what really happens is proved by the fact that the illusion does not appear when there is no such substance as the said Snow ;—similarly again, when the Sun's rays, coming into contact with the heat radiating from the Earth's surface, begin to flicker, there arises the notion of 'water' in regard to it, by reason of the perception of the common quality of (flickering);

* When we subsequently come to recognise the pillar as 'pillar', all that this proves is that our former *cognition* of it was wrong, *not* that the 'man' (as which the pillar had been formerly apprehended) is non-existent, nor that the former cognition had no *objective* counterpart at all.

that this is so is proved by the fact that when the man draws near, or when the Sun's rays are not there, there is no such illusion. Thus we find that in the case of every Wrong Apprehension there is some sort of real entity at the bottom somewhere, and no Wrong Apprehension is entirely baseless. We also find that there is a clear difference in the character of the two cognitions,—*viz*: (*a*) that of the magician and his audience (the former regarding the magic phenomenon as *unreal*, and the latter believing it to be *real*); (*b*) that of the man at a distance and of one who is near at hand, the former regarding the 'imaginary city' and the 'miragic water' as *real*, while the latter has no idea of such things at all; and (*c*) that of the sleeping man and of the waking man. All this diversity would be inexplicable if everything were non-existent, and as such entirely without any name or character.

Sūtra 36

[*Having disposed of the Idealist, who, while denying the reality of the External World, admits the Idea,—the Author next takes up the Nihilist, who denies the Idea also*]—**In the same manner, the existence of the 'Apprehension' also (cannot be denied); because we actually perceive its cause, as also its real existence.**

BHĀSYA

Just as the existence of the 'object' of Wrong Apprehension cannot be denied, so that of the Apprehension itself cannot be denied;—why?—(*a*) because we actually perceive its cause, and (*b*) because we actually perceive its real existence; (*a*) as a matter of fact, we are actually cognisant of the cause of Wrong Apprehension; and (*b*) Wrong Apprehension also is found to appear in every person, and is actually cognised as such, being, as it is, distinctly cognisable. From all this it follows that Wrong Apprehension actually exists.

[And when even *Wrong* Apprehension is *real*, *Right* Apprehension is all the more so].

Sūtra 37

Wrong Apprehension has a double character, based upon the difference between the real object and the counterpart.*

* The Bauddha argues that, since the object of Wrong Apprehension is non-existent, that of Right Apprehension also must be non-existent. This

BHĀṢYA

The 'real object' is the *Pillar*, and the 'counterpart' is the *Man*; and whenever there is a wrong apprehension of the Pillar as 'Man', both of these—the real object and the counterpart—are manifested in it quite distinctly, and the misapprehension is due to the perception of their common properties;—similarly there is misapprehension of the *Flag* as a *line of cranes*, of a piece *of stone* as a *pigeon*. In fact, Wrong Apprehensions are possible only in regard to *similar* objects, because they are brought about by the perception of *common* properties (belonging to two or more similar objects). (For these reasons, he for whom everything is without name and form—according to such a person there can be no possibility (of Wrong Apprehension).

As regards Odour and such other objects of Cognition, the notion of 'Odour' etc., (*i.e.*, of the things in their own character),—which would be regarded (by the Opponent) as Wrong Apprehension,—must, in fact, be regarded as *True* Apprehension; for the simple reason that in the case of these Cognitions, there are no two things involved—in the shape of the real object and its couuterpart,—nor is there the perception of any property common to two or more things.

From all this it follows that the allegation that—"the conceptions of the Instruments and the Objects of Cognition are wrong"—is not right.

End of Section

SECTION (5)

(*Sūtras 38–49*)

The Development of True Knowledge

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It has been said above that when there is True Knowledge of the causes of Defects, there follows the cessation of the notion of

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is what the present *Sūtra* traverses. The idea is that the object of Wrong Apprehension also is not entirely non-existent: What forms the object of Wrong Apprehension has a dual character—that of the real object 'Pillar' and also that of the counterpart 'Man'; and though in the character of 'man' the object is *non-existent*, it is really *existent* in the character of 'Pillar'.

'I.' Now the question arises—How is True Knowledge brought about ?*

Sūtra 38

[True Knowledge proceeds] from the practice of a particular form of meditation.†

BHĀṢYA

When the Mind having been abstracted (withdrawn) from the Sense-organs, is kept steady by an effort tending to concentration,—the contact that takes place between this Mind and the Soul, and which is accompanied by a conscious eagerness to get at the truth, is what is called 'Meditation'.§ During this meditation, no cognitions appear in regard to the objects of the senses. From the practice of the said Meditation proceeds True Knowledge.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[*Objection*]—"It has been said that *during "Meditation no cognitions appear in regard to the objects of the senses*; but—

* The reality of the External World and of Cognitions having been established, the Author reverts to what was said under Sūtras 4-2-1 *et seq.* in connection with the causes of Defects, where the process was described. This cannot be regarded as sufficient for the purposes of the enquirer; as the True Knowledge therein described cannot do away with such illusions and wrong apprehensions as are of the nature of Direct Apprehension;—hence it becomes necessary to describe such True Knowledge as may be of the character of Direct Apprehension—*Pariśuddhi*.

This is the particular form of 'True Knowledge' that is referred to by the question with which the *Bhāṣya* introduces the Sūtra.—*Vardhamāna.*

Viśvanātha adds—The Knowledge produced by the Scriptures is momentary, like all cognitions, so that when it ceases to exist, wrong notions would again continue to appear and entangle the Soul. Hence it becomes necessary to explain the process by which the said True Knowledge may be developed and amplified and rendered capable of putting an end, once for all, to all possibility of wrong notions appearing again.

† The exact reading of this Sūtra is uncertain. Sū. Ms. D. and Vishvanātha read as in the viz. edition; Puri Sū. Ms. reads समाधिविशेषाभावात् (which is apparently wrong); the *Tātparya* reads समाधितत्त्वाभ्यासात्; though the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* reads as in the Viz. edition. Sū. Ms. C. however reads—तत्त्वज्ञानविवृद्धिस्तत्त्वज्ञानवासनात् (?) ततश्चात्यन्तिको मिथ्याज्ञाननाशः।

§ By 'concentration' is meant the keeping of the Soul within its own abode in the lotus of the heart. As such concentration is present also during deep sleep, we have the additional qualification 'which is accompanied by etc.'—which excludes Deep Sleep.—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 39

"This is not possible ; (A) Because certain objects are extremely powerful."—

BHĀṢYA

" In some cases, Cognitions *will* appear, even in the absence of any wish on the part of the person ; so that what has been asserted cannot be right ;—why ?—*because certain objects are extremely powerful* As a matter of fact, we find that sometimes, even though the man has no wish for the cognising, the cognition does appear, as we find in the case of the thundering of the clouds and such things (which we cannot help hearing, even against our wish). So that the said *particular kind of meditation* cannot be possible. "

Sūtra 40

" (B) Also because Cognitions are brought about by Hunger etc. "

BHĀṢYA

" Such things as Hunger and Thirst, Heat and Cold, and Disease bring about cognitions even against our wish. Hence no 'concentration' (or one-pointedness, of the Mind) is possible."

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It is possible that the man may renounce Meditation and become agitated, and there may also be causes tending to bring about such agitation as constitutes an obstacle to Meditation ; but even so,—

Sūtra 41

Meditation would be brought about by the force of the fruit of what has been previously accomplished.

BHĀṢYA

'*What has been previously accomplished*'—stands for the Merit and Wisdom, acquired in previous lives,—which serve to bring about True Knowledge ;—'*Force of the fruit*'—stands for the faculty born of Yogic practices ; if there were no fruits of such practices, people would never pay any heed to them ; even in the case of ordinary worldly acts, we find that constant practice produces a certain faculty.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It is for the removal of the obstable (to Meditation) that—

Sūtra 42

there is the advice that Yoga should be practised in forests, caves and on river-banks.

BHĀṢYA

The Merit produced by the practice of Yoga follows the Soul in other births also ; and when the Merit that brings about True Knowledge has reached a high stage of development, and the Exercise of Meditation has assumed high proportions,—True Knowledge appears. We have actually found that Meditation serves to suppress the force of even powerful things ; as for example, even the ordinary man says—' My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear this,' or ' I did not know this. '

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[Says the Opponent]—" But if you admit the fact (urged in Sū. 39) that on account of the force of certain extremely powerful things, Cognitions appear even against the man's wish—then,—

Sūtra 43

" **this contingency would arise also upon Final Release**".

" Even when the man has become *released*, it would be possible for Cognitions to appear, by reason of the force of external things."

Sūtra 44

Not so ; for Cognition is sure to appear only in the accomplished Body.

BHĀṢYA

It is only when the Body,—as the receptacle of Activity, Sense-organs and Objects,—has been accomplished, under the influence of Karma (past deeds) that the presence of their cause makes the appearance of Cognitions sure to come about ; so that however powerful the external object may be, it is not able to bring about Cognitions in the Soul ; for the external object has been found to have that power (of bringing about Cognitions) only when it is in contact with a Sense-organ. [And no such contact is possible in the case of the person who has attained Final Release].

Sūtra 45

And there is absence of that when Final Release has been attained.

BHĀṢYA

'*That*'—stands for the Body and the Sense-organs, which contain the causes of cognition ; and of this there is *absence* when Final Release has been attained ; for the simple reason that there are no Merit and Demerit left (to bear fruition). Hence the allegation (in Sū. 43)—that " the contingency would arise also upon Final Release "—is not right.

It is for this reason that Final Release consists of freedom from all kinds of pain ; inasmuch as the root of all pain, and the receptacle of all pain,—*i. e.*, the Body and the Sense-organs,—absolutely cease upon the attainment of Final Release, it follows that Final Release consists in absolute freedom from all pain ; for without its root, and without its receptacle, no pain can appear.

Sūtra 46

For that purpose (there should be) embellishment of the Soul, by means of restraints and observances and such other methods of internal discipline as may be learnt from the Science of Yoga.

BHĀṢYA

For the purpose of attaining Final Release, there should be '*embellishment of the Soul*'.—'*Restraints*' are the means of acquiring merit, common to men in all Life-stages ; while '*Observances*' are peculiar to each Life-stage. '*Embellishment of the Soul*'—consists in the destruction of Demerit and accretion of Merit.—'*Internal discipline*' should be learnt from the Science of Yoga ; it consists of Penance, Controlling of the Breath, Abstraction of the Mind, Contemplation and Concentration of the Mind ; and the practice of the renouncing of objects of sense serves to remove attachment and hatred. The other '*methods*' consist of the details of conduct laid down for Yoga [such as concentrating of the Mind, eating only particular kinds of food, not staying at one place for any length of time, and so forth].

Sūtra 47

[There should also be] repetition of the study of the Science, as also friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science.

BHĀṢYA

'For that purpose' has to be construed with this *Sūtra* also. The term '*jñāna*' stands for *that by which things are known*, *jñāyate anena i.e.*, the Science of the Soul;—the '*grahaṇa*', 'study', of this consists in reading it and retaining it in the mind;—the 'repetition' of such study means the carrying on of it continuously, in the shape of reading it, listening to it (being expounded) and pondering over it.—'*Friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science*'—is meant to bring about consolidation of the knowledge acquired; this 'consolidation' consists in—(1) the removing of doubts, (2) the knowing of things not already known, (3) the confirmation (by the opinions of the learned) of the conclusions already arrived at (by one's self);—the term '*saṁvāda*' means* '*samāya vādaḥ*', 'discussion for the sake of coming to an agreement' [*i.e.*, *friendly* discussion'].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The expression 'friendly discussion with persons learned in the Science' (occurring in the preceding *Sūtra*) is vague; it is explained in the following Sūtra :—

Sūtra 48

That (friendly discussion) should be carried on with the pupil, the teacher, companions in study, and other well-known learned persons,—who wish well (to the enquirer) and who are not jealous of him.†

BHĀSYA

The meaning of the *Sūtra* is explained by its own words.

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* The reading of the Viz. edition समापवाद gives no sense; the right reading समाय वाद is supplied by the Puri Ms.

† The Commentators have explained '*tam*' as referring to the 'person learned in the Science', '*abhyupeyāt*' as *jānīyāt*; by this the Sūtra would mean that one should know the persons mentioned as 'learned in the Science'.—Similarly '*śreyorthibhiḥ*' they explain as meaning 'those that have faith in Final Release.' We have thought it best to deviate from this explanation. In the case of the former, it is not easy to construe the instrumental in शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्ट श्रेयोर्थिभि : and as regards the latter, it is very much simpler, and more in keeping with the epithet '*ānasūyibhiḥ*', to take it in its natural sense 'those who wish well'; as it is only such well-wishers whose intercourse can be entirely friendly and conducive to good.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

It might be thought that—the putting forward of theories and counter-theories would be unpleasant to the other party (the teacher and the rest) ; [with a view to this we have the following *Sūtra.*] :—

Sūtra 49

Being a seeker (after truth) [the man should carry it on] for the accomplishment of his purpose, even without putting forward any counter-theories.

'*He should carry on the discussion*' (of the foregoing *Sūtra*) has to be construed here also. Inasmuch as the man is desirous of acquiring knowledge from the other person, he should simply express a desire to learn the truth ; and thus without seeking to establish any theory of his own, he should clarify (correct) his own view of things,—specially by realising the fact that the doctrines of several philosophers are mutually contradictory [and from among these accepting what is right and rejecting what is wrong].

End of Section (5)

SECTION (6)

(Sūtras 50—51)

The Guarding of True Knowledge

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Through excessive partiality to their own theories, some people transgress all bounds of reasoning ; in that case—

Sūtra 50

Disputation and Wrangling (should be carried on) for the purpose of defending one's own determination to get at the truth ; just as the hedge of thorny branches is put up for the protection of sprouting seeds.

BHĀṢYA

This, however, is meant only for those persons who have not acquired True Knowledge, whose defects have not been entirely removed, and who are still making an attempt for those purposes.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

When one has been rudely addressed by an Opponent, either through arrogance (of superior knowledge), or through sheer prejudice (against truth), or through some other similar reason (*i.e.*, desire for wealth, fame etc.),—then he (failing to perceive the right answer to the ill-mannered allegations of the Opponent)—

Sūtra 51

should pick up a quarrel with him and proceed to deal with him by Disputation and by Wrangling.

BHĀSYA

'*Pick up a quarrel*'—*i.e.* with a view to defeating the Opponent,—and not with a view to getting at the truth. But this should be done only for the purpose of defending true Science,* and not for the purpose of obtaining wealth, honour or fame.

Thus ends the *Bhāṣya* on the II Daily Lesson *of Discourse* IV.

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* The motive prompting the man should be—If this ill-mannered person is allowed to go undefeated, then ordinary men will accept his conclusions as the right ones, and this would bring about a total confusion relating to Dharma and true Philosophy,—says the *Tātparya*.

ADHYĀYA V

DAILY LESSON I

SECTION (1)

(*Sūtras 1—3*)

*The Futile Rejoinders consisting in the Unfair Urging of the Fallacy of 'Neutralisation.'**

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Futile Rejoinder having been defined (in Sū. 1-2-18) as 'that objection which is taken on the basis of mere similarity and dissimilarity', it was described briefly under Sū. 1-2-20, where it was pointed out that 'there is multiplicity of Futile Rejoinders owing to there being several and diverse varieties of it'; this Futile Rejoinder is now described in detail. The Futile Rejoinders herein described consist of arguments urged in confutation of the argument that has been put forward in demonstration of a certain conclusion; and their number is twenty-four; they are as follows :—

* Among commentators there has been a great deal of discussion in regard to the exact character of this Fifth Discourse and its connection with what has gone before. To the end of Adh. IV, we had the *Examination*, 'Parīkṣā', of what had been *mentioned* in Sū. 1-1-1 and *defined* in the rest of Adh. 1; so that the natural subject-matter of Adh. V should consist in the continuation of the same *Examination* of things; what we find, however, in this *Adhyāya* are *definitions* of the several varieties of Futile Rejoinders and Clinchers. Hence the difficulty.

The *Tātparya* says—The proper place for the *defining* of the particular kinds of *Futile Rejoinders* and *Clinchers* was just after the general definition of these in Adh. I; yet the author of the Sūtra intentionally omitted to do it there, in order not to delay the examination of the 'objects of cognition', for which the pupils were growing eager; and having finished all that, he now naturally reverts to the *defining* of the several varieties of the two categories that he had left undefined. Further, the last *part* of the preceding *Adhyāya* having dealt with 'Disputation and Wrangling', it is in connection with those that the Sage deals with Futile Rejoinder and Clincher, which can occur only in Disputation and Wrangling; so that the sequence of Aḍh. V is all right; its subject-matter arising directly out of what has gone towards the end of the preceding *Adhyāya*.

The *Pariśuddhi* enters into a long discussion as to whether Adh. V is meant to be 'Definition' or 'Examination'; and comes to the conclusion that its subject-matter consists of *Definition*.

Sūtra 1

(1) Parity,* per Similarity, (2) per Dissimilarity, (3) per Augmentation, (4) per Subtraction, (5) per Uncertainty, (6) per Certainty, (7) per Shuffling, (8) per Probandum, (9) per Convergence, (10) per Non-convergence, (11) per Continued Question, (12) per Counter-Instance, (13) per Non-generation, (14) per Doubt, (15) per Vacillation, (16) per Non-probativeness, (17) per Presumption, (18) per Non-difference, (19) per Evidence, (20) per Apprehension, (21) per Non-apprehension, (22) per Non-eternality, (23) per Eternality and (24) per Character of Effect.'—

BHĀṢYA

When the argument urged in confutation is through *similarity*, and does not differ in validity from the argument put forward in demonstration, it constitutes 'Parity per Similarity'; the said 'non-difference' we shall exemplify in the particular instances that we shall cite. 'Parity per Dissimilarity' and the other Futile Rejoinders may be similarly described.

BHĀṢYA

The definition (of these Futile Rejoinders) is as follows :—

Sūtra 2

(1) and (2)—The original Proposition having been propounded on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity, if the Opponent seeks to prove the contrary of its predicate, also on

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* Udayanācārya in his *Bodhasiddhi* (*Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*) thus explains the signification of the term '*sama*' occurring at the end of these names.—(1) According to the *Vārtika*, it means 'equalising'; *i.e.*, the Futile Rejoinder is put forward for the purpose of counter-poising or neutralising the effectr of the original Reasoning ;—(2) according to the *Bhāṣya*, it means that the Futile Rejoinder is put up with a view to show that there is nothing in the original reasoning which differentiates it from what is now put forward; [there is not much difference between these two].—(3) others explain it as meaning that the Futile Rejoinder puts the original *reasoner* on exactly the same footing as his Opponent putting forward the Rejoinder ;—(4) the 'Equality' of the Futile Rejoinder lies in the fact that while demolishing the reasoning of the first party, it demolishes itself also. [Udayanācārya himself accepts this last explanation.]

the basis of similarity and dissimilarity, we have instances of ' Parity per Similarity', and ' Parity per Dissimilarity'.*

BHĀṢYA

(1) When the original proposition is propounded on the basis of similarity, if the Opposition to it, seeking to establish the contrary of its predicate, is set up also on the basis of similarity,—and this Opposition does not differ from the argument put forward in support of the original proposition,—it is a case of that Opposition which is called 'Parity per Similarity'. E.g. The Proposition having been in the form ' The Soul must be *active* (mobile),—because every Substance is endowed with qualities conducive to *activity*,—the clod of earth, which is a substance, is endowed with qualities conducive to *activity*, and is found to be *active*,—the Soul also is so,—therefore the Soul must be active ;'—the Opponent sets up the following opposition to it, also on the basis of Similarity :—' The Soul must be inactive,—because every all-pervading substance is inactive,—Ākāśa, which is an all-pervading substance, is inactive,—the Soul also is so,—therefore the Soul must be inactive. ' And there is no special reason why on the ground of its *similarity* to active substances the Soul should be regarded as *active*, and it should not be regarded as *inactive*, on the ground of its *similarity* to *inactive substances* ;—so that inasmuch as there is no special reason (which makes one or the other more valid), this is an instance of Futile Rejoinder called ' Parity per Similarity'. [This is a case where the original Proposition is based upon Similarity, and the Opposition to it is also based upon Similarity.]

(2) An instance of ' Parity per Dissimilarity' (in opposition to the same Proposition) is the following—' The clod of earth which is endowed with qualities conducive to activity, is found to be limited in its extent,—*the Soul is not so limited*—therefore the Soul cannot be active, like the clod of Earth ;'—there being no special reason why, on the basis of its *similarity* to an *active* substance, the Soul should be regarded as *active*,—and why, on the basis of its *dissimilarity* to the *active* substance, it should not be

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* *Sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām* is to be construed with '*upasamhārē*,' as also with '*taddharmaviparyayopapattēḥ*,'—according to the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. Viśvanātha appears to construe it only with the latter term.

regarded as *inactive* ; and inasmuch as there is no such special reason, it is a case of 'Parity per Dissimilarity'. [This is a case of the Proposition being based on Similarity, and the Opposition on Dissimilarity].

(3) The original Proposition being set up on the basis of *dissimilarity*,—'The Soul must be inactive,—because it is all-pervading,—every *active* substance is found to be not all-pervading, as in the case of the clod of Earth,—the Soul is not so non-all-pervading.—hence it must be inactive' ;—the following opposition is set up on the basis of dissimilarity :—'the Ākāśa, which is an inactive substance, is found to be devoid of qualities conducive to activity,—the Soul is not so devoid of such qualities, —hence the Soul cannot be inactive' ;—and there is no special reason why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *active* substance the Soul should be regarded as *inactive*, and why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *inactive* substance, it should not be regarded as *active* ; thus there being no such special reason, this is an instance of 'Parity per Dissimilarity'. [This is an instance of the Proposition as well as its Opposition both being based upon Dissimilarity].

(4) An instance of 'Parity per Similarity' (in opposition to the same Proposition)*—'the clod of Earth which is active, is found to be endowed with qualities conducive to activity,—the Soul also is so endowed,—hence it should be active';—there is no special reason why, on the ground of its *dissimilarity* to the *active* substance, the Soul should be regarded as *inactive*, and why on the ground of its *similarity* to the *active* substance, it should not be regarded as *active* ; and there being no such special reason, this is an instance of 'Parity per Similarity'. [This is an instance of the Proposition being based upon *Dissimilarity* and the Opposition on *Similarity*.]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The answer to the above two Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—†

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* The words अथ साधर्म्यसम wanting in the Viz. text is supplied by the Puri Ms. B. and also Mss. C and D.

† *Udayanachārya* in his *Bodha-siddhi* says—Each of these two Futile Rejoinders is three-fold · (1) Bearing upon a true subject, (2) bearing upon an untrue subject, and (3) consisting of wrong expression. The examples

Sūtra 3

The proposition would be established in the same manner as the fact of a certain animal being the 'Cow' is established by the presence in it of the class-character of the 'cow'.—

BHĀṢYA

If one were to seek to establish his proposition by means of mere 'similarity', or by means of mere 'dissimilarity',—then there would certainly be the uncertainty (inconclusiveness, urged in the Futile Rejoinder). There is however no such uncertainty when the conclusion is based upon a particular property [such as is invariably concomitant with what is sought to be proved]; *e g.* that a certain animal is the *cow* is proved by reason only of that 'similarity of it to the cow' which consists in *the presence of the particular class-character* '*cow*' (which is invariably concomitant with, inseparable from, all cows),—and not by reason of the presence of such other properties as are different from the *presence of the dewlap* * [which *other properties* are not invariably concomitant with all cows]. Similarly the proposition that a certain animal is the cow is proved by reason only of that 'dissimilarity of it to the Horse' which consists in *the presence of the lass-character* '*cow*'—and not that dissimilarity which might consist in a mere diversity of qualities etc. All this has been explained in the section on 'Factors of Reasoning' (in *Bhāsya* on Sū. 1-1-39), where it has been pointed out that in the sentence

cited in the Vārtika belong to the first kind (Sound being really non-eternal). Following is the example of the second kind —The Proposition being propounded in the form 'Sound must be *eternal*, because it is intangible, like Ākaśa', the Opposition is set up against it that 'Sound being cognisable, and as such similar to *non-eternal* things, it should be regarded as *non-eternal*'. 'The examples cited in the *Bhāṣya* belong to the third kind; as the subject thereof is true, it is only the verbal expression that is defective.' A Rejoinder, even though quite right in matter, if it is put up in wrong form, becomes Futile.

* The word '*sāsnādisambandhāt*' as it stands, would mean that the said conclusion cannot be proved by *the presence of the dewlap etc.* This however would be wrong; as *the presence of the dewlop etc.*, is as peculiar to, and invariably concomitant with, all cows, as the class-character 'cow' itself. In view of this, the *Tātparya* has explained the compound '*sāsnādi*' as meaning properties *other than the presence of the dewlap.*

(formulating the inferential argument), several Instruments of Cognition combine together and conjointly accomplish the common purpose (of proving the conclusion),—and that the *uncertainty* (that the Futile Rejoinders point out) can apply only to Fallacious Reasonings (and not to valid reasonings).

End of Section (1)

SECTION (2)

(*Sūtras 4–6*)

Dealing with the six Futile Rejoinders—(3) 'Parity per Augmentation'; (4) 'Parity per Subtraction'; (5) 'Parity per Uncertainty'; (6) 'Parity per Certainty'; (7) 'Parity per Shuffling'; and (8) 'Parity per Probandum',—which are based upon the diversity of the character of the Subject and that of the Example.

Sūtra 4

Based upon the difference in the properties of the 'Subject'* and of the 'Example' are the Futile Rejoinders named (3) 'Parity per Augmentation'; (4) 'Parity per Subtraction'; (5) 'Parity per Uncertainty'; (6) 'Parity per Certainty'; (7) 'Parity per Shuffling'; and based upon the fact of both (Subject and Example) being 'objects to be proved' (by Inference) is the Futile Rejoinder named (8) 'Parity per Probandum'.—

BHĀṢYA

(3) When the Opposer puts forward the contingency of an additional property of the 'Example' subsisting in the 'Subject', it is 'Parity *per Augmentation*'.† *E.g.* [against the Proposition that 'the Soul must be active, because it is endowed with properties conducive to action, like the Clod of Earth'] the Opposition is set up—"if by reason of the presence of qualities conducive to action, the Soul should, like the Clod of Earth, be regarded as active, then, like the Clod of Earth, it has to be

* '*Sādhya*' says Viśvanātha, stands here for '*pakṣa*', 'Subject'. The diverse character referred to are *existence* and *non-existence*.

† The property in question does not really belong to the 'Subject', and the Rejoinder attributes that property to it; thus there is an accession to, a union of the properties of, the 'Subject'. Hence the name 'Parity per Augmentation'.

regarded as tangible also; if it is not tangible, like the Clod of Earth, then it should not be active either; or you should point out some special reason (why it should be regarded as *active*, and not as *tangible*). [Here the *additional* quality of *tangibility*, which is not existent in the Soul, is attributed to it]."*

(4) When the Opposer urges the contingency of the *absence of a certain property* in the Subject, on the analogy of the 'Example',—It is 'Parity *per subtraction*'; *e. g.*, (against the same Proposition) the Opposition is set up—" inasmuch as the Clod of Earth is found to be *active* and *not all-pervading*, the Soul also, if active, should be regarded as *not all-pervading*; or you should point out some special reason (why it should be regarded as *active* and not as *not all-pervading*) [Here the property of *all-pervadingness* is subtracted from the Soul].†

(5) and (6) '*Varṇya*' means '*khyāpanīya*', '*that which is yet to be known*', hence '*uncertain*'; and '*avarnya*', '*certain*', is the reverse of that; these two properties, 'uncertainty' and 'certainty' belong respectively to the 'Subject' and the 'Example' [the presence of the Probandum in the Example being known for *certain*, while its presence in the Subject is still *uncertain*]; and when, in opposition, the opposer reverses these qualities (by attributing *uncertainty* to the 'Example', and *certainty* to the 'Subject'], we have the Futile Rejoinders, 'Parity *per Uncertainty*' and 'Parity *per Certainty*'.§

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* This Futile Rejoinder is intended to urge the Fallacy of 'Contradiction'—says Udayana.

† This is intended to urge the Fallacy of the 'Unknown'.

§ 'Parity per Uncertainty', by reducing the Example to Uncertainty, makes it *equal* to the 'Subject'; and 'Parity per Certainty', by removing *uncertainty* from the 'Subject', makes it equal to the 'Example'. The 'Subject' is that in which the presence of the Probandum is *doubtful* and is sought to be confirmed by the argument in question; while the 'Example' is that wherein the presence of the Probandum is known for certain.

As an example of 'Parity per Uncertainty' in the generalised form, Viśvanātha puts forward the following :—Against any argument that the First Party might put up in support of his Proposition, the Opponent will set up the following Opposition—" What can prove the Proposition is only that Property which as Probans, subsists in the Subject of that Proposition;—this Probans must in order to be effective, subsist in the Example also;—now the principal property that subsists in the 'Subject' is *the character of*

(7) The 'Example' being endowed with the property that constitutes the Probans (proving the desired Proposition),—if the Opponent attributes to it some other property, and then urges the fact of this other property being such as is not invariably concomitant with the properties of the Probandum,—it is a case of 'Parity *per Shuffling*'. E. g. (against the same Proposition) we have the Opposition—" One thing endowed with qualities conducive to action is found to be *possessed of Gravity*, as we find in the Clod of Earth (Example),—while another thing similarly endowed is found to be *devoid of Gravity*, as we find in the case of Air ;—similarly it is possible that while one thing, the Clod of Earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is *active*, another thing, the Soul, which is similarly endowed, may be *without action* ;—or you should show some special reason (against this). "*

(8) That character is called 'Probandum' which is found to be one upon which the whole force of the Probans and the other Factors of the Reasoning is operative ; and when such

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having the presence of the probandum doubtful ;—and this same character should reside in the Example ; hence the Example also should be one in which *the presence of the probandum is doubtful*."—And the following is the example of 'Parity per Certainty' :—" The Example must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is known for certain,—the property in the Example must also reside in the Subject,—hence the Subject also must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is known for certain,—and if the Subject is so, then it loses the very character of the 'Subject', which must be one in which the presence of the Probandum is only *doubtful*".

The 'Parity per Uncertainty' is intended to urge the Fallacy of 'contradiction' and 'Parity per Certainty' is intended to urge the Fallacy of the 'unknown',—says Uḍayana.

* Here the Opponent attributes to the Example, Clod of Earth, the quality of 'gravity', and then shows that *gravity*, one quality of the Example, is not invariably concomitant with the *qualities conducive to action* (as in Air, we find these latter, but not the former),—and analogously it may be possible that *qualities conducive to action*, which also belong to the Example, may not be invariably concomitant with *activity*. Here we have a case of a property (gravity) being found in the Example which is not invariably concomitant with the Probans, 'qualities couducive to action'. This also includes the case where the property found in the Example is one with which the Probans is not invariably concomitant. This Futile Rejoinder is intended to urge the Fallacy of Inconclusiveness,—says Udayana.

character is attributed to the 'Example', it is 'Parity *per Probandum*'. E. g., "If the Soul is to be regarded as *active*, in the same manner as the Clod of Earth is active, then it comes to this that the Clod of Earth is like the Soul,—and the Soul is the Subject in regard to which the presence of Activity is still to be proved,—hence the Clod of Earth also should be one in regard to which the presence of Activity is still to be proved :—if this is not so, then it is not* true that the Soul is like the Clod of Earth [which means that the Example cited is not right]."†

The answer to the above six Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—

Sūtra 5

Inasmuch as the 'Reaffirmation' (leading to the conclusion) is only secured on the basis of a particular similarity (between the 'Subject' and the 'Example), there can be no denial of it on the basis of any mere dissimilarity.§

It is not possible to hide away (*i.e.* deny) what has been duly established ;—and the 'analogy' (between the Subject and the Example) is duly established, if there is some point of similarity between them ; as we find in the case of the well-known analogy 'as the Cow so the Gavaya'; this being so, in regard to the cow and the *Gavaya*, it is not possible to urge that "there is some difference (of character) between the two (and hence the analogy is not right)",—similarly (in the case in question) when on the point of that character which is meant to establish the conclusion, it is found that it is present in the

* This न is wanting in the Viz: text ; it is found in the Puri Mss. also in C. and D.

† The Subject, the Probans and the Example must be such as are definitely known from other sources of knowledge, and are not dependent upon the reasoning of which they themselves form parts. That which is to be proved, i.e. the Probandum, is one that is not so known. If the Example is shown to be one which also is still to be proved, this vitiates the entire reasoning.

This is meant to urge the Fallacy of the 'Unknown'.

§ Invariable concomitance is the essential element, and when we have even one point of similarity which is invariably concomitant with the Probandum, that is enough to prove our conclusion. It is not possible for the 'Subject' and the 'Example' to have no dissimilarity at all ; that would mean *identity*. All that is necessary is that they should resemble on certain such points as are invariably concomitant with the Probandum.

Example (and in the Subject),—it cannot be possible to deny the conclusiveness of the said character merely by pointing out that there is some difference between the two, consisting in a diversity in their properties.

Sūtra 6

Further, inasmuch as the 'Example' becomes an 'Example' only by reason of the indication of the actual presence, in it, of the Probandum [it can never be said to stand on the same footing as the Probandum, which is still to be proved].

BHĀṢYA

What is indicated (in the Example) is only such a fact as is not incompatible with what is agreed upon by all men, ordinary as well as learned; and since it is only when the presence of the Probandum is so indicated that the Example becomes a true 'Example',—there can be no ground for saying that the Example stands on the same footing as the Probandum.*

End of Section (2)

SECTION (3)

[*Sūtras 7–8*]

Dealing with (9) 'Parity per Convergence' and (10) 'Parity per Non-convergence.'

Sūtra 7

"The Probans (could establish the Probandum) either by becoming united, or not becoming united, with the Probandum;—if it becomes united with it, then it becomes non-different from it; while if it does not becomes united with it, it cannot prove it"—these arguments constitute (9) 'Parity per Convergence' and (10) 'Parity per non-convergence.'

BHĀṢYA

"Is it by becoming united with the Probandum that the Probans would establish it? Or by not becoming united with it? It cannot establish it by becoming united with it; because by

* The answer given in Sū. 5, applies to all the six Futile Rejoinders described in Sū. 4. What is said in Su. 6, is the answer that is applicable to only three of them—'Parity per Uncertainty', 'Parity per Certainty', and 'Parity per Probandum'—*Tātparya*.

becoming united with it, it would become non-different from it, and as such could not establish it. When of two things both are existent, and become united,—which could be the 'probans', the 'establisher', and which the 'probandum' * the 'established'? If, on the other hand, the Probans does not become united with the Probandum,—then (on that very account) it could not establish it; for example, the Lamp does not illumine an object unless it is united with it". When the Opposition is urged on the basis of 'uniting' (Converging), it is 'Parity per Convergence'; and when it is urged on the basis of 'not-uniting' (non-converging), it is 'Parity per Non-convergence'.

The answer to the above two Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—

Sūtra 8

The Denials (embodied in the Rejoinders) are not effective; (*a*) because we find the Jar and such other objects accomplished (when their causes are in contact with them), and (*b*) because Killing by magic (is accomplished without the killer coming into contact with the killed person).†

BHĀṢYA

The denial is not right, in either of the two forms : (*a*) Such effects as the Jar and the like are brought about by the Agent, the Instruments, and the Receptacle, only when these are in contact with the Clay (out of which the Jar is made). [So that 'Parity per Convergence' can have no force] ;—and (*b*) when trouble (killing) is brought on a person by means of magical spells, we find that the cause brings about its effect without coming into contact with it [So that 'Parity per Non-Convergence' also can have no force].

End of Section (3)

* It is only what is not already accomplished that can be established; what is united with anything must be an accomplished entity; hence no such thing can be what is *to be established*, the 'probandum'; and when two things unite, they become identified; hence if the Probans and the Probandum become united, there can be no relation of cause and effect between them.—*Tātparya*.

†The printed *Nyāyasūcinibandha* (Bd-Ind.) reads व्यभिचार for अभिचार.

SECTION (4)

Sūtra 9

Dealing with—(11) '*Parity per Continued Question*' *and* (12) *Parity per Counter-instance.*'

Sūtra 9

(*a*) When the basis of the 'Example' is not mentioned, it is (11) 'Parity per Continued Question' and (*b*) when the Opposition is set up through a counterinstance, it is (12) 'Parity per Counter-instance'.

BHĀṢYA

(*a*) When the Opposition is set up in the form of the 'Continued Questioning'—that "it is necessary (for the propounder of the original Proposition) to point out the proof for the Probans also"—it is Opposition called 'Parity per Continued Question'. *E.g.*, "You do not mention the reason (basis) for asserting that the Clod of Earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, must be active; and until the reason is mentioned, nothing can be accepted as true". *

(*b*) When the Opposition is based upon a counter-instance, it is 'Parity per Counter-instance'. *E.g.* the original proposition having been put forward in the form 'The Soul must be active,—because it is endowed with qualities conducive to action, —like the Clod of Earth',—the Opponent sets up a counter-instance—"*Ākāśa*, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is found to be *without action* [and hence why cannot the Soul be regarded as *inactive*, like *Ākāśa*?]". But what is that quality in *Ākāśa* which is conducive to action? "It consists of contact with Air, which aided by Faculty or momentum (leads to action), as is found in the case of the contact of Air with the Tree." †

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinders is as follows :—

* The *Tātparya* thus explains the difference between 'Parity per Continued Question' and 'Parity per Probandum'.—In 'Parity per Probandum' the Opponent urges the necessity of the Probans and all other Factors of Reasoning being provided in support of the Example, exactly in the same manner as is done in support of the Probandum; while in 'Parity per Continued Question', he only wants to know by what means of cognition the Example is known.

† Contact of Air with the Tree leads to the action of moving in the Tree; hence the contact of Air in *Ākāśa* also should be conducive to action.

Sūtra 10

The continued question could come to an end just as it does in the case of the fetching of the Lamp.

BHĀṢYA

The first party, on being questioned by the Opponent in the manner described in the preceding *Sūtra*, can say (in reply)—Who are the persons that fetch the lamp? and why do they fetch it? [The Opponent will say]—"It is fetched by persons desiring to see, and they fetch it for the purpose of seeing the things to be seen." But [the first party will ask again] Why do not people, desiring to see the Lamp (which is a thing to be seen) fetch another lamp?—"They do not do so, because they can see the lamp even without the second lamp." From this, it follows that for the seeing of the Lamp itself, the fetching of another lamp is useless. [Now turning to the case in question]—For what purpose is the Example put forward?—It is put forward for the purpose of making known something not already known. Why then is the *mention of the basis of the Example* sought for* (by the Opponent setting up the Futile Rejoinder)? If it is sought for the purpose of making the Example *known*,—then our contention is that the Example is already known [as, if it were not known, it would not be put forward as *Example*]; for the Example is that in regard to which there is a consensus of opinion among all men, learned and unlearned; so that any *mention of basis* for the purpose of making the Example known would be absolutely useless. This is the answer to 'Parity per Continued Question'.

The answer to 'Parity per Counter-instance' is as follows:—

Sūtra 11

If the Counter-instance is an effective reason, the Example also cannot but be an effective reason.

BHĀṢYA

When the Opponent puts forward the Counter-instance, he does not cite any special reason in support thereof—to show that for such and such a reason the Counter-instance is an

* The correct reading is देश्यते as found in Mss. B. C. and D.

effective reason, and the Example is not so. So that, when the Counter-instance is recognised as an effective reason, there can be no ground for saying that the Example is not an effective reason ;—and when can it not fail to be effective reason ? Only when it is itself not capable of being denied and is capable of proving the conclusion. [So that if it is effective reason, it must prove the conclusion.]

End of Section (4)

SECTION (5)

(*Sūtras 12-13*)

Dealing with (13) '*Parity per Non-generation*'.

Sūtra 12

'Before the birth (of the Subject), since [what is urged as] the ground [for the probandum being predicated of it] cannot subsist, [the argument can prove nothing],"— this is 'Parity per Non-generation'.

BHĀṢYA

The proposition being stated in the form—'Sound must be non-eternal *because it comes after effort*, like the Jar', the Opponent sets up the following Opposition :—" Before it is produced, the Sound has not appeared, hence (at that time) the *character of coming after effort*, which is the ground urged for its non-eternality, does not subsist in Sound ; and since this character does not subsist in Sound, it follows that Sound is *eternal* ; and that which is eternal is *never produced*'.—This opposition, based upon 'non-generation' (or non-production), is 'Parity per Non-generation'.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 13

Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it is, and since what is urged as the ground (for the Proposition) does then subsist in it,—the presence of the ground cannot be denied.

BHĀṢYA

Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it is—*i.e.*, it is only when it has been produced that the Sound becomes 'Sound'; before it is produced, it is not even

'Sound'; and as it is 'Sound' only after it has been produced, and when the Sound has been produced, *the character of coming after effort*, which is the ground for non-eternality, is actually present in it; and *since the ground does then subsist in it*, there is no force in the objection that "before the birth of the Subject, the ground does not subsist:.in it" (urged in the Futile Rejoinder).

End of Section (5)

SECTION (6)

[*Sūtras 14–15*]

Dealing with 'Parity per Doubt'.

Sūtra 14

The 'Community' and the 'Example', both being equally perceptible by the senses, [the Opposition] based upon similarity to 'eternal' as well as 'non-eternal' things constitutes 'Parity per Doubt'.

BHĀṢYA

The Proposition being put forward in the form—'Sound must be non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar', —the Opponent opposes it by casting doubt over it: "Even though Sound comes after effort, it has this *similarity* to the *eternal* 'Community' that both are *perceptible by the senses*;—and the same also constitutes its *similarity* to the *non-eternal* 'Jar' —thus, by reason of its *similarity* to both 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' things, there must be doubt (as to the real character of Sound)."

The answer to the above is as follows:

Sūtra 15

(*a*) As regards the doubt being raised on the basis of (mere) 'similarity', [our answer is that] there can be no such doubt when the 'dissimilarity' (to that same thing) has been duly recognised; (*b*) if, even on both (similarity and dissimilarity) being recognised, doubts were to arise, then there would be no end to such doubts,—(*c*) and since mere 'similarity' is not accepted as an everlasting source of doubt,—the opposition set up cannot be right.

BHĀṢYA

(*a*) When, on perceiving the distinguishing feature of 'Man' —which constitutes its 'dissimilarity' (to the Pillar)—it has been duly ascertained that the object perceived is a 'Man',—there is no room for any doubt arising in regard to it on the basis of some 'similarity' between Man and Pillar. Thus, in the case of Sound, *the character of coming after effort*, which forms its distinguishing feature and dissimilarity to *eternal* things, having been recognised, its 'non-eternality' becomes duly ascertained; and there can be no room for any further doubt arising on the mere ground of its similarity to eternal and non-eternal things. (*b*) If such a Doubt were to arise, then, inasmuch as the 'similarity' between the Man and the Pillar would never cease, the Doubt would never come to an end. (*c*) Lastly, *we do not admit that 'similarity' is an everlasting source of Doubt*, even when the distinctive feature of the thing has been duly recognised; *e.g.*, when the distinctive feature of Man has been recognised, a mere similarity between 'Man' and 'Pillar' does not become a source of doubt.

End of Section (6)

SECTION (7)

[*Sūtras 16–17*]

Dealing with 'Parity per Neutralisation.'

Sūtra 16

"By reason of Similarity to both, there arises vacillation"—(Opposition) based upon this reasoning is 'Parity per Neutralistion.'

BHĀṢYA

By reason of the similarity (of Sound) to both, eternal and non-eternal things, there is likelihood of the two contrary views [*i.e.* the original Proposition as well as its contrary] ;—this is what is meant by the term '*prakriyā*', or 'vacillation' in the *Sūtra* : One view being—'Sound must be non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar',—the other view is propounded on the basis of the similarity (of Sound) to *Eternal* things ['Sound must be eternal, because it is perceptible by the Auditory Organ, like the *class-character Sound*']. Thus then, it is found that when the Probans—'because it comes after effort'—is put for-

ward as constituting the similarity (of Sound) to *non-eternal* things, it is not free from the possibility of the contrary view being set up ; and in the face of this possibility, the conclusion sought to be based upon that Probans cannot be established. The same holds good in regard to a Probans that would be put forward as constituting the 'similarity' (of Sound) to *eternal* things. The Opposition put forward on the basis of this 'vacillation' constitutes 'Parity per Neutralisation'.

What has been said in this Sūtra applies also to the case of *Dissimilarity* ; and 'by reason of Dissimilarity to both, there arises Vacillation,—and Opposition based upon this reasoning constitutes *Parity per Neutralisation*'.

The answer to the above is as follows :—

Sūtra 17

Inasmuch as the said 'Vacillation' can follow only from the counter-view, there can be no denial of it ; specially as that contrary-view must be regarded as established (before the 'Vacillation' can be put forward).*

BHĀṢYA

When the Opponent says that—"by reason of similarity to both there arises vacillation"—his assertion comes to this that there is 'vacillation', because the *counter-view* is there; it is only when there is (real) similarity to both that one of them can be called the 'counter-view'; hence it follows from the statement that the 'counter-view' is an established fact ; and the 'counter-view' being regarded as established, its denial cannot be right. If the 'counter-view' is *established*, its denial cannot be right; and if its denial is right, the 'counter-view' cannot be regarded as *established* ; for 'the establishment of the counter-view' and 'the right denial of the counter-view' are contradictory terms.

When however [as in the case of the Fallacy of Neutralisation, which also is based upon vacillation] the 'vacillation' is due to the absence of definite knowledge (in regard to the subject

* The term '*pratipakṣa*' 'counter-view', stands for the view of the First Party ; it is called 'counter-view' from the Opponent's point of view—*Udayana* and *Viśvanātha*.

in question) [and not to the mere existence of the counter-view], the 'vacillation' comes to an end, as soon as that definite right knowledge is attained; *i.e.*, as soon as definite right knowledge has been attained, the vacillation ceases.*

End of Section (7)

SECTION (8)

[Sūtras 18–20]

Dealing with (16) '*Parity per Non-probativeness*'.

Sūtra 18

'Parity per Non-probativeness' is based upon the contention that "*the Probans as such cannot exist at any of the three points of time*".

BHĀṢYA

"'Probans' is *that which proves*; and this could exist only either (*a*) before, or (*b*) after or (*c*) together with, the probandum (that which it is intended to prove). Now, (*a*) if the Probans is held to exist before the Probandum,—at the time that the Probandum is not there, of what could it be the 'probans', 'means of proving'? (*b*) If it is held to exist after the Probandum,—in the absence of the Probans, of what could there be the 'Probandum' (to be proved)? (*c*) If the Probans and the Probandum are held to exist (simultaneously),—since both would be equally existent, which could be the 'probans' (means of proving) of what? From all this it follows that the 'probans' does not differ from what is *non-probative*."

* When the Opponent puts up the Futile Rejoinder based upon the vacillation in regard to the exact character of Sound, on account of its being similar to eternal as well as non-eternal things,—he admits that the proposition that 'Sound is non-eternal' is as admissible as that 'Sound is eternal'; that both possess an equal degree of truth; otherwise, if one were more reasonable, that would be definitely accepted and there would be no vacillation. And when he accepts the admissibility of the view that 'Sound is non-eternal', he cannot, consistently with himself, deny it.

The position of the person urging the Fallacy of 'Neutralisation', is different; he bases his denial of the conclusion of the first party, not upon any vacillation, but upon absence of true knowledge.

This contention, thus based upon similarity to what is non-probative, constitutes 'Parity per Non-probativeness'. *

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 19

It is not true that "the Probans cannot exist at any of the three points of time", because it is by the Probans that the Probandum can be proved.

BHĀṢYA

It is not true that "the Probans cannot exist at any of the three points of time" ;—why ?—*because it is by the Probans that the Probandum is proved.* As a matter of fact, we find that the *accomplishing* of *what is to be accomplished*, as also the *knowing* of *what is to be known*, is brought about by a cause ; and this patent fact of ordinary perception is an instance in point.† As regards the question—"at the time that the Probandum is non-existent, of what could the Probans be the *means of proving* ?"—our answer is that [it is the means of proving of *what is to be proved* ; just as in the cases cited] the cause is the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished, and of the knowing of what is to be made known.

Sūtra 20

Further, [according to the Opponent's reasoning] there can be no Denial ; from which it follows that what has been denied cannot be denied.

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* This Futile Rejoinder differs from 'Parity per Convergence' and 'Parity per Non-convergence' on the following points :—(1) In these latter the question raised was in regard to the form of the Probans, while in the present case, it is raised in regard to its causal efficiency ; (2) in the latter two the convergence or otherwise was in regard to the thing denoted by the words of the probans, while here it is the verbal expression that is taken up for enquiry ; (3) there were only *two* alternatives, while here we have *three* ; (4) those two had the semblance of the contention urging the fact of the qualification of the Probans being untrue, while here the contention urges a reasoning to the contrary—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

† Just as the *accomplishing* of *what is to accomplished* is brought about by a cause, in the same manner the *proving* of *what is to be proved* (*i.e.*, the Probandum) must be broght about by a cause ; and this cause is the *Probans*.

BHĀṢYA

[Exactly what you have urged against our Probans, we can urge, with equal force, against the Opponent]—The denial cannot exist, either before, or after, or together with, what is denied —-and since there can be no 'Denial' at all (of the Probans urged by the first party), it follows that the Probans (being undeniable) is firmly established.

End of Section (8)

SECTION (9)

[*Sūtras 21–22*]

Dealing with (17) '*Parity per Presumption*'.

Sūtra 21

When the contrary conclusion is proved by means of Presumption, it is 'Parity per Presumption'.

BHĀṢYA

The proposition having been sought to be established by the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar',—if the Opponent seeks to establish the contrary conclusion by means of Presumption,—this is a case of 'Parity per Presumption'; it is as follows :—'If Sound is held to be non-eternal, on the ground of its coming after effort, which constitutes its similarity to non-eternal things,—then it follows by implication, that Sound must be regarded as eternal, on the ground of its *similarity to eternal things*, consisting in the fact that it is *intangible*, like eternal things'.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows—

Sūtra 22

(A) If what is not expressly stated can be taken as following by implication, then the renouncing would be taken as following by implication, for the simple reason that such renouncing is not expressly stated ;—(B) and further, 'Presumption' would be indecisive.

BHĀṢYA

(A) Without showing the capacity (of the words to afford the idea of what is presumed), if what is not expressly stated is held (by the Opponent) to be taken as implied,—then the renoun-

cing by such an arguer of his own view may also be taken as implied, for the simple reason that it is not expressly stated; and thus inasmuch as the view that 'Sound is non-eternal' would be regarded as established (by reason of its being taken as implied by reason of its not being expressly stated by you), this would mean that your own view that 'Sound is eternal' has been renounced.

(B) *Further, Presumption would be indecisive*; that is, Presumption would apply equally to both views; for 'if on the ground of its similarity to eternal things consisting of *intangibility*, Sound were to be regarded as *eternal*, like *Ākāśa*,—it would be taken as following by implication that, on account of its similarity to *non-eternal* things, consisting in *its coming after effort*, Sound is *non-eternal*'.*

Then again, conclusive Presumption does not necessarily follow from mere negation; for instance, because the *solid* gravel falls, it does not necessarily follow by presumption that there can be no falling of Water, which is liquid (not solid).

End of Section (9)

SECTION (10)

[Sūtra 23—24]

Dealing with (1·) '*Parity per Non-difference*'.

Sūtra 23

"If the presence of a single (common) property were to make the two things non-different,—then all things would have to be regarded as non-different, because the property of 'existence' is present in all";—this contention constitutes 'Parity per Non-difference'.

BHĀṢYA

The single (common) property, in the case in question, is that of *coming after effort*; and because this single property is present in Sound and in the Jar, if these two things be regarded as non-different,—*i.e.*, both be regarded as 'non-eternal';—then all things should have to be regarded as non-different—Why?—*Because the property of 'existence' is present in all*; the one

* This is the reverse of the argument put forward in the Futile Rejoinder.

property of 'existence' is present in all things; and since 'Existence' is present in all things, all things should be regarded as non-different. Such contention constitutes 'Parity per Non-differenoe'.*

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows: —

Sūtra 24

The above denial does not hold; because in the case of some (common property) the presence of certain other proparties) of the similar thing is possible, while in the case of others such presence is not possible.

BHĀṢYA

For instance, in the case where the one common property between the 'Subject' and the 'Example' consists of 'coming after effort', the presence of another property—which constitutes a further 'non-difference' or 'similarity' between them —is found possible; while in the case of the common property among *all things* consisting of 'existence', the presence of no other common property is found possible; which could constitute a further 'non-difference' among them.

The following might be urged (by the Nihilist, who holds that 'existence' is invariably concomitant with 'Non-eternality');—" Non-eternality would be the other property common to 'all things', the presence whereof would be indicated by the presence (in them) of the property of *existence.*"

(A) Under this assumption, the Proposition would come to be of the following form: 'All entities are non-eternal, because they have the property of *Existence*'; and in that case, no 'Example' would be available, apart from what is already included in the Proposition (which includes '*all* things'); and there can be no valid reasoning without an Example; nor would

* Udayana in his *Bodhasiddhi*, notices a different interpretation of this Sūtra by which the meaning is as follows —'The single property that constitutes the Probans is really effective; so that if the Subject and the Example were taken as possessed of the unqualified probandum, then *they would be non-different in every way, Sarvāviśeṣaḥ*; because their co-existence is well known.'

it be right to put up as 'Example' some thing that is already included under the Proposition; for what is itself yet to be proved cannot serve as an 'Example'. (B) Then again, inasmuch as *existent* things are actually found to be both *eternal* and *non-eternal*, they cannot all be regarded as *non-eternal* (on the ground of *existence*). From all this it follows that the sentence—"all things would have to be regarded as non-different, because the property of 'existence' is present in all" (Sū. 23) is meaningless.

(C) Lastly, when the Opponent alleges, that "because *existence* is present in all things, they should be regarded as non-eternal",—he admits that 'Sound is non-eternal'; so that opposition to this last Proposition is not quite consistent. *

End of Section (10)

SECTION (11)

[Sūtras 25–26]

Dealing with (19) *'Parity per Evidence'.*

Sūtra 25

'Parity per Evidence' is based upon the presence of grounds for both (views).

BHĀṢYA

"If Sound is held to be non-eternal, because there is present ground (or evidence) for its non-eternality—there is present evidence for eternality also, in the shape of *Intangibility*; so that it may be regarded as eternal also". This, being an opposition based upon *the presence of grounds for both*, 'Eternality' and 'Non-eternality,' is 'Parity per Evidence'.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūtra 26

This denial has no force; because the presence of ground in support (of the original Proposition) is admitted.

BHĀṢYA

When the Opponent alleges 'the presence of grounds for both views' (Sū. 25), he cannot deny that 'Sound is non-eternal, *because there are grounds for non-eternality*'. If this

* The Futile Rejoinder was urged against the Proposition 'Sound is non-eternal'; and yet this is admitted by the Opponent in setting forth the Rejoinder.

could be denied, then it would not be true that 'grounds for both views are present'. When he speaks of 'the presence of grounds for both views', he admits that there are grounds for 'non-eternality'; and having been admitted, it cannot be denied. "The denial is due to incongruity.' But 'incongruity' applies equally (to both views). "When we pointed out the incongruity consisting of the possibility of both eternality and non-eternality, we put forth the denial." But the 'incongruity' applies equally to your own view as well as to that of the other party; and it cannot establish any one of the two views.*

End of Section 11

SECTION (12)

[*Sūtra 27–28*]

Dealing with 'Parity per Apprehension'.

Sūtra 27

'Parity per Apprehension' is based upon the fact that what is put forward is found to exist even in the absence of the cause mentioned.

BHĀṢYA

Even in the absence of *the character of coming after effort* which is mentioned as the cause (ground) of 'non-eternality'—this 'non-eternality' is found in that Sound which proceeds from the breaking of the branches of the tree shaken by the wind [this Sound not being the Product of the Effort of any person] ;—and the Opposition, based upon this fact of the Probandum being found to exist even in the absence of the Probans, constitutes 'Parity per Apprehension'.†

* If you admit the presence of grounds for both views, you admit the truth of the other view also; while if you deny the presence of the said grounds, you deny those for your own view also. So that the Futile Rejoinder that you urge stultifies itself.—*Udayana*.

† The *Bodhasiddhi* mentions five kinds of this Futile Rejoinder: (1) The Subject existing in the absence of the Probandum, which makes it a case of the Fallacy of 'Contradiction';—(2) the Subject existing without the Probans,—this being a case of the Fallacy of the 'Unknown';—(3) the Subject existing without both Probans and Probandum,—when there are both of the said fallacies;—(4) the Probandum existing without the Probans—this being a case of untrue premiss, the Probans not being invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—(5) the Probans existing without the Probandum, in which case also the necessary invariable concomitance between the two would be wanting. It goes on to cite examples of the Futile Rejoinder based upon each of these five.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 28

Inasmuch as the property in question may be due to some other cause,—the denial has no force at all.

BHĀṢYA

When the First Party says—' [Sound must be non-eternal] *because it is the outcome of effort* ', what is meant is that *it is produced from some cause* ; and it is not meant to restrict the particular product (Sound) to one particular cause only ;— so that if the property in question, ' Non-eternality ', is found in Sound produced from some other cause,—in what way does that militate against our view ?

End of Section (12)

SECTION (13)

[*Sūtras 29-31*]

Dealing with ' Parity per Non-apprehension '.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The First Party puts forward the Proposition in the following form]—' It is not true that even before it is uttered, Sound exists and (if it is not heard) it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it ';—this is not true—why?—because we do not perceive any covering or obstruction ; that is, in the case of such things as Water (underground) and the like, we find that when they are existent, if there is *non-apprehension* of them, it is due to the presence of obstruction (in the shape of the surface of the ground under which the water lies) ; in the case of Sound, however, we do not find its non-apprehension to be due to the presence of obstruction or any such causes of non-apprehension ; and such cause of its non-apprehension would certainly have been perceived (if it existed), just as it is perceived in the case of Water etc. ;—as a matter of fact, however, no such cause is perceived (in the case of Sound); hence it follows that when Sound is not apprehended (heard), its condition is contrary (not analogous) to that of the Water etc. [*i.e.* while Water etc., are *existent*, Sound is *non-existent*].' [And against this the Opponent sets up the following Futile Rejoinder]—

Sūtra 29

" Inasmuch as Non-apprehension of the obstruction is also not apprehended,—it follows that this Non-apprehension is not-existent ; and this proves the contrary conclusion [*i.e.* existence of the obstruction] "—the opposition based upon this contention is ' Parity per Non-apprehension '.

" The ' Non-apprehension ' of Obstruction etc., is not apprehended ;—and from this ' non-apprehension of the Non-apprehension, ' it follows that the latter does not exist ; and this ' Non-apprehension ' being non-existent, what has been urged by the First Party as the ' Probans ' of his reasoning is found to be non-existent ; all which leads to the conclusion that Obstruction etc., are *existent*. And since the contrary conclusion is thus proved, the original proposition—' it is not true that even before it is uttered, Sound exists, and it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it '—is *not proved*.

Thus it is found that the probans, 'because Obstruction is not apprehended ', is equally applicable to the *Obstruction*, and to the *Non-apprehension* of the Obstruction. "

This opposition, based upon Non-apprehension, constitutes ' Parity per Non-apprehension'.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 30

Since 'Non-apprehension' is of the nature of negation of apprehension,* the reason urged is no reason at all.

BHĀṢYA

The reasoning—" There can be no non-apprehension of Obstruction, because no such Non-apprehension is apprehended —is no reasoning at all, *because Non-apprehension is of the nature of the negation of apprehension* '; that is, because Non-apprehension ' is nothing more than mere *negation of apprehension*. As a matter of fact, what *exists* forms the object of 'apprehension', and this, by reason of its being apprehended, is asserted *to be existent* ; while of ' Non-apprehension ' the object is that

* It is of the nature of ' Negation of Apprehension '—i e. mere ' Negation of Apprehension', without any further qulification—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

which *does not exist* ; and this by reason of its being not apprehended is declared to be *non-existent*. The 'non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of the obstruction' cannot negate the 'non-apprehension' ; operating as it does upon its own objective, which is 'Non-apprehension', it cannot negate that same 'objective';*—and when the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' *is not negated*, it becomes capable of serving as an effective Probans (for proving the non-existence of the obstruction). 'Obstruction' can be the object of apprehension when it exists : and if it exists there should be *apprehension* of it ;—so that when it is not apprehended—there being an absence of the 'apprehension' that would indicate the existence of its own objective.—from this 'non-apprehension' (serving as the means of cognition) it is understood that the object in question (which would have been apprehended if it existed) is the object of 'Non-apprehension'; i. e. it is *non-existent* ; † the resultant conclusion being that 'the Obstruction and such other things, which would have been the cause of (which could have accounted for) the non-apprehension of Sound (before its utterance), are *non-existent*.' And the reason for this lies in the fact that what 'Non-apprehension' (as a means of cognition) indicates is that there is no apprehension, - this fact of there being non-apprehension forming the subject of the said 'Non-apprehension'.

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* This passage is rather obscure.

We have adopted the explanation given by the *Tātparya* :—What the Opponent, in putting forward the Futile Rejoinder, does, is to urge that there must be obstruction and the apprehension of this obstruction, because we fail to apprehend the non-apprehension of these. But it is far more reasonable to regard the latter absence of apprehension (of the non-apprehension of obstruction) as bearing upon the obstruction and its apprehension, than upon Non-apprehension. Because as the *Nyayamanjari* points out, what is negated by a negation must be something *positive* ; apprehension proves the *existence*, and 'non-apprehension' the *non-existence*, of only positive entities ; hence even the 'non-apprehension', even though of the 'non-apprehension of obstruction', can prove the *non-existence* only of the *obstruction* and *apprehensions*, which are positive entities, and not of the *non-apprehension* itself.

The *Bodhasiddhi* also explains similarly.

† The *viṣaya* object, the cognition of which is brought about by 'Non-apprehension', is *the non-existence of the object that would have been apprehended*.

Sūtra 31

Further, because the presence and absence of one's several cognitions are clearly perceptible to every person.*

BHĀṢYA

'*Therefore the reasoning put forward in the Futile Rejoinder is no reasoning at all*'—this has to be brought in from the preceding *Sūtra*. The presence and absence of the several cognitions that living beings have in the body, are clearly discernible by them; as is clear from such conceptions as 'My doubtful cognition *exists*' and 'My doubtful cognition *does not exist*'; similarly in connection with perceptional, inferential, verbal and reminiscential cognitions. So that in the case in question, when there is 'non-apprehension of the obstruction',—i e. the *non-existence* of its apprehension—it is clearly discernible by the person himself, and he has the conception, 'My apprehension of the obstruction is not present', or 'Obstruction, or any such thing as would be the cause of the non-perception of Sound, is not apprehended'; from which it follows that what was alleged in (Sū. 29)—"inasmuch as the non-apprehension of the obstruction is also not apprehended it follows that this Non-apprehension also is non-existent"—is not right.

End of Section 13

SECTION 14

Dealing with (22) 'Parity per Non-eternality'.

Sūtra 32

"If by reason of 'similarity' two things be regarded as having analogous properties, then all things should have to be regarded as 'non-eternal',—this contention constitutes 'Parity per Non-eternality'.

BHĀṢYA

"When the First Party says that—'Sound should be regarded as *non-eternal*, by reason of its similarity to the Jar, which is *non-eternal*',—he becomes faced with the undesirable contingency of

*According to *Tātparya* and *Bodhasiddhi* the Sūtra would mean—'it is clearly perceptible to every person whether a certain cognition apprehends the Existence or Non-existence of a thing.' The translation adopts the interpretation of the *Nyāyamañjarī* which is more in keeping with the Bhāṣya.

having to regard *all* things as *non-eternal*, by reason of their similarity (consisting of *existence*) to the Jar, which is non-eternal."—This opposition based upon 'non-eternality' constitutes 'Parity per Non-eternality.' *

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 33

If rejection can be based upon 'similarity', there should be rejection also of the denial (set up by the Opponent), as there is a similarity between the denial and that which it is sought to deny.*

BHĀṢYA

The 'Denial' is that allegation which is fully equipped with the Proposition and the other Factors of Reasoning, and which, while representing the counter-view, sets aside the original view;† —and the said 'Denial' has this similarity to the *original view* that both are equipped with the factors of Reasoning, Proposition and the rest. Now, if there is to be a rejection of *non-eternality* (of Sound) on the ground of the 'similarity' (of all things) with the non-eternal (Jar),—then, inasmuch as this would mean that 'similarity' leads to rejection, it would follow that there should be rejection of the *Denial* also, on the ground of its similarity to *what is sought to be denied* (i.e. the original view).§

Sūtra 34

What serves as the Probans is that property which is definitely known to subsist in the Example, as being an infallible indicator of the Probandum ; and since such a Probans can be of both kinds, there can be no non-difference (among all things).

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* This Futile Rejoinder is described as based upon 'similarity'; it includes also a similar rejoinder based upon 'dissimilarity'—says the *Bodhasiddhi*.

* The right reading of the Sūtra, as shown by the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, the *Bhāṣya, the Vārtika*, the *Tātparya* and *Bodhasiddhi*, is साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेध्यसाधर्म्यात्.

† The correct reading is पक्षनिवर्तकम् ; with the reading पक्षनिर्वर्तक, the meaning would be—'which is meant to establish a counter-view'.

§ The *Tātparya* remarks that the answer contained in this *Sūtra* only puts the Opponent on the same footing as the First Party. The real answer comes in the next Sūtra.

BHĀṢYA

That property, which is found in the 'Example' to be an infallible indicator of the Probandum, is what is put forward as the *Probans*. *This Probans can be of both kinds*,— i.e. it may be similar to certain things, and dissimilar to certain other things; when it is similar, it constitutes the 'similarity' (among those things), and when it is dissimilar, it constitutes the 'dissimilarity' (among those things). Now, it is only a particular form of 'similarity' that constitutes the real 'Probans',—and not either mere 'similarity' without any qualification, or mere 'dissimilarity'. What you have urged (under Sū. 32)—that, "If by reason of similarity two things are to be regarded as having analogous properties, then all things should have to be regarded as non-eternal, and this constitutes Parity per Non-eternality",—is based upon *mere* 'similarity' and *mere* 'dissimilarity'; and as such cannot be right.*

[In addition to what has been said here] all that was said (in Sū. 5-1-24) in answer to Parity per Non-difference should be taken as applying with equal force to the present Futile Rejoinder also.

End of Section 14

SECTION (15)

[*Sūtras 35-36*]

Dealing with (23) ' Parity per Eternality

Sūtra 35

" The character of ' non-eternality ' being eternal, it follows that the ' non-eternal thing ' is itself eternal",—based upon this contention is ' Parity per Eternality'.

BHĀṢYA

" The proposition is put forward in the form—' Sound is non-eternal '; now, is this ' non-eternality ' of Sound *eternal*, everlasting, or *non-eternal*, evanescent ? If it is present in Sound

*What can rightly prove a conclusion is only such 'similarity' or 'dissimilarity ' as is invariably concomitant with the Probandum. While the 'similarity' that has been put forward by the Opponent as his 'probans' in the proving of the 'non-eternality' of all things, is '*Existence*'; and there is no invariable concomitance between 'Existence' and 'Non-eternality'; there being several things that are *existent* and yet *eternal*, *not* non-eternal.

at all times, then, since the property (non-eternality) is everlasting, the thing to which that property belongs '(Sound)' must also be everlasting, so that Sound should be *Eternal*. If, on the other hand, the said property ('Non-eternality') is not present in Sound at all times,—then since (at some time or other) 'Non-eternality' would be absent in Sound, Sound would be 'eternal'.

This opposition based upon 'Eternality', constitutes 'Parity per Eternality'.*

BHĀṢYA

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows :—

Sūtra 36

Inasmuch as the everlasting character of the 'non-eternality' in the subject of Denial (Sound) [is admitted by the Opponent], the 'non-eternality' of the non-eternal thing (Sound) becomes established; so that there can be no basis for the Denial.†

When the Opponent speaks of the character of *non-eternality* being 'everlasting' in Sound, which is the object whose non-eternality he seeks to deny,—he admits the *non-eternality* of Sound ;—and when this 'non-eternality of Sound' has been thus admitted, there is no room for the Denial. If, on the other hand, he does not admit the 'everlasting' character of the 'non-eternality in Sound', then for him, the expression,—'because non-eternality in Sound is eternal',—cannot serve as the Probans (of his reasoning) ;—and in the absence of the Probans, the denial cannot be proved.

* In this Sūtra, the mention of 'non-eternality' is meant to include all those specific reasons that may be adduced in support of the non-eternality of Sound. The sense of the definition of 'Parity per Eternality' is as follows—When the Opponent puts forward certain exhaustive alternatives in regard to the property put forward by the First Party, and shows that none of these is admissible, and then proceeds to urge that the Subject cannot, on that account, be accepted as having that property ;—this form of Opposition constitutes 'Parity per Eternality'.—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

† The *Nyāyamañjarī* reads the Sūtra without अनित्ये and with अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः. The presence or absence of अनित्ये does not make any difference in the meaning. But from the explanation provided in the Bhāṣya, the Bodhasiddhi and the Nyāyamañjarī, अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः is the right reading for नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः.

In fact, what is meant by Sound being 'non-eternal' is that it is *produced and ceases to exist on being destroyed*; and there can be no question against this; hence there is no room for any such question as—"does the non-eternality subsist in Sound at all times or not?"—Why?—Because the non-eternality of Sound consists in its being produced and ceasing to exist on being destroyed;—it is not right to regard 'Sound' as the *container* (the receptacle) and 'non-eternality' as the *contained*; for such a conception would involve a self-contradiction in terms.* Further, 'eternality' and 'non-eternality' are contradictory terms (hence also the Denial cannot be maintained); that 'non-eternality' and 'eternality'—which are mutual contradictories—should belong to the same Object (Sound) is an impossibility. For these reasons we conclude that what has been alleged by the Opponent—that "Non-eternality being eternal, Sound must be eternal"—has absolutely no sense.

End of Section 15

SECTION (16)

[*Sūtras 37–38*]

Dealing with (24) 'Parity per character of Effect'.

Sūtra 37

'Parity per character of Effect' is based on the diverse character of the products of effort.

BHĀṢYA

The original proposition is put up in the form—'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is the outcome of effort*'; now that which is 'the outcome of effort' is such as, *not having previous existence comes into existence*; as is found to be the case with such *products* as the Jar and the like; that which is 'non-eternal', on the other hand, is such as, *having come into existence, ceases to exist*. Such being the condition of things, the Opposition is

* If 'non-eternality' is contained in 'Sound', then alone can there be any force in the contention that if the former is eternal, the latter also should be so; as in that case alone could the former not subsist without the latter. As a matter of fact, the relation of 'container and contained' does not subsist between *Sound* and Non-eternality. For such relationship belongs only to *positive* entities, and Non-eternality is purely *negative*; and this only *qualifies* Sound, it does not *subsist in it*;—says the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

set up on the basis of *the diverse character of the products of effort.* 'Coming into existence after effort' we find in the case of the jar, etc., and we also find the 'manifestation' of things concealed under some obstruction, by the removal of the obstruction [and this also is the *outcome of effort*]; and there is no special reason to show whether Sound *comes into existence after Effort*, or there is only *manifestation* of it (after effort); and the Opposition set up on the basis of this fact of both these (production and manifestation) being equally the 'products of effort',* is 'Parity per Character of Effect'.

The answer to the above Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—

Sūtra 38

Even though there are several Kinds of Products,—inasmuch as [in the other Kind of Product] causes of non-apprehension are present, Effort could not be the cause (of mere 'manifestation' of Sound, in whose case there is no cause of non-apprehension).*

Even though there are several kinds of Products, there are present causes of non-apprehension,—hence Effort could not be the cause, of the manifestation of Sound. In a case where there is *manifestation* as the *outcome of effort*, it is possible that there may have been some cause, in the shape of obstruction, to which its non-apprehension (before manifestation) was due, so that when, as a result of effort, there is a removal of the obstruction, there comes about the *apprehension* of the thing, which constitutes its 'manifestation'. In the case of Sound, however, no such cause of Non-apprehension is possible, by the removal whereof, as following from Effort, there could come about the 'manifestation' of

* The mere fact of Sound being the 'outcome of Effort' does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is non-eternal, it comes into existence, or is destroyed; for even if it were only *manifested*, it could be regarded as the 'outcome of effort'.

* We have translated the Sūtra as it is explained in the Bhāṣya and read in all manuscripts. The interpretation however is far fetched; hence the *Nyāyamañjarī* has read the Sūtra with the last term as अनुपलब्धिकारणानुपपत्तेः and explains it to mean as follows.—'*Even though there are various kinds of Products,—Effort cannot be regarded as the cause (of the manifestation of Sound), as there is not present (in the case of Sound) any cause of its non-apprehension*'. This is much simpler.

the Sound consisting of its *apprehension*. From this it follows that Sound is *produced*, not *manifested* (by Effort).*

End of Section 16

SECTION (17)

[*Sūtras 39–43*]

*Dealing with the 'Ṣaṭpakṣi'—the six steps of a Futile Discussion.**

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

[The *first* step consisting of the Proposition, 'Sound must be non-eternal, because it is the outcome of effort, like the Jar'], it is urged against this that the Probans is 'inconclusive', and being 'inconclusive', it cannot prove the 'conclusion'—(this represents the *second* step) ;—[to this the First Party, offers the following *wrong answer*, which represents the *third* step]—If my Probans cannot prove the conclusion because it is inconclusive, then—

Sūtras 39

the same fault lies with the denial (by the Opponent) also.—

BHĀṢYA

That is, the Denial also is 'inconclusive' ; it denies something, and does not deny other things ; and being 'inconclusive', it cannot prove the desired conclusion.

Or, the Opponent having said—"If Sound be held to be *non-eternal*, there is no special reason why what happens to Sound, after Effort, is *production*, and not *manifestation*,"—[he is met by the First Party with the following wrong answer]—if Sound be held to be *eternal*, then also there is no special reason why what

* The *Nyāyamañjarī* remarks that by having selected the 'non-eternality of Sound' as the Example, dealt with under all the twenty-four *Futile Rejoinders*, the author of the *Bhāṣya* has accomplished two purposes : he provides examples of the Rejoinders and also sets aside all possible objections against the Nyāya doctrine of the *Non-eternality of Sound.*

* Says the *Tātparya*—It has been shown up to the last Section that when the Opponent sets up a Futile Rejoinder he is met by the First Party with a suitable answer ; and in every such case, the disputants come to an understanding as to the true conclusion. But there are cases where the First Party also meets the Opponent with a wrong answer ; in that case no right conclusion is arrived at ; and an entirely futile discussion is carried on, to six steps. This is what the author of the Sūtra proceeds to show, for the benefit of his pupils.

happens to Sound is *manifestation*, not *production*. Thus special reasons being equally wanting in both views, both are equally *inconclusive*.

Sūtra 40

The same may be said by the First Party in answer to all (Futile Rejoinders)—

BHĀSYA

In connection with all that may be taken as the basis of the Futile Rejoinders—*e g* 'Similarity' and the rest—whenever no special corroborative reason may be found,—the contention may be put forward (by the First Party) that both views stand on the same footing

Sūtra 41

[*Fourth Step*] "**With the Contravention of the Denial also would lie the same fault as that which lies against the Denial itself.**

BHĀṢYA

It has been urged by the First Party that the fault of *Inconclusiveness* that had been urged (in the *Second Step*) as lying in the original Proposition, lies also in the Denial (set up by the Opponent). But the same fault lies with this contravention of the Denial Thus then, the *First Step* in this Futile Discussion consists in the propounding of the original proposition by the First Party—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is the outcome of Effort' ,—the *Second Step* consists of the denial or negative argument set up by the Opponent Critic, in the form—"Since the products of Effort are of several kinds there is Parity per Character of Effect" , this is what is called the 'Denial' ;—then comes the *Third Step*—in which the First Party urges that the same fault lies with the Denial also. this is what is called (in the *Sūtra*) *Vipratiṣēdha*' (Contravention) ;—then comes the *Fourth Step* (urged by the Opponent)—"the same fault of Inconclusiveness lies also with the Contravention of the Denial."

Sūtra 42

[*Fifth Step*]—**The contingency of the same fault lying with the Contravention of the denial is urged (by the Opponent), after admitting the presence of the fault in his**

own contention;—and this involves 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion'.—

BHĀṢYA

What the Opponent has done (in the *Fourth Step*) is to confess that the view he had expressed in the *Second Step* is faulty, and, without freeing his view from that defect, he has admitted it and then has urged that the same fault of 'Inconclusiveness' lies also with the Contravention of the Denial in the *Third Step*;—and on the part of the Opponent this involves a 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion'. This is the *Fifth Step* [in the Futile Discussion]

Sūtra 43

[*Sixth Step*]—**"It is after having admitted what has been urged against his own view, that the first party has urged the presence of the same fault (in the Opponent's view), and has put forward reasons for the same;—in so doing he has admitted the presence (in his own view) of the fault urged against the Opponent's view;—so that the fault of 'Confessing the contrary opinion' is equally applicable to him also".**

BHĀṢYA

The fault urged against the original Proposition of the First Party was that 'there are several kinds of products of effort' (Sū 37); and this is what, for the Fitst Party who is propounding reasons in support of that proposition, constitutes *'Svapakṣalakṣana'*, *'fault urged against his own view'*;—how?—because it arises out of his own view;—now what he has done (in course of the present Futile Discussion) is to admit this fault that has been urged against his view, and without refuting it, he has admitted it and urged the presence of the same fault in the words 'the same fault lies with the Denial also' (Sū. 39), and he has put forward reasons in support of the same,—in the words 'the denial is inconclusive' Thus it being a case where *he has admitted what has been urged against his view and urged the presence of the same fault in the Opponent's view and has put forward reasons for the same*,—this means that he has admitted the presence in his own view of the fault he had urged against the Opponent's view.*

* The right reading is परपक्षदोषोऽभ्युपगतो भवति as found in C.

'How so?' The Opponent had argued that 'there are several kinds of products of Effort', by which he meant to indicate 'the fault of inconclusiveness' (as lying against the original proposition);—without refuting this the First Party has said—'the same fault lies with the Denial also';—thus he has admitted that the arguments in support of the original proposition are faulty, and then urged the same against the Denial also; by doing so he admits the view of the Opponent, and becomes open to the same charge (of 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'). Just as the Opponent having admitted the faultiness of the Denial of the First Party, and having urged the presence of the same fault in the Contravention of the Denial also, has been charged (in the *Fifth Step*) with 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion',—exactly in the same manner, the First Party also, having admitted the faultiness of the affirmation of the original Proposition, and having urged the presence of the same fault against the Denial, becomes open to the same charge of 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'.

This represents the *Sixth Step* in the Futile Discussion. Among the six steps, the *first*, *third* and *Fifth* steps represent the assertions of the Propounder of the Original Proposition, and the *second*, *fourth* and *sixth* represent those of the Opponent denying that Proposition. When we come to consider the validity and invalidity of those assertions, we find as follows:—(*a*) Since there is no difference in the meaning of the *fourth* and the *sixth*, they are open to the charge of needless repetition; for what the *fourth* says is that 'with the Contravention of the Denial also would lie the same fault as that which lies with the Denial itself' (Sū. 41), which means that the other party is subject to the same fault;—and again in the *sixth* we have the assertion that by admitting the Opponent's view the First Party becomes open to the same charge; and this also means that the other party is open to the same fault; thus there is no difference in the meanings of these two.—(*b*) The same charge of needless repetition lies also against the *third* and *fifth* steps; in the *third* what is alleged is that the same fault lies with the Denial also, which admits the equality of both views and again in the *fifth* it is admitted that the denial of the the Denial is subject to the same fault;—so that the *fifth* says nothing new.—(*c*) Again

the *fifth* and *sixth* also are mere repetitions, there being no difference in what they allege.—(*d*) The *third* and the *fourth* involve the 'Confession of the Contrary Opinion'.—(*e*) In the *first* and the *second*, no special reasons have been adduced (in support of either view). Thus it is found that in the Futile Discussion consisting of the said six steps, neither of the two views becomes established.

When does this Futile Discussion with the six steps, take place ?—It takes place whenever the First Party begins the discussion with the contention that the same fault lies with the denial also ; and in this case neither of the two views becomes demonstrated. When, however, the third step (in answer to the Opponent's denial which is the second step) is put forward by the First Party in the form—'Even though there are several kinds of Products, inasmuch as in the other kinds of Product causes of non-apprehension are present, Effort could not be the cause of the manifestation of Sound' (Sū. 38)—then the original view does become demonstrated, that 'What happens to Sound after Effort is that it comes into existence, and not that it becomes manifested' ; and in this case there is no room for the six steps of the Futile Discussion.

Thus ends the First Daily Lesson of the Fifth Adhyāya of the Bhāṣya.

ADHYĀYA V

DAILY LESSON II

SECTION (1)

[*Sūtras 1-6*]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀSYA

Dealing with the five Clinchers or Grounds of Defeat that bear upon the Proposition and the Statement of the Probans.

Under Sū. 1-2-19 and 20 it has been briefly stated that—'It is a case of Clincher when there is misapprehension, as also when there is non-apprehension; and there is a multiplicity of Clinchers owing to there being several varieties of both'; the same has now got to be described in detail. The Clinchers are actual occasions of defeat, the receptacles of faults; and they mostly bear upon the Proposition and other Factors of Reasoning, and they may affect the propounder of the true, as also that of the false, doctrine [but only so long as perfect wisdom has not been attained]. They are divided as follows :—

Sūtra 1

(1) Violating the Proposition, (2) Shifting the Proposition, (3) Contradicting the Proposition, (4) Renouncing the Proposition, (5) Shifting the the Probans, (6) Irrelevancy, (7) Meaningless Jargon, (8) Unintelligibility, (9) Incoherence, (10) Inconsequentiality, (11) Incompleteness, (12) Redundance, (13) Repetition, (14) Non-reproduction, (15) Incomprehension, (16) Embarrassment, (17) Evasion, (18) Confession of a Contrary Opinion, (19) Overlooking the Censurable, (20) Censuring of the non-censurable, (21) Inconsistency, and (22) Fallacious Probans are the Clinchers.—

BHĀṢYA

All these, divided into twenty-two kinds, are defined one by one, in the following Sūtras *

* These twenty-two Clinchers have been grouped under seven heads, each of which is dealt with in the seven *sections* of this *Daily Lesson*

Sūtra 2

When the property of the 'counter-instance' (urged by the Opponent) is admitted by one to be present in the example cited by himself,—it is a case of (1) 'Violating the Proposition'.

BHĀṢYA

The Opposition having been set up on the basis of a certain property which is contrary to the Probandum,—if the First Party admits that that contrary property, which belongs to the Counter-instance cited by the Opponent, is present in the Example cited by himself, he violates his original Proposition; hence this becomes a case of 'Violating the Proposition'. *Example*—The Proposition having been put forward in the form—'Sound must be non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the senses, like the Jar',—the Opponent says—"But we find that Community, which is *eternal*, is also perceptible by the senses, and why cannot Sound also be the same?"—Being met with this Opposition, the First Party may say—'if Community, which is perceptible by the senses, is eternal, the Jar also may be eternal'; and in this the First Party attributes 'eternality' to the Example that he had cited in support of his proposition; and in so doing he violates his entire thesis up to the 'Final Conclusion'; and violating his entire thesis, he is said to violate his Proposition,—since the Thesis rests in the Proposition.*

Sūtra 3

The subject of the (original) Proposition having been denied, if the First Party finds a diversity in the properties (of the Example and the counter-instance), and puts it forward with a view to establish the former Proposition,—this is (2) 'Shifting the Proposition'.

* The *Bodhasiddhi* remarks that the Sūtra describes two kinds of 'Violating the Proposition'—the first is described by the very name 'Violating the Proposition', and another by the rest of the Sūtra. The example of the former kind would be that case when, on finding that he cannot bring forward arguments to sustain his position, the First Party entirely surrenders his point.—'All right, I give up my point; *Sound is not non-eternal.*' What is cited in the *Bhāṣya* is the example of the second kind.

BHĀṢYA

The '*subject of the original Proposition*' is—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible by the Senses, like the Jar'; this Proposition having been propounded (by the First Party), which consists in showing, by means of a counter-instance, that the Probans (of the original Proposition) is not truly concomitant (with the Probandum),—'Community, which is perceptible by the senses, being *eternal*';—and *the subject of the original Proposition being thus denied*, the First Party finds a '*diversity in the properties of Example and the Counter-instance*',—*i. e.*, he finds that while both (Jar and Community) have a certain property, *being perceptible by the senses*, in common, there are others in which they differ; *e. g.*, Community is perceptible by the senses and *all-prevading*, while the Jar is perceptible by the senses and *not-all-pervading*; and perceiving this diversity of properties he puts it forward with a view to establish his former Proposition,—how?—[in this way]—'Just as the Jar is *not-all-pervading*, so is Sound also *not-all-pervading*, and hence like the Jar it should be *non-eternal* also'; —now here the former Proposition was 'Sound is non-eternal', and 'Sound is not-all-pervading' is a totally different Proposition,—this is thus an instance of 'Shifting the Proposition'.

"In what way does this become a *Ground of Defeat*, a Clincher?"

Well, as a matter of fact, one Proposition does not prove another Proposition; what prove a Proposition are the Probans and the Example; hence the putting forward (as proof) of what cannot prove the Proposition is entirely Futile; and being futile, it becomes a 'Ground of Defeat'.*

Sūtra 4

When there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans, it is (3) 'Contradiction of the Proposition'.

* Though when the First Party puts forward the fact of Sound being *not-all-pervading*, the *idea* in his mind is that, after having brought this home to the other party, he would add that as a qualifying clause to his original premiss—stating it in the form 'because Sound, *while being not-all-pervading*, is perceptible by the senses (it must be non-eternal)';—yet until he actually does so, his position is clearly subject to the said Clincher.—*Tātparya*.

BHĀṢYA

The Proposition is stated in the form—'Substance must be something different from Quality', and the Statement of the Probans is in the form—'because no objects are ever perceived, except Colour etc.':—and there is a contradiction (conflict) between these, Proposition and Statement of the Probans.—How?—If Substance is something different from Quality, then it is not possible that nothing except Colour etc. should be perceived;—while if nothing except Colour etc., is perceived, then it is not possible that Substance should be something different from Quality; thus there is a conflict between the two statements—(a) 'Substance must be different from Quality' and (b) 'Nothing except Colour etc. is perceived'; *i.e.*, the two are mutually Nugatory, and are impossible.*

Sūtra 5

The original thesis having been opposed, if what was formerly affirmed happens to be retracted,—it is (4) 'Renouncing the Proposition'.

BHĀṢYA

The original thesis having been put forward in the form, "Sound is non-eternal because it is perceptible by the senses," the other party says—"Community is perceptible by the senses, and is yet eternal, and similarly Sound also, which is perceptible by the senses, may be eternal";—and the original thesis being thus opposed, if the First Party happens, to say—'Who says that Sound is *non-eternal*?' This retraction of what had been affirmed in the Proposition is what is called 'Renouncing the Proposition'. *

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* The *Bodhasiddhi* remarks that the contradiction between the 'Proposition' and the 'Statement of the Probans' has been mentioned only by way of illustration; as a matter of fact, there is contradiction of the Proposition whenever there is any inconsistency between any two factors of the reasoning, and also when the Proposition is inconsistent with a well-ascertained fact.

* The Bauddha Logician Dharmakīrti has objected to this Clincher of 'Renouncing the Proposition', on the ground that the First Party having been already 'defeated' by the pointing out of the inconclusiveness of his Probans, there can be no need for any further 'ground of defeat'. The *Tātparya* has answered this by saying that, as soon as the person finds that unless he renounces his proposition he shall be faced with the Fallacy of

Sūtra 6

The Probans in the unqualified form having been opposed, if the First Party desires to qualify it, it is a case of (5) 'shifting the probans'.—

BHĀṢYA

Example:—The Proposition is set up in the form, 'Everything that is manifested has a single origin';—why?—'*because products emanating from a single origin have a definite magnitude,*— in the Cup and other products of Clay we find a definite magnitude, the product being of the same magnitude as the composition of the original substance—and such magnitude is found in every product;—and every manifested thing is found to have a definite magnitude;—hence from the fact that every product emanating from a single origin has a definite magnitude, we conclude that everything that is manifested emanates from a single origin.' Against this argument of the First Party, the following Opposition is set up with a view to show that the Probans is not invariably concomitant with the Probandum:—

"As a matter of fact, magnitude is found present in products emanating from the same origion, as also in those emanating from several origins." This opposition having been put forward, the First Party says—'[My reasoning would then be] because a definite magnitude is found in the Cup and other products, *in all which there subsists the same original substance*;—every manifested thing, *having subsisting in it Pleasure, Pain and Delusion* (*the constituent attributes of Primordial Matter*), is found to have definite magnitude;—and from this it follows that no other original substances being found subsisting in all manifested things, they must all have a single origin (in the form of Primordial Matter).'

Now here it is found that in the first instance the First Party stated the Probans in an unqualified form ['because they have a definite magnitude']- and when this was objected to—he added a qualification to it [in the form 'while having the same

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Inconclusiveness,—with a view to save himself from that he retracts the Proposition; so that this Retraction comes in before the charge of Inconclusiveness is brought home to him, and until this is brought home to him, he cannot be 'defeated'.

original substance subsisting in them'!; and this thus becomes a case of 'Shifting the Probans'.

[The reason why this is a 'ground for defeat', is as follows] —The second (qualified) probans having been put forward, if the party mentions an Example in corroboration of what is stated in the Probans, then that *manifested thing*, which is cited as 'Example' (which, as example, cannot be included in the Proposition) ceases to be the emanation from a single origin, because, by its very nature (of Example), it must be the emanation from some other origin;*—if, on the other hand, no Example is cited, then the Probans, not having its truth corroborated by a suitable Example, cannot prove that desired conclusion; so that the Probans turning out to be futile, the 'ground of defeat' remains in force.

End of Section (1)

SECTION (2)

[Sūtras 7—10]

Dealing with the four Clinchers—(6), (7), (8) and (9) which consist in the non-apprehension of what is needed for the desired purpose.

Sūtra 7

The putting forward of statements bearing no connection with the purpose in hand constitutes (6) 'Irrelevancy'.

BHĀṢYA

The thesis and counter-thesis having been set up in the manner described above, the 'purpose in hand' being the proving of the Probandum by a proper Probans—the First Party might make the following statement:—'That Sound is eternal is proved by the *Hetu, because it is intangible*' [having said so far he finds that his Proban is not valid, hence he goes on]—'the term *hetu* is a verbal noun derived from the root *hi* and affix *tun*,—a term is either a *Noun* or a *Verb* or a *Preposition*, or Indeclinable

* The proposition is in the form—'all manifested things are etc.'; if the example is not included in this 'all', then what is predicated of the 'all' will not be true of the Example; if the Example is also included in it, then no Example can be possible.

Particle;—the *Noun* is that word which has its form qualified by the fact of the thing denoted by it having a distinct action,—the Verb is either (a) an aggregate of the action and the active agencies, or (b) that which denotes the presence in the active agent, of a certain action qualified by a definite time and number,* or (c) that which is simply expressed by the root and is qualified by a particular time,—the Indeclinables are those that, in actual usage, have no denotation apart from what is expressed by the Noun or the Verb,—the Prepositions are used as prefixes and serve to qualify the action denoted by the Verb'; —and so forth, [all which has nothing to do with the proving of his Proposition]; and this constitutes 'Irrelevancy'.

Sūtra 8

That which is like the mere repeating of the letters of alphabet is (7) 'Meaningless Jargon'.

BHĀṢYA

E. g., 'Sound is eternal, because *ka-ca-ṭa-ta-pa* are *ja-ba-ga-ḍa-das'*, † 'like *jha-bha-ña-gha-ḍha-dha-ṣ'*;—such statements are absolutely meaningless. Since the mere letters of the alphabet can have no denotation, they cannot express anything; hence it is the mere letters that are repeated in a certain order.§

Sūtra 9

If the assertion made is such that, though stated three times, it fails to be understood by the audience and the Second Party, it is a case of (8) 'Un-intelligibility'—

BHĀṢYA

If the assertion is made and is not understood by the audience and the Second Party, even though stated three times—and this happens when the assertion consists of words with double meanings, or of such words as are not met with in ordinary

* The right reading in all Mss. is कारकसंख्याविशिष्ट.

† The right reading is supplied by B and D-कचटतपाना जबगडदशत्वात्.

§ No such argument is found in actual usage. The *Tātparya* points out that we have an example of this when the Drāviḍa puts forward his argument, for the convincing of an Arya, in his own Vernacular, which conveys no idea to the latter, who is ignorant of the Draviḍian tongue; and for whom the words of that language are only so many letter-sounds.

usage, or when the words are uttered too hurriedly and so forth ;—this constitutes 'Unintelligibility' ; since the man makes use of unintelligible expressions intentionally, with a view to cover the weakness of his reasonings,—this constitutes a 'Ground of Defeat'.

Sūtra 10

In a case where, there being no connection between the expressions following one another, they are found to afford no connected meaning, it is a case of (9) 'Incoherence'.

BHĀṢYA

In a case where, either among several words or several sentences, there is no possibility of proper sequence and connection,—and hence the whole is found to be disconnected,—since there is no meaning obtained from the words or sentences taken collectively, it is a case of 'Incoherence'. *E.g.* (*a*) 'Ten pomegranates, six cakes' (where there is no connection between the two sentences), (*b*) 'Cup—goatskin—flesh—lump—deer-skin*—of the Virgin—to be drunk—her father—devoid of character'.† Where the words have no connection among themselves.

End of Section (2)

SECTION (3)

[*Sūtras 11–13*]

Dealing with the (*10*), (*11*) *and* (*12*) *Clinchers—which consist in the wrong presentment of one's case.*

Sūtra 11

When the factors of reasoning are stated in the reversed order, it is a case of (10) 'Inconsequentiality'.

BHĀṢYA

Among the several Factors of Reasoning, Proposition and the rest, there is a definite natural order, in which they are stated,—which is based upon the nature of what is expressed by each of them ; and when a statement is made in which this natural order is reversed,—it becomes a case of that 'Ground of Defeat', which

* C and B and D read रौरुकम् .

† C and D read अप्रतिशील.

is called 'Inconsequentiality'; which means that what is expressed by the several Factors is not found to form a connected whole.

Sūtra 12

That which is wanting in any one of the Factors of Reasoning is (1) the 'Incomplete'.—

BHĀṢYA

When the statement is wanting in any one of the Factors of Reasoning—Proposition and the rest—it is a case of the 'Ground of Defeat' called 'Incompleteness'; for in the absence of a complete statement of the reasoning, the desired conclusion cannot be established.

Sūtra 13

That which contains superfluous 'Probans' and 'Example' is the (12) 'Redundant'—

BHĀṢYA

One alone being sufficient for the purpose in view, (when more than one Probans or Examples are put forward), one or the other must be superfluous This, however, is to be regarded as a 'Ground of Defeat' only when there is a restriction (placed upon the speaker, in regard to stating *only* what is actually necessary for his proposition)

End of Section (3)

SECTION (4)

[*Sūtras 14-15*]

Sūtra 14

Dealing with the Clincher (13) Repetition.

The re-statement of Words and Ideas constitutes 'Repetition'—except in the case of Reproduction.

BHĀṢYA

Except in the case of Reproduction, (*a*) 'Repetition' of Words and (*b*) Repetition of Ideas (constitute 'grounds of defeat'); e.g. (*a*) 'Sound is eternal, Sound is eternal;' here we have 'repetition of words'; and (*b*) 'Sound is *non-eternal*, Intonation is *liable to destruction*'; here we have the ' repetition of the Idea ' (of Sound

being not everlasting). In the case of Reproduction' it is not 'Repetition' (a Ground of Defeat); because in that case the re-statement serves an additional purpose; when for instance, 'the re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the Probans constitutes the Final Conclusion'. (Sū. 1-1-39).

Sūtra 15

The actual statement by means of directly expressive words of what is already implied—

BHĀṢYA

is Repetition,*—this term coming in from the preceding Sūtra.

Example [of this second kind of Repetition]—Having asserted that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced', if the man goes on to add 'only that which does not have the character of being produced can be eternal', which words are expressive of the idea that is already got by 'implication'—this should be regarded as 'Repetition'; because words are used only for the purpose of conveying a meaning, and when this has already been done by implication [the actual using of words to the same effect is superfluous].

End of Section (4)

SECTION (5)

[*Sūtras 16–19*]

Dealing with the four Clinchers—(14), (15), (16) and (17)—which denote incompatibility with the right method of Answer.

Sūtra 16

If the First Party fails to re-state what has been stated (by the Second Party) three times, and duly understood by the audience, it is a case of (14) 'Non-reproduction'.

BHĀṢYA

When the meaning of the sentence has been duly understood by the audience, and it has been stated by the Opponent three times,—if the First Party fails to re-state it, it is a 'Ground of

* The Nyāyasūcīnibandha, the Tātparya and Sū. Ms D. makes 'पुनरुक्तम्' part of the Sūtra 15, itself, but this is not in keeping with the Bhāsya.

Defeat' named 'Non-reproduction'. Because, unless he re-states the position of the Opponent, on the basis of what would be put forward his arguments against that position?*

Sūtra 17

When the statement is not comprehended it is a case of (15) 'Incomprehension'.

BHĀṢYA

When the statement (of the Opponent) has been understood by the Audience, and has been repeated, by the Opponent, three times, if the First Party still fails to comprehend it, this is the 'Ground of Defeat' named 'Incomprehension'. Without understanding what the Opponent has said, whose refutation would be set forth?

Sūtra 18

It is (16) 'Embarassment' when the Party does not know the answer.

BHĀṢYA

The 'answer' consists in the confutation of the Opponent's view†; when the Party does not know this, he is 'Defeated'.

Sūtra 19

When the Party breaks off the discussion under the pretext of business, it is a case of (17) 'Evasion'.

BHĀṢYA

When the Party puts forward the pretext of having to do something else, and breaks off the discussion, saying—'I have got to do such and such a work, I shall resume the discussion after having finished that work,'—this is the 'Ground of Defeat' named 'Evasion.' In such a case, since every discussion ends with a single 'Clincher', the man, by breaking off in the said manner, concludes the discussion into which he had entered, and thus the discussion taken up after the lapse of some time, would be a new discussion.

End of Section (5)

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* Though the man does not understand it, he does not say so;—if he did, it would be a case of 'Incomprehension'. Nor does he desist from the discussion;—if he did, it would be a case of 'Evasion'.—*Bodhasiddhi*.

† पक्षप्रतिषेधः is the right reading as in C and D.

SECTION (6)

[*Sūtras* 20-22]

Dealing with the three Clinchers—(18), (19) and (20)—which bear upon flaws in the Statements.

Sūtra 20

If the Party admits the flaw in his own thesis, and then urges the same in that of the Opponent,—this is a case of (18) 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'.

BHĀṢYA

When the Party admits that defect in his thesis which has been urged against it by the Opponent—and without trying to show that his statement is free from that defect, he simply says—'the same defect is found in your statement also',—he admits the defect in his own thesis, and then tries to apply the same to that of the Opponent; and in doing this he admits the opinion of the other party regarding his own thesis, and as such becomes subject to the 'ground of defeat' called 'Confessing the Contrary Opinion'.

Sūtra 21

When one Party has rendered himself subject to a 'Clincher', if the other party fails to bring it home to him (by directly charging him with it),—the latter himself becomes subject to the Clincher of (19) 'Overlooking the Censurable'.—

BHĀṢYA

What is meant by the man being 'Censurable' is that he becomes open to the contingency of the application of the 'Clincher' being brought home to him; the 'overlooking' of this means that he does *not* directly charge his opponent with the words—'You have become subject to a Clincher or Ground of Defeat''.

This 'Ground of Defeat' however can be pointed out only by the audience, when directly appealed to with the question—'Who is defeated?' The man himself, who had rendered himself open to a Clincher, could not very well show his own cloven feet (by saying 'I had rendered myself subject to a Clincher, and you failed to urge it against me').

Sūtra 22

When one party urges a 'Clincher' when there is no 'Clincher' (incurred by the other party),—it is a case of (20) 'Censuring the Un-censurable'.

BHĀṢYA

It is only when the man has a wrong conception of the true character of the 'Clincher' that he can urge—'You are defeated' —against the other Party, who in fact, has *not* rendered himself subject to a 'Clincher;' and in doing so, since he would be censuring one who does not deserve to be censured, he should be regarded as 'defeated'.*

Sūtra 23

Having taken up one standpoint, if the party carries on the discussion without restriction,—it is a case of (21) 'Inconsistency'.—

BHĀṢYA

Having affirmed a certain character in regard to a thing, if the party carries on further discussion *without restriction*—*i.e.*, even contrary to the view taken up before—it should be regarded as a case of 'Inconsistency'. E g. 'An entity never renounces itself,—there can be no distinction in what exists—that which is non-existent can never come into existence,—no non-existent thing is ever produced', having taken up this standpoint, the *Sānkhya* goes on to establish this thesis in the following manner:—'All that is manifested must be regarded as emanating from a single origin, because there is a common substratum running through all emanations,—and in the case of the Earthen Cup and such things it is found that they have the substratum of *Clay* running through them all, and are the emanations from a single origin—and all manifested things are found

* This is not the same as 'Embarassment', as in this latter the man does not know what to say in answer, while in 'Censuring the Un-censurable' he says something, as the *answer*, which is not an answer at all. It is for this reason that this 'Clincher' includes all *Futile Rejoinders*. The difference between this and 'Fallacious Probans' lies in this that the 'Fallacius Probans' when pointed out, tends to the 'defeat' of the propounder of the argument, while 'Censuring the Un-censurable' is urged against the person who is answering an argument.—*Tātparya*.

to have Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion running through them all,—and from seeing the subsistence of this common substratum in these—Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion,—we conclude that the whole of this Universe must be the emanation from a single origin'.*—When he has said this he is met (by the Logician) with the following question—'How is it to be determind that a certain thing is the *origin*, and another the *emanation*?'—Thus questioned, *Sānkhya* answers—'That which itself remains constant while one character of it ceases to exist and another comes into existence is the *origin*, and the character that ceases to exist and comes into existence is the *emanation*.'†

Now here we find that the Sankhya has carried on discussion without any restriction, without regard to the view taken up by him before, in fact even contrary to the opinion accepted before. For the opinion accepted by him at the outset was—'the non-existent can never come into existence—the existent cannot cease to exist'; and it is a well-known fact that unless there is cessation of existence' of what has been *existent*, or 'coming into existence' of what has been *non-existent*, there can be no *disappearance* or *appearance*; e.g. when, the Clay remaining constant, its own character, in the shape of the *Cup*, comes into existence, it is said to *appear*, and when it has ceased to exist, it is said to *disappear*;—all this should not be possible (according to the Sānkhya standpoint) even in connection with the character of the Clay. Having all this urged against himself, if the *Sānkhya* comes to admit that what is *existent* does *cease to exist*, and what *is non-existent does come into existence*,—then he becomes subject to the Clincher of 'Inconsistency'; while if he does not admit the said facts, his thesis fails to be established.§

* The right reading is एकमकृतीद विश्वमिति, as found in D.

† The best reading of this passage is found in the *Tātparya* and D—यस्यावस्थितस्य धर्मान्तरनिवृत्तौ यद्धर्मान्तरं प्रवर्तते सा प्रकृतिः यद्धर्मान्तरम्प्रवर्तते निवर्तते वा स विकार इति. In the case of the Jar, the Clay is the constant factor; while the varying shapes of the Jar, Cup etc., are the *emanations*.

§ Without the said fact, no distinction is possible between 'Origin' and 'Emanation'; and without this distinction, the original Proposition of the Sānkhya can have no meaning.

Sūtra 24

(22) The 'Fallacious Probans' also, (are Clinchers) as they have been already described.

BHĀṢYA

The 'Fallacious Probans' also are 'Grounds of Defeat'. *Question*—"Is it on account of the presence of some other character that the Fallacious Probans comes to be regarded as *Clinchers*,—just in the same way as the 'Instruments of Cognition' come to be regarded as 'Objects of Cognition'?"

In answer to this the *Sūtra* says—*as they have been described*; *i.e.*, it is in the character of the 'Fallacious Probans' itself that they become 'Grounds of Defeat' (Clinchers) also.

Thus have the Instruments of Right Cognition and other categories been duly *mentioned*, *defined* and *examined*.

'The Science of Reasoning that revealed itself to the Sage Akṣapāda, the chief of exponents,—of that Vātsyāyana has propounded the Commentary.'

Thus ends the Second Daily Lesson of the Fifth Discourse in the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana.

FINIS

INDEX-GLOSSARY

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